



*M. Gravelot inv. del. et Sculp.*

*HANNIBAL after the Battle of CANNAE.*

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THE  
ROMAN HISTORY

FROM THE  
FOUNDATION of ROME

TO THE  
BATTLE of ACTIUM:

THAT IS,

To the End of the COMMONWEALTH.

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Paris, Professor of Eloquence in the Royal College, and  
Fellow of the Royal Academy of Inscriptions and Belles  
Lettres.*

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## THE ROMAN HISTORY.

**T**HIS book contains the greatest events in the space of two years only; the Dictatorship of Fabius Maximus, to whom Minucius is General of the horse; and the famous battle of Cannæ under the Consuls Paulus Æmilius and Varro.

### S E C T. I.

*Fabius Maximus is nominated Prodictator, and Minucius his General of the horse. Hannibal ravages the Country, and besieges Spoletum ineffectually. On the Consul's return, Fabius is again nominated Dictator. He begins by acts of religion. The Dictator's departure. Authority of the Dictatorship. Servilius is appointed to guard the coasts with a fleet. Fabius determines not to hazard a battle, in which design he perseveres inflexibly, notwithstanding the endeavours of Hannibal, and the raillery of his own people. Character of Minucius. Hannibal misled through the mistake of his guide. Admirable fidelity of the allies of the Roman People. Seditious Discourse of Minucius*

V O L. V. B against

*against the Dictator. Rash skirmish and defeat of Mancinus. Skirmishes between the two armies. Hannibal extricates himself in a very dangerous post by a stratagem entirely new. Fabius is obliged to go to Rome. Successful expeditions of Cn. Scipio in Spain. P. Scipio goes thither to join his brother. Spanish hostages delivered up to the Romans by the contrivance of Abelox. The wise delays of Fabius discredit him. Two other reasons render him suspected. Slight advantage of Minucius over Hannibal. The People give Minucius equal authority with the Dictator. Insolent behaviour of Minucius. Battle between Hannibal and Minucius. The latter is beaten. Fabius preserves him. Minucius acknowledges his fault, and returns to his obedience to the Dictator. Extraordinary qualities of Fabius. Wisdom of his conduct in respect to Hannibal. Digression upon the changes made in the Roman coin.*

*General  
idea of the  
Dictator-  
ship.*

**N**O Dictator \* had been created during thirty three years at Rome for the command of armies, when Fabius was invested with that dignity. We must remember, that the Dictator was a kind of King; but for six months only. All other authority, during his government, either ceased, or was subordinate to him, except only that of the Tribunes of the People, who exercised the functions of their office independently of him. The Consuls were only his Lieutenants, and appeared in his presence as private persons. As a mark of this fulness of power, he had four and twenty Lictors; whereas each of the Consuls had but twelve. He presided in the Senate, when he was

\* Dictators were sometimes mentioned there had been some appointed for civil functions, Dictators of this kind, and after which they abdicated. Fabius himself amongst the In the thirty-three years here rest.



in the city, and caused its resolutions to be put in execution. The command of the armies belonged to him. The General of the horse, whom he appointed, did not share in authority with him, and was only a principal officer, that received the Dictator's orders, and supplied his place in his absence. For the rest, the Dictatorship, as is plain from the facts of which we are now speaking, was not an office that always subsisted in the Commonwealth. Recourse was had to it, when the occasions of the State made it necessary.

If ever the Commonwealth stood in need of this extraordinary resource, it was undoubtedly in the present conjuncture, after the famous battle of Thrasymenus, which was the third defeat of the Romans, in less than a year after Hannibal had entered Italy. The Romans were then in a great consternation, and apprehended for the city itself. But because the Consul, to whom alone it appertained to nominate a Dictator, was absent, and it was not easy to send a courier, or convey letters to him, the Carthaginians being in possession of all the passes; and besides, as there was no example of a Dictator's having been created by the People, Q. Fabius Maximus was elected Prodictator. He was allowed to be the only person, whose greatness of soul, and gravity of manners, answered the dignity and majesty of that office; and the more, as he was still of an age, in which the mind is of sufficient vigour to execute the designs it has formed, and in which resolution and boldness are tempered with prudence. He chose Q. Minucius Rufus for his master of the horse, a man of courage, who had been Consul, but too bold, and incapable of a principal command. Fabius demanded permission of the People to ride in the army; for by an antient law, the Dictator was

A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.  
*Fabius nominated*  
*Prodictator, and*  
*Minucius Rufus*  
*General of the horse.*  
Liv. xxii. 8.  
Plut. in Fab. p. 175.

B 2

expressly



A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

expressly forbade to do so; whether the greatest strength of the Romans was supposed to consist in their infantry, and for that reason it was believed necessary for the Dictator to continue always at the head of the battalions without ever quitting them; or because, that office being of sovereign authority in all things, it was thought proper, that the Dictator should appear to depend on the People, at least in that particular.

The first care of the Dictator, for so I shall call him from henceforth, was to fortify Rome, to post bodies of troops for defending the avenues to it, and to break down the bridges over the rivers. The Romans believed themselves reduced to provide for the safety of the city, as they could not defend Italy against Hannibal.

*Hannibal  
ravages  
the country,  
and at-  
tacks Spo-  
letum in  
vain.  
Polyb. iii.  
237.  
Liv. xxii.  
9.*

Though Hannibal had room to conceive the greatest hopes, however he did not think it proper to approach Rome yet. He contented himself with keeping the field, and ravaging the country as he advanced towards \* Adria. He crossed † Umbria, and marched directly to ‡ Spoleum, which he endeavoured to carry by storm; but without effect; for he was repulsed with loss. He judged from the little success he had in attacking a single colony, how much it would cost him, to make himself master of Rome itself. From thence he marched towards † Picenum, where his greedy and rapacious troops found in the fertility and riches of the country, wherewithal to refresh them after their fatigues, and to enrich them at the same time.

\* *New Atri, a city of the kingdom of Naples.*

† *Duchy of Urbino.*

‡ *A city in the ecclesiastical state.*

† *Marché D'Ancona & de Fermo.*



It was about this time, that Hannibal dispatch-  
ed couriers to Carthage, with advice of the good  
success of his enterprizes in Italy. For till then  
he had not approached the Sea. This news gave  
the Carthaginians extreme pleasure: they applied  
themselves more than ever to the affairs of Spain  
and Italy, and omitted nothing that might pro-  
mote and hasten their success.

A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.  
*Hannibal*  
*dispatches*  
*couriers to*  
*Carthage.*  
Polyb. iii.  
238.

Hannibal from time to time changed quarters,  
without removing from the Adriatick Sea. He  
caused the horses to be washed with old wine,  
which he found there in abundance, and thereby  
reinstated them for service. He also caused the  
wounded men to be cured, and gave others time  
and means to recruit their strength; and when he  
saw them all well and vigorous, he began his  
march, and crossed the territory of the \* Prætutii  
and of Adria, those of the Marrucini and Fren-  
tani, and all the country adjoining to Luceria and  
Arpi. Wherever he passed, he plundered, massa-  
cred, and burnt all before him.

During this time, the Consul Cn. Servilius had  
put the Gauls to flight in several engagements,  
in which he had gained some slight advantages,  
and had taken one inconsiderable town from them.  
But he had no sooner received advice of his  
colleague's defeat, than he advanced by great  
marches towards Rome, in order not to be want-  
ing to his country on occasion. It may be be-  
lieved, that his presence gave room to supply what  
had been wanting in the first nomination of Fabius,  
and that he was created Dictator a second time in  
all the forms.

*On the re-*  
*turn of the*  
*Consul, Fa-*  
*bius is no-*  
*minated*  
*Dictator.*  
Liv. xxii.  
9.

He no sooner entered upon office, than he as-  
sembled the Senate. Believing it incumbent upon

*He begins*  
*by acts of*  
*religion.*  
Liv. xxii.  
9.

\* Most of these countries form  
a part of Abruzzo citeriori, and

Plut. in  
Fab. 176.

A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

him to begin his administration by acts of religion, he gave the Senators to understand, that Flaminius had erred much less through temerity and ignorance of the art of war, than through his contempt for the Auspices, and the worship of the Gods. A great number of ceremonies were decreed, and vows of several kinds made; amongst others that of the *ver sacrum*. By this vow the Roman People were engaged to sacrifice to Jupiter at the time fixed, all that should be brought forth during the spring by the flocks and herds of sheep, goats, and kine. For the same end it was decreed, that the sum of three hundred thousand three hundred and thirty three *Asses* and one third, should be employed in the celebration of the great games. This sum shews, that a trine number was considered, even amongst the Pagans, as religious and sacred. All the different vows having been made with the usual ceremonies, the day for the public procession was declared, at which an infinite number of People as well of the country as city were present. By all these acts, says Plutarch, he endeavoured not to fill their minds with superstition, but to animate their courage by piety, and to dispel their fears by a firm confidence in the protection of heaven.

About  
800 l.  
sterling.

Departure  
of the Dictator.

Liv. xxii.  
11.

\* *Tivoli*.

From affairs of religion, the Dictator proceeded to those of war. Having levied two Legions, to join those, which he was to receive from the Consul Servilius, he fixed the day for their rendezvous at \* Tibur. At the same time he published a decree, by which all who inhabited cities or forts badly fortified, were ordered to retire into places of safety; as also those of the country, that lived upon the route Hannibal was to take. And to deprive him of the means of subsisting, he caused the houses to be burnt, and the corn to

to be destroyed upon the places that were abandoned. A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

After having given all these orders, Fabius set out by the *Via Flaminia* to meet the Consul and his army. When he was near Ocriculum, he perceived the Consul advancing with some officers on horseback to meet him. He immediately ordered him to be told to alight, and to come to him without lictor or train. The Consul's ready obedience, and the respect with which he accosted Fabius, gave the citizens and allies that high idea of the Dictatorship, which time had almost effaced. Was it pride in the Dictator to exact this mark of submission and respect from a Consul? Undoubtedly no: it was discipline, duty and justice. The Divine Providence, which does every thing with weight and measure, in communicating part of its power to Kings, Princes, and those that are at the head of any state whatsoever, in order to render their authority more awful, and at the same time more useful to inferiors, has thought fit, that it should be attended with pomp and splendor to strike the eye; that Lictors with rods and axes, or armed guards, should walk before them, to inspire terror, and that in approaching their thrones and persons certain external homages should be paid them, to express the submission and obedience, that become subjects. Men are not penetrating enough to discern and honour, in men like themselves, the authority of God, if they were to see it in a condition, that had nothing great and splendid, nothing but low and contemptible in it. Authority  
of the Dic-  
tatorship.  
Liv. Plut.

Whilst the Dictator and Consul were still in discourse, the Dictator received letters from Rome, by which he was informed, that the vessels, which had set sail from the port of Ostia, laden with provisions for the army in Spain, had been taken. Servilius  
is appoint-  
ed to guard  
the coasts  
with a  
fleet.  
Liv. ibid.



A. R. 535. by the Carthaginian fleet near the port of \* Cossa.  
 Ant. C. 217.

It was for this reason Servilius had orders to repair as soon as possible to Ostia, to take all the ships he should find in that port or near Rome, to fill them with soldiers and seamen, to pursue the enemy's fleet, and to defend the coasts of Italy.

*Fabius determines*

*not to hazard a*

*battle, in*

*which design he*

*perseveres*

*inflexibly,*

*notwithstanding*

*the endeavours of*

*Hannibal,*

*and the*

*raillery of*

*his own*

*people.*

Polyb. iii.

239, 240.

Liv. xxii.

12.

Plut. in

Fab. 176.

The Dictator having received the army from Fulvius Flaccus, one of the Consul's Lieutenants, repaired to Tibur on the day appointed for the general rendezvous. From thence he advanced to Præneste, and crossed the country into the Latine Way. After having caused the places to be viewed with abundance of care, he marched in quest of the enemy, with the design he had then formed, and from which he never after departed, not to hazard a battle, till he should be obliged to it by necessity. He applied himself to observing Hannibal's motions, straitening his quarters, cutting off his provisions, avoiding the plains on account of the Numidian cavalry, following the enemy when they decamped, harrassing them in their marches, and lastly in keeping at such a distance, as left him at liberty not to come to blows, except when he should see an evident advantage.

Hannibal was then at a small distance from the city of Arpi in Apulia; and from the first day that he saw the enemy near him, did not fail to offer him battle. But when he saw that every thing continued still and quiet in the Dictator's camp, and that all his endeavours did not occasion the least motion there, he retired into his own, blaming in appearance the cowardice of the Romans, whom he reproached with being insensible to glory, with having lost that martial ardor so natural to their forefathers, and with openly yield-

\* Cossa, a city and promontory of Etruria.



ing him an easy victory. But he was inwardly vexed to see, that he had to do with a General so different from Flaminius and Sempronius; and that the Romans, taught by their misfortunes, had at last chosen a General capable of making head against Hannibal.

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From that moment, he saw that he should not have warm and bold attacks to apprehend from the Dictator, but a prudent and circumspect conduct, that might involve him in great difficulties. It remained to know, whether the new General, whose constancy he had not yet experienced, had firmness enough unalterably to pursue the plan which he seemed to have laid down to himself. He therefore tried to vary his resolution by the different motions he made; by ravaging lands, plundering cities, and burning towns and villages. Sometimes he decamped with precipitation; sometimes he halted suddenly in some valley out of the way; in order to see whether he could not surprize him in the open country. But Fabius kept his troops upon eminences, without losing sight of Hannibal; never approaching him near enough to come to blows, but not keeping so distant, as to put it in his power to escape him. He kept the soldiers strictly in the camp; not suffering them to quit it except to forage and that not without very strong convoys. He engaged only in slight skirmishes, and with so much precaution, that his troops had always the advantage. By that means, he insensibly revived the confidence of the Soldiery, of which the loss of three battles had deprived them, and made them capable of relying as before upon their valour and good fortune.

(a) Fabius found a no less obstacle to his wife's designs

*Character  
of Minu-  
cius.*

Liv. xxii.

(a) Sed non Annibalem magis infestum tan sanis consiliis habebat, quam magistrum equitum, qui nihil aliud, quam quòd

12.

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Aet. C. 217.

designs in Minucius, his General of the horse, than in Hannibal. He was one, whom nothing hindered from ruining the Commonwealth, but the state of subordination and dependence, in which he was: he was hot and hasty in council, and arrogant and presumptuous in discourse. He attacked Fabius without any reserve, at first before a small number of persons, but soon after publicly. He treated him as pusillanimous and cowardly, instead of prudent and circumspect, as he was; giving his virtues the names of the vices that bordered nearest upon them. Thus by a mean and black cunning, which succeeds but too often, and consists in decrying those above us in office and merit, he established his own reputation upon the ruin of that of his General.

The Carthaginians after having plundered \*Dau-  
nia, and passed the Appennines, advanced as far as Samnium, a fertile country, which had long enjoyed a profound peace, where they found so great an abundance of provisions, that notwithstanding the consumption and waste, which they made of them, they could not exhaust them. From thence they made incursions into the territory of Beneventum, a colony of the Romans, and took Telesia a well fortified city, where they made a prodigious booty. Hannibal was determined to go to Capua, in effect of the hopes that had been given him that that city was inclined to embrace his party. The Romans continued to follow him

quod parebat imperio, moræ  
ad præcipitandam remp. habe-  
bat: ferox rapidusque in con-  
siliis, ac lingua immodicus,  
primò inter paucos, dein pro-  
palam in vulgus, pro cuncta-  
tore segnem, pro cauto timi-  
dum, affingens vicina virtuti-

bus vitia, compellabat: pre-  
mendorumque superiorum ar-  
te, (quæ pessima ars nimis  
prosperis multorum successibus  
crevit) se se extollebat.

\* Hod. Capitanata, *pro-  
vince of the kingdom of Naples  
in Apulia.*

at

at a day or two's march distance, without intending to come up with, or to fight him. The Carthaginian General commanded his guide to conduct him into the territory of Casinum, having been informed by those who knew the country, that if he seized the defile which was in those parts, the Romans would have no passage to come to the aid of their allies. But the barbarous manner, in which he pronounced that name, made the guide mistake Casilinum for Casinum. So that taking a quite different route, he crossed the territories of Allifa, Calatia and Calenum, and came to the plains of Stella, contrary to his intention. He at length discovered his error, and that Casinum was a great way from thence. To intimidate the other guides by the punishment of this, and to prevent himself from falling into the like inconvenience for the future, after having caused him to be whipt with rods, he ordered him to be crucified. Was this guide criminal for having been mistaken in such a manner?

Hannibal, to take advantage of this mistake, began to ravage the plains of Capua, and especially the fine and rich country of Falernum, supposing, that the cities in their territory would renounce the alliance of the Romans. For till then, though they had been defeated in three battles, no city of Italy had gone over to the Carthaginians. They had all continued faithful, even those who had suffered most : so much respect and veneration had the allies for the Roman Commonwealth. Nothing does more honour to the Roman People, nor makes their character better known, than what Polybius says in this place. And it must be judged of from such strokes. Livy renders them the same testimony, and seems even to rise upon the

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*Hannibal*  
*miscon-*  
*ducted*  
*through*  
*the mistake*  
*of his*  
*guide.*  
Liv. xxii.  
13.

*Admirable*  
*fidelity of*  
*the allies*  
*of Rome.*  
Polyb. iii.  
24.  
Liv. xxii.  
13.



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Ant. C. 217.

the Greek historian. (a) Whilst all, says he, was in a flame in Italy, the horrible ravages committed by Hannibal were not capable of shaking the fidelity of the allies. It was, adds he, and what follows cannot be too well observed; it was, because, finding themselves under a government full of equity and moderation, they submitted without pain to a People in whom they discerned a superiority of merit, that rendered them most worthy of commanding; which is the firmest tie and most assured pledge of the fidelity of those that obey.

*Seditious  
discourse of  
Minucius  
against the  
D'Eator.*

Liv. xxii.

14.

Plut. in

Fab. 177.

The murmurs and seditious discourse of the General of the horse had ceased for some days, because Fabius, who followed Hannibal, having marched his army faster than usually, Minucius, and his party, believed that he was hastening to the aid of Campania. But when they were incamped near the Volturnus, and from thence saw the finest country of Italy a prey to the enemy; especially when they saw from the top of mount Maflicus the whole country of Falernum and Sinuessa ravaged, and all the houses burnt by the Carthaginians, whilst Fabius, persisted in keeping the eminences, and said not a word of coming to a battle: the sedition broke out again with more violence than ever. *Are we then come hither, said Minucius still more furious than before, to see, as a grateful sight, the dreadful ravages suffered by our allies. If the motives of glory and interest cannot excite our courage, have we no compassion for our fellow-citizens, sent by our fathers as a colony to Sinuessa? What! do we remain insensible, whilst we see*

(a) Nec tamen is terror, bantur imperio, nec abnuentur omnia bello flagrant, bant, quod unicum vinculum fide socios dimovit: videlicet fidei est, melioribus parere. quia iusto & moderato rege- Liv.

*the*

*the same coasts in the power of Numidians and Moors, along which our ancestors would have thought it a dishonour, that the Carthaginians should navigate with impunity. It is but some few months since, that on being informed of the siege and danger of Saguntum, we were transported with indignation : and we now see with tranquillity Hannibal just upon the point of storming a city, inhabited by a Roman colony. If that great General, who was deservedly called the second founder of Rome, had acted as does now this new Camillus, who has been deemed solely worthy of the Dictatorship in so unhappy a conjuncture ; Rome had been still in the hands of the Gauls. Let us not then deceive ourselves in this respect. It is a folly to believe, that victory can be attained with folded arms, or vows addressed to heaven. The troops must be made to take arms, be led into the plain, and try their swords with the enemy. It is by action, by courting danger, that the Roman power attained its height, and not by this timorous conduct, to which cowards give the name of prudence and circumspection.*

*These discourses spread in the army, and there was not a single man in it, that did not rank Minucius much above the Dictator. Even the friends of Fabius, and those, who seemed most in his interest, advised him to put an end to all these rumours, which were injurious to his reputation, by shewing some condescension for the officers and soldiers, who all in general demanded ardently to be led on against the enemy. But the Dictator, without emotion, told them : I should shew myself really much more timorous than they accuse me of being, if the fear of their jests and reproaches made me change a resolution that I did not take, till after I had maturely weighed all the consequences, and had discovered the absolute necessity of it. When we fear for our country, we fear without shame : but to fear the discourse of men, and suffer one's self to be*

*frightened*

A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

Plut. in  
Fab.  
P. 177.

A. R. 535.  
AEL. C. 217.

*frightened by their railing, is to shew one's self unworthy of command, and to make one's self the slave of those, of whom one ought to be master, and to check and correct when they think amiss.* Fabius therefore, always on his guard as well against his own soldiers as the enemy, and even considering the Romans, as the principal adversaries in respect to whom he ought to shew himself invincible, persisted in observing the same conduct during all the rest of the campaign, notwithstanding the injurious reports, which he knew had been carried from the camp to the city against his pretended timidity, and want of vigour. Hannibal, despairing of drawing him on to a battle, thought of retiring into some place, where he might pass the winter commodiously. He was not willing to consume the provisions he had amassed, but to lay them up in some place of safety. For it was not sufficient, that his army had no wants at present: he took pains that they might always have abundance.

*Re-engage-ment and defeat of Mancinus.*

Liv. xxii.  
15.

Fabius was apprized by his scouts of Hannibal's design; and as he was assured, that he would necessarily quit Campania by the route he had entered it, he detached a part of his troops to seize the mountain Callicula and the fort of Casilinum. As for himself, he led back his army over the same hills, and sent out L. Mancinus for intelligence with four hundred horse. That young officer had orders to observe the enemy's motions without shewing himself if possible, at least without exposing himself, and to return with an account of what passed. But being of the number of those, whom the seditious and extravagant discourses of Minucius had misled, he no sooner saw some of the Numidian cavalry dispersed in the villages, than he ran headlong upon them, and even killed some of them. Nothing more was  
wanting



wanting to make him entirely forget his commission. His ardor for fighting prevailed over the obedience, which he owed the Dictator. The Numidians, divided in several parties, came on to attack him one after another ; and then flying with design before him, drew him on insensibly near their camp, very much fatigued, as well as all his people and their horses. Carthalon, who commanded all the cavalry, immediately came out, and having put them to flight, even before he came up with them, he pursued them almost two leagues without any intermission. Mancinus seeing he could not escape the enemy, that persisted in the pursuit, exhorted his troops to defend themselves to the utmost of their power, and faced about against the Numidians, to whom he was much inferior as well in number, as force and confidence. In consequence himself with the bravest of his followers were killed. The rest fled full gallop to Calenum, and from thence by by-ways to the camp of the Dictator.

By accident Minucius was come up that day to rejoin Fabius, who some days before had been detached to seize a very narrow pass upon the top of Tarracina, that commands the sea ; in order to prevent Hannibal from advancing towards Rome, as he might have done, if the Appian Way had been left open to him. The Dictator and the General of the horse having united their troops, encamped upon the way Hannibal was to pass, about two miles from the enemy. The next day, the Carthaginians occupied all the ground between the two camps. The Romans posted themselves under their intrenchments, where they certainly had the advantage of place : the enemy however continued to advance, with their cavalry in front ; which occasioned several skirmishes between the two armies. But the Romans, by Fabius's

*Skirmish  
between  
the two  
parties.  
Liv. 16.*

A. R. 535.  
 ANL.C. 217.

bis's order, did not quit their posts, so that the action passed conformably to the Dictator's plan, rather than to the intentions of Hannibal. Eight hundred Cathaginians were left upon the place, and the Romans lost only two hundred men.

*Hannibal extricates himself out of a very dangerous post by a stratagem entirely new.*

Polyb. iii.  
 243—245  
 Liv. xxii.  
 15—18.  
 Plut. in  
 Fab. 177.  
 App. 522.

Hannibal was in great perplexity: It was absolutely necessary for him to return the way he came, which was a very narrow one, and in which it was very easy to incommode him. Fabius was resolved to take the advantage of the enemy's perplexity, and sent four thousand men before to seize the pass itself, after having exhorted them to do their duty well, and make the most of the happy situation of the post they were going to seize. He followed afterwards with the greatest part of his army, to post himself upon the hill that commanded the defiles. The Carthaginians arrived, and incamped in the plain at the foot of the mountains. Hannibal found himself shut up on all sides, and under the sad necessity of passing the winter between the rocks of Formiæ on one side, and on the other in the frightful sands, and marshes of Linternum: whereas the Romans had Capua and Samnium behind them, and a great number of rich allies, who could send them provisions in abundance.

The Romans believed it impossible for Hannibal to extricate himself out of the post wherein he had engaged, and flattered themselves with the grateful hope of taking all the rich plunder the Carthaginians carried with them, and of soon terminating a war, which had already cost them so much blood, and given them such just alarms for the future. Fabius himself thought in the same manner, and applied himself solely in viewing what posts he should seize, how and where he should begin the attack; and these designs were to be executed the next day.

Hannibal rightly judging what the enemy could do on this occasion, did not give them time. He well perceived, that his usual stratagems and arts were turned upon himself: but he had not exhausted them entirely. It is in such conjunctures, that a General has occasion for uncommon presence of mind and constancy of soul, to confront danger in all its extent without fear, and to find sure and ready resources without deliberating. He therefore (a) conceived an entirely new stratagem, which had never before been employed, and which was less capable of hurting in effect, than of confounding and terrifying by the sight of it. He got about two thousand oxen together, as well wild as tame, which were part of the plunder he had taken in the enemy's country. He ordered vine-branches and other small dry wood to be brought in from the country, of which little bundles were made, and dexterously affixed to the horns of those animals. He commanded Asdrubal to cause them to be set on fire about the middle of the night, and to drive the oxen towards the eminences, especially towards the defiles, which the Romans had occupied.

Having taken his measures thus, he began to march in silence, and advanced towards the defiles, with his heavy-armed infantry in front, his cavalry followed by the plunder in the centre, and the Spaniards and Gauls in the rear. The oxen were a great way before the advanced guard of his army. At first the fear only of the flames, that blazed upon their heads, and still more, the pain they felt, when the fire had reached to the quick, made those animals mad, so that they dispersed themselves on all sides upon the hills, and into the

(a) *Lubibrium oculorum, specie terribile, ad frustrandum hostem commentus.* Liv.



A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

forests. Their efforts to rid themselves of the fire by violent motions and tossing their heads, only increased and spread the flames, which set fire to all the shrubs round about. The Romans were terrified, and imagined at first, that they were men, who ran on all sides with torches in their hands. Those, who had been posted at the entrance itself of the defile in order to keep it, fled as soon as they perceived the fires over their heads and made to the top of the mountain, as the safest place, because they saw fewest fires there. They however found some oxen there, which had separated from the rest. And at first taking them for animals that breathed fire out of their mouths, they stopped in surprise at the sight. But having discovered what they were by approaching nearer, and seeing what they had taken for a prodigy, was an artifice entirely human, instead of taking courage they were only the more terrified: they believed, that they should be surrounded by the enemy, and fled in still greater disorder than before. They happened to fall in with Hannibal's light-armed troops. But both sides being equally afraid to engage during the darkness of the night, expected day without beginning the battle: Mean while Hannibal had time to make all his troops pass the defile.

Fabius fully perceived this motion. But not doubting that it was a stratagem of Hannibal's, he kept his soldiers in their intrenchments, not being inclined to hazard a battle during the night. At break of day, there was a battle on the top of the hill, in which the Romans, being superior in number, would easily have defeated Hannibal's light-armed troops, that were separated from the rest of the army, if he had not sustained them with a body of the Spaniards, which he sent to their aid. The soldiers of that nation being accustomed

to climb, and to run lightly through forests and over the steepest rocks, easily eluded, by the agility of their bodies and their manner of attacking and defending, the efforts of an enemy heavy-armed, and accustomed to fight on the plain without quitting their posts. Both retired into their camps, after the Romans had lost some of their men in this action, whereas few or none of the Spaniards fell in it.

Hannibal, having extricated himself with as much glory as good fortune out of a very great danger, went to incamp in the territory of Allifæ, whither Fabius followed him. The latter, according to the plan he had laid down, marched his troops continually on the eminences, keeping between Hannibal's army and the city of Rome, without losing sight of the enemy, and without laying himself open to be forced to a battle. Hannibal, after some motions, returned a second time into Apulia, and advanced as far as Geraunium, the inhabitants of which were retired, because the place was not tenable. Fabius approached, and incamped in the territory of Larinum in an advantageous post.

Being obliged some time after to set out for Rome, whither affairs of religion had recalled him, he employed not only authority and counsel, but almost entreaties, to prevail upon the General of the horse, “ that during his absence he would “ not tempt fortune : that he would rely more upon “ on prudence, than chance ; and that he would “ rather imitate his conduct, than that of Sempronius and Flaminius. That he would not “ imagine it a small advantage to have stopped the “ progress of Hannibal, and eluded his artifices “ during the whole campaign. That according “ to the maxim of the most skilful and wisest “ physicians, rest often did the sick more good, “ than

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Ant. C. 217.

*Fabius is obliged to go to Rome.*

Polyb. iii. 245.

Liv. xxii.

18.

Plut. 179.

A. R. 535. " than violent remedies. That to have ceased to  
 Ant. C. 217. " be overcome by an enemy always victorious till  
 " then, and to have at length had time to breathe,  
 " after so many successive defeats, was no small  
 " gain. The sequel will shew how fruitless these  
 counsels were. In the mean time Fabius set out  
 for Rome.

*Successful  
 expeditions  
 of Cn. Scipio in  
 Spain.*  
 Polyb. iii.  
 245.  
 Liv. xxii.  
 19.

Italy was not the only theatre of the war. It was made in Spain by sea and land with no less vigour. Asdrubal having fitted out thirty ships, which his brother had left him, and having added ten more to them, made forty sail, of which he had given the command to Amilcar, set out from new Carthage or Carthagena. He then made the land-forces quit their winter-quarters, put himself at their head, and making the ships keep along the coast, followed them on the shore, with design to join the two armies, when they should be near the Iberus. Cn. Scipio, being apprized of this design of the Carthaginians, at first intended to march by land to meet them : but, when he knew how numerous the enemy's army was, and what preparations they had made, he embarked his chosen troops on board his ships ; and then having set sail with a fleet of thirty-five galleys, after two days sail from Tarragona, he landed near the mouth of the Iberus. When he was about ten miles from the enemy, he detached two frigates of Marseilles to scout. For the people of Marseilles were always the first to expose themselves, and their intrepidity was of great service to him. None were more firmly attached to the interests of the Romans than this people, who in the sequel gave them frequent proofs of their affection, but signalized themselves especially, in the war with Hannibal. These two frigates brought back advice, that the enemy's fleet was at the mouth of the Iberus. Cneus immediately made all the sail he could.



to surprize it. But Asdrubal, being informed long before by sentinels, that the Romans approached, drew up his troops in battle upon the coast, and gave orders that the crews should go on board the ships. When the Romans were near, the charge was sounded, and the battle began immediately. The Carthaginians sustained the attack with vigour during some time, but they soon gave way. After having seen two of their ships taken by the Romans, and four sunk, they retired towards the land : but being pursued warmly by the Romans, they approached the shore as much as they could : and then, quitting their ships, they fled for refuge towards their land-army. The Romans pursued them so vigourously, that they took all the galleys, that had not bulged upon the coast, or ran ashore, and carried them off, fastened to the poops of their ships to the number of twenty-five. This victory, which cost the Romans little, made them masters of all that sea, and the neighbouring coasts. They advanced as far as the gates of Carthagera, set fire to the houses next the walls, and laid waste the whole country round about. The fleet laden with spoils steered from thence as far as \* Longuntica, where Asdrubal had made a great provision of (*Spartum*) a kind of broom, which was used for making cables. They set fire to it, after having taken away as much of it as they had occasion for.

The fleet returned by the same course to the countries of Spain on this side of the Iberus. It was here Scipio found the Deputies of all the nations, that inhabit along the river, and even of many of those which are at the extremities of the province. More than sixscore States submitted

\* *A city situated upon the coast of the kingdom of Valencia.*

A. R. 535.  
A. C. 217.

sincerely and faithfully to the Power of the Romans, and gave them hostages.

The \* Celtiberians, who formed part of the States, of which we have just spoke, took arms by order of the Roman General, and entered into the province of the Carthaginians, where they carried three cities by storm. They afterwards defeated Asdrubal himself in two different battles, in which they killed him fifteen thousand men, took four thousand prisoners, and a great number of ensigns.

When the news of these defeats was received at Carthage, seventy sail of ships were fitted out; for it was believed impossible to undertake any thing without being masters of the sea. This fleet sailed at first to Sardinia, and from Sardinia to the coast of Pisa in Italy, where the commanders were in hope of conferring with Hannibal. The Romans advanced with an hundred and twenty ships of war, *quinqueremes*. The Carthaginians, being informed, that they were at sea, returned the same way to Carthage. Servilius, the Roman Admiral, pursued them during some time, but could not come up with them.

P. Scipio  
goes to join  
his brother  
in Spain.

Polyb. iii.  
247.  
Liv. xxii.  
22.

Whilst this passed P. Scipio arrived in Spain with a new reinforcement of ships and soldiers. The Senate, perswaded that the affairs of Spain deserved peculiar attention, and that it was not only useful but necessary to push the Carthaginians to the utmost in that country, and to carry on the war more vigorously there in order to a powerful diversion, fitted out twenty ships, or, according to Livy, thirty, with eight thousand land-forces, and all kinds of munitions. This reinforcement was commanded by P. Scipio, who was sent into Spain, according to the scheme formed from the

\* The Celtiberians inhabited a part of Arragon.

begining of the campaign, with orders to join his brother Cneus as soon as possible, in order to act in concert with him. It was apprehended at Rome, that the Carthaginians by being masters in those countries, and by amassing munitions and money there in abundance, might make themselves masters of the sea, and by supplying Hannibal with troops and money, might assist him in subjecting Italy. P. Scipio being arrived in Spain, and having joined his brother, rendered the Commonwealth very great services. Till then the Romans had not ventured to pass the Iberus. They believed, they had done enough in acquiring the amity of the States on this side, and having engaged them in their party by alliances: but the two brothers being joined, passed that river, and advanced as far as Saguntum.

They knew that the hostages, which Hannibal had taken from all the States of Spain to secure their fidelity, were kept in the citadel of this place with no great number of troops. The fear of expiating their revolt by the blood of their children, was the sole tie, that continued the Spaniards in the party of the Carthaginians, which they were very desirous of quitting for that of the Romans. This tie, which awed a great part of the province, was broke by a Spaniard, who shewed more address and art, than fidelity on the occasion. He was called Abelox, a person of quality, and much considered in the country. He had till then been very much attached to the Carthaginians: but through an inconstancy, usual enough amongst those Barbarians, he had changed side, at least in his will, with fortune. For the rest, being fully perswaded, that people only despise a deserter and a traitor, that brings over with him only his own person into the party he embraces, he conceived thoughts of obtaining some great advantage for the Romans,

A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

*Spanish  
hostages  
delivered  
up to the  
Romans by  
the strata-  
gem of  
Abelox.*  
Polyb. iii.  
248—250  
Liv. xxii.  
22.



A. R. 535.  
 AN. C. 217.

in order to render himself considerable amongst them. He believed, that the greatest service he could render them in the present conjuncture, was to deliver up to them the hostages, which Hannibal had caused to be kept in Saguntum. The question was to bring in, or rather to deceive Bostar, to whom the keeping of them had been confided. “He went to him, and having made  
 “the conversation turn upon the hostages, he  
 “gave him to understand, that fear had kept the  
 “Spaniards within their duty, as long as the Ro-  
 “mans were at a distance: but that since they ar-  
 “rived in the province, their camp was become  
 “the asylum of all those who affected change.  
 “That therefore it was necessary to engage peo-  
 “ple, whom authority could no longer keep  
 “within bounds, by favour and advantages. That  
 “the most certain means to assure the fidelity of  
 “the States was to give them up their hostages. (a)  
 “That it was natural for every one to be pleased  
 “with being trusted, and that to render men  
 “faithful, it often suffices to place confidence in  
 “them.” He then offered to carry back the se-  
 veral hostages into their own country. Bostar was far from being so cunning as the Carthaginians commonly were; and judging of others by himself, he was far from suspecting a man of quality of so black a perfidy. He suffered himself to be persuaded, and in the night caused all the hostages to be put into the hands of Abelox, who immediately delivered them up to the Scipios, as he had before agreed with them. The Roman Generals, without losing time, caused them to be carried to their parents. It is easy to conceive, what surprize, and at the same time what joy, such

(a) Vult sibi quisque credi, & habita fides ipsam plerumque obligat fidem. Liv.

an act of clemency and generosity occasioned in the country. All the Spaniards with common consent, declared for the Romans, and would have taken arms immediately against the Carthaginians, if winter, which then came on, had not obliged both sides to retire into their quarters.

And this is what passed in Spain the second year of the war with Hannibal, whilst the salutary delay of Fabius in Italy had given the Romans time to breathe after so many losses. What is surprising here is, that at the same time, that so wise a conduct gave Hannibal the utmost anxiety, who saw the Romans had at length chosen a General, that made war by principle and not by chance; it was mistaken by the very people, who reaped the benefit of it, by the Romans both of the city and army, especially after a slight advantage, of which we shall soon speak.

Two things also contributed to render this General odious to the Romans. First the stratagem of Hannibal, who having been shewn an estate belonging to the Dictator by deserters; forbade any ravages to be committed upon it, whilst he put all around it to fire and sword, in order to render him suspected of some intelligence with the Carthaginians. The second thing, which also contributed to alienate the People against him, was his having made a treaty with Hannibal, without consulting the Senate, in respect to the Cartel for the exchange of prisoners; by which it was agreed, as had been done in the first war, that man should be restored for man, and that for the ransom of those, who remained after the exchange, a thousand sesterces *per* head should be paid, that is, about six pounds Sterling. The number of the prisoners, that the Romans had to ransom, amounted to a sum of more than fifteen hundred pounds. This article of the ransom having been proposed

A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

*The wise  
delays of  
Fabius  
hurt him  
with the  
army and  
people.*  
Liv. xxii.  
23.

*Two other  
things ren-  
der him  
suspected.*  
Liv. xxii.  
23.  
Plut. in  
Fab. 178.

in

A. R. 535.  
Ann. C. 217.

in the Senate, and the Senate always deferring to order the money to be paid, because Fabius had made this treaty without their participation, he at length thought proper to send his son to Rome, with instructions to sell the lands which the enemy had spared, and ransom the prisoners with his own money. Most of them were desirous to reimburse him afterwards, but he could not be prevailed upon to consent to it.

*Sight ad-  
vantage of  
Minucius  
over Han-  
nibal.*

Polyb. iii.  
251.  
Liv. xxii.  
24.

We have already said, that Hannibal had seized Geraunium in Apulia, and intended to form his magazines in that place, and to settle his winter quarters there. He was actually incamped before the walls of that city, from whence he sent two thirds of his army to forage, with orders to each man to bring in a certain measure of corn to those who were appointed to lay it up: the third part of his troops served to guard his camp, and to sustain the foragers in case they should be attacked.

Minucius had approached Hannibal, and incamped in the territory of Larinum, with the army which he commanded alone, after the Dictator went to Rome. Seeing himself at liberty to act through his superior's absence, he meditated projects, that suited his genius, sometimes of falling upon Hannibal's foragers whilst dispersed in the country, and sometimes of attacking his camp, where only the third part of his army remained. Hannibal soon perceived, that the method of making war had changed with the General in the enemies camp. As to him, seeing that the Romans approached, he contented himself with sending the third part of his soldiers to forage, and kept the rest in his camp. He was always attentive to his first design; which was not to consume his plunder, and to lay up great quantities of provisions, in order that during the winter quarters the men, carriage-



carriage-beasts, and especially the horses, might want for nothing: for it was upon his cavalry that he principally relied.

Hannibal had sent during the night some Numidians, who seized an eminence near the Romans, and which commanded their camp. The latter, despising the small number of those Numidians, dislodged them the next day, and incamped there themselves. By this means, there remained only a very small space between the two camps. Minucius, one day perceiving that the greatest part of the Carthaginian army, was dispersed in the country, detached his cavalry and light armed infantry against the foragers, and went himself with the Legions to attack the camp of the Carthaginians. All that Hannibal could do, was to defend himself. The slaughter of his foragers was great. This success inspired Minucius with excessive pride and arrogance, and flushed him with a boldness and temerity, that was sensible of no danger, and suffered him to see nothing but certain victory in the most hazardous enterprizes.

Fame, which always magnifies things, published this small advantage, which Minucius had gained, as a great victory. The letters wrote by the General of the horse still rose upon rumour. Nothing was talked of in the assemblies of the Senate and People for several days but this affair: their joy was not to be expressed. As there had been almost no hopes hitherto of this war, it was believed, that affairs were upon the point of changing face. Besides which, this advantage made people think that if the troops had done nothing hitherto, it was not through want of courage; but that it was to be ascribed to the timorous circumspection and excessive prudence of the Dictator, in respect to whom no reproaches were spared.

*The People make the authority of Minucius equal to that of the Dictator.*

*Polyb. iii. 253. Liv. xxii. 25—26. Plut. page 129.*

A. R. 535.  
Aet. C. 217.

Fabius alone, in the midst of the publick universal joy, believed neither rumour, nor Minucius's letters, and though every thing had been exactly true, he was not afraid to say, that he apprehended more from Minucius's good success, than if he had met with a little adversity. Nobody gave ear to him, and the Senate itself was averse to hear him cry up the enemy's forces, and repeat the defeats, which the temerity and ignorance of former Generals had occasioned. He however declared, " that if he continued to command, he would call Minucius to an account  
" for having fought contrary to his orders. That  
" he would soon make the Romans confess, that  
" a good General considered fortune as nothing,  
" and set no value upon any thing but prudence  
" and reason. That he thought, he had deserved  
" more glory, in the present conjuncture, for having preserved his troops from any shame and  
" disgrace, than if, at other times, he had slain  
" many thousands of the enemy."

All these discourses had no effect. One of the Tribunes had the insolence to exclaim against Fabius without any bounds. He said, " That it  
" was no longer possible to bear his ill humour.  
" That not satisfied with having prevented in  
" person and upon the spot, the advantages which  
" might have been gained over the enemy, he  
" destroyed, as far as in him lay, those which  
" had actually been gained in his absence. That  
" he only protracted the war for the sake of continuing longer in command, and to be sole  
" master both in Rome and the army. That in  
" order to prevent Minucius from looking the  
" enemy in the face, and undertaking some military expedition, he had in a manner tied up  
" his hands, and had kept the soldiers confined  
" within their intrenchments as in a prison. That  
" lastly,

“ lastly, as soon as the Dictator’s departure had A. R. 535.  
 “ set them at liberty, they had marched against Ant. C. 217.  
 “ the enemy, had defeated, and put them to  
 “ flight. That for all these reasons, he should  
 “ boldly have proposed to divest Fabius of the  
 “ Dictatorship, if the Romans had the courage  
 “ of their forefathers. But as the run and taste of  
 “ the times was incapable of an action of vigour,  
 “ he would content himself with a very moderate  
 “ demand, which was, that the authority should  
 “ be equally divided between the Dictator and  
 “ the General of the horse, without suffering Q.  
 “ Fabius however to return to the army, before  
 “ he nominated a new Consul in the room of Fla-  
 “ minius.”

The Dictator did not deign to justify himself  
 against the Tribune’s accusation ; but raising his  
 voice, said : “ He thought it proper that without  
 “ loss of time they should compleat the sacrifices  
 “ and religious ceremonies, for which he had  
 “ been made to come to Rome, in order that  
 “ he might return soon to the army, to chastise  
 “ the temerity of Minucius, who, contrary to  
 “ his orders, had attacked the enemy.” He  
 created M. Atilius Regulus Consul, and the even-  
 ing before the people were to give their suffrages  
 upon the proposal of the Tribune, that he might  
 not be witness of the blow they were going to  
 give his authority in respect to the General of the  
 horse, he set out in the night in order to rejoin  
 the army. The next day the People assembled  
 early, and the Tribune made the proposal. But it  
 was necessary, according to custom, that some-  
 body should speak upon the subject, and explain  
 it at large to the multitude, before they proceeded  
 to vote. Of all the Romans, Varro alone, took  
 upon him the odious commission to support the  
 Tribune’s enterprize : we shall soon see what this

Varro



A. R. 535.  
Ann. C. 217.

Varro was. The proposal passed, and Fabius received the news of it upon the road. Every body, as well in the city as at the army, friends and enemies, considered this decree as the grossest affront, and the most ignominious treatment, that could be offered the Dictator. He alone judged quite differently of it. And as the Sage of old answered one, who told him, *these people laugh at you ; and for my part*, says the Philosopher, *I don't think they laugh at me* ; judging very rightly that those are only derided who deserve derision, and who are moved and concerned at it : Fabius in like manner remained insensible to this supposed insult. He bore the injustice of the people with the same constancy of soul, with which he had suffered the invectives of his enemies ; and, well assured, that in dividing the command between Minucius and him, they had not divided ability in the art of commanding ; he returned into his camp, no less victorious over the insults of his citizens, than the artifices of the enemy.

*Insolence  
and pride  
of Minu-  
cius.*

Liv. xxii.  
27.

Plut. in  
Fab. p. 179

Minucius thought very differently. He was before insupportable through the pride, with which his success, and the favour of the multitude, had inspired him : but now, observing no mean, he boasted, that he was no less the conqueror of Fabius, than of Hannibal. He said with great self-satisfaction, “ That this famous General, the sole  
“ resource in the disgraces of the publick, this  
“ Dictator judged solely capable of making head  
“ against Hannibal, had seen his inferior, his  
“ General of the horse, become his equal by a  
“ decree, of which there was no example in the  
“ whole series of the history of the Roman Peo-  
“ ple ; and that in the same city, where the Gene-  
“ rals of the horse had been accustomed to trem-  
“ ble at the sight of the Dictator’s rods and axes ;  
“ with so much lustre had his merit and personal  
“ good

“ good fortune appeared ! That he would there-  
 “ fore pursue his good fortune, if the Dictator ob-  
 “ stinately persisted in a slow and timorous con-  
 “ duct, condemned by the gods and men.”

A. R. 535.  
 Ant. C. 217.

The actions of Minucius were agreeable to his discourse. From the first day that he saw Fabius, he told him, that it was necessary to determine in what manner they should use the authority, which had lately been divided between them : and without waiting the Dictator's answer, he gave his own opinion first, and declared, that in his judgment, the best they could do, was to agree, that each of them should command the whole army in chief alternately during one day, or for a longer space of time, if that was thought expedient. Fabius was not of this opinion. He believed, “ that all  
 “ which should be abandoned to the temerity of  
 “ his Colleague, would at the same time be given  
 “ up to the mercy of fortune. He chose to di-  
 “ vide the troops into two bodies. He owned,  
 “ that he was obliged to give him a share in the  
 “ command, but not to give it up entirely to him ;  
 “ protesting, that he never would voluntarily,  
 “ and of his own accord, renounce governing the  
 “ public affairs with prudence, at least according  
 “ to the part of the authority he was permitted to  
 “ retain ; and that as he was prevented from pre-  
 “ serving the whole, he would at least preserve  
 “ what he could.” As soon as the partition of the troops was made, Minucius resolved to incamp separately, and posted himself in the plain.

The (a) two great qualities, that form a great Captain, are valour and prudence : but they both border upon two great failings, which may have

(a) Ac sanè, quod difficil-  
 limum est, & prælio strenuus  
 erat, & bonus consilio : quo-  
 rum alterum ex providentia  
 timorem, alterum ex audacia  
 temeritatem plerumque afferre  
 solet. *Sallust. in bell. Ju-*  
*gurt.*

A. R. 535.  
A.M. C. 217.

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A. R. 535  
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terrible consequences. For, usually, prudence through too great precaution degenerates into fear; and valour, through too much audacity, into rashness. We shall soon see Minucius fall into this latter fault: but Fabius always knew how to observe a wise moderation, a mean, which is very rare and difficult, being equally brave in action, and circumspect in enterprizes, as Sallust says of Jugurtha.

*Battle between Hannibal and Minucius.*

*The latter is beaten.*

*Fabius*

*saves him.*

Polyb. <sup>iii.</sup>

254.

Plut. in

Fab. 18c.

Hannibal, who knew all that passed amongst the enemy by the means of deserters and his spies, felt a double joy in effect of the change that had happened. For the rashness of Minucius being now unlimited, was an assured prey for him; and the prudence of Fabius had lost half its strength. Between the camps of Minucius and Hannibal there was an eminence so situated, that whoever seized it first, must have a great advantage over his enemy. Hannibal knew all the importance of this post; but was not in haste to seize it; because he expected to make a better use of it, by leaving it to become an occasion of a battle. The plain round about, viewed at a distance, seemed entirely level and open, and at first sight was judged incapable of ambuscades. But Hannibal had observed hollows, cuts, and cavities in it, each deep enough to contain and conceal about two hundred men. He threw five hundred horse and five thousand foot into them in the night. And least that ambuscade should be discovered in the morning by the enemy's foragers, at sun-rise the next day he caused the hill to be seized by his light-armed troops.

Minucius believed the occasion happy, and sent out his light-armed infantry, with orders to dispute this post vigorously. He made his cavalry follow them, and then marched out himself with his legions. Hannibal, on his side, continually sent

sent new troops thither, which he followed immediately with the horse, and the rest of his army ; so that the action insensibly became general. The light-armed Romans who advanced up hill, were beat down first upon the cavalry, that followed them. The latter was soon broke by the Carthaginian horse, which were much superior in number, and retired towards the main body of the legions. The infantry, though surrounded with terrified troops, remained alone intrepid ; and if it had fought in a less disadvantageous post ; and stratagem, on the side of the enemy, had not been united with force, the success of the preceding days had so much animated them, that they were in a disposition to dispute the victory well. But, at that moment, Hannibal gave the signal for the troops in ambuscade to move, who suddenly attacking the legions in flank and rear, occasioned so much disorder and consternation amongst them, that none of them had either courage enough to fight, or any hopes of saving themselves by flying.

Fabius, whom his zeal for the good of the State rendered attentive to all his Colleague's motions, saw from his camp the danger, to which the army of Minucius was exposed. *I rightly foresaw, said he, that rashness would soon meet the misfortune it pursues. But let us refer our reproaches to another time ; and now fly to their aid. Let us go and force the victory out of the enemy's hands, and from the mouths of our own people the confession of their fault.* Those that fled, at the sight of the aid, which they received in a manner as if it had come from heaven, resumed courage, and joined the army of Fabius, which advanced in good order. The defeated troops, and those which were still quite fresh, forming now but one body, were in full march to charge the Carthaginians, when Hanni-



A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

bal caused the retreat to be founded, not disowning, that if he had defeated Minucius, Fabius in his turn had defeated him ; an highly glorious testimony from such an enemy ! He added, by way of pleasantry, (a) *that at length the cloud which used to shew itself upon the hills, was fallen with much noise and a great storm.*

After the battle Fabius having taken the spoils of the enemy, who had been left upon the spot, returned to his camp, without letting a single offensive, or angry word against his Colleague escape him.

Minucius  
owns his  
fault, and  
returns to  
his chieft-  
ance to the  
Dictator.  
Liv. xxii  
20. 10  
Plut. 131.

Something would have been wanting to the glory of the Dictator, if Minucius himself had not paid homage to it. He did so, and in the most solemn manner possible. Assoon as he entered his camp after the battle, he assembled his soldiers, and made the following discourse to them. *I have often heard that the first and highest degree of merit is to know how to act aright of one self, without having occasion for the counsel of others : the second, to be capable of following and executing good advice : but that he who neither knows how to command nor obey, ought to be considered as the weakest of men. As nature does not admit us to aspire at the first kind of glory, let us at least endeavour to deserve the second, and till we have learnt how to command, let us submit to obey one wiser than ourselves. Let us go and rejoin Fabius, and carry our ensigns to his tent. The only occasion in which I will command you from henceforth, is to go and submit to his orders ; and to pay at the same time the respect and obedience, which we owe to him. When I have saluted him by the name of Father, a title he merits both by his rank, and the great service we have just received from him, do you also,*

(a) Tandem eam nubem, quæ sedere in jugis montium solita sit, cum procella imbrem dedisse. Liv.

fellow-

*fellow-soldiers, salute those, by whose arms and valour you have just been preserved, your patrons and preservers ; and if we have acquired nothing else this day, it shall at least give us the glory of being grateful.*

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Ant. C. 217.

He immediately put himself at their head, and marched directly to the camp of the Dictator. Fabius, and all that were with him, were very much surprized, when they saw him arrive. Every thing was done conformably to the design Minucius had laid down. After he had caused his ensigns to be planted before Fabius's tribunal, he began the first by saluting him with the name of Father, and all his soldiers saluted the Dictator's with that of Patrons and Preservers. He then spoke \* as follows, *Great Dictator, I have just equalled you with my father, by giving you the same name ; but I am more indebted to you than to him. To him I only owe my life ; to you I owe not only that, but the lives of all these soldiers that surround me. I myself therefore cancel and annul the decree of the People, which was rather a burthen than an honour to me. I return with joy to my obedience to your authority and under your auspices, and that for the greater advantage, as I hope and desire, as well of yourself and me,*

\* *I cannot help inserting here the speech Plutarch puts into the mouth of Minucius, which is very shining and abounds with wit, whereas that of Livy is more simple. You have this day, Dictator, gained two very signal victories : by your valour, you have overcome the enemy ; and by your wisdom and generosity your Colleague. By the one of these victories you have preserved, and by the other you have instructed, us ; and*

*the advantage you have gained over me is no less salutary and glorious for me than my defeat by Hannibal was shameful and unhappy. I therefore call you father, having no name more venerable, that I can give you ; though the obligation I have to you is much greater than to him who gave me life. For I not only owe my own life to you, but the preservation of all these valiant men.*

A. R. 535.  
Ann. C. 217.

*as of your two armies, of which the one is indebted for its preservation to the other. I only entreat you to forget all that is passed, and to permit me to retain under your command the office of General of the horse, and to be the rank they hold in the troops.*

After this discourse, the officers and soldiers of the two armies embraced. Fabius's troops received those of Minucius, known or not, into their tents, with the most sensible marks of kindness and affection. All became friends that moment ; and that day, which had begun so unhappily, concluded with universal joy.

As soon as the news of this reconciliation was carried to Rome, and confirmed by letters from the Generals and soldiers, there was not one who did not extol the Dictator's generosity and wisdom to the skies. They saw how much superior the true knowledge of commanding, and an always judicious and firm conduct, was to rash bravery, and a frantic itch for signaling oneself. Hannibal and the Carthaginians had an higher opinion of Fabius than before ; and then first began to perceive, that they made war in Italy, and against the Romans. For, always before, they had conceived such a contempt for those, who commanded the troops of the Commonwealth, as well as for the troops themselves, that they could scarce imagine they were at war with the same nation, of whom their fathers had left them so terrible an idea.

*Excellent  
qualities  
of Fabius.*

We see here excellent qualities in Fabius, and the more admirable as they are more uncommon. In battle, to confront the greatest dangers and even death, is a great effort of virtue ; it is, however, common. But patiently to suffer the most injurious and unmerited reproaches, to see his reputation torn in pieces by a subordinate and dependant officer ; to expose himself to universal



censure and disgrace, for observing the only conduct capable of preserving the State ; and to see the most important services repaid with the most cruel ingratitude by an whole people, and not to depart either from his plan or his duty in the midst of so many and so sensible subjects of discontent ; this must be confessed to be the effect of a force, constancy and nobleness of sentiments much above the common. The love of virtue is, in most men, so languid and weak, that it can scarce support itself without the help of the approbation and esteem of men. (a) How glorious did this generous contempt of glory become for Fabius, and with what interest did it not repay him what he seemed to have lost and sacrificed for the public good !

This (b) love of the public good was the soul of his actions, and continually inspired him with that inflexible firmness and constancy for the service of his country, against which he never deviated into the least resentment, whatever injury he received from it.

To these excellent qualities, Fabius added another, not less estimable, nor rare, which is to resist the grateful and powerful attractions of revenge, become so natural to man since his corruption. Not only not a word of indignation and insult escapes him against an enemy, who had so cruelly injured him ; but, soon after, when it was in his power to have let him perish in an action, in which his own rashness had engaged him, he flies to his aid, extricates him out of danger, accepts

(a) Adeo spreta in tempore injuriis laceratus, in eodem gloria cum fœnore redit ! *Liv.* animi habitu permanfit, nec

(b) [Est] illa pietatis constantia admirabilis, quam Q. Fabius Maximus infatigabilem patriæ præstitit—Compluribus unquam sibi reip. permisit irasci, tam perseverans in amore civium fuit. *Pal. Max.* iii. 8.

A. R. 535. his submission, and restores him to his friendship,  
 A. C. 217. without making him sensible of the injury received,  
 and his injustice, by the slightest reproach.

*Wisdom of Fabius's conduct in respect to Hannibal.* Fabius's conduct here in respect to Hannibal, which was only designed insensibly to revive the confidence of the Roman armies, discouraged by preceding defeats; to abate the impetuous ardour of the young victor he had to oppose, by affected delays; to undermine and consume his strength by degrees, by incessantly harassing his troops; to make him incapable either of ravaging the countries of the allies, or of forcing him to a decisive action: this conduct, I say, has always been considered as the effect of consummate prudence, and a perfect knowledge of the rules of the art-military. (a) It acquired Fabius the glorious titles of *wise Delayer*, who by protraction had saved the State; a title which did him more honour, than all the victories he could have gained. And indeed, what courage, what greatness of soul, did it not require, to set himself above the rumours and reproaches of an whole army, and of almost the whole people; and to have no view but the safety of his country? This is what Ennius, an almost cotemporary poet, has so well expressed in verses known by every body.

As it was in Fabius's Dictatorship, which will soon end, that a considerable change happened in the coin, I thought it necessary to treat that subject here in few words.

(a) Quintus Maximus & tantem patientia sua molli-  
 bella gerebat ut adolescens, bat, de quo preclarè familia-  
 cum planè esset grandis; & ris noster Ennius (*It is Cato*  
 Annibalem juveniliter, exul- *the Elder that speaks.*)

Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.

Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem.

Ergo magisque magisque viri nunc gloria claret.

*Cic. de senect. n. 10.*

*Digression*

*Digression upon the changes made in the Roman coin.*

Rome at first, as we have observed elsewhere, <sup>Plin. xxxiii. 3.</sup> used only bits of brass, of more or less weight, for money, which were of no determinate form, and had no just impression. King Servius Tullius made *Asses* of a pound in weight, and this was called *æs grave*, so often mentioned in authors. These asses were weighed and not counted. He caused them to be marked with the figure of some animal, (*pecudum*) as of an ox, a sheep, an hog, which occasioned their being called *pecunia*. These asses were divided into several pieces of less weight: *Semisses*, the half; *trientes*, the third; *quadrantes*, the fourth. Only brass-money was used till the Consulship of C. Fabius and Q. Ogulnius, that is, till the 483d year of Rome, five years before the first Punic war.

Rome at that time, become more powerful, and mistress of almost all Italy, by the defeat of Pyrrhus and the Tarentini, began to coin silver-money; viz. *denarii*, *quinarii*, that were afterwards called *viçtoriat*i and *sestertii*. The *denarii* were worth ten asses, or ten pounds of brass; the *quinarii* five; the *sestertii* two and an half. Hence we see how scarce silver was, and how much it was worth in those early times. According to Budæus and Gronovius, an hundred *denarii* were very near the pound of silver. The *denarius* was worth ten asses, or ten pounds of brass. Consequently every pound of silver was worth a thousand asses, or a thousand pounds of brass.

Soon after, that is during the first Punic war, <sup>Plin. ibid.</sup> the necessities of the Commonwealth occasioned the asses to be reduced from the weight of one pound or twelve ounces, to that of two ounces, *sextantarium pondus*, always retaining the same va-



A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

lue. This new brass-money had also a new stamp, viz. a Janus with two faces on one side, and the prow of a ship on the other.

In the second Punic war, during the Dictatorship of Fabius, in the 535th year of Rome, the weight of the *as* was again lowered to one half, and reduced to one ounce. Its proportion with silver was then changed, and the *denarius* was worth sixteen asses. (a) Pliny observes, that the *denarius* was reckoned in the pay of the soldiery only as ten asses : that is, by continuing to use the name of *denarius* to express the pay of the soldiers, they had however only (b) ten asses and not sixteen. Accordingly the seditious troops demanded the *denarius* for their pay.

Lastly, the weight of the *as* was again lowered one half, and reduced to half an ounce. The law, which decreed this change, and which Pliny calls *Lex Papiria*, gives us the name of its author ; but it is not exactly known in what time he lived. Though the weight of the *as* was then less by one half than in the time of the second Punic war, it however always retained the same proportion with silver.

(a) In militari tamen stipendio semper denarius pro decem assibus datus. *Plin. ibid.*

(b) Denarius in diem assibus animam & corpus aestimari. *Tacit. Annal. l. 17.*

## S E C T. II.

*The Consul Servilius, after a short expedition into Africa, returns into Italy, to take upon him the command of the land forces. The two Consuls follow the plan of Fabius. The deputies of Naples offer a present to the Romans. A spy, and slaves punished. Ambassadors sent to different places. Preparations made for the election of Consuls. Birth and character of Varro. Speech of a Tribune in his favour. He is elected Consul, and has Paulus Æmilius for his Collegue. Prætors nominated. Number of troops. Ambassadors from King Hiero arrive at Rome with presents. Presumptuous speeches of the Consul Varro. Wise speech of Paulus Æmilius. The Senate exhort him to come to a decisive battle. Fine discourse of Fabius to Paulus Æmilius. The latter's answer. Speech of Paulus Æmilius to the troops. Hannibal's stratagem discovered. Extreme difficulties, to which the want of provisions reduce him. Alarm of Rome concerning the battle upon the point of being fought. Division and dispute between the two Consuls. Varro is determined to give battle contrary to his colleague's opinion. Hannibal's speech to his troops. Famous battle of Cannæ. Defeat of the Romans. Death of Paulus Æmilius. Reflection upon Hannibal's refusing to march directly to attack Rome. The Carthaginians take the spoils of the dead upon the field of battle. Hannibal makes himself master of the two camps. Generosity of a lady of Canusium in respect to the Romans. Scipio the younger suppresses a dangerous conspiracy. Four thousand Romans retire to Venusia. The Consul Varro repairs thither.*

W H I L S T

A. R. 535.

Ant. C. 217.

*The Consul**Servilius,**after a**short expe-**dition in**Africa,**resumes the**Command**of the land**forces*

Liv. xxii.

31.

**W**HILST the things, which we have just related passed in Italy, the Consul Cn. Servilius, after having cruized along the coasts of Sardinia and Corsica with a fleet of an hundred and twenty galleys, and received hostages from both, went to Africa, where he at first gained some advantages. But a blow which followed soon after, obliged him to return to Sicily. When he arrived at Lilybæum, he left his fleet with the Prætor T. Otacilius, who appointed his Lieutenant P. Sura to carry it back to Rome. As to himself, he crossed all Sicily by land, and afterwards went to Italy over the strait of Messina. He received letters there from Fabius, by which, after having been almost six months in the Dictatorship, he recalled him, to take upon him the command of the troops in conjunction with his Colleague M. Atilius.

*The two**Consuls**follow the**plan of**Fabius.*

Liv. xxii.

32.

The two Consuls being placed at the head, the one of the army of Fabius, and the other of that of Minucius, fortified themselves early in the quarters, where they were to pass the winter, (for it was then towards the close of the autumn) and afterwards carried on the war in concert, and with great unity, entirely according to the plan of Fabius. When Hannibal came out in quest of provisions and forage, they always attacked him at advantage, falling upon the straglers of the enemy, but carefully avoiding general actions, which Hannibal ardently pursued. By this conduct the Carthaginian General was reduced to such straits for provisions, that if he had not feared being reproached with flying, he would immediately have removed into Gaul, having absolutely lost all hope of subsisting his troops, in the country where he was, if the Consuls of the next year observed the same conduct as these.

Winter



Winter having put a stop to hostilities on both sides, the two armies continued quiet in the neighbourhood of Geraunium in Apulia, when the deputies of Naples arrived at Rome. Having permission to enter the Senate, they carried thither forty gold cups of a considerable weight. The chief of the embassy said : “ That it was easy to conceive, that the treasures of the Commonwealth might be exhausted by the expences attending the war. That the Neapolitans were not ignorant, that the Roman People fought for the preservation of the cities and countries of Italy, as well as for Rome its capital. That for that reason they had believed it just and reasonable to aid them with the treasures which their ancestors had left them, to be the ornament of their temples in prosperity, and a resource for themselves in bad fortune. That they were entirely disposed to afford them all the other aids, of which they could be supposed capable. That the greatest pleasure, which the Roman People could do them, was to consider all that belonged to the Neapolitans as their own, and to honour them so far as to vouchsafe to accept a present, much less considerable in its own value, than the good will of those who offered it.” The Ambassadors were thanked for their generosity and regard : but the Senate contented themselves with accepting only the lightest of the forty cups.

At this time, a Carthaginian spy was discovered at Rome, who had continued there almost two years. He was dismissed after having his hands cut off. Twenty-five slaves were also hanged, who had formed a conspiracy in the field of Mars. The discoverer had his liberty given him, and a sum of copper-money amounting to about fifty pounds sterling.

Ambas-

A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217  
Deputies  
from Na-  
ples offer  
the Ro-  
mans a  
present.  
Liv. xxii.  
32.

A spy and  
slaves  
punished.  
Liv. xxii.  
33.

A. R. 535.  
 Ann. C. 217.  
*Embassies*  
*sent to different*  
*parts.*  
 Ibid.

Ambassadors were sent to Philip, King of Macedonia, to demand, that he would deliver up to the Roman People Demetrius of Pharos, who had taken refuge in his dominions, after having been conquered. Another embassy was sent to the Ligurians, to complain of their having supplied the Carthaginians with provisions and troops : and at the same time to take a nearer view of what passed amongst the Boii and Insubrians. A third was also sent to Pinæus, King of Illyricum, to demand the payment of the tribute he owed, or hostages, if he was not in a condition to pay it as it became due. All these particular cares shew how attentive the Senate was in respect to every thing, that concerned the interests of the Commonwealth, even in the most remote countries, notwithstanding the enemy, that pressed them so vigorously in the very heart of the State.

*New Consuls chosen.*  
 Polyb. iii.  
 253.  
 Liv. xxii  
 34.

The point of importance was to chuse Consuls capable of making head against Hannibal. We have seen that the wise delay of Fabius had given the Romans time to breathe, and to recover themselves a little after so many disgraces, that had happened upon the neck of each other. The effect of it was so sensible, that Hannibal, at the end of the second year of the war, all victorious as he was, having however neither town, post, nor country in alliance with him, was extremely at a loss. Nothing was wanting, but to continue the war upon the same plan, entirely to reduce him to despair, and even to destroy him. The thing was manifest, and could not escape even the least penetrating. But when it pleases God to blind a people, they no longer make use of their reason and prudence. To render the Romans entirely wise, it was necessary they should receive a greater blow than any they had experienced before.

The principal instrument of this total disgrace was C. Terentius Varro, who, by reducing them to extremities, obliged them to observe a more prudent conduct. This man, of entirely mean birth, being the son of a butcher, and who had done the vilest offices of that business under his father, being possessed of a considerable fortune, presumed to aspire at an higher condition. He was constantly at the bar, and in the assemblies of the People, and by dint of taking the part, and pleading the causes, of the meanest of the citizens against the principal persons of the Commonwealth, whose fortunes and reputation he attacked at the same time, he made himself known, and paved himself a way to the offices of the Commonwealth. He successively obtained the Quæstorship, the two Ædileships, and the Prætorship. The Consulship was still behind. A favourable occasion arose for a man like him to smooth his way to it. This was, when the question was to make Minucius General of the horse equal to Fabius his Dictator. We have seen that only Varro had the impudence to support so unjust and pernicious a proposal. By that means he knew how dexterously to take advantage of the hatred for the Dictator for gaining the favour of the people, with whom he had all the merit of the decree, which then passed. He did not fail the year following, which is that of which we are speaking, to demand the Consulship as the just reward of so great a service.

It is the sign of a weak government, and the most usual cause of the misfortunes that happen in a State, when (a) in the choice of Generals and Commanders, no difference is made between good

(a) Inter bonos & malos discrimen nullum : omnia virtutis præmia ambitio possidet. *Sallust. in bell. Catil.*



A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 217.

and bad men, and favour and faction carry the rewards, that are due to merit. This truth will appear in this place in all its light on the occasion of Varro.

*Discourse  
of a Tri-  
bune in fa-  
vour of  
Varro.*  
Liv. xxii.  
34—35.

The People favoured him highly. The Senators opposed his demand with their whole power, being unwilling that it should be a custom for the dregs of the people to become their equals, by declaring themselves their enemies. Varro had a relation amongst the Tribunes of the People, who to render the person of his candidate the more agreeable, laboured by his seditious discourses, to render the whole Nobility odious to the People. He said, “ that it was the Nobility, who by desiring  
“ war for many years, had occasioned Hannibal  
“ to come into Italy : and, not contented with  
“ that, they had expressly and by fraud protract-  
“ ed it, though it had been easy to terminate it  
“ at once. That it was a plot formed by them  
“ all, and that there would be no end to the  
“ war, till a Consul truly Plebeian was created,  
“ that is to say, a \* *new* man. For, added he,  
“ the Plebeians that have become noble, are ini-  
“ tiated into the same mysteries, and as soon as  
“ they have ceased to be despised by the Patrici-  
“ ans, have began to despise the People.”

*Varro is  
elected  
Consul.*

Discourses of this kind made so great an impression, that though Varro had five competitors, of which three were Patricians, and two of Plebeian families, but long become illustrious by having borne the great offices, he was created Consul alone, in order that he might preside in the assemblies, in which a Collegue was to be given him.

\* He was called a new man, the Romans constituted Nobility, whose ancestors had never borne that was divided into Patrician and Plebeian. any Curule offices, which with

The Nobility then cast their eyes upon Paulus Æmilius, who had been Consul with M. Livius the year before the second Punic war. We have already related, that on the expiration of their Consulship, they had been accused before the People, as having appropriated part of the spoils taken in the war to themselves. Livius had been found guilty, and fined : and Paulus Æmilius had escaped not without great difficulty. Besides being still extremely exasperated against the People, whom he could not forgive so great an affront, he had a great repugnance to entering again into offices. He was however forced to get the better of it, and all the other candidates having declined, he was given rather for an Antagonist, than a Colleague, to Varro.

C. TERENTIUS VARRO.  
L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS II.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

The Consuls being chosen, four Prætors according to the custom of those times were appointed, Manius Pomponius Matho, P. Furius Philus, M. Claudius Marcellus, and L. Postumius Albinus; the two first remained in the city to administer justice. Marcellus had Sicily for his province, and Postumius Gaul. It is remarkable, that these four Prætors had already borne that office, and the two last had even been consuls. Of all the magistrates of this year, Varro was the only one, that exercised an office with which he was invested for the first time. Care had been taken to send a fresh supply of provisions to the fleet, that wintered at Lilybæum ; and all the necessary munitions for the armies under the command of the two Scipios were embarked for Spain : And preparations for the approaching campaign were made with the utmost diligence.

A. R. 536.

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*Number of**the troops.*

Polyb. iii.

257.

Liv. xxii.

36.

The armies were much more numerous than ever they had been. The Romans usually raised no more than four legions, each consisting of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. The Latines supplied a like number of infantry, and twice as many cavalry. Half of these troops of the allies, and two legions, were given to each Consul. They usually made war separately. Eight Roman legions were now raised, each composed of five thousand foot, and three hundred horse, with the like number of foot and twice as many horse of the allies ; which in all amounted to fourscore and seven thousand two hundred men.

Ambassadors arrived from Pæstum, who brought many gold cups to Rome. The Senate acted in the same manner with them as it had with the Neapolitans. They were thanked for their good will, but their present was not accepted.

*Ambassa-**ders from**King Hiero**arrive**at Rome**with pre-**sents.*

Liv. xxii

57.

About the same time a fleet laden with provisions sent by King Hiero to the Romans his allies, entered the port of Ostia. When the Ambassadors of that Prince were introduced, they assured the Senate, “ that the King their master could  
 “ not have been more afflicted for any loss of his  
 “ own, than he had been for the death of the  
 “ Consul Flaminus, and the defeat of his army.  
 “ That accordingly tho’ he was sensible, that the  
 “ greatness of soul of the Roman People was still  
 “ more admirable in bad fortune than in good, he  
 “ thought it incumbent upon him to send them all  
 “ the aids, which good and faithful allies usually  
 “ supply during war ; and which he desired the  
 “ Senate to accept. That first he presented the  
 “ Commonwealth, as an happy omen of the fu-  
 “ ture, a Victory of gold, weighing three hun-  
 “ dred and twenty pounds, which he begged them  
 “ to accept, and desired that they might keep it  
 “ for ever. That they had brought in their gal-  
 “ lies



“ lies an hundred thousand bushels of wheat, and  
 “ two hundred thousand of barley, in order that  
 “ the Romans might not want provisions; and that  
 “ their master would transport what farther quan-  
 “ tity they should think fit, and wheresoever they  
 “ should appoint. That Hiero knew, that the  
 “ Commonwealth employed no soldiers in their  
 “ armies, but Romans and allies of the Latine  
 “ name. But that as he had seen in their camps  
 “ foreign auxiliary light-armed troops, he had sent  
 “ them a thousand such troops, as well archers  
 “ as slingers, which the Romans might oppose to  
 “ the Balearians, Moors, and other nations, that  
 “ used arrows. To these presents they added a  
 “ salutary piece of advice, which was to order the  
 “ Prætor of Sicily to sail to Africa with his  
 “ fleet, in order that the enemy having also the  
 “ war in their country, might be less in a condi-  
 “ tion to send Hannibal reinforcements.”

The Senate replied to these Ambassadors, “ That  
 “ King Hiero was considered at Rome as a good  
 “ and faithful ally. That ever since he had been  
 “ in alliance with the Romans, he had upon all  
 “ occasions given them proofs of a sincere amity  
 “ and a generosity truly royal, to which they  
 “ were as sensible as they ought. That the Ro-  
 “ man People had refused the gold offered them  
 “ by some States, and had contented themselves  
 “ with their good will. That they accepted the  
 “ Victory sent by Hiero as a good omen; that  
 “ they intended to place it in the Capitol, that is,  
 “ in the temple of Jupiter, and hoped that it  
 “ would remain there for ever, to be favourable  
 “ to them in all their undertakings.” The pro-  
 visions arrived from Sicily, with the archers and  
 slingers, which came at the same time, were given  
 to the Consuls. Twenty-five galleys were added

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to the fleet that T. Otacilius commanded in Sicily, and he was permitted to sail to Africa, if he judged that the good of the Commonwealth required it.

*Vain glorious discourse of the Consul Varro.*

Liv. xxii.  
38.

*Discourse of P. Æmilius.*

The Consuls after having made the levies, of which we have been speaking, continued some days in the city, till the aid for the Latines arrived. In that interval, Varro held several assemblies of the People, in which he always spoke in the same spirit of rashness and arrogance, “accusing the  
“ Patricians of having drawn the war into Italy,  
“ and affirming, that it would continue there as  
“ long as Generals of the temper and character of  
“ Fabius should have the command. That as for  
“ him, he would terminate it the very first day he  
“ saw the enemy.” Paulus Æmilius his Colleague harangued the People but once, which was the evening before his departure, and was not heard favourably, because he chose rather to tell them the truth, than to flatter them. He spoke of Varro with abundance of caution and reserve, except in declaring, “That he could not easily conceive  
“ how a General, before he knew his own troops,  
“ or those of the enemy, the situation of places,  
“ and the nature of a country, whilst still in the  
“ midst of Rome, could know at such a distance  
“ how it would be proper to act when he should  
“ be at the head of his army, and even tell  
“ the day beforehand when he should give battle.  
“ (a) That as to himself he knew, that it was  
“ for the circumstances of times and places to determine the resolutions of men, and not for men  
“ to pretend by their resolutions to dispose those  
“ circumstances, which did not depend on them.

(a) Se, quæ consilia magis pus immatura non præceptures dent hominibus, quam rum. Liv.  
homines rebus, ea ante tem-

“ That

“ That therefore he should be in no haste to take  
 “ immature measures. That he wished, that un-  
 “ dertakings conducted and resolved with pru-  
 “ dence, might have good success. That teme-  
 “ rity, besides its not suiting reasonable persons,  
 “ had hitherto been unfortunate.”

The Senate observed to Paulus Æmilius, of *The Senate*  
 what importance the good or bad success of this *exhort P.*  
 campaign would be to the commonwealth. They *Æmilius*  
 exhorted him to make a good choice of his time *to come to*  
 for a decisive action, and to behave with the va- *a decisive*  
 lour and prudence so justly admired in him; in a *battle.*  
 word; in a manner worthy of the Roman name.  
 This discourse of the Senate, and still more the  
 extraordinary preparations, which had been made  
 for this campaign, shew clearly, that the Senate  
 itself desired an end might be put to the war.  
 They did not set fore score thousand men and up-  
 wards on foot to protract it, and to continue with-  
 out action.

It was easy to judge that Paulus Æmilius was *Fine dis-*  
 disposed of himself to prefer the safest, to the *course of*  
 most specious, conduct. However, Fabius, full *Fabius to*  
 of zeal for the safety of his country, and perhaps *P. Æmi-*  
 discontented with the two express ardor of the Se- *lius.*  
 nate for coming to a battle, was desirous to have *Liv. xxii.*  
 a particular conference with Paulus Æmilius, in *39.*  
 order to confirm him further in his good resoluti- *Plut. in*  
 ons, and he spoke to him in these terms, when he *Fab. 182.*  
 was upon the point of setting out. *If you had a*  
*Colleague like yourself, which were most to be desired,*  
*or if yourself were like your Colleague, it would be to*  
*no manner of purpose for me to speak to you. For*  
*two good Consuls would not want my advice, in order*  
*to their taking the most advantageous measures for the*  
*Commonwealth; and two bad Generals, far from*  
*following my counsels, would not so much as bear them.*  
*But knowing the difference between you and Varro, I*  
 E 2 *address*



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address myself to you only; and I am even much afraid, that as good a citizen, and as able a captain, as you are, you will endeavour in vain to support the Commonwealth, whilst it is so ill sustained on the other side. The good and bad measures, which shall be taken, will have the support of consular authority. For do not deceive yourself, Paulus Æmilius, you must expect to find a no less obstacle in the person of Varro, than in that of Hannibal your enemy: and I do not know, whether the first will not be more formidable to you than the second. You will have to do with the one only in the field of battle; but with the other at all times and in all places. Against Hannibal, you will find support in your legions: Varro will attack you with your own soldiers. We know what the imprudence of Flaminius has cost the Commonwealth. If Varro puts his plan in execution, and gives battle, as soon as he sees the enemy, either I am entirely ignorant of the art of war, and know neither Hannibal nor the Carthaginians, or there will soon be a place in Italy more famous for our defeat than the lake of Trasymenus. I can affirm, without fearing to give room for suspecting me of vain-glory, that the only means for succeeding against Hannibal, is to pursue the method I observed in making war with him. (a) Nor is this to be judged by the event, (which is the instructor of fools) but by reason, which has been, and always will and must be the same, as long as the same things continue. We are making war in the midst of Italy, in the very bosom of our country. We are surrounded on all sides by our citizens and allies. They aid us with men and horses, with arms and provisions; and they will certainly continue to do

(a) Nec eventus modò hoc futuraque, donec eadem res docet, (stultorum iste magister manebunt, immutabilis est. eii;) sed eadem ratio quæ fuit, Liv.

so : we have too many proofs of their zeal and fidelity to be capable of doubting that. We every day become more strong, more prudent, more determinate, and more experienced. Hannibal on the contrary is in a foreign, and an enemy's country, separated from his own by a great tract of lands and seas. He is at war with all around him ; remote from home, and is at peace neither by land nor sea. He has not a city that receives him within its walls, nor any fund upon which he can rely. He lives from day to day upon what he plunders in the country. He has scarce preserved the third part of the troops, with which he passed the Iberus. Famine has destroyed more of them than the sword ; and he knows not how to subsist the few that remain. Can it then be doubted, but that by protraction we must ruin an enemy that grows weaker every day, and to whom neither troops, provisions, nor money are sent. How long has he kept dancing round the walls of Geraunium and defending that miserable fortress of Apulia, as if it was the walls of Carthage. But not to propose only my own example to you, you know in what manner the last Consuls Atilius and Servilius eluded all his effects by keeping upon the defensive. This, Paulus Æmilius, is the sole means you have for saving the Commonwealth. But unhappily, you will find greater difficulties to put it in execution from your own people, than from the enemy. The Romans desire the same thing as the Carthaginians, and Varro is of the same opinion with Hannibal. You (a) have therefore two

(a) Duobus Ducibus unus resistas oportet. Resistes autem, adversus famam rumoreque hominum si satis firmus steteris ; si te neque Collegæ vana gloria, neque falsa tua infamia moverit. Veritatem laborare nimis sæpe, aiunt, extinguere nunquam. Gloriam qui

spreverit, veram habebit. Sine timidum pro cauto, tardum pro considerato, imbellem pro perito belli vocent. Malo te sapiens hostis metuat, quàm stulti cives laudent. Omnia audentem contemnet Annibal : nil temere agentem metuet.

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*Generals to resist alone, which you will do effectually, if you know how to despise the discourses and opinions of men; and if you neither suffer yourself to be dazzled by the vain glory of your Colleague, nor terrified by the false infamy with which they will endeavour to blacken you. It is commonly said, that truth may suffer some eclipse, and that too often, but that it is never totally extinguished. To know how to contemn glory when proper, is the means of acquiring the most solid. Suffer with patience your prudence to be called timidity, your wise circumspection slowness and inactivity, your ability in the art of war, incapacity and cowardice. I had rather a wise enemy should fear you, than foolish citizens praise you. Hannibal will despise you, if he sees you dare all things, and fear you, if you act nothing rashly. Upon the whole I am not for your remaining entirely without action, but that all your enterprizes be guided by reason and not abandoned to chance. Be always master of events. Be always armed and upon your guard. Never be wanting to any favourable occasion; but never give the enemy one for surprizing you. If you go on without precipitation, you will see clear, and all your steps will be safe. Haste and beat blind and confound us.*

*Answer of  
Paulus  
Æmilius.  
Liv. xxii.  
40.*

The Consul replied with a dejected air, “ that this advice seemed very wise and salutary, but “ that it was not easy to put it in execution.” As he had always in mind the injustice, which had been done him on the expiration of his first Consulship, he added, “ that he hoped the event of “ the campaign would be happy; but that if any “ misfortune should happen, he had rather perish “ by the swords of the enemy, than by the voices “ of his citizens.”

After this conversation, Paulus Æmilius set out for the army, attended to the gates of the city by the principal Senators; whilst a train more remarkable



markable from its great number, than its dignity, A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216. followed its idol the Plebeian Consul.

When they were both arrived at the camp, they Speech of  
P. Æmi-  
lius to the  
troops. assembled the troops, to declare to them the intentions of the Senate, and to animate them in respect to their duty. Paulus Æmilius spoke, and judging it necessary to encourage the troops after the blows they had received, and to dispel the dread they had conceived in consequence, he represented to them, “ That if they had been  
“ worsted in the preceding battles, they had many  
“ reasons to prove, that it was not their fault ;  
“ but that if it were now judged proper to give  
“ battle, nothing could prevent the victory. That  
“ before the same army had not been commanded  
“ by the two Consuls, and that no troops had  
“ been used but new raised men, without exercise  
“ or experience, and who had come to blows with  
“ the enemy, almost without having either seen  
“ or known him.” *But now, added he, you see  
all things in a very different situation. Both Con-  
suls are at your head, and share all dangers with  
you. You know the arms of the enemy, their man-  
ner of forming themselves, and their number. Scarce  
a day has passed for above a year, but you have mea-  
sured your swords with them. Different circumstances  
must produce different effects. After having fought  
on particular occasions with equal forces, and been  
frequently victorious, it would be very strange, if  
you were defeated when more than one half superior  
in number. Romans, nothing is wanting to give you  
victory, but the will to conquer ; and I should injure  
you, to exhort you not to want that. Remember only,  
that your anxious and trembling country has its eyes  
fixed upon you. Its cares, its strength, its hopes, are  
all united in your army. The fate of Rome, of your  
fathers, wives, children, is in your hands : Do you  
act in such a manner that the event may answer their  
expectation.*

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

*expectation.* After this discourse Paulus Æmilius dismissed the assembly. Though Hannibal saw the Roman troops augmented to double their number, he was however extremely rejoiced on the arrival of the two Consuls, because he desired only an occasion to come to a battle.

*Hanni-  
bal's stra-  
tagem dis-  
covered.*

Liv. xxii.

41—43.

The Romans had at first a slight advantage over Hannibal's foragers in a tumultuary engagement, wherein the Carthaginians left seventeen hundred men upon the spot, and the Romans but one hundred at most, as well citizens as allies. Hannibal was not sorry for this slight success of the enemy. He considered it as a proper bait for drawing them into his toils, and conceived thoughts of making the best of it immediately. As if this blow had intimidated him, he decamped during the night, leaving almost all his baggage behind him. He had caused a great number of fires to be kindled in his camp, in order to make them believe, that it was his intention to disguise his flight. As for himself he lay concealed with his troops behind the mountains. As soon as day appeared, the soldiers perceived, that Hannibal's camp was abandoned, and demanded with great cries, that the signal should be given for pursuing the enemy, and plundering their camp. Varro strongly supported their demand. Paulus Æmilius did not omit to repeat, that it was necessary to keep upon their guard, and to distrust the stratagems of Hannibal. Seeing that no regard was had to him, he caused his Collegue to be informed, that the Auspices were not favourable. Varro durst proceed no farther: but the army refused to obey. Happily two slaves, who had been made prisoners the year before by the Carthaginians, having found means to escape, arrived at this moment in the Roman camp, and being carried immediately to the Consuls, gave them to understand,

understand, that Hannibal's army was posted in ambush behind the mountains. (a) This information came in very good time for giving the Consuls occasion to make their authority respected; which the ill-judged softness and complacency of Varro had taught the troops to despise.

Hannibal, finding his stratagem discovered, returned into his camp. The perplexity in which he then was, well proves the wisdom of the conduct, which Fabius had first observed, and which Paulus Æmilius followed after his example. He was in want both of provisions and money. His troops began to murmur already, and to complain openly, of not having their pay, and of being made to perish by hunger. The Spanish soldiers had already conceived thoughts of going over to the Romans. And lastly, it was said, that Hannibal himself had deliberated more than once, whether he should not fly into Gaul with his cavalry, and leave all his infantry behind him, which he could subsist no longer. Famine obliged him to decamp, and to remove into a part of Apulia, where the heats were greater, and where, for that reason, the grain ripened sooner. He posted himself near Cannæ, a little town, which soon after became very famous from the battle fought there. It was situated upon the river Aufidus, now called Ofanto. It was an open country, which Hannibal had purposely chosen, in order to use his cavalry, in which his principal strength and confidence lay. The Romans followed him close, and incamped near him.

When the rumour spread at Rome, that the two armies were in view of each other, and were preparing for a battle, though it was expected, and

(a) Horum opportunus adventus Consules imperii potentes fecit, cum ambitio al-

rius suam primum apud eos pravâ indulgentiâ majestatem solvisset.

*Alarm of Rome concerning the battle upon the point of being fought.*  
Polyb. iii.



A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

even desired, however in that critical moment, which was to determine the fate of the Commonwealth, every body was seized with anxiety and dread. The past defeats made them tremble for the future; and as the imagination is apt to dwell particularly upon the evil it fears, they represented to themselves in the strongest light all the misfortunes, to which they should be exposed in case of being overcome. In all the temples, prayers and sacrifices were made to evert the effect of the dreadful prodigies, with which the whole city resounded. For, says Polybius, in urgent dangers, the Romans took extreme care to appease the wrath of the gods and men; and of all the ceremonies prescribed for these occasions, there is not any that they do not observe, without fear of disgracing themselves, whatever seeming meanness they may include.

The Consuls had divided their troops into two camps. The least was on the other side of the Aufidus upon the eastern shore: the great camp, which contained the best part of the army, was on this side of that river, as was the camp of the Carthaginians. These two camps of the Romans had a communication by a bridge. This nearness occasioned frequent skirmishes. Hannibal incessantly harried the enemy, sending out parties of Numidians, that fatigued them extremely, and fell suddenly sometimes upon one part of their camp, and sometimes on another.

*Division  
and dispute  
between  
the two  
Consuls.*

Every thing was in confusion in the Roman army. The councils of war passed rather in disputes, than deliberations. As the camps were in a very level and open plain, and Hannibal's cavalry

Liv. xxii.

44.

Plut. in

Fab. 182.

Paulus Æmilius did not judge it proper to give battle in that place, but was desirous to draw the enemy on to a ground, where the infantry might

†

have

have the greatest share in the action. His Col-<sup>A. R. 536.</sup>  
league, a General without experience, but full of <sup>Ant. C. 216.</sup>  
presumption and esteem for himself, was of a quite  
contrary opinion. This is the great inconvenience  
that frequently attends a command divided between  
two Generals, between whom jealousy, contrariety  
of humour, and diversity of views seldom fails to  
excite division. Paulus Æmilius objected to  
Varro the example of the rashness of Sempronius  
and Flaminius. Varro reproached him in his turn,  
that the conduct of Fabius, which he was for imi-  
tating, was a very commodious pretext, for cover-  
ing real cowardice under the specious name of pru-  
dence. He called the gods and men to witness,  
that it was not his fault, if Hannibal, by a long  
and quiet possession, attained a kind of right over  
Italy. That he was in a manner chained up by  
his Collegue, and that their arms were taken out  
of the hands of the soldiers, who were full of ar-  
dor, and desired only to fight.

Varro at last, exasperated by a new insult of  
the Numidians, who had pursued a body of Ro-  
mans almost to the gates of the camp, was finally  
resolved to give battle the next day, when he was  
to command: for the Consuls commanded each  
their day alternately. Accordingly, early in the  
morning the next day, he made his troops ad-  
vance to give battle, without consulting his Col-  
league. Paulus Æmilius followed, being incapa-  
ble of resolving not to second him, though he by  
no means approved his conduct.

Hannibal, after having made his troops sensi-  
ble, that had they been given their choice of a <sup>Hannibal</sup>  
ground for fighting, they could not, superior as <sup>harangues</sup>  
they were in cavalry, have chosen one more for <sup>his troops.</sup>  
their advantage. <sup>Polyb. iii.</sup>  
*Return the gods thanks therefore,* <sup>261.</sup>  
*said he, for having brought the enemy hither, that*  
*you may triumph over them; and think well of me*  
*also*

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

*also for having reduced the Romans to the necessity of fighting. After three great successive victories, what more is wanting to inspire you with confidence, than the remembrance of your own exploits. The former battles have made you masters of the flat country: by this, you will become so of all the cities, riches and power of the Romans. But the question is not to speak; we must act. I hope from the protection of the gods, that you will soon see the effect of my promises.*

*Famous*

*battle of*  
*Cannæ.*

Polyb. iii.

262—267

Liv. xxii.

45—50.

Plut. in

Fab. 182,

183.

Appian.

de Bell.

Ann.

323—328

The two armies were very unequal in number. There was in that of the Romans, including the allies, fourscore thousand foot, and something more than six thousand horse; and in that of the Carthaginians, forty thousand foot, all well disciplined and inured to war, and then thousand horse. Varro, at day-break, having made the troops of the great camp pass the Aufidus, drew them up immediately in battle, after having joined them with those of the little camp. The whole infantry were upon one line, closer and of greater depth than usual. The cavalry was upon the two wings: that of the Romans on the right, supported by the Aufidus; and that of the allies on the left wing. The light-armed troops were advanced in the front of the battle to some distance. Paulus Æmilius commanded the right of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius Geminus, the Consul of the preceding year, was in the centre.

Hannibal immediately drew up his army in one line. He posted his Spanish and Gaulish cavalry on the left, sustained by the Aufidus, to oppose the Roman horse, and upon the same line half his heavy-armed African infantry; then the Spanish and Gaulish infantry, which properly formed the centre; on their right the other half of the African infantry; and lastly, the Numidian horse, which composed the right wing. The light-armed troops were in the front, facing those of the Romans.



mans. Asdrubal had the left, Hanno the right, Hannibal, having his brother with him, reserved the command of the centre to himself. A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

The African troops might have been taken for a body of Romans, so much did they resemble them by the arms, which they had gained in the battles of Trebia and Thrasymenus, and which they then employed against those who had suffered them to be taken from them. The Spaniards and Gauls had shields of the same form; but their swords were very different. Those of the former were equally proper for cutting and thrusting, whereas those of the Gauls cut only with the edge, and to a certain distance. The soldiers of those two nations, especially the Gauls, had a dreadful aspect, in effect of the extraordinary bigness of their bodies. The latter were naked from their belts upwards. The Spaniards wore linnen habits, the extreme whiteness of which, exalted by a border of a purple colour, made a surprizingly splendid appearance.


Hannibal, who knew how to take his advantages as a great Captain, forgot nothing, that could conduce to the victory. A wind peculiar to that region, called in the country the Vulturnus, blew always at a certain period. He took care to draw up in such a manner, that his army, facing the north, had it in their backs, and the enemy, fronting the south, had it in their faces; so that he was not in the least incommoded with it; whereas the Romans, whose eyes it filled with dust, scarce saw before them. From hence we may judge how far Hannibal carried his attention, which nothing seems to escape. Liv. xxii.  
43.  
Plut. in  
Fab. p.  
183.

The two armies marched against each other, and began the charge. After that of the light-armed soldiers on both sides, which was only a kind of prelude, the action began by the two wings

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

wings of the cavalry, on the side of the Aufidus: Hannibal's left wing, which was an old corps, to whose valour he was principally indebted for his successes, attacked that of the Romans with so much force and violence, that they had never experienced the like. This charge was not made in the usual manner of attacks of cavalry, by sometimes falling back, and sometimes returning to the assault; but in fighting man to man and very near, because they had not room enough to extend themselves, being pent up on one side by the river, and on the other by the infantry. The shock was furious, and equally sustained on both sides; and whilst it was still doubtful, to which side the victory would incline, the Roman horse, according to a custom usual enough in their corps; and which was sometimes successful, but was now very ill applied, dismounted and fought on foot. When Hannibal was informed of this, he cried out: *I am as well pleased with them in that posture, as I should be to have them all delivered up to me bound hand and foot.* Accordingly, after having defended themselves with the utmost valour, most of them fell upon the spot. Asdrubal pursued those that fled, and made a great slaughter of them.

Plut. in  
Fab. 183.

Whilst the horse were thus engaged, the infantry of both armies advanced also against each other. The battle began at first in the centre. As soon as Hannibal perceived, that the Romans began to give way, he made the Gauls and Spaniards move that were in the main body, and whom he commanded in person. In proportion as they advanced towards the enemy, he made the right and left form a semicircle like a  placed thus. At first the opposite centre of the Romans charged them. After some resistance the Spaniards and Gauls began to give way, and to lose ground. The rest of the Roman infantry also moved on in order

der to take them in flank. They fell back according to the orders they had received, continuing to fight, and regained the ground, where they had at first been drawn up in battle. The Romans, seeing that the Spaniards and Gauls continued to retreat, continued also to pursue them. Hannibal then, well pleased to see every thing succeed according to his design, and perceiving the moment was come for acting with all his forces, he gave orders, that his Africans should wheel to the right and left upon the Romans. These two bodies, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order, having wheeled about suddenly towards the space, or hollow, into which the Romans had thrown themselves in disorder and confusion, charged them on both sides with vigour, without giving them time to look about them, or leaving them ground to form themselves.

In the mean time, the Numidian cavalry of the right wing was engaged also with the enemy opposite to them, that is, the cavalry of the allies of the Romans. Though they did not distinguish themselves in this battle, and the advantage was equal on both sides, they were however very useful on this occasion. For they found the enemies they had in their front sufficient employment, to prevent them from having time to assist their own people. But when the left wing, where Asdrubal commanded, had routed, as we have said, the whole horse of the right wing of the Romans, and had joined the Numidians, the cavalry of the Romans did not expect to be attacked by them, and fled.

It is said, that Asdrubal then did a thing, which shews his prudence no less than it contributed to the success of the battle. As the Numidians were very numerous, and never did their duty better than when an enemy fled, he ordered them



A. R. 536.  
Ant.C. 216.

to pursue the Romans to prevent their rallying, and led on the Spanish and Gaulish horse to the charge, to support the African infantry. Accordingly he fell upon the Roman foot in the rear; which being attacked at the same time both in the flanks and rear, and surrounded on all sides, was entirely cut to pieces, after having acted prodigies of valour.

Death of  
P. Æmi-  
lius.  
Liv. xxii.  
49.

Paulus Æmilius had been considerably wounded from the beginning of the battle: however he continued to discharge all the duties of a great Captain; till victory having at length entirely declared for the Carthaginians, those who had fought around him, abandoned him, and fled. A legi-  
onary Tribune, called Cn. Lentulus, came by on horseback near the place where the Consul was sitting upon a stone, covered all over with his blood. When he saw him in that sad condition, he pressed him earnestly to get upon his horse, and make off, whilst he had some strength remaining. The Consul, to use the expression of

Animæq;  
magnæ  
prodigum  
Paulam,  
superante  
Pæno.

Horace, prodigal of his great soul, refused that offer. *I have taken my resolution, said he. I will expire upon these heaps of my dead soldiers. But do you take care not to lose the little time you have for escaping from the enemy, through an useless compassion. Go, and tell the Senate from me to fortify Rome, and to make troops enter it for its defence, before the victor arrives to attack it. Tell Fabius in particular, that I lived and died highly sensible and fully convinced of the wisdom of his counsels.* At that moment, a body of the flying troops arrived, and soon after them another of the enemy in pursuit of them; who killed the Consul without knowing him. The horse of Lentulus saved him, through the favour of the tumult. The Consul Varro retired to Venusia, attended only by seventy horse. About  
four

four thousand men escaped the slaughter, and took refuge in the neighbouring cities. A. R. 535.  
Ant. C. 216.

Many of the Romans had remained during the battle in the two camps to guard them, or had retired to them after it. Those of the great camp sent to the others, who were to the number of seven or eight thousand men, to come and join them, in order to their retiring in one body to Canusium, whilst the enemy, fatigued with the battle, and full of wine, were buried in sleep. This proposal was very ill received; and notwithstanding the warm remonstrances of Sempronius, one of the Tribunes of the army, most of them rejected it. Only some of them, filled with courage, followed the Tribune, notwithstanding the opposition of their companions, and having passed through the enemy, arrived in the great camp to the number of six hundred. From thence having joined a greater number, they all retired without danger to Canusium.

Besides the consul Paulus Æmilius, two Quæstors, and one and twenty legionary Tribunes, there perished in this battle many illustrious persons, who had been either Consuls or Prætors. Of this number were Servilius, Consul the year before; Minucius, who had been Consul and General of the horse under Fabius; fourscore Senators, who had served voluntarily out of zeal for their country; and so amazing a number of Knights, that Hannibal sent three bushels of the rings, that distinguished the Knights from the rest of the People, to Carthage. The general loss amounted to at least fifty thousand men, and according to Polybius, to more than seventy thousand. The Carthaginians were so furious against the enemy, that they did not cease killing, till Hannibal, in the greatest heat of the slaughter,

A. R. 556.  
Ant. C. 216.

cried out several times: *Hold, soldiers, spare the conquered.*

On the side of Hannibal, the victory was complete, and he was indebted for it principally, as well as for the preceding ones, to the superiority of his cavalry. He lost four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred horses.

Liv. xxii.

51.  
Plot in  
Fab. 184.

Whilst all the officers were congratulating Hannibal upon his victory; and considering the war as terminated, were advising him to give himself and his soldiers some days rest; Maharbal, General of his horse, who was well convinced, that there was not a moment to be lost, said to him: *Take great care of that; for that you may know of what consequence the gaining of this battle is to you, in five days you shall dine in the Capitol. Only follow me with the foot, I will go before at the head of my horse, that they may see me arrive, before they can know I have begun my march.* (a) The idea of so great a success dazzled Hannibal, and he could not immediately come into it. He therefore answered Maharbal, *that he applauded his zeal, but that it required time to consider his proposal.* I see, replied Maharbal, *the Gods have not given all talents to the same man. You know how to conquer, Hannibal; but not how to use your victory.* It is generally enough believed, that the inactivity of this day on Hannibal's side, saved Rome and her dominions.

Reflection  
upon Han-  
nibal's re-  
fusing to  
besiege  
Rome.

Many, and Livy amongst the rest, condemn Hannibal for this delay, as a capital error. Some

(a) Annibali nimis læta res est visa, majorque quam ut eam itatim capere animo posset. Itaque voluntatem se laudat: Maharbalis, ait: ad cōgruū pensandū, temporis opus

esse. Tum Maharbal, Non omnia nimirum eidem dii dedere. VINCERE SCIS, ANNIBAL, VICTORIA UTINESCIS. Mora ejus diei satis creditur saluti fuisse urbi atque imperio.

are



are more reserved, and cannot, without very convincing proofs, censure so great a Captain; who in all other things does not seem to have ever been wanting either in prudence to make the right choice, or in vivacity and promptitude, to put it in execution. They are besides restrained by the authority, or at least silence of Polybius, who, in speaking of the great consequences of this memorable day, agrees, that the Carthaginians conceived great hopes of carrying Rome on the first assault: but as to him, he does not explain himself concerning what it was necessary to have done in respect to a city very populous, extremely warlike, well fortified, and defended by a garrison of two legions; and he does not drop a word, that implies such a project practicable; or that Hannibal was in the wrong for not having attempted it.

And accordingly, on examining things nearer, we do not find, that the common rules of war admitted him to undertake it. It is certain, that Hannibal's whole infantry before the battle amounted only to forty thousand men; that being diminished six thousand, who had been killed in the action, and a much greater number undoubtedly, who had been wounded, and obliged to quit the field, he had no more than twenty six, or twenty-seven thousand foot in a condition to act; and that that number could neither suffice for forming the circumvallation of a city of such extent as Rome, with a river running through it, nor for attacking it in form, without either machines, munitions, or any of the things necessary in a siege. For the same reason Hannibal, after his success at Thrasymenus, all victorious as he was, had attacked Spoletum ineffectually; and a little after the battle of Cannæ, he was obliged to raise the siege of a small city of no name or strength. And it cannot be denied, that if, on the occasion

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.Polyb. iii.  
268.

Liv. xxii.

Liv. xxii.

18.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

in question, he had miscarried, as he had reason to expect, he would irretrievably have ruined all his affairs. But to judge properly of this fact, it were necessary to be of the military profession, and perhaps cotemporary with the action. This is an antient matter of dispute, upon which it becomes only the skilful to pass judgment. As for me, after having advanced my doubts, I shall not omit to use Livy's words upon this subject.

*The Carthaginians take the spoils of the dead in the field of battle.*

Liv. xxii.  
51.

The day after the battle, as soon as it was light, the Carthaginians began to gather the spoils. How much soever they hated the Romans, they could not consider the slaughter they had made without horror. The field of battle, and all the places adjacent, were covered with dead bodies, according as they had been killed during the battle or in flight. But what attracted their attention most, was a Numidian still alive, lying upon a dead Roman. The first had his ears and nose torn and bleeding. For the Roman, not being able to use his hands, in order to hold and handle his arms, because they were entirely disabled with wounds, had rose from anger to fury, and had died tearing his enemy with his teeth.

*Hannibal makes himself master of the two camps.*

Liv. xxii.  
52.

After they had passed part of the day in stripping the dead of the spoils, Hannibal led his troops on to attack the little camp. His first care was to post a body of troops upon the banks of the Aufidus, to prevent the enemy from having water. But as they were all weary with labour and watching, and most of them covered with wounds, they surrendered sooner than he expected. The capitulation was, that they should deliver up their arms and horses to the victor, retaining only a single habit. That when the prisoners should be ransomed, about seven pounds ten shillings should be paid for each Roman citizen, five pounds for each ally, and fifty for every slave. The Carthaginians

ginians took possession of their persons, and kept them under a good guard, after having separated the citizens from the allies.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

Whilst Hannibal lost a great deal of time on this side, those of the great camp, who had sufficient strength or courage, to the number of four thousand foot and two hundred horse, retired to Canusium, some in bodies, and others dispersed over the country, which was not the most unsafe way. Only the cowardly and the wounded remained, who surrendered themselves to the victor upon the same conditions as those of the little camp.

Hannibal made a very considerable booty. But except men, horses, and a little silver, which was principally upon the furniture of the horses, (for the Romans carried very little plate into the field) he abandoned all the rest to the soldiers.

He afterwards caused the bodies of his own people to be placed in an heap, in order to burn and pay them the last duties. Some authors write, that he caused the Consul's body to be sought, and that having found it, he gave it very honourable interment.

As to those who had retired to Canusium, the inhabitants giving them nothing but quarters, a lady of Apulia, of considerable birth and riches, called Buisa, supplied them with cloaths, provisions, and even money. After the war, the Senate did not fail to express their gratitude to her for so great a generosity, and to confer extraordinary honours upon her.

*Generosity of a lady of Canusium.*  
Liv. *ibid.*

For the rest, as there were four legionary Tribunes amongst these troops, the question was, which of them should command till farther orders. By the consent of them all, that honour was conferred upon P. Scipio then very young, and upon Appius Claudius.



A. R. 536.  
 Ant. C. 216.  
 Young  
 Scipio sup-  
 presses a  
 dangerous  
 conspiracy.  
 Liv. xxii.  
 53.

Whilst they were deliberating amongst themselves upon what was necessary to be done in the present conjuncture, P. Furius Philus, the son of a person of Consular dignity, came to tell them, that they entertained false hopes, and that the Commonwealth was intirely ruined. That a considerable number of the better sort of the youth, with L. Cæcilius Metellus at their head, were endeavouring to get ships, with design to quit Italy, and to embark, in order to retire to some king in alliance with the Romans. Of all the misfortunes, that had fallen upon the commonwealth, there had been no example of so desperate and fatal a resolution. All that were in the Council, were struck with amazement on this news. Most of them kept a mournful silence. Some proposed deliberating upon the affair; when young Scipio, for whom the glory of terminating this war successfully was reserved, affirmed, “ that there was  
 “ no time to be lost in an affair of that nature.  
 “ That the question was to act, and not to deli-  
 “ berate. That those who loved the Common-  
 “ wealth had only to follow him. That there  
 “ could not be greater enemies of the State, than  
 “ men capable of forming such a design.” After these words, he went directly to the house, where Metellus lodged, followed by a great number of the most zealous. And having found the young persons assembled, of whom he had been informed, he drew his sword, and presenting the point to them, he said: *I swear first, that I will not abandon the Commonwealth, and that I will not suffer any one else to abandon it. Great Jupiter, I call upon you to witness my oath, and I consent, if I fail to keep it, that you will cause me and my family to perish by the most cruel of deaths. Cæcilius, do you take the same oath, and all that are here assembled. Whoever refuses to comply, shall die this mo-*

ment. They all swore, being as much terrified as if they had seen and heard the Victor Hannibal; and permitted Scipio to have them guarded in fight.

At the time this passed at Canusium, about four thousand men, horse and foot, who had been dispersed in the flight about the country, repaired to Venusia to the Consul. The inhabitants of that city received them into their houses, where they took great care of them. They supplied all those, that wanted them, with arms and cloaths, and gave each horseman about twelve shillings, and each of the foot about eight shillings. In a word, both in publick and private, they treated them with all possible marks of extreme good-will. They were unwilling it should be said, that the People of their city had been less generous than a single woman of Canusium: such force has good example.

But Busa, notwithstanding her great fortune and good heart, was overwhelmed by the great number of those, who had occasion for her aid. Already more than ten thousand men had repaired into that city. Appius and Scipio having been informed, that one of the Consuls had outlived the loss of the battle, sent him a courier, to let him know what troops they had with them, and to ask whether it was his will, that they should march them to him at Venusia, or should expect him at Canusium. Varro chose rather to go and join them, where they were. When he arrived there, he saw himself at the head of a body of troops, that might pass for a Consular army, and with these forces, if he was not yet in a condition to keep the field, he was at least capable of stopping the enemy by opposing them with the walls of Canusium.

## S E C T. III.

*Consternation, which the confused rumor of the loss of the army occasions at Rome. The Senate assembles. Wise counsel of Fabius to make the necessary dispositions in the city. The Senate receives letters from Varro, which inform them of the present state of affairs. News concerning Sicily. M. Marcellus is appointed to command the troops in the room of Varro. Crime of two Vestals. Q. Fabius Piclor is sent to Delphi. Human victims sacrificed to the Gods. Marcellus takes upon him the command of the troops. M. Junius is created Dictator. Slaves listed. Hannibal permits the prisoners to send deputies to Rome, to treat about their ransom. Cartholon, a Carthaginian officer, ordered to quit the territory of the Commonwealth. Speech of one of the deputies in favour of the prisoners. Speech of Manlius Torquatus against the same prisoners. The Senate refuses to ransom them. Reflexion upon that refusal. Mean fraud of one of the Deputies. Many allies quit the party of the Romans. Varro returns to Rome, where he is very well received. Reflexion upon this conduct of the Roman People.*

A. R. 536.  
 Ant. C. 216.  
*Consternation of Rome on the confused rumor of the defeat of the army.*  
 Liv. xxii.  
 54.

**N**O certain and exact news of what had passed at the battle of Cannæ, had yet been received at Rome ; and it even was not known, that there was still in being the sad remains of which we have just been speaking. The entire defeat of both armies, and the death of the two Consuls, was rumoured. Never had Rome, since the taking of the city by the Gauls, been under such alarm, and in so great and universal a consternation. It was talked, that the Romans had now neither camp, Generals, nor soldiers. That Hannibal



nibal was master of Apulia, and Samnium, as he would soon be of all Italy. Nothing was heard, but cries and groans in the streets ; the women in tears, tearing their hair, and beating their breasts, in the dreadful despair to which they were reduced ; the men, sad and dejected, and inwardly abandoned to a grief, they were desirous to conceal, expressed it in spite of themselves by their silence.

What other nation would not have sunk under the weight of so many calamities ? If we compare the battle of Cannæ with that, which the Carthaginians lost at the islands Ægates, and which reduced them to give up Sicily and Sardinia to the Victor, and afterwards to pay him tribute ; or that which Hannibal himself lost afterwards at the gates of Carthage ; they are in nothing to be compared with it ; except that the loss of them was sustained with less constancy and courage.

Affairs were in this condition, when the Prætors, P. Furius Philus, and M. Pomponius, assembled the Senate, in order to take measures for the preservation of Rome. For they did not doubt, but Hannibal, after having defeated their armies, would immediately set out to attack the Capitol, the taking of which would terminate the war, and compleat the ruin of the Commonwealth. But as the women, who flocked around the Senate-house made the air resound with their cries, and that even before it was known, who was alive and who dead, all families were equally in the greatest affliction : Q. Fabius Maximus was of opinion,

“ that couriers should be immediately dispatched  
 “ upon the Appian and Latine Ways, with orders  
 “ to interrogate those, who had escaped by flight,  
 “ and whom they should meet on their route, to  
 “ know from them the fate of the Consuls and  
 “ army ; where the remains of the troops were ;  
 “ admitting there were any : which way Hanni-

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

*The Senate  
assembles.  
Wise coun-  
sel of Fa-  
bius to  
make the  
necessary  
dispositions  
in the city.  
Liv. xxii.  
55.  
Plut. in  
Fab. 184.*

A. R. 536.  
A. C. 216.

“ bal had directed his march after the battle ;  
 “ what he was actually doing ; and what might  
 “ be conjectured in respect to his future designs.  
 “ He also represented, that for want of the magi-  
 “ strates, whose number was too small in the city,  
 “ the Senators should take care to calm the trou-  
 “ ble and dread, that prevailed in it ; and he  
 “ added a very long detail of all it was necessary  
 “ for them to do in order to succeed in this re-  
 “ spect. That when the tumult should be ap-  
 “ peased, and the minds of the people more calm,  
 “ the Senate should re-assemble to deliberate more  
 “ coolly upon measures for preserving the Com-  
 “ monwealth.”

*The Senate  
 receives  
 letters  
 from Var-  
 ro, which  
 inform  
 them of  
 the present  
 state of  
 affairs.  
 Liv. xxii.  
 56.*

Every body came into this opinion, and it was immediately put in execution. The first thing that was done, was to forbid the women to appear in public, because their despair and clamour served only to deject the People, already too much affected. In the second place, the Senators went from house to house to encourage the heads of families, and to represent to them, that the State did not want resources against the present evils. Fabius himself, instead of appearing timorous, and without hope, as he did when there seemed nothing to fear ; now, when every body was in extreme consternation and horrible anguish, walked about with a grave pace, and a countenance full of assurance and tranquillity ; which, with his serious and consoling discourses, revived the courage, and calmed the grief, of the whole city. And lastly, lest fear should prevail over all other sentiments, and the citizens, by retiring elsewhere, should leave the city without defence, guards were posted at the gates, in order that nobody might go out without permission. When the Senators had dispersed the multitude, that had gathered round the Senate-house and in the Forum,  
 and

and appeased the tumult in all parts of the city, letters arrived from Varro, by which “ he informed the Senate of the death of the Consul Paulus Æmilius and the defeat of the army : “ That as for him, he was actually at Canusium, “ where he was drawing together the remains of “ this defeat : That he had with him about ten “ thousand men in a condition bad enough : That “ (a) Hannibal was still at Cannæ ; where he “ amused himself with gathering the spoils upon “ the field of battle, and setting a rate for the “ ransom of the prisoners in a manner becoming “ neither a great General, nor a Victor.” Soon after all the citizens were informed of their particular losses. And as there was not a family, which was not obliged to wear mourning, it was limited by a decree of the Senate to thirty days, in order, that the festivals and other ceremonies of religion, whether publick or private, should not be interrupted too long.

The Senate had scarce re-entered their house, than they received other letters from Sicily, by which the Prætor T. Otacilius informed them, that the Carthaginian fleet ravaged King Hiero’s dominions. That he had made preparations for sailing to attack it ; but that he had received advice at the same time, that they had another fleet near the islands Ægates, which was preparing to sail to Lilybæum, and to ravage the province of the Roman People, when he should have set out to cover the coasts of Syracuse. That it was therefore necessary to send a new fleet, if they designed to defend Hiero, and the Province of Sicily.

(a) Pœnum federe ad Cannas, in captivorum pretiis prædaque alia, nec victoris animo, nec magni Ducis more, nundinantem.



A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

*M. Marcellus is appointed to command the troops in the room of Varro.*

Liv. xxii.

57.  
*Crime of two vestals.*

Ibid.

*Q. Fabius Pictor is sent to Delphi.*

Polyb. i.  
13.  
III. 164,  
&c.

*Human victims sacrificed to the gods.*

Liv. xxii  
37.

The Senators were of opinion, that M. Claudius Marcellus, who commanded the fleet at Ostia, should be sent to Canusium, and that the Consul should be wrote to, to leave the command of the army to that Prætor, and to come himself to Rome, as soon as he could, and as the good of the Commonwealth would admit.

The fear which so much bad news gave the Romans, was still augmented by a great number of prodigies, of which the most terrifying, was the crime of the Vestals Opimia and Floronia, who both, this same year, suffered themselves to be corrupted. The one, according to custom, was buried alive near the gate Collina; the other killed herself to avoid that punishment. The Decemviri were ordered to consult the books of the Sibyl; and Q. Fabius Pictor was sent to Delphi, to know from the oracle, by what prayers and sacrifices the wrath of the gods might be appeased. This was the Fabius Pictor, who wrote the Roman History from Romulus down to his own times. The work of a Senator, employed in the public affairs, should, I conceive, be of great authority. But Polybius imputes to him a blind passion for his country, which often made him depart from the truth; and Livy himself does not seem to have set any great value upon him.

During the absence of Fabius Pictor, some extraordinary sacrifices were made, as prescribed in the books that contained the destiny of the Romans. Amongst the rest a male and female Gaul, and a Grecian man and woman were sacrificed, by being buried alive in a cave in the beast-market, which had been lined with stone. This place had before been bathed with human blood, according to a rite, that the Romans had borrowed from foreign nations. What blindness was this! What idea had these nations of their gods, to believe that human

human blood was capable of appeasing their wrath? But how could a people, who valued themselves upon their great humanity, and politeness of manners, as the Romans did, give into so cruel and barbarous a superstition? This was the worship, which the devil, *who was a murderer from the beginning*, and had usurped the place of the true God, required from men, and which we should still pay him, if the all-powerful grace of the Redeemer had not delivered us from slavery to him.

In the mean time M. Marcellus sent fifteen hundred men, whom he had raised for the sea-service, to Rome, to guard the city. As to himself, after having sent the third legion to Teanum in Campania with the legionary Tribunes, he left the fleet, with as many soldiers as could be spared, and under the command of P. Furius Philus; and some days after repaired to Canusium by great marches.

M. Junius, having afterwards been created Dictator by the authority of the Senate, appointed Ti. Sempronius General of the horse, and, amongst the new troops, he listed all the young men, who had attained the age of seventeen (which was the time when the Romans first entered to serve in the army) and he even listed some who had not quitted the robe \* *prætecta*, and who, consequently, were under that age. Of these he composed four legions and a body of a thousand horse. At the same time he sent to demand of the allies of the Latine name the contingent they were to furnish in virtue of the treaty. He also caused arms of all kinds to be prepared, without including those which had formerly been taken from the enemy, and which were removed from the temples and porticos to arm the new soldiers.

\* They did not quit the *Prætecta* till seventeen years of age. I have spoke of it, and of the other Roman habits, at the end of the preceding volume.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

*Slaves  
listed.*

Liv. *ibid.*

Besides these, the Romans made levies of a new kind. For the Commonwealth not being capable of supplying a sufficient number of free citizens, listed eight thousand of the most robust slaves, first asking them, whether they took arms with their own entire consent and good-will: a very remarkable circumstance. They did not believe, that soldiers raised by force were to be relied upon. They preferred soldiers of this kind to those, who were Hannibal's prisoners, and whom that General offered to restore for a less ransom than the price paid for these slaves.

*Hannibal  
permits the  
Roman  
prisoners to  
send deputies  
to  
Rome to  
treat of  
their ran-  
som.*

Liv. xxii.  
55.

Hannibal, after the victory at Cannæ, acting rather like a Conqueror than a General, that remembered he had still enemies to overcome, caused a state of all the prisoners to be laid before him. He separated the allies from the Romans; spoke to the first with the same professions of good-will and amity, as he had before after the battle of Thrasymenus; and dismissed them all without ransom. Then having ordered the Romans to be brought before him, which he had not hitherto done, he spoke to them with lenity enough. He told them, " That it was not his intention to de-  
" stroy their nation; that he fought against them  
" only for glory and empire. That as his fore-  
" fathers had given way to the valour of the  
" Romans, he would use his utmost endeavours to  
" reduce the Romans to give way in their turn to  
" his good fortune and courage. That therefore  
" he would permit the prisoners to ransom them-  
" selves. That he demanded for each horseman  
" about twelve pounds, for each of the foot about  
" seven, and about two pounds ten shillings for  
" every slave."

Though Hannibal had considerably increased the ransom before agreed upon, the prisoners however accepted with joy the conditions, though unjust,



unjust, upon which they were permitted to withdraw out of the hands of the enemy. They therefore chose ten of the most considerable, amongst them, whom they sent to Rome to the Senate. Hannibal desired no other security for their faith, than the oath which they took to return. He sent Carthalon, a Carthaginian of the greatest distinction, along with them, to propose conditions to the Romans, in case he found them disposed to make peace. When these deputies had quitted the camp of the Carthaginians, one of them, pretending to have forgot something, returned thither, and rejoined his companions before night.

When it was known at Rome, that they were upon the point of arriving in the city, the Dictator sent one of his Lictors to Carthalon, to order him in his name to quit the territory of the Commonwealth before night. Is this then the Chief of a People conquered and reduced to extremities, who assumes such a tone of haughtiness and empire to his conquerors?

As to the deputies of the prisoners, he admitted them to an audience of the Senate, when M. Junius, the principal person amongst them, spoke thus in the name of them all. *There is nobody, fathers, that does not know, no people have less regard for the prisoners of their country than the Romans: But, without having too good an opinion of our cause, we may affirm, that no prisoners ever deserved your indifference or contempt less than we. For it was neither in the field of battle, nor through fear, that we delivered up our arms to the enemy: but after having fought till night, on heaps of dead bodies, we at last retired into our camp. During the remains of day, and the whole night following, notwithstanding the fatigues we had undergone, notwithstanding the wounds, with which we were covered, we defended*

*our*

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*Carthalon, a Carthaginian officer, ordered to quit the lands of the Commonwealth.*

*Liv. ibid. Speech of one of the deputies to the Senate in favour of the prisoners.*

*Liv. xxii.*

*59.*

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A. C. 216.

our intrenchments. The next day, seeing ourselves invested by a victorious army, and having our communication with the water cut off, without any hopes of opening ourselves a way through an innumerable multitude of enemies; and convinced besides, that it was no crime to save some small remains of an army, that had left fifty thousand men upon the field of battle; we at length treated concerning our ransom, and delivered up to the enemy the arms, that could no longer be of any use to us.

We knew, that our ancestors had given the Gauls gold to ransom themselves; and that our fathers, though so severe in respect to the conditions of peace, had however sent Ambassadors to Tarentum, to treat about the ransom of prisoners. And notwithstanding that, the battle, which we lost at Allia against the Gauls, and that which Pyrrhus gained against us at Heraclea, were less pernicious to the Commonwealth by the slaughter of our soldiers, than by their fear and flight. Whereas the fields of Cannæ are covered with the dead bodies of the Romans; and if we escaped the enemy's fury, it was because their arms were blunted, and their strength exhausted by slaughtering us.

There are even some of us who cannot be reproached with having quitted the field of battle; but who having been appointed to guard the camp, fell with the camp itself into the hands of the enemy.

I do not envy the fate or condition of any of my countrymen and fellow-soldiers, nor desire to justify myself at their expence. But, unless there be merit in running better, and flying faster and more successfully than others, I do not think those to be preferred to us, most of whom quitted the field of battle without arms, and did not stop till they had reached Venusia or Canusium; nor that they can boast of being able to do the Commonwealth better service than we. You will find good and valiant soldiers in them; but the remem-

*remembrance that we are indebted to your goodness for having been ransomed, and reinstated in our country, will induce us to exceed them if possible by our valour and zeal.*

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Ant. C. 216.

*You are raising soldiers of all ages and conditions. I am informed, that you are arming eight thousand slaves. We are very near the same number of citizens, and our ransom will not exceed what it will cost you to purchase them. For I should injure the Roman name, if I compared them with us in any other manner.*

*If you make any difficulty to chuse the side of favour and humanity in respect to us, a treatment for which we do not believe we have given room; consider to what enemy you are going to abandon us. Is it to a Pyrrhus, who treated our prisoners like his friends and guests; or to a Barbarian, to a Carthaginian, equally avaricious and cruel? If you saw the chains, with which your citizens are laden; if you were witnesses of the misery, in which they are made to languish, you would undoubtedly be no less moved with their condition, than if you were to turn your eyes upon the fields of Cannæ, covered with heaps of the dead bodies of your soldiers.*

*You hear the groans, and may see the tears of our relations, who expect your answer in the most cruel anxiety. What do you believe must be the alarm of our absent companions concerning the decree you are going to pronounce, which will determine in respect to their lives and liberty.*

*Though Hannibal, contrary to his disposition, should incline to treat us with lenity and goodness, could we endure life, after you should have judged us unworthy of being ransomed? The prisoners, whom Pyrrhus dismissed in former times without ransom, returned to Rome along with the principal persons of the city, who had been sent to him to treat of their ransom. For me, I should return into my country, a citizen of*



A. R. 536.  
 ABL. C. 216.

*less value than a small sum of money. Every one has his maxims, and manner of thinking. I know, that I am exposed to lose my life: but I fear much less to die, than to live without honour; and I should think myself eternally dishonoured, if it should appear, that you had condemned us as wretches unworthy of your compassion. For it will never be imagined, that it was on account of the money you are desirous to save.*

As soon as he had done speaking, the croud of their relations, who were not far from the assembly, began to raise mournful cries. They stretched out their hands towards the Senators, and implored them to restore them their children, brothers, fathers, and husbands: for the occasion had also induced the women to come into the Forum, to join their prayers with those of the men. After the people were made to remove, they began to collect the voices. Opinions were very much divided. The most compassionate were for ransoming them with the public money. Others maintained, that the Commonwealth was not in a condition to be at that expence: that it sufficed to suffer them to ransom themselves with their own money: they added, that the State might aid such as had not ready money, on condition, that they should engage their lands or houses for the payment of the money, that should be lent them.

*Speech of  
 Manlius  
 Torquatus  
 against the  
 prisoners.*

Liv. xxii.

60.

T. Manlius Torquatus then, one of the most illustrious Senators, who had been twice Consul, but who was still more distinguished by the ancient severity, which in the opinion of many he carried even into cruelty, when it came to his turn to speak, explained himself in the following terms. *If the deputies had been contented with asking, that the prisoners should be ransomed, without attacking the reputation of others, I should have given my opinion in one word. I should only have exhorted you*

to follow the example set you by your fathers, and from which we cannot depart without ruining military discipline. But as they have almost made it for their glory to have surrendered themselves to the enemy, and have made no difficulty to prefer themselves, not only to those who were taken in the field of battle, but even to those who retired to Venusia and Canusium, and to the Consul Varro himself, I think it incumbent on me to let you know all that passed after the battle of Cannæ. I wish I had now for my auditors the soldiers of Canusium, the irreproachable witnesses of every one's valour and cowardice; or at least P. Sempronius, whose counsel and example had they regarded, they would now be soldiers in our camp, and not prisoners in the hands of the enemy. But what was their conduct? From the time that the greatest part of the enemy had re-entered their camp, either to rest themselves after the fatigues of the battle, or to give themselves up to the joy that always succeeds victory, an whole night passed, in which they might have forced their way through the few Carthaginians, that were left to oppose a retreat, which seven thousand men were capable of opening sword in hand, even in the midst of an whole army. But they had neither hearts to undertake it themselves, nor docility enough to follow him, who set them the example, and exhorted them to imitate him. During the greatest part of the night, Sempronius never ceased advising and pressing them to follow him, whilst the enemy were still but in small numbers around their camp, whilst all was in profound silence, and the night would cover their retreat. It was in vain for him to remonstrate to them, that before day appeared, they would arrive in the cities of the allies, where they would have nothing farther to fear; and to animate them, he mentioned several examples of the like nature. Nothing was capable of moving you. He shewed you a way, that led to safety with glory; and

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

*your courage failed you, even when the question was to save your lives. You had before your eyes fifty thousand of your citizens and allies, that lay dead upon the field of battle : and so many examples of courage could not inspire you with any. And you were not only contented with being abject and cowardly ; you not only refused to follow him that gave you good counsel, but you endeavoured to keep him with you, to stop himself, if at the head of a body of soldiers more valiant than you, he had not opened his way through cowards and traitors sword in hand. Sempronius was obliged to force a passage through his own citizens, before he forced one through the enemy. And should Rome regret the loss of such soldiers ? Of seven thousand men only six hundred had the valour to return free, and with their arms in their hands, into their country, whilst forty thousand of the enemy could neither deter, nor keep them back. With how much more ease would two whole legions have executed the same enterprize ? To conclude, I shall reduce my opinion to these few words. I believe you ought no more to ransom these men, than to give up those to Hannibal, who opened themselves a way through the enemy with the greatest valour, and gloriously restored themselves to their country.*

*The Senate  
refuses to  
ransom the  
prisoners*

Liv. xxii.  
61.

This speech made a great impression. The Senators, moved with Manlius's discourse, had less regard to the ties of blood, in which they stood with most of the prisoners, than to the fatal consequences, that an indulgence, so little conformable to the severity of their ancestors, might have. Besides which, they did not believe it proper to be at an expence, that would at the same time exhaust the treasury of the commonwealth, and furnish Hannibal with a supply, of which it was well known he was in extreme want. It was therefore resolved not to ransom the prisoners. This sad answer, and the loss of so many citizens, added to those



those who had been killed in the battle, excited new sorrow in every heart; and the whole multitude, that had remained at the entrance of the Senate-house, followed the deputies to the gates of the city with tears in their eyes, and making lamentable moan.

One can scarce refrain from taxing the inflexible rigor, with which the Senate rejected the request of seven thousand prisoners, whose case seemed to plead much in their favour, with excessive and inhuman cruelty. If the maxim of conquering or dying, and never to give up their arms to the enemy, had been a maxim inviolably observed by the Romans, we should be less surprized. But that was not the case; we have seen, on more than one occasion, the prisoners of war ransomed by the Romans. Indeed it might be that reason itself that induced them now to shew themselves so firm and inexorable, in order to give new vigour, by a signal example, to that maxim, which they considered with reason as the strongest support of the State, and, which could alone render them invincible, by rendering them formidable and superior to all their enemies. Accordingly Polybius observes, and his remark well confirms what we say here, that one of the reasons which had induced Hannibal to propose the ransom of the prisoners, was to deprive them, if possible, of that ardor of courage, that made them so terrible, and that determinate resolution of dying rather than to give up their arms; by shewing them in this ransom an assured resource, even though they should surrender to the enemy. And he adds, that it was the knowledge the Senators had of this design of Hannibal, which rendered them inexorable.

A. R. 536.  
Ant.C. 216.

*Reflections upon that refusal.*

Polyb. vi. 500.

*Mean fraud of one of the deputies.*

Liv. xxii. 61.

One of the deputies returned to his house, believing he had acquitted himself of his oath by going

A. R. 536.  
Ann. C. 216.

ing back fraudulently into Hannibal's camp, under the pretence of having forgot something. But so mean a fraud, that dishonoured the Roman name, was no sooner known, than it was told in full Senate. It was the opinion of every body, that he should be seized, put under a guard, and carried back to Hannibal's camp.

Many of  
the allies  
quit the  
side of the  
Romans.

Liv. xxii.  
61.

After the battle of Cannæ ensued the revolt of Italy. The allies of the Romans, whose fidelity had been unalterable till that day, began to stagger, without any other reason than the fear of seeing the Commonwealth destroyed. The names of the States, that quitted the party of the Romans, but at different times, some sooner, some later, were as follows. The Campanians, Atellani, Calatini, Hirpini, part of Apulia, all the Samnites except the Pentri, the Bruttii, and Lucanians; to whom may be added the Sallentini, all the coast inhabited by the Greeks, the Metapontini, the Tarentines, the Crotonienses, the Locri, and all the Cisalpine Gauls.

Plut. in  
Fab. 184.

We have here the effect of an injudicious ill-timed battle, and what Fabius had foreseen: Whereas before it Hannibal had neither city, magazine nor port in Italy in his possession, and could not subsist his troops without great difficulties; and that only from day to day, by what he could plunder and carry off having no safe convoys, nor any provisions for this war, and running here and there with his army, one might almost say, like a great body of robbers: instead of this unhappy condition, he saw himself on a sudden master of a great part of Italy, with provisions and forage in vast abundance. The value of a wise and experienced General was then known. What before the battle was called slowness and timidity in Fabius, soon after seemed, not the effect of human reason, but, says Plutarch, of a divine genius,

nus, that had foreseen at such a distance things that were to happen, and which seemed scarce credible to those, who made so fatal an experience of them. A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

But what is astonishing here, is that so many disgraces and losses, which happened one upon another, could not oblige the Romans to hear the least word of peace. And lastly, what exceeds every thing that can be imagined of this kind, is the glorious reception, which they made Varro at his return, after a defeat of which himself had been the principal and almost sole cause. When it was known, that he was upon the point of entering Rome, all the orders of the State went out to meet him, and return him thanks for not having despaired of the Commonwealth, and that, in so great a misfortune, he had not abandoned it, but was come to resume the helm, and to put himself at the head of the laws, and of his citizens, as not judging them yet without resource. There is no punishment, of which a General, who had sustained a like loss, or even a much less, would not have been thought worthy at Carthage. *Varro returns to Rome, and is very well received.*  
Plut. in Fab. 184.  
Liv. xxii. 61.  
Paulum pudit, Varro non desperavit, Flor.

This singular stroke gives us great room for admiring the wisdom of the Roman Senate. What a difference there is between Rome and Carthage in respect to the spirit and principles of government! Is it really good policy to make Generals accountable for their success? May they not happen to be unfortunate without any fault of theirs? But, though it should be through their fault, that a battle, a war, should have been unsuccessful, does that fault (I except treason) deserve to be punished with death? If it is ignorance in the art of war, or even cowardice, ought not the State or Prince that chose them, to impute that thought to themselves? Besides which, are there not punishments more conformable to humanity, and at the



A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 226.

same time more useful to the State? Amongst the Romans a fine, a slight disgrace, a kind of voluntary exile, seemed sufficient punishments for their Generals; and even those were used but very rarely. They chose rather to give them time and occasion to amend their faults by noble exploits, which entirely obliterated the shame and remembrance of them, and preserved Generals for the Commonwealth, that might become capable of rendering it service. The barbarous custom, still actually observed amongst the Turks, with whom we see, in a very short space of time, three or four Grand Vizirs leave their heads upon the scaffold, or perish by the fatal bow-string; is that custom, I say, a proper means for inspiring those with courage and zeal, who are appointed to command? But, to return to the Romans, and the conduct they observed in respect to Varro, if they had condemned him to die, as he seemed to deserve, after having occasioned more than fifty thousand citizens to perish, how capable would such a decree have been of augmenting the consternation and despair of the publick, which rose but too high already: whereas the favourable reception which they gave the Consul, intimated to the people, that the evil was not without remedy, and made them believe, that the Senate had certain and present resources.

The conduct of the Senate in respect to Varro was always equally sustained. He was continued in command several years; but with the precaution of only giving him commissions of little importance: so that his person was always honoured, but without exposing the State to the consequences of his incapacity.

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BOOK

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## BOOK THE FIFTEENTH.

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# THE ROMAN HISTORY.

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### S E C T. I.

*Hannibal, after the battle of Cannæ, marches into Campania. He goes towards Capua, a city abandoned to luxury and voluptuousness. Pacuvius Calavius subjects the Senate of that city to the People, and thereby to himself. Causes of the luxury and debauchery of the Campanians. They send Ambassadors to Varro, who discovers to them too much in respect to the loss sustained at Cannæ. The same Ambassadors are sent to Hannibal. Conditions of the alliance of the Campanians with Hannibal. He is received into Capua. Perolla proposes to his father to kill Hannibal. Calavius dissuades him from so horrid a design. Hannibal's magnificent promises to the Campanians. He demands Decius Magius to be delivered up to him: which is complied with immediately. Magius reproaches the Campanians with their cowardice. He is driven by a storm into Egypt. Fabius Pictor brings back the answer of the oracle of Delphi to Rome.*

A. R. 536.  
 Ant. C. 216.  
*Hannibal,*  
*after the*  
*battle of*  
*Cannæ,*  
*goes to*  
*Campania*  
 Liv. xxii.  
 1.

**H**annibal, after having conquered the Romans at Cannæ, and taken and plundered their camp, marched immediately from Apulia into Samnium, and entered the country of the Hirpini, where the city of \* Compfa was delivered up to him. After having left all his plunder and baggage there, he divided his army into two bodies. Mago, with the one, had orders to receive such of the cities, as surrendered of themselves, into the alliance of the Carthaginians, or to reduce those which should make resistance. Hannibal with the other, crossed all Campania, advanced towards the † lower sea, with design to make himself master of Naples (*Neapolis*) in order to have a maritime city at his disposal, which would put him in a condition to receive the aids Carthage should send him. But having considered more narrowly the height and solidity of the walls of that city, he saw, that he should get nothing by attacking it, and desisted from that enterprize.

*He turns*  
*towards*  
*Capua, a*  
*city aban-*  
*doned to*  
*luxury.*  
 Liv. xxiii.  
 2.  
*Pacuvius*  
*Calavius*  
*subjects the*  
*Senate of*  
*Capua to*  
*the People,*  
*and there-*  
*by to him-*  
*self.*  
 ibid. 2—4

From thence he turned his march towards Capua. The inhabitants of that city were plunged in luxury and voluptuousness. These were the fruits of a long peace, and continual prosperity, during a great number of years. But, in this general corruption, the greatest evil of Capua was the abuse, which the people made of their liberty. Pacuvius Calavius had found the secret of making the Senate dependant on the People, and thereby of subjecting it to himself. This popular citizen, though noble, had by bad methods acquired infinite credit at Capua. The year that the Romans were defeated at Thrasymenus, he was principal magistrate of that city. He was perswaded, that

\* Now Conza in the ulte-  
 rior Principality.

† Mare inferum, that washes  
 the coasts of Campania.



the People, who had long hated the Senate, and who are always fond of innovations, would take occasion from this defeat to proceed to great extremities ; as to assassinate the Senate, and give up Capua to Hannibal, in case that General approached with his victorious army. Pacuvius was a bad man ; but not of the number of those abandoned wretches of the first class, to whom the most enormous crimes are easy. He was very well pleased to lord it in his country, but he did not desire, that it should be utterly ruined ; and he knew, that a State is absolutely undone, when a public council subsists no longer in it. He therefore conceived a stratagem, from which he was in hopes of deriving two advantages at once, *viz.* to save the Senate, and to subject it entirely to the People and himself.

In order to this, he assembled the Senators, and represented to them, “ that they were threatned  
 “ with extreme danger. That the populace did  
 “ not intend to revolt in order to destroy the  
 “ Senate afterwards, but that their design was to  
 “ rid themselves of the Senate, by killing all, of  
 “ whom it was composed, in order to give them-  
 “ selves afterwards to Hannibal. That he knew  
 “ a means to preserve them from that danger : but  
 “ that it was previously necessary, that forgetting  
 “ all differences, which had happened concerning  
 “ the government of the State, they should aban-  
 “ don themselves entirely to his faith and ho-  
 “ nour.” And as soon as all the Senators, in  
 their terror, had assured him, that they would  
 implicitly follow his counsels : “ I shall shut you  
 “ up in the Senate-house, said he to them, and  
 “ pretending to approve a design, which it would  
 “ be in vain for me to oppose, and to enter my-  
 “ self into the conspiracy, I shall assuredly find  
 “ means to save your lives. You may rely  
 “ upon

A. R. 536.  
Ann. C. 216.

“ upon my word. I am ready to give all the security for this that you shall demand.” When they seemed to confide in his promises, he caused the hall, where they were assembled, to be shut, and placed guards in the porch, to prevent any body from coming in or going out.

Then having assembled the People: *You have long desired, said he, to punish the crimes of the wicked and detestable Senators. You may now satiate your revenge. I have them shut up in the Senate-house; and am going to give them up to your daggers, single and unarmed. Follow therefore the impulses of a just indignation. But remember however, that you ought to prefer your own interests to the pleasure of gratifying your resentment. For in a word, if I am not mistaken, it is only against these Senators you are incensed; and your design is not, that Capua should absolutely remain without any publick council. You must either give yourselves a King, which you have in horror; or you must have a Senate; which is the only council of a free State. In order to this you must, by the same act, do two things equally important: which is, to destroy the old Senate, and choose a new one. The Senators are going to appear before you one after another. I shall ask you what you resolve in respect to each of them. The sentence you pronounce, shall be followed with the execution. But, before each criminal is punished, you will take care to nominate an honest man and a good citizen to supply his place.*

After this discourse, he sat down, caused all the names of the Senators to be thrown into an urn, and ordered, that the person whose name was first drawn should be brought out of the Senate. As soon as his name was heard, all cried out, that he was a vile wretch, and merited nothing but the gibbet. *I see plainly, said Pacuvius, that you condemn this man. Before you punish him, substitute another in his room who is a man of probity, and*  
capable

*capable of being a good Senator.* All the citizens continued silent at first, for want of knowing a man of worth. At length, one of the most impudent of the multitude, having ventured to name one, they set up a cry on all sides; some saying, they did not know him, others reproaching him with the meanness of his birth, the low trade he followed, or the irregularity of his manners. Still greater difficulties were found in respect to the second and third, that they thought fit to propose; so that the impossibility of finding a better man, than him they had at first condemned, obliged all the citizens to return to their houses, declaring of all evils the most supportable to be That, to which People are accustomed; and they left the Senators in peace.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

Pacuvius having thus saved the lives of the Senators, he subjected them, by this pretended service, to his power, much more than to that of the People. From thenceforth he exercised an absolute sway in the city, without being obliged to use violence, every body voluntarily submitting to him. The Senators, forgetting their rank, and even their liberty, flattered the people, and paid an abject court to them. They invited the meanest of the citizens to their tables, and when any cause was to be tried, in order to gain the favour of the multitude, they declared highly for him, who had them on his side. In a word, in all the deliberations of the Senate the decision was just as the People approved.

The inhabitants of Capua were in all times much addicted to luxury and voluptuousness. This disposition, which was in a manner natural to them, was kept up and confirmed by the fertility of their country, and the neighbourhood of the sea; two sources which supplied them not only with what was necessary to life, but also with all that could gratify

*Causes of  
the luxury  
and vices  
of the Cam-  
panians.*  
Liv. xxiii.



A. R. 536.  
Ann. C. 216.

gratify the senses, and render them effeminate and cowardly. But since this last event, the abject complacency of the Great, and the excessive licentiousness of the multitude, occasioned, that no body set any bounds to their expences, or gave any check to their passions. The Laws, Magistrates, and Senate, were derided with impunity. And to crown all their evils, after the battle of Cannæ, the respect they had for the Roman people, which had alone been capable of keeping them within some bounds of moderation, was changed into contempt. The sole consideration, that prevented them from quitting their ancient allies directly, in order to go over to the Carthaginians, was that many of the most powerful families of Capua had allied themselves by marriage to those of Rome; and the Romans had chosen out of the troops, supplied them by the Campanians for the war, three hundred horse of the principal families of Capua, and had sent them to Sicily, and distributed them in the garrisons of that province.

*The Campanians send Ambassadors to Varro, who discovers too much to them concerning the defeat at Cannæ.*

It was not without abundance of difficulty, that the fathers and nearest relations of those horse prevailed, that Ambassadors should be sent to the Roman Consul upon the subject of the defeat at Cannæ, They found him still at Venusia with a small number of soldiers half-armed, in a condition highly capable of exciting compassion in good and faithful allies, but which could only inspire contempt in a people so proud, and so little sensible to faith and honour, as those of Capua. The Consul's discourse served only to increase that disposition. For, after the deputies had declared, that the People of Capua shared as much as possible in the misfortune that had happened to the Romans, and had offered him in the name of their State all the aids they might have occasion for; Varro, as if

he

he expressly designed to make the Roman people contemptible to allies, whose character he ought to have known, “ talked to the deputies of the  
“ battle of Cannæ (a) as of a blow, that left Rome  
“ neither strength, resource, hope, or any means  
“ of rising up of herself from so deplorable a  
“ state. That legions and cavalry, arms and en-  
“ signs, men and horses, money and provisions,  
“ were all wanting. That if the Campanians  
“ desired to shew themselves good and faithful al-  
“ lies, they ought to think, not of aiding the  
“ Romans in the war, but of almost entirely sus-  
“ taining it in their stead. That as for the rest, it  
“ was as much for their interest as that of the  
“ Romans, not to suffer Hannibal to prevail over  
“ them, unless they would make a people equally  
“ perfidious and cruel their masters, become the  
“ conquest of the Numidians and Moors, and re-  
“ ceive laws from Africa and Carthage.”

The deputies, after this discourse, withdrew, *The same*  
expressing some outward concern, but inwardly *Ambassa-*  
transported to see Rome reduced to so deplorable *dors are*  
a condition. Vibius Virius, one of them, said to *sent to*  
his colleague on their return, “ That the time was *Hannibal.*  
“ come, when the Campanians could not only re-  
“ cover the lands unjustly taken from them by  
“ the Romans, but also acquire the empire of all  
“ Italy. That they could make an alliance with  
“ Hannibal upon whatever conditions they plea-  
“ sed; and that after that General had terminated  
“ the war, and should return victorious into Afri-  
“ ca with his army, it was not to be doubted, but  
“ he would leave them masters of Italy.” They

(a) Nihil, ne quod supple- aut binis postero die amissis  
remus quidem, nobis reliquit castris, ponerunt. Itaque non  
fortuna. Legiones equitatus, juvetis nos in bello oportet,  
arma, signa, equi virique, pe- sed penè bellum pro nobis sus-  
cunia, commeatus, aut in acie, cipiatis. *Liv.*

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

were all of Virius's opinion. When they returned to Capua, and had given an account of their embassy, there was nobody, that did not consider the Roman Commonwealth as absolutely ruined. The People, and the greatest part of the Senators, would have immediately abandoned the Romans, if the seniors, by the authority they still retained, had not deferred that change for some days. But at length numbers prevailed over the sounder part, and it was concluded, that the same deputies should be sent to Hannibal.

*Conditions  
of the alli-  
ance of the  
Campani-  
ans with  
Hannibal.  
Liv. xxiii.  
7.*

The Ambassadors made an alliance with him upon the following conditions. “ That neither  
“ the generals nor magistrates of Carthage should  
“ have any right over the citizens of Capua. That  
“ they should not be obliged to bear arms against  
“ their will, to hold any office, or pay any tri-  
“ bute. That Capua should be governed accord-  
“ ing to its own laws, and by its own magistrates,  
“ as before the treaty. That Hannibal should  
“ put into the hands of the Campanians three  
“ hundred prisoners, to be chosen by themselves,  
“ whom they should exchange for the three hun-  
“ dred Campanians in the Romans service in Sici-  
“ ly.” Besides these conditions, which were ex-  
pressed in the treaty, the people of Capua proceed-  
ed to a cruelty against the Romans, which Han-  
nibal had not required. They seized all the Ro-  
man officers, and other citizens, who were in their  
power, either at Capua for the affairs of the war,  
or for what concerned themselves in their private  
capacities; and having shut them up in baths un-  
der pretence of securing their persons, they put  
them to death with unheard-of cruelty, by stifling  
them with the steam of these places, which depriv-  
ed them of respiration.

*Horrible  
cruelty of  
the Cam-  
panians.*

Decius



Decius Magius had opposed this act of inhumanity, as well as the sending of the embassy to Hannibal to the utmost: (a) He was a man, that wanted nothing to be considered in the highest degree by his country, but to have to do with a people in their senses. When he saw, that Hannibal sent a garrison into Capua, he represented to them in the most lively colours, the deplorable condition, to which the Tarentines were formerly reduced, and the miseries they suffered, in consequence of having given themselves an imperious and violent master in the person of Pyrrhus, and of having received a garrison he sent into their city. That of Hannibal having been admitted notwithstanding his remonstrances, he however did not desist. He exhorted them in the strongest terms, either to drive it out of their city, or if they desired, by a glorious and memorable action to expiate the crime they had committed, in betraying their antient allies in so shameful a manner, to put Hannibal's soldiers to the sword, and at that price to retrieve the amity of the Roman People. As Magius talked publickly in this manner, Hannibal was soon informed of it. He immediately sent him orders to come to him. Magius replied haughtily, that he would not; and that Hannibal had no authority over the inhabitants of Capua. That General then in a rage ordered, that he should be laid in chains, and dragged by force to his camp. But, after some moments reflexion, apprehending, that so violent a treatment might irritate the Campanians, and excite some tumult in the city, he sent a courier to Marius Blaius Prætor of the Campanians, to inform him, that he would come himself to Capua the next day; and accord-

A. R. 156.  
Ant. C. 236.

*Decius  
Magius  
opposes the  
reception of  
Hannibal.  
Liv. xxiii.  
7—9.*

(a) Vir, cui ad summan auctoritatem nihil præter sanam civium mentem defuit.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

ingly he set out, as he had said, with a small number of soldiers.

*Hannibal*  
*is received*  
*into Ca-*  
*puæ.*

The Prætor having assembled the citizens, ordered them to go in a body with their wives and children to meet Hannibal. All the world complied in consequence, not only out of obedience, but curiosity and desire to see a General, who had made himself famous by so many victories. Magius did not quit the city. But, that it might not be said, that fear prevented him from appearing, as having something to reproach himself with, he did not keep within doors. He walked in the public place with his son and a small number of his friends; whilst all the city was in motion to receive Hannibal, and to have the pleasure of considering the person of so great a man.

Who would have expected in a city abandoned to luxury and debauch, and given up to slavery, to have found a citizen of so generous a zeal for the safety and liberty of his country, and of a courage so intrepid and so much superior to all fear. Perhaps he carried it too far. This cool behaviour and tranquillity of a man, threatened with certain danger; who affects to walk in the publick place with his friends, favours much of bravado and insult. Magius, through an immoderate desire of glory, seemed to provoke death.

Tacit.

*Famam Fatumque provocabat.*

Hannibal had no sooner entered the city, than he demanded that the Senate should be assembled.

He was desired not to enter upon any serious affair then, and to permit, that the first day he honoured them with his presence, and which the city of Capua considered as a festival, might be passed in rejoicing. Notwithstanding his natural ardor, he did himself violence; and not to refuse the Campanians the first favour they asked of him, he passed the greatest part of the day in visiting, what

what there was of curious and remarkable in the city. A. R. 536.  
Ant C. 216.

He lodged in the house of Stenius and Pacuvius, two brothers of the greatest distinction in Capua for their birth and riches. Pacuvius Calavius, the head of the faction, that had engaged Capua in Hannibal's interests, carried his son Perolla thither, after having forced him with difficulty out of the company of Decius Magius, in conjunction with whom he had always strongly supported the party of the Romans against the Carthaginians; neither the example of the greatest part of his countrymen, nor paternal authority, being able to make him change his opinion. Hannibal was informed of the conduct and inclinations of this young man; nor did his father endeavour to justify him; but by his prayers he obtained pardon for him. Hannibal granted it with so good a grace, that he even invited him and his father to an entertainment given him by Minius, to which none else were admitted except Jubellius Taurea, a man famous for his bravery in war.

They (a) fate down to table before \* the usual time; and, which then seemed to be a kind of debauch, they began to eat a great while before night. This feast was magnificent, and spoke neither the manners and frugality of Carthage, nor the austerity of military discipline. The entertainment was such an one, as we may suppose it, in the most opulent and voluptuous house of a city devoted to luxury and pleasure. All the guests appeared in the greatest gaiety. Only Pe-

(a) Cœperunt epulari deſa, omnibus voluptatum ille-  
die: & convivium non ex cebris inſtructum. *Liv.*  
more Punico, aut militari diſ- \* *I ſhall relate the cuſtom of*  
ciplina eſſe, ſed, ut in civi- *the antients in reſpect to meals*  
tate atque etiam domo luxuri- *in the ſequel.*



A. R. 536.  
A. C. 216.

rolla continued to wear a countenance sad enough ; whilst neither the invitations of the masters of the house, nor of Hannibal himself, could induce him to have any share in the common joy. He excused himself on account of his health ; and his father added, that it was no wonder he appeared disordered and in confusion in the presence of Hannibal.

*Perilla*  
*sees his*  
*father to*  
*kill Han-*  
*nibal.*

Towards the evening, his father having quitted the room of the feast, he followed him into a garden behind the house. And there taking him aside : *Father*, said he, *I am going to inform you of a design, which will not only obtain us pardon from the Romans for our revolt, but will place us in higher credit and consideration with them than ever.* Pacuvius, in great surprize, asked him what it was ? Upon which the young man opening his robe, shewed him a dagger which hung at his gash. *I am going*, said he, *to seal our alliance with the Romans in the blood of Hannibal. I thought proper to apprize you of it first, that, if you did not think fit to be a witness of the action, you might withdraw.*

*Calavius*  
*dissuades*  
*his son*  
*from his*  
*design.*

Calavius, in as much terror, as if he had seen the blood of Hannibal shed, said : (a) *Son, I beg and*  
*conjure*

(a) Per ego te, inquit, fili, quæcumque jura liberos jungunt parentibus, precor quæloque, ne ante oculos patris facere & pati omnia nefanda velis. Paucæ horæ sunt, intra quas jurante: per quicquid deorum est, dextræ dextras jungentes, fidem obstrinximus, ut iacratu fido manus, digressi ab colloquio, extemplo in eum armaremus? Surgis ab hospitali mensa, ad quam tertius Campanorum adhibitus ab Annibale es, ut eam ipsam

mensam cruentares hospitis sanguine? Annibalem pater filio meo potui placare, filium Annibali non possum? Sed sit nihil sancti, non fides, non religio, non pietas: audeantur infanda, si non perniciem nobis cum scelere afferunt. Unus aggressurus es Annibalem. Quid illa turba tot liberorum fervorumque? quid in unum intenti omnium oculi? quid tot dextræ? torpescent — ne in amentia illa? Vultum ipsius Annibalis, quem armati exercitus

conjure you by all the most sacred rights of nature and blood that bind fathers to sons, not to commit the most enormous of all crimes in my sight, and not expose yourself to the most dreadful of all punishments. It is but few moments, since we engaged ourselves by the most solemn oaths, that we gave Hannibal the most sacred marks of an inviolable amity, calling all the gods to witness to our faith: and shall we, who have but this instant quitted his conversation, arm the same hands against him, which we gave him as pledges of our fidelity. That table, where the gods, that avenge the violated rights of hospitality, preside; to which you were admitted by a favour which only two Campanians share with you; do you quit that sacred table only to stain it a moment after with the blood of your guest? Ah! after having obtained Hannibal's pardon for my son, were it possible that I could not obtain my son's for Hannibal? But let us have no regard to any thing, of most sacred amongst men: let us violate at once faith, religion, piety: let us be guilty of the blackest action in nature; if our destruction be not inevitably annexed to the crime. Do you, single and alone, pretend to attack Hannibal? But at the same time, what will become of all those freemen and slaves, that surround him? All those eyes, which are incessantly fixed upon him, to watch for his preservation; will they be shut on a sudden? Can you hope, that so many hands armed for his defence, will remain benumbed and motionless, the moment you proceed to that excess of madness? Can you sustain the look of Hannibal, that formidable look,

exercitus sustinere nequeunt, quem horret populus Romanus, tu sustinebis? Et, alia auxilia defint, me ipsum ferire, corpus meum opponentem pro corpore Annibalis, sustinebis? Atqui per meum pectus petendus ille tibi transigendusque est. Deterreri hic sine te potius, quam illic vinci. Valeant preces apud te meae, sicut pro te hodie valuerunt. Liv.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

*which whole armies cannot sustain, and which makes the Roman People tremble? And should all other aid be wanting, would you have the courage to strike through me, when I cover him with my body, and place myself between him and you? For I assure you, you must strike through me to reach him. Be therefore dissuaded this instant, rather than resolve to perish in so ill-concerted an enterprize; and let my entreaties prevail with you, after having been this day so prevalent in your behalf.*

So moving a discourse softened Perolla into tears. His father seeing him moved, embraced him tenderly, and repeated his instances and entreaties, till he had made him promise to quit his dagger, and renounce his design. *I am reduced then, said Perolla, to substitute my father to my country, in acquitting my self to the one of the piety I owe the other. But I cannot help lamenting you, father, when I consider, that you will have the reproach to undergo of having three times betrayed your country. The first, when you caused the treaty with Hannibal to be concluded: the second, when you broke the alliance with the Romans: and the third, this day, when you have hindered me from reconciling Capua with Rome. Dear and unhappy country, receive this steel, with which I armed myself for thy defence, since a father wrests it out of my hands.* On saying these words he threw the dagger over the garden-wall, and returned into the hall of the feast, to avoid giving suspicion.

We cannot but be struck at first with some admiration for the bold design of Perolla: but if we consider, that war has its laws as well as peace, the design of an assassination will undoubtedly be condemned, which becomes still the more criminal from the circumstances of treachery with which it is attended. If Decius Magius was the author of it, which seems probable enough, he can be considered



sidered no longer as innocent, nor believed not to deserve the treatment he is going to suffer. A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

Accordingly, the next day after Hannibal's entrance, the Senate of Capua being assembled, the Carthaginian General made a very gracious speech to it, full of professions of amity and good-will. He thanked them for having preferred the alliance of the Carthaginians to that of the Romans. And amongst the magnificent promises he made them, he assured them, "that in a short time Capua should be the Capital of all Italy, and that the Romans themselves, as well as the other States, should come thither to receive the law. That however, there was a man amongst them, that ought not to have any share in the amity of the Carthaginians, nor be included in the treaty lately made with them; that he even did not deserve the name of Campanian, as he was the only one, that opposed the opinion of his country: this was Decius Magius. That he demanded him to be delivered up, and that in his presence the Senate, after having taken cognizance of his crime, should pass sentence in respect to him." There was not a single Senator that dared reply, though most of them thought, that Magius did not deserve so rigorous a treatment, and that Hannibal, in the very beginning, gave a mortal blow to their liberty. *Hannibal's magnificent promises to the Campanians.*  
*He demands that Decius Magius be delivered up to him; which is done immediately.*

The principal magistrate immediately quitted the Senate, and having placed himself upon his tribunal, caused Magius to be brought before him, and ordered him to defend himself. The latter, without departing in the least from his haughtiness, refused to answer; alledging that he was dispensed from doing so by the first article of the very treaty made with Hannibal. His reasons could not fail of being rejected. He was put in chains, and dragged away through the streets of the city, in

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216  
Magius  
reproaches  
the Cam-  
barians  
with their  
luxuries.

order to be conducted to the camp of the Cartha-  
ginians. As long as he had liberty to speak, he con-  
tinued to address discourse, full of force and bold-  
ness to the multitude, that surrounded him. Be-  
hold, said he, *the liberty you imagined to procure for*  
*your selves. In the public Forum, in broad day, be-*  
*fore your eyes, a man of the principal rank in your*  
*city is laden with chains, and carried to execution.*  
*What greater violence could be exercised in Capua, if*  
*it had been taken by force of arms? Go meet Hanni-*  
*bal, adorn the city. Make the day of his entrance a*  
*day of rejoicing. a festival, to see him triumph over*  
*one of your citizens.* It was apprehended that these  
reproaches might make some impression upon the  
People; so that his head was muffled up in such a  
manner, that he could not make himself heard.  
Hannibal was afraid to put him to death, in his  
camp, lest it should excite some tumult in the  
city. He caused him to be put on board a ship,  
which was to carry him to Carthage. But a tem-  
pest drove him upon the coasts of Cyrene, which  
was subject to the King of Egypt; who was then  
Ptolomy Philopator. Magius found an asylum in  
the States of that Prince, and continued there in  
safety under his protection.

He is dri-  
ven by a  
storm into  
Egypt.

Fabius  
Piscus  
brings  
back the  
answer of  
the oracle  
to Rome.  
Liv. xxiii.  
11.

In the mean time Q. Fabius Prætor returned to  
Rome from Delphi, where he had been sent Am-  
bassador, and brought back the answer of the ora-  
cle, which ordered the Romans to make certain  
sacrifices, promised them success for the time to  
come, and recommended to them to observe great  
moderation in their prosperity.

## S E C T. II.

*Mago carries the news of the victory at Cannæ, to Carthage. Himilco of Hannibal's faction, insults Hanno. The latter answers him. The Senate decrees Hannibal aids. The Dictator, after having provided for every thing, sets out from Rome. Hannibal makes vain attempts upon Naples and Nola. Marcellus by his engaging behaviour brings over L. Bantius of Nola. Hannibal is beat by Marcellus before the walls of that city. Citizens of Nola punished for their treason. Hannibal attacks Casilinum. Winter quarters at Capua fatal to Hannibal's army, Casilinum, forced by extremity of famine, surrenders to Hannibal. Fidelity of the Petellini to the Romans. State of affairs in Sicily and Sardinia. Dictator created to appoint new Senators in the room of the dead ones. New Consuls and new Prætors created. L. Postumius, Consul elect, perishes in Gaul with his whole army. This news occasions a great mourning at Rome. The Senate regulates the distribution of the troops, which are to serve this year. Affairs of Spain little favourable for the Carthaginians. Asdrubal receives orders to march to Italy. Himilco arrives in Spain to succeed him. The two Scipios, to prevent Asdrubal's departure, give him battle. His army is defeated.*

**W**HILST what we have just been saying passed at Rome and in Italy, Mago, son of Amilcar Barca, was gone to Carthage to carry the news of the victory of Cannæ. He did not set out immediately after this action. Before he embarked, he stopped during some days in the country of the Brutii by his brother's order, to receive the cities, that abandoned the party of the Romans, Abrazzo.

A. R. 536.

Ant. C. 216.

*Mago carries the**news of**the victory**of Cannæ**to Car-**thage.*

Liv. xxiii.

12, 13.

Hod.



A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

Romans, into the alliance of the Carthaginians. When he was admitted to audience in the Senate of Carthage, he gave an account of all his brother had done in Italy. He said, “ that Hannibal  
“ had fought against seven Generals, of whom  
“ five were Consuls, and the two others, one a  
“ Dictator, and the other General of the Horse.  
“ That in the several battles he had fought with  
“ six Consular armies, he had killed above two  
“ hundred thousand of the enemy, and had taken  
“ more than fifty thousand prisoners. That of  
“ five Consuls with whom he had to deal, he had  
“ killed two in the field of battle; that a third  
“ had been dangerously wounded; and that of the  
“ two others who had retired without wounds,  
“ the last, after the loss of his whole army, had  
“ escaped with difficulty at the head of only fifty  
“ men. That the General of the horse had been  
“ defeated and put to flight. That the Dictator  
“ was considered with admiration, and passed for  
“ a singularly great General, only because he con-  
“ tinually avoided coming to a battle. That the  
“ People of Brutium and Apulia, with part of  
“ the Samnites and Lucanians, were come over  
“ to the side of the Carthaginians. That Capua,  
“ the Capital not only of Campania, but all Italy,  
“ since the defeat of the Romans at Cannæ, had  
“ surrendered of itself to Hannibal. That it was  
“ highly proper to return such thanks to the Gods  
“ as might bear some proportion to the victories  
“ gained over the enemy.” Afterwards, to prove  
by effects the great successes he had related in his discourse, he caused a bushel of gold rings to be emptied in the porch of the Senate, which had been taken off the fingers of those, who had fallen in the battle of Cannæ. He added, in order to give a greater idea of the loss, which the Romans had sustained in that battle, that none but  
Knights

Knights and persons of distinction had a right to wear them. The result of his harangue was,

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“ That the more hopes they had of speedily terminating the war to their advantage, the greater efforts they ought to make for sending all kinds of supplies to Hannibal. That he was making war far from Carthage in the midst of an enemy’s country : that the consumption of provisions and money rose very high ; and that so many battles could not destroy the armies of the enemy, without weakening that of the Victor. That it was therefore necessary to send recruits, provisions, and money to an army, who had rendered the Carthaginian State such great services.”

As this discourse of Mago’s had diffused joy throughout the whole assembly, Himilco, of the Barcinian faction, thought this an happy occasion for insulting Hanno, who was of the opposite faction : *Well, Hanno, said he, what do you think of all this ? Are you still sorry for our having undertaken this war with the Romans ? Are you still for having Hannibal delivered up to them ? Speak : do you object to our returning thanks to the Gods, as has been proposed. Let us bear a Roman Senator in the midst of the Senate of Carthage.*

Hanno, with a grave air and tone, replied to this discourse of Himilco in these terms : *I should have been silent this day to avoid interrupting a joy, to which I see every body abandon themselves, by a discourse, which perhaps will not be to your liking. But, by answering nothing to a Senator, that interrogates me, I should leave room to suspect me either of an ill-judged mistaken pride, or of a servile baseness ; which would argue I had forgot, either that I speak to a free man, or that I am so myself. I therefore answer Himilco, that I continue to be dissatisfied with this war, and that I shall never cease*

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*to declare myself again, your invincible General, till I see the war terminated by a treaty with supportable conditions; and I shall always regret the antient peace, till a new one be made. The advantages, which Mago has been displaying, give at this instant great pleasure to Himilco, and the other partisans of Hannibal: they may have the same effect upon me also, and I am very much inclined to rejoice as well as they; because these great successes, if we take the advantage of them, may procure more favourable conditions of peace. But if we let so happy an occasion slip, in which we may seem rather to give peace than receive it, I greatly apprehend, that this joy, which now transports you, will soon forsake us, and be reduced to nothing. For after all, what are these so much boasted successes, and what do they determine? I have cut in pieces armies of the enemy; send me troops: what then would you ask, if you had been defeated? I have taken two of the enemy's camps, probably full of spoils and all kinds of provisions; send me provisions and money: what else would you ask, if you had lost your own camp? But that I may not be the only person brought to the bar, (for I think I have as much right to interrogate Himilco, as he me) let him, or Mago, answer me. The defeat at Cannæ has destroyed the power of the Romans, and all Italy has taken arms against them. Tell me then, whether there be one of all the Latin States, that has come over to your side; and whether, of all the citizens, that compose the thirty-five tribes of Rome, there be a single man that has deserted. Mago having replied, that neither the one nor the other had happened: We have then, replied he, still a great number of enemies upon our hands. Tell us at least, what the disposition is of the enemies that remain, and whether they retain any hope. Mago answering that he knew nothing of the matter. There is nothing so easy to be known, resumed Hanno. Have you*



*you beard, that to ask peace has been spoke of in the Roman Senate? Have the Romans sent Embassadors to Hannibal to treat about it? Mago having answered in the negative: The war therefore still subsists as entirely as it did the first day, that Hannibal entered Italy, replied the other. There are many amongst us who remember the vicissitudes of the first war. Our affairs were never in a better condition either by land or sea, than they were before the Consulship of C. Lutatius and Aulus Postumius. It was in that very Consulship, that we were defeated at the islands Ægates. If our fortune should now happen to change (may the Gods avert the omen) is there any reason to hope, that we shall have peace, when overcome, whilst no body offers it at present when we are victorious? For my part, if the question were, either to give the Romans peace, or to receive it from them, I know what I should say. But if you consult me concerning Mago's proposals, this is my opinion: either Hannibal is victorious, and in that case is in no need of aid; or he deceives us with vain hopes, and then he deserves still less to be regarded.*

Hanno's discourse did not make much impression upon the Senate. They were too much engrossed by the joy, which victory inspires, to hearken to any thing that might change it. Besides which, the perpetual enmity between Hannibal's house and his, made them suspect him: and they were also convinced, that by exerting themselves a little, they should presently see the war terminate to their advantage. They therefore unanimously resolved, that a reinforcement of four thousand Numidians, forty elephants, and a great sum of money should be sent to Hannibal. At the same time a general officer was dispatched to raise twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse in Spain, to recruit the army in that province, and that

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The Senate  
decrees  
Hannibal  
aids.

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that in Italy. But these orders were executed very slowly and with great indolence, as happens often enough in times of prosperity, especially when divisions and jealousies subsist between those that govern. The spirit of faction and party is the ruin of publick affairs. Hanno was a man of counsel and ability, and had very right views: but all his excellent qualities were poisoned by his avowed antipathy for the family and person of Hannibal. To be useful in Councils, and to give weight to one's opinion in them, it is necessary to be impartial, and to have no view but the good of the publick.

*The Dictator after having provided for every thing sets out from Rome.*  
Liv. xxiii.  
14.

The Romans on their side, were very intent upon repairing their losses. Besides their natural application and vivacity, adversity made them more active and vigilant. The Consul neglected nothing that related to his province. The Dictator, M. Junius Pera, after having discharged the duties of religion, asked the people, according to custom, permission to ride on horseback in commanding the army. He immediately made two legions, which the Consuls had levied at the beginning of the year, take arms, with the eight thousand slaves, of whom we have spoke above, and the Cohorts, that had been draughted from the territory of Picenum, and a neighbouring canton called \* Ager Gallicus. As these forces did not seem sufficient, he had recourse to a remedy never employed but in the most desperate conjunctures, and when the Decent is obliged to give way to the Useful. He published a decree, by which he released all that were confined in the prisons either for crimes or debts, the number of which amount-

\* This was a small country between the Rubicon and the Esis, conquered from the Galli Senones, and distributed amongst the Roman citizens in virtue of the law passed by Flaminius when tribune of the People.

ed to six thousand men. As the State was in want of all things, it was necessary to give them the arms which had been taken from the Gauls, and carried in triumph by Flaminius. After these dispositions, he set out from the city with five and twenty thousand men capable of service.

As to Hannibal, after having secured Capua, he made a second attempt upon the city of Naples, but as ineffectually as the first. He afterwards marched his troops into the territory of Nola, and confined his views to that place. The Senators gave Claudius Marcellus advice, who was then at Canusium, of the extreme danger in which that city was, because the People were inclined to surrender it to Hannibal. He marched thither without loss of time. As soon as Hannibal was informed, that he approached, he retired towards the sea on the side of Naples, ardently desiring to make himself master of that city, in order to have a port, where he might securely receive the ships, that should come to him from Africa. Not having been capable to alter the fidelity of the inhabitants of that city, he laid siege to Nuceria, and having long kept it blocked up, at length reduced it by famine, leaving the inhabitants at liberty to retire where they thought fit. He promised them great rewards, if they would serve in his troops: but not a single man of them would accept his offers.

The people of Nola were far from being of the same disposition. There was in that city a young officer called L. Bantius. The Romans had not at that time among their allies an horse-man more distinguished for his bravery. Hannibal having found him, after the battle of Cannæ, almost without life in the midst of an heap of dead bodies, had caused his wounds to be dressed with abundance of care and goodness, and after he was cured,

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*Hannibal makes vain attempts upon Naples and Nola. ibid.*

*Marcellus by his engaging behaviour brings over L. Bantius of Nola. Liv. xxiii. 15. Plut. in Marc. 303*



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cured, had sent him home, not only without ransom, but with great presents. In gratitude for so extraordinary a service, Bantius had already spared no pains to put Nola into Hannibal's hands, and Marcellus found him still restless and busy. It was necessary to be rid of him either by execution, or to engage him by favour. Marcellus chose the latter, to which his natural disposition inclined him: for he was humane, affable, insinuating, and of a character highly adapted to engaging affection.

Accordingly one day when Bantius came to make his court to him, Marcellus asked him who he was. It was not because he did not know him long before; but he sought a pretext for entering into the conversation he wanted to have with him. Bantius having told him his name, Marcellus expressed surprize and admiration, *How!* said he; *Are you that Bantius, so much talked of at Rome, as an officer, that fought so bravely at the battle of Cannæ, and was the only one that did not abandon the Consul P. Æmilius, but covered that General with your body against the wounds aimed at him?* Bantius having answered that it was himself, and having shewn him the scars of his wounds. *Ah!* said Marcellus, *after having giving us such great proofs of your amity, why did not you come to us from the first to receive those honours which you deserve. Do you imagine, that we don't know how to reward the merit of friends, which even the enemy themselves have in esteem.* To these kind words, attended with an obliging air of familiarity, he added a present that crowned all. Besides a sum of money, which he ordered his treasurer to pay him, he gave him a fine war-horse; and before his face ordered his Lictors to give him admittance, whenever he came to see him.

*Questor.*

We see here in this instance of Marcellus, how necessary the art of disposing the mind, and winning the heart, is to those, who are in principal offices, and administer governments: that it is not by haughtiness and insolence, by menaces and chastisements, that men are to be governed: but that marks of favour and friendship, praises, and rewards, dispensed properly and with address, are the most certain means to bring them into measures, and attach them for ever.

By this generous behaviour, Marcellus so effectually softened the haughty spirit of the young soldier Bantius, that he was all the rest of his life one of the bravest and most faithful allies of Rome. No one was more attentive, nor more warm, than him to discover and declare such of the people of Nola, as espoused the party of Hannibal; and they were very numerous. Hannibal being returned before Nola, they were resolved, as soon as the Romans should march out against the enemy, to shut the gates, plunder the baggage, and surrender to the Carthaginians; and they had had several interviews with the enemy during the night.

Marcellus was apprized of this conspiracy, and took all the necessary measures to prevent its effect. He purposely kept close for some days within the city, not through fear, but to give the enemy a rash confidence. Hannibal, in consequence, approached the place with less order and precaution than usual. Marcellus, who kept his troops drawn up in battle within the walls, made them sally that moment through three gates, and fell upon the besiegers with so much force and impetuosity, that they could not sustain the charge. After having defended themselves for some time with sufficient vigour and courage, they were at length broke, and obliged to retire into their camp.

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*Hannibal is beaten by Marcellus before the walls of Nola.*  
Liv. xxiii. 16.

Plut. in Marc. 303.

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Am. C. 216.

camp. Hannibal lost two thousand three hundred men in this action, and on the side of Marcellus only five hundred were killed.

This was the first advantage gained by the Romans over Hannibal since the battle of Cannæ, and it was of extreme consequence to them. For, in the condition the affairs of the Commonwealth then were, it was more difficult to stop the course of Hannibal's victories, than it was afterwards to conquer him. This advantage revived the courage of the Romans, and inspired them with a confidence in themselves, by shewing them, that they fought with an enemy, who was not invincible, but might be checked and beaten.

*Citizens of Nola surprised for their treason.*

Marcellus having then caused the gates of the city to be shut, and posted guards to prevent any body from going out, made an exact enquiry concerning such as had held secret correspondence during the night with the enemy. Seventy of the most criminal having been convicted of treason, the Prætor condemned them to lose their heads, confiscated their estates for the benefit of the Roman people, and restored all the authority to the Senate of Nola, of which the cabal had deprived it.

*Hannibal attacks Casilinum. Liv. xxiii. 13.*

Hannibal having failed at Nola, besieged Casilinum. But, though the place was small, and the garrison only a thousand men, the Carthaginians were frequently repulsed with loss: so that Hannibal, ashamed to continue long before an inconsiderable place without doing any thing, chose to fortify his camp, and to leave some troops there, in order not to abandon the enterprize entirely, and retired to Capua.

*Winter-quarters at Capua fatal to Hannibal's army.*

It was (a) here that this army, which had so long

(2) Quos nulla mali vicerat impensius, quo avidius ex invis, perdidere nimia bona ac solentia in eas se merferant. voluptates immodicæ: & eo Liv.

withstood



withstood the greatest hardships, and which the most dreadful dangers had never been able to discourage, was entirely conquered by plenty and pleasures, into which it plunged the more greedily, as it had not been accustomed to them. Rest, wine and good cheer, debauch with women, and idleness, which became every day more grateful to them, as they familiarized themselves with it, all combined to enervate their bodies and courage to such a degree, that if they sustained their ground for some time, it was rather in effect of the lustre of their former victories, than by their present force. Those who were judges of the art of war, considered the fault committed by Hannibal in putting his troops into winter-quarters at Capua, as much greater than that of not having marched to Rome immediately after the battle of Cannæ. For that delay and neglect, says Livy, might seem only to have deferred his victory; whereas his stay at Capua deprived him of the forces necessary to conquer. When Hannibal drew out his troops from that city, one might have said that they were quite different men from what they had been before. Accustomed to lodge in commodious houses, to live in abundance and idleness, they could no longer endure hunger, thirst, long marches, and the other fatigues of war. Most of them carried away debauched wives with them. During the whole summer great numbers deserted, who had no other asylum but Capua against the wise severity of their Generals.

I have only copied Livy in what I have just said of Capua: But I do not know whether all he says of the fatal consequences of the winter-quarters in that voluptuous city, is entirely just and well-founded. When we consider attentively all the circumstances of this part of history, we can scarce be convinced, that the little progress made after-

*Reflection  
upon Han-  
nibal's stay  
at Capua.*

A. R. 536.  
A.M.C. 216.

wards by Hannibal's arms, is to be ascribed to his stay at Capua. That is indeed one cause, but the least considerable; and the bravery, with which the Carthaginians after that time beat Consuls and Prætors, took cities in the sight of the Romans, maintained their conquests, and continued fourteen years in Italy, without its being in the power of the enemy to drive them out: all this suffices to give us room to believe, that Livy exaggerates the pernicious effects of the voluptuousness of Capua.

Liv. xxiii.  
13.

bid. 32.

The true cause of the decline of Hannibal's affairs, was the want of supplies and recruits from his country. After Mago's representation, the Senate of Carthage had judged it necessary, in order to push on the conquest of Italy, to send thither from Africa a considerable reinforcement of Numidian cavalry, forty elephants, and a thousand talents, (about an hundred and fifty thousand pounds;) and to take twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse into pay in Spain, to re-inforce their armies in Spain and Italy. However Mago could obtain only twelve thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse; and even when he was ready to set out for Italy with these troops so short in number of those he had been promised, he was countermanded and sent to Spain. Hannibal then, after such great promises, received neither infantry, cavalry, elephants, nor money; and had absolutely exhausted his personal resources. His troops were reduced to twenty-six thousand foot, and nine thousand horse. How was it possible, with an army so weakened, to occupy in a foreign country all the necessary posts, hold his new allies in dependance, maintain his conquests, make new ones, and keep the field against two armies of Romans renewed every year? And this was the true cause of the decline

cline of Hannibal's affairs. If we had the passage, <sup>A. R. 536.</sup>  
in which Polybius treated upon this subject, we <sup>Ant. C. 216.</sup>  
should undoubtedly see, that he had insisted more  
upon this cause, than upon the voluptuousness of  
Capua.

As soon as the rigor of the cold weather began *Casilinum*,  
to abate, Hannibal drew his troops out of their <sup>compelled</sup>  
winter-quarters, and returned to *Casilinum*, the <sup>by extreme</sup>  
inhabitants of which, as well as the soldiers of the <sup>famine,</sup>  
garrison, were reduced to extreme famine. For <sup>surrenders</sup>  
though the attacks had ceased during the winter, <sup>to Hanni-</sup>  
as the city had been continually blocked up, it had <sup>bal.</sup>  
not been possible to introduce provisions into it. <sup>Liv. xxiii.</sup>  
Tib. Sempronius commanded the Romans in the <sup>19.</sup>  
absence of the Dictator, whom the affairs of reli-  
gion had recalled to Rome. Marcellus was very  
desirous of marching to the aid of the besieged :  
but he was kept back, on the one side by the wa-  
ters of the Volturnus, which had rose extremely,  
and on the other by the people of Nola, who were  
afraid of being attacked by the Campanians, as-  
soon as the Romans should be removed. Sempro-  
nius was at hand to act ; but as the Dictator had  
forbade him to undertake any thing till his return,  
he was afraid to make any motion in favour of  
*Casilinum*, though he was informed that it suffered  
extremities capable of subduing the most heroick  
fortitude. All that he could do was to fill a great  
number of barrels with corn brought in from the  
neighbouring country, and to put them in the Vul-  
turnus, the current of which carried them into the  
city, taking care to give the magistrate notice to  
take them out as they arrived. This was done for  
three nights successively, and gave the besieged a  
little time to breathe. But the Carthaginians hav-  
ing at length discovered it, that resource was en-  
tirely cut off. Nothing passed afterwards, but  
what was stopped on the way, except nuts which



A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

the Romans threw in, and when at Casilinum, were taken out with hurdles. But what was so poor a supply in so great a famine? Reduced to the last extremity, they were obliged to eat the leather of their shields, after having boiled it to make it soft; to add to such wretched nourishments, rats and other the most unclean animals; and to dig up the herbage and roots that grew at the bottom of the walls. Hannibal perceiving that they were sowing radishes; How! cried he quite astonished; do the besieged imagine, that I shall stay before this place, till those plants are ripe? This sight determined him to suffer them to treat with him concerning the ransom of the free persons, which he had always refused before. They agreed to pay about twenty pounds for each. When the money was paid, Hannibal suffered them to retire to Cumæ, as he had engaged, and put a garrison of six hundred soldiers into the place.

Septunces  
auri.

*Fidelity of  
Petelia to  
the Ro-  
mans.*

Liv. xxiii.  
20.

The inhabitants of Petelia, a city of the Bruttii, shewed no less fidelity. The Senate having answered with grief to their deputies, that the Roman people were not in a condition to send aid to so remote a place, they persevered in their attachment to the Romans, till necessity at length reduced them to surrender.

*State of  
affairs in  
Sicily and  
Sardinia.*

Liv. xxiii.  
21.

Almost at the same time, letters were received at Rome from Sicily and Sardinia, which were read in the Senate. The Pro-prætor, T. Otacilius, wrote from those provinces, that the Prætor Furius was arrived from Africa at Lilybæum with his fleet, dangerously ill of the wounds he had received, and at the point of death. That they had neither money nor corn to pay and subsist the soldiers and mariners, and did not know how to act. He strongly pressed the Senate to send both as soon as possible, and, if they thought it proper to make one of the new Prætors set out immediately

ately to succeed him. Aulus Cornelius Mammula, Pro-prætor of Sardinia, also demanded provisions and money, of which he was in want. The Senate answered both, that they were not in a condition to supply them with any thing: and that they must provide, as well as they could, for the occasions of their fleets and armies. T. Otacilius sent Ambassadors to King Hiero, the sole resource of the Roman people, and received from him as much money as he had occasion for, with provisions for six months. The cities of Sardinia supplied Cornelius in like manner, and with abundance of zeal and affection.

As money was also wanting at Rome, the People nominated three of the principal citizens to receive the sums, which private persons were willing to lend the Commonwealth. After having chosen three Pontiffs in the room of those who were dead, it was thought proper to fill up the vacant places of the Senators, which were very numerous; the loss of so many battles having made a great gap in the Senate. The affair was brought on by the Prætor Pomponius. Sp. Carvilius, who spoke first, was of opinion, that in order to supply the places of those who were wanting, and at the same time to unite more firmly with them, the freedom of Rome should be given to two Senators of each of the Latine States, and that they should be substituted to those of Rome, who were dead. This proposal occasioned a general murmur and indignation. Q. Fabius Maximus said, that nothing had ever been advanced at a more improper time, than a proposal capable of exciting new commotions amongst the allies, whose fidelity was but too much shaken already. And that if the deliberations of the Senate had ever required inviolable secrecy, this discourse, which had escaped the rashness of a single man, ought to be forgot, suppressed,

*Dictator created to chuse Senators in the room of those who were dead.*  
Liv. xxiii. 22, 23.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

pressed, and buried in eternal silence, as something that had never happened. Accordingly it was never mentioned afterwards.

The Senate thought it proper to create a Dictator, in order to make the choice in question. This nomination was usually made by the Censors: but there were none then in the Commonwealth, and the present situation of affairs required a shorter method. The Consul Varro, who had been expressly sent for from Apulia, nominated M. Fabius Buteo Dictator, without a General of the horse, with power to exercise that office during six months. He was the oldest person that had been Censor. As soon as he ascended the tribunal for harangues, attended by his Lictors, he himself observed upon all the irregularities, that had passed in his creation. He declared, “ that he did not approve either  
“ that there should be two Dictators at the same  
“ time in the Commonwealth, which had never  
“ happened before; or, that they should raise  
“ him to that dignity without a General of the  
“ horse; that the same person should have the  
“ authority of a Censor for the second time; or  
“ lastly, that a Dictator should be permitted to  
“ continue six months in office, unless it were for  
“ making war. He added, that if necessity obli-  
“ ged him to set himself above the laws, it was  
“ incumbent upon him to act as near to them as  
“ it should be possible. That he should strike  
“ out the name of no Senator actually upon the  
“ list, that it might not be said, that a single per-  
“ son had been supreme arbiter in respect to the  
“ honour and dignity of a Senator. And as to  
“ the vacant places, in filling them up, he should  
“ regulate his conduct according to distinctions  
“ generally known and independent of his choice,  
“ and not according to his own opinion of perso-  
“ nal



“nal merit, of which it did not become him to  
 “make himself the sole judge.” A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

He kept his word, and after having caused the list of the old Senators, with which he did not meddle, to be called over; to supply the places of the dead, he nominated first those, who had exercised some curule magistracy, according to the order of time in which each had held it. He afterwards nominated those, who had been Plebeian Ædiles, Tribunes of the People, Prætors or Quæstors: and lastly, those who had taken spoils from the enemy, or obtained the civic crown.

After having created in this manner an hundred and seventy-seven Senators with the general approbation of all the citizens, he abdicated the Dictatorship, and descended from the tribunal as a private person. And having ordered his Lic-tors to withdraw, he mingled with the crowd, and purposely remained there a considerable time, to avoid being reconducted home in pomp by the People. But his modesty did not cool the ardor of the citizens. When he withdrew, they formed a very numerous train for him, and attended him quite home with the utmost zeal and respect. There is a moderation and wisdom in the discourse and conduct of Buteo, that cannot be too much esteemed and admired. It was a small number of such Senators as him, who always determined the opinions of the whole body in important affairs, and were in a manner the soul of the public deliberations, and of the government. Happy the Legislatures, in which there are such men, and which know how to set the right value upon their merit!

The Consul set out the next night to rejoin his army, without apprizing the Senate, and for fear they should keep him in the city, to preside at the election of the Consuls for the following year. The next day the Senate was of opinion, that the Dic-  
New Con-  
suls and  
Prætors  
chosen.  
Liv. xxiii,  
24.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

tator should be wrote to, and desired, in case the affairs of the Commonwealth would admit, to come to Rome for the election of Consuls, and to bring with him the General of the horse, and the Prætor, M. Marcellus, in order that they might consult them in person upon the present state of the Commonwealth, and in concert with them, take such measures as should be judged the most prudent and salutary. All who had been sent for came to Rome, having left their Lieutenants to command the legions. The Dictator, after having spoke of himself in few words, and with great modesty, and with the highest praises of the wise conduct of Ti. Sempronius, his General of the horse, summoned an assembly, in which L. Postumius was created Consul for the third time, with Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. The first was absent, and commanded in Gaul: the second was at Rome, and then General of the horse, and Curule Ædile. M. Valerius Flaccus, and Q. Mucius Scævola, were afterwards created Prætors. The Dictator, after having caused these magistrates to be nominated, returned to rejoin his army at Theanum, leaving the General of the horse at Rome, who was to enter upon the Consulship some days after, and to whom, for that reason, it was necessary to consult the Senators concerning the troops, that were to be raised, and employed the year following for the service of the Commonwealth.

L. Postu-  
mius Con-  
sul elect,  
is killed in  
Gaul,  
with all  
his troops.  
Liv. xxiii.  
24.

At the time, whilst they were most occupied by these cares, news came that L. Postumius, Consul elect, had perished in Cisalpine Gaul with all the troops under his command. He was to march his army through a vast forest, which the Gauls called \* *Litana*. On the right and left of the way he was to take, those people had sawed

\* The exact situation of this forest is not known.

the trees almost through at bottom, in such a manner that they continued upright, but so, that the least force sufficed for throwing them down. (This fact seems scarce probable, and still less what follows.) Postumius had two Roman legions with him, which with the allies that had joined him along the *Mare Superum* or Adriatic sea, formed a body of fifteen thousand men, at the head of which he had entered the enemy's country. The Gauls, who were posted at the extremities of the forest, no sooner saw the Romans in the midst of it, than they pushed down the sawed trees, that were most distant from the way. These falling upon those next them, which did the same on others that the least blow sufficed to throw down, crushed the Romans, arms, men and horses, in so dreadful a manner, that scarce ten of them escaped. For most of them being either killed or stifled by the trunks and branches of the trees under which they lay, those who by accident escaped so dreadful a disaster, were immediately destroyed by the enemy, who had dispersed themselves compleatly armed in the adjacent places, and in the middle of the forest. A very small number, who were in hopes of escaping by a bridge over a river, were taken by the Gauls, who had seized it some time before. It was here Postumius fell, after having used his utmost efforts not to be taken prisoner. The Boii cut off his head, and carried it in triumph with his arms, and the rest of his spoils, into the principal temple of their nation. They afterwards extracted the brains and lined the scull with gold; and, according to their custom, the priests and ministers of their gods used it as a cup for the libations, which they made in their sacrifices, and to drink out of it at their meals. The spoils they took were proportioned to their victory. For except the animals, which had

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.



A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

*This news  
occasions  
exceeding  
sorrow at  
Rome.*

been crushed to death by the fall of the trees, no part of the spoils was lost : all was found upon the spot where the army had perished, nothing having been carried off in flight.

When the news of so great a misfortune was brought to Rome, the citizens were seized with such sorrow, that the shops were immediately shut, and the whole city for some days seemed a solitude ; every body continuing at home as at midnight. To remove this image of universal affliction and mourning, the Senate ordered the Ædiles to go through the streets, and cause the shops to be opened. Ti. Sempronius then having assembled the Senate, consoled them, “ and having bade  
“ them call to mind the courage and constancy,  
“ with which they had sustained the defeat at  
“ Cannæ, he exhorted them to arm themselves  
“ with courage, and not to suffer themselves to be  
“ overwhelmed by less calamities. He gave them  
“ to understand, that, provided affairs should  
“ succeed against Hannibal and the Carthaginians,  
“ as there was room to hope, the war with the  
“ Gauls might, without hazard, be deferred till  
“ another time. That with the assistance of the  
“ gods, the Roman People should find a proper  
“ occasion to avenge themselves for the fraud and  
“ artifice of those barbarians. But that the object  
“ which ought to employ their attention at pre-  
“ sent, was the war with the Carthaginians, and  
“ the forces, which they should be in a condition  
“ to bring into the field against them.”

*The Se-  
nate dis-  
tributes the  
troops that  
are to  
serve this  
year.*

Liv. xxiii.  
25.

He began himself to give an account of the number of the horse and foot, as well citizens as allies, that actually served in the Dictator's army. Marcellus then gave the detail of his. Those, who knew what troops the Consul Varro had with him in Apulia, were asked concerning them. And the result of this kind of review was, that they

they should find it very difficult to form Consular armies, capable of supporting so important a war. For this reason, whatever cause there was to be irritated against the Gauls, it was resolved to abandon that enterprize for the present. The Dictator's army was given to the Consul. The soldiers of Marcellus's army, who had fled at Cannæ, were ordered to go to Sicily, and to serve there as long as the war should continue in Italy. It was also judged proper to transport thither such of the troops of the Dictator's legions, upon whose valour they could least rely, without fixing them any time, but that assigned by the laws for the number of campaigns, every citizen was obliged to serve. The two legions that had remained this year in the city to guard it, were decreed to the Consul, that should be elected to succeed L. Postumius. And orders were given for two legions to return immediately from Sicily, out of which the Consul, to whom those of the city should fall, should take what number of soldiers he should have occasion for. The Consul Varro was continued in command for one year, without lessening the number of the troops he had under him in Apulia, for the defence of that country.

Whilst these things passed in Italy, the war was carried on in Spain with no less vigour. The Romans had always had the advantage hitherto in that province. The two Scipios had divided their forces, so that Cneus commanded the land-army, whilst Publius kept the sea with his fleet. Asdrubal, who commanded the Carthaginians, not being in a condition to resist the Romans upon either element, placed his whole security in the distance he set between him and the enemy. It was not till after he had used abundance of entreaties, and made many instances, that four thousand foot and five hundred horse were sent him to recruit his army.

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

*Affairs of  
Spain little  
in favour  
of the  
Cartha-  
ginians.*  
Liv. xxiii.  
26—27.

A. R. 536.  
Ann. C. 216.

army. With this aid, he marched and incamped near the Romans, believing himself in a condition to make head against them by land: and at the same time he ordered his fleet, after having supplied it with all that it wanted, to defend the islands and sea-coasts in the dependance of the Carthaginians.

At the same time that he used his utmost endeavours to reinstate the affairs of the Carthaginians in Spain, he had the mortification to receive advice, that the Captains, who commanded his ships, had deserted. After the great reproaches he had made them for having abandoned the fleet near the Iberus in a cowardly manner, they had adhered but faintly to Asdrubal, and the interests of the Carthaginians. They first declared for the Romans, and then brought over several cities in the country of the \* Tarteſſii, and even took one by force. This revolt obliged Asdrubal to remove from the Romans, in order to carry the war that way. The rebels had at first considerable advantages over the Carthaginians, so that Asdrubal was afraid to keep the field: but those successes became fatal to them. Observing no longer either order or discipline, they dispersed on all sides without any precaution. Asdrubal well knew how to take his advantage of their negligence. He fell upon them when they least expected him, put them to the rout, and entirely defeated them. This victory obliged the whole nation to submit to him the next day.

*Asdrubal  
receives  
orders to  
march into  
Italy.*  
Liv. xxiii.  
27.

Things were in this state, when Asdrubal received orders to march immediately into Italy. The report of this spreading in Spain, entirely changed the face of affairs. Asdrubal perceived it well. He wrote to the Senate of Carthage, to

\* These people were borderers upon the Iberus near Arragon.



inform them of the bad effect, which the report of his departure had already produced throughout the whole country. He told them, “ that if he  
 “ quitted the province, he should no sooner have  
 “ passed the Iberus, than it would declare en-  
 “ tirely for the Romans. That besides his not  
 “ having either General or troops to leave in his  
 “ place, those who commanded the Roman ar-  
 “ mies, were Captains of such abilities in war,  
 “ that it would be highly difficult to make head  
 “ against them even with equal forces. That  
 “ therefore, if they were desirous to preserve  
 “ Spain, they should send him a successor at the  
 “ head of a considerable army : that however  
 “ successful such new General might be, it could  
 “ not be without difficulty, and that he would  
 “ find employment enough in his command.”

These letters at first made some impression upon the Senators of Carthage : but as they were, preferably to all things, bent upon supporting themselves in Italy, they did not change their resolution in respect to Asdrubal and his troops. They *Himilco* made Himilco set out with a good army and a *arrives in* strong fleet, to preserve and defend Spain both by *Spain to* sea and land. As soon as that General arrived, *supply As-* having provided for the safety of his troops and *drubal's* fleet, he marched to join Asdrubal with a body *place.* of cavalry with all possible expedition. When he *Liv. xxiii.* had informed him of the decrees of the Senate, *28.* and had been told in his turn in what manner the war was to be made in Spain, he returned to his camp, placing his whole safety in expedition, and continually quitting the places through which he passed, before the inhabitants could take any measures for stopping him. As to Asdrubal, before he quitted the province, he raised money from all the States, that continued in subjection to the Carthaginians, foreseeing, that he should have  
 great

A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216.

great occasion for it in the march he was going to undertake; after which he moved towards the banks of the Iberus.

*The two  
Scipios  
give As-  
drubal  
battle to  
prevent  
his de-  
parture.  
He is de-  
feated  
with his  
whole  
army.*

Liv. xxiii.  
28, 29.

The two Roman Generals were no sooner apprized of the orders Asdrubal had received, than they renounced all other designs, and joined their forces to oppose his departure. They rightly perceived, that if that General, with the army he had in Spain, should actually enter Italy, where it was already highly difficult to resist Hannibal alone, the joining of the two brothers would infallibly be followed by the ruin of Rome. They therefore united their forces upon the banks of the Iberus, and having passed that river, they marched against Asdrubal. For some days the two armies continued incamped at five miles from each other, contenting themselves with skirmishing, whilst neither seemed to think of a general action. At length on the same day, and almost at the same moment, the Generals on both sides, as if by concert, gave the signal of battle, and came down into the plain with all their forces. The Romans were drawn up in three lines as usual, which were the *Hastati*, the *Principes*, and the *Triarii*. The cavalry formed the two wings. Part of the light-armed soldiers were placed amongst those in the front rank, the rest were in the rear of the army. Asdrubal posted the Spaniards in the main body, with the Carthaginians on their right, and the Africans with the auxiliary troops on their left. As to the cavalry he placed that of the Numidians on the right wing in a line with the Carthaginian infantry, and the rest in a line with the Africans. He did not place all the Numidians on the right, but only those, who led two horses at once, and were accustomed, in the heat of the action, to leap completely armed from that which was tired and harrassed upon the other  
that

that was fresh: so great were both the agility of the riders, and the docility of the horses in adapting themselves to all their motions.

The Generals on both sides having drawn up their armies in the order I have just said, had different motives for hoping, that were almost equally founded. Their troops were equal enough as to their number: but on the side of the soldiers, the sentiments and courage were highly different. For, though the Romans were making war far from their own country, their Generals had not omitted to persuade them, that they fought for Italy, and the city of Rome itself, in preventing the two brothers and their armies from joining. For which reason, conceiving, that their return to their wives and children depended upon the success of this battle, they were determined to conquer, or to die. The other army was composed of people, who had neither the same ardor, nor the same resolution, because they had not the same interests. Most of the soldiers were Spaniards, that chose rather to be defeated in Spain, than to conquer there, in order to be dragged into Italy. Accordingly, those who were in the main body gave way on the first charge, and almost before one dart had been thrown at them: and afterwards seeing the Romans come on with abundance of vigour, they openly took to flight. The two other bodies of infantry did not fight with the less courage on this account. The Carthaginians on one side, and the Africans on the other, charged the enemy with great ardor, whom they kept in a manner inclosed. But as soon as the infantry of the Romans was entirely advanced into the middle in pursuing the main body that fled, it was in a condition to open its way through the two bodies of the enemy's foot that attacked it in flank on the right and left. Though it had two attacks



A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

to sustain at once, it was victorious in both. For after having defeated and put to flight the centre, it was superior both in valour and number to those that remained. There was abundance of blood shed in this latter part of the battle; and if the Spaniards had not fled in the beginning of the action, very few of so great an army had escaped. The cavalry did not charge at all. For, as soon as the Moors and Numidians saw victory declare for the enemy by the defeat of the main-body, they fled, and driving the elephants before them, left the two bodies of the infantry uncovered. Asdrubal, on his side, having sustained the battle to the last, escaped from the midst of the slaughter with a small number of soldiers. The Romans seized and plundered his camp.

The success of this battle confirmed such of the Spaniards in the party of the Romans, as wavered before between them and the Carthaginians: instead of which Asdrubal had lost all hopes, not only of going with his army to Italy, but even of continuing in Spain with any safety. This good success, which the letters of the Scipios made known at Rome, occasioned great joy, not only because Asdrubal had been defeated in Spain, but because he had been prevented from coming to Italy.

In the events I have been relating, we see how careful Providence is to temper and ballance good and bad successes, in order to keep mankind in a wise (*b*) mean, equally distant from two extremes, by inspiring them with sentiments either of fear in the most smiling prosperity, or of hope in the greatest adversity.

(*b*) Sperat infestis, metuit secundis

Alteram sortem bene præparatum Pectus. *Horat.*

S E C T.

## S E C T. III.

*Double tax laid on the people at Rome. Distribution of the armies. Marcellus is elected Consul. Defect in his election. Q. Fabius Maximus substituted to him. New disposition of the armies. The Carthaginians send troops into Sardinia. The Consuls and other Generals repair to their respective provinces. Philip sends Ambassadors to Hannibal. Stratagem of Xenophanes, Chief of the embassy. Alliance made between Philip and Hannibal. Xenophanes, with the rest of the Ambassadors, is taken by the Romans, and sent to Rome. State of Sardinia. Enterprize of the Campanians against Cumæ frustrated by Sempronius. He also defends Cumæ against Hannibal. Vigilance and prudence of that Consul. The Ambassadors of Philip and Hannibal brought to Rome. Measures taken by the Romans against Philip. That Prince sends new Ambassadors to Hannibal. Discord at Nola between the Senate and people. Sardinia revolts. It is entirely subjected by Manlius after a great victory. Marcellus ravages the lands of Hannibal's allies, who implore his aid. The army of Hannibal is beaten before Nola by Marcellus. Single combat between Jubellius and Claudius. State of affairs in Spain. Private persons supply the Commonwealth with money. The Carthaginians beaten twice together in Spain by the Scipios.*

**W**HILST the affairs of Spain went very A. R. 536.  
Ant. C. 216. ill on the side of the Carthaginians, Hannibal laboured with indefatigable application to sustain and advance those of Italy. Petellia was taken by the Carthaginians: Croto and Locris by the Bruttii. Rhegium was the only city of that canton, that continued faithful to the Romans. Sicily also, at the instigation of Gelo, Hiero's eldest

A. R. 536.  
Ant.C. 216.

deft fon, inclined to the Carthaginians. Gelo's death deferred the effect of this difpofition for fome time, as we fhew in the fequel.

The three fons of M. Æmilius Lepidus celebrate funeral games in honour of their father, and give combats of gladiators: I have fpoke of thefe combats in the preceding volume. The great Roman games were alfo celebrated.

The fourth year of the war with Hannibal, the Consul Ti. Sempronius Gracchus entered upon office on the Ides of March (the 15th) as well as the Prætors. The People were defirous that M. Marcellus fhould continue to command in quality of Pro-conful, becaufe fince the battle of Cannæ, he was the only General, that had fought Hannibal in Italy with advantage.

A. R. 537.  
Ant.C. 215.

### TI. SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS.

*Double tax  
laid upon  
the people  
at Rome.  
Liv. xxiii.  
31.*

The first day the Senate affembled in the Capitol to deliberate upon the affairs of the Commonwealth, they decreed, that this year the citizens fhould pay double the ufual tax, and that out of half the total amount, which fhould be levied immediately, the foldiers fhould be paid the arrears actually due to them for their fervice. Thofe who were at the battle of Cannæ, were excluded from this payment.

*Diftribution of the  
armies.*

As to the armies, the Consul Ti. Sempronius, in confequence of what had been regulated in the fame affembly, ordered the two legions of the city to rendezvous at Cales, from whence they were to march to the camp of Claudius Marcellus beyond Sueffula. The Prætor, Appius Claudius Pulcher, had orders to take the troops of that diftrict, which were principally the remains of the army of Cannæ, in order to transport them to Sicily, and fend back thofe to Rome that were in that province.



province. M. Claudius Marcellus went to take the two legions of the city at Cales, whither they had been commanded to repair, in order to march them into the camp, called the Claudian camp, from his name. Appius Claudius ordered T. Metilius Croto, his Lieutenant, to put himself at the head of the old troops, and to carry them to Sicily.

At first every body expected with impatience, *Marcellus* that the Consul would appoint an assembly for the nomination of his colleague. But many having observed, that Marcellus had been removed as if with design, for whom that dignity was intended preferably to all others, as a reward of the glorious actions, which he had done during his Prætorship, a great murmur arose in the Senate. There was reason to suspect, that there was artifice in the conduct that had been observed in respect to Marcellus. He was a Plebeian; as the Consul was also. It is probable enough, that the Patricians were for preventing both Consulships from being filled by Plebeians; which had hitherto been without example. However this conjecture were, which the sequel will appear to verify, the Consul, whose being a Plebeian himself, must exempt him from all suspicion of having entered into this combination, and who had it in his power to frustrate it, replied to those who complained: *Nothing has been done, Fathers, but for the good of the Commonwealth. It was proper, that Marcellus should go to Campania to change the armies there, and that the assembly should not be appointed till after he had executed his commission, and was returned to Rome; in order that you may have such a Consul, as the present conjunctures require, and you yourselves approve.* Accordingly nothing more was said of assemblies till the return of Marcellus. As soon as that happened, one was held, and he was elected

A. R. 557.  
Ant. C. 215.

*Q. Fabius  
Maximus  
is substituted  
to him.*

Consul unanimously, and immediately entered upon office. But as a clap of thunder was heard that moment, and his election was declared defective by the Augurs, he abdicated, and Q. Fabius Maximus was substituted in his place, who was then Consul for the third time.

This declaration of the Augurs upon the pretended defect in the election of a second Plebeian Consul, may with reason be suspected. A great many years will pass before this first example of two Plebeian Consuls will be followed by a second.

TI. SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS. III.

*New distribution  
of the arms.*

The Consuls made a new distribution of the troops different from the former plan. Fabius had for him the army, which M. Junius had commanded during his Dictatorship: and his colleague Sempronius twenty five thousand allies, to which were added the slaves, who had voluntarily engaged to carry arms to the number of eight thousand. The Prætor Valerius had the legions, which were returned from Sicily. Marcellus, as Proconsul, was left at the head of those, who were to cover Nola beyond Sueffula. The Prætors, to whose lot Sicily and Sardinia had fallen, set out for their provinces.

Whilst this passed, when Mago, Hannibal's brother, was upon the point of setting out from Carthage, in order to carry to Italy twelve thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, twenty elephants, and a thousand talents of silver (an hundred and fifty thousand pounds) with a convoy of sixty galleys, news came that the Carthaginians had been defeated in Spain, and that all the states of that province were gone over to the Romans. This news made Carthage change the design of sending Mago

Mago to Italy; because supplies seemed more necessary in Spain. At the same time also another event happened, which made them still more unmindful of Hannibal: this was an occasion that offered of recovering Sardinia. They were informed, “ that the Romans had but few troops “ in that island; that they had sent a new Prætor, of no experience, in the room of Aulus Cornelius, who had long governed the province, and who knew it perfectly well. That besides the Sardinians were weary of the Roman government, which the year before had treated them with exceeding rigour, in obliging them to furnish money and corn beyond their power. That they wanted only a leader to revolt.” These complaints were carried to Carthage by deputies, who secretly sent thither the principal persons of the nation, and especially Hampficoras, the most considerable of them all by his credit and riches. The news from Spain and Sardinia, which came at the same time, having excited both hope and fear, they sent Mago to Spain with his ships and troops, and chose Asdrubal, surnamed the Bald, for the expedition of Sardinia, with forces very near equal to those commanded by Mago. Hannibal in the mean time, who on his side had the most pressing occasion for aid, and who saw his forces decrease every day, must have been in great uneasiness and perplexity.

The Roman Consuls, on their side, had no sooner finished the affairs which kept them in the city, than they prepared to set out for the army. Sempronius ordered the troops he was to command to repair to Sinuessæ by a day assigned them. Q. Fabius also set out, in order to put himself at the head of his army, after having commanded the inhabitants of the country, according to the permission he had obtained for that purpose from the

*The Carthaginians send troops into Sardinia.*

*Liv. xxiii. 32.*

*The Consuls and other Generals repair to their respective provinces.*



A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 213.

Senate, to carry all their grain into the fortified cities before the first of June; declaring, that as to those, who should not have obeyed, he would ravage their lands, sell their slaves by auction, and burn their houses. The very Prætors who had been created for the administration of justice, were not exempted from the functions of war. Valerius was sent into Apulia, to receive the army from Varro, and to make it go to Sicily under the command of some Lieutenant-general; whilst he put himself at the head of the legions that returned from Sicily, and employed them for the defence of the sea-coasts between Brundisium and Tarentum, with the assistance of a fleet of twenty-five ships, of which the command was also given him. Q. Fulvius, Prætor of the city, with a like number of ships, was appointed to guard the coasts adjacent to Rome. Varro, who was continued in command, but only in employments of little importance, and remote from the enemy, had orders to levy troops in the territory of Picenum, and to act for the safety of that country. T. Otacilius Crassus had no sooner consecrated the Temple of Prudence, than he was sent into Sicily to command the fleet in the ports or upon the coasts of that island.

Philip  
sends Am-  
bassadors  
to Hanni-  
bal.  
Liv. xxiii.  
33.

All the Kings and nations had their eyes upon the famous quarrel, that had armed the two most powerful people of the earth. Philip, King of Macedonia, interested himself particularly, being a nearer neighbour than any of the rest to Italy, from which he was separated only by the \* Ionian sea. As soon as he was informed, that Hannibal had passed the Alps, he was rejoiced to see two such powerful Republicks at blows with each other: and as long as their strength seemed equal,

\* Part of the Mediterranean between Greece and Sicily.

he did not know for which of the two to wish that victory might declare. But, when he was informed, that Hannibal had defeated the Romans in three battles, which he had fought with them almost upon the neck of each other, he was no longer in suspense about determining for the side of the victor. Advices that he received soon after, confirmed him in that resolution. Whilst he was present at the celebration of the Nemæan games at Argos, a courier arrived from Macedonia, with the news, that the Romans had lost a great battle. This was evidently that of Cannæ. He imparted this only to Demetrius of Pharos, who, as we have said, had taken refuge with that Prince, after the Romans had reduced him to quit Illyricum. Demetrius took the advantage of this occasion to animate him for a war with the Romans, to which, said he, the Gods themselves seemed to invite him, so favourable was the present conjuncture. He represented to him, that in the present condition of Rome, which had neither aid nor hope, he might, by joining his numerous forces with those of Hannibal, assure himself of the conquest of Italy; after which it would be easy for him to make himself monarch of the universe; a noble ambition, that became no one better than himself.

A young King, successful till then in his undertakings, bold, enterprizing, and besides of a family that had always flattered themselves with one day attaining universal empire, could not but be enchanted with such discourse. He therefore from thenceforth meditated nothing but giving peace to Greece, where he was actually at war with the Ætolians, in order that he might turn his whole thoughts, and all his forces, on the side of Italy. We have given the detail of this negociation elsewhere, and have repeated, after Polybius, the wise reflections

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

Polyb. v.  
439.

*Ancient  
Hist.*  
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Book xvii.

A. R. 537.  
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reflections of a deputy from Naupactus, who represented both to Philip and the Greeks, of what importance it was to unite, if they desired not to be crushed, either by the Romans or Carthaginians, that is, by that of the two people, which should be victorious in the war they were then making upon each other. But we must not omit observing here, that from that moment all Greece (and soon after Asia) had their eyes fixed solely upon the West, at first either upon Rome or Carthage, and afterwards upon Rome only, as if the States and Kings of the East and South had from that time foreseen, that it was from the West they were to receive masters.

Philip, after having made peace, returned into Macedonia, where Demetrius continued his warm solicitations, speaking of nothing but the grand project, with which he had so successfully began to inspire him. And the Prince's thoughts turned upon nothing else night and day, so that his conversation, and even dreams, were solely engrossed by the war with the Romans. Polybius observes, that it was not out of friendship for the King, that Demetrius was so warm and tenacious in giving him this advice, but out of hatred for the Roman Commonwealth, and because there was no other means for him to re-instate himself in the island of Pharos. It is usual for flatterers to cover their self-interested views under the mask of warm and passionate zeal; as it is for Princes to abandon themselves blindly to counsels, that flatter and gratify their passions.

Philip, after the battle of Cannæ, put what he had resolved the year before in execution, and sent Ambassadors to Hannibal, to congratulate him upon his victories, and to make an alliance with him. Those Ambassadors took great care to shun the ports of Brundisium and Tarentum, knowing they



they were guarded by the ships and troops of the Romans. They therefore landed near the temple of Juno at the \* promontory, which gave the name of *Lacinian* to that Goddess. From thence, crossing Apulia in their way to Capua, they fell directly into the middle of the Roman troops, that guarded the country, and were carried before the Prætor Valerius, who was then encamped at Luceria. Xenophanes, chief of the embassy, was not at all confounded. He told Valerius, boldly, that he came from King Philip to demand the amity and alliance of the Romans. That he was charged with orders from his master for the Consul, Senate, and People of Rome, and that he desired to be conducted to them. Valerius, charmed with the advantageous offers of so powerful a King, at a time when the Commonwealth was abandoned by its antient allies, received these Ambassadors from an enemy as friends and guests. He gave them guides, whom he commanded to carry them the safest way, and very carefully to inform them which posts were occupied by the Romans, and which by the Carthaginians. Xenophanes passed through the midst of the Roman troops into Campania; and from thence with the first opportunity of escaping, repaired to Hannibal's camp, and made an alliance with him in the name of Philip, of which the conditions were: “ That  
 “ the King of Macedonia should come to Italy  
 “ with as strong a fleet as he could fit out: (this  
 “ was supposed to be about two hundred ships)  
 “ that he should ravage the coasts of Italy, and  
 “ on his side should make war with all his forces, both by sea and land. That when they  
 “ should be reduced into subjection, Italy, with  
 “ the city of Rome, and the whole spoils, should

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

*Stratagem  
of Xenophanes,  
chief of the  
embassy.*

*Alliance  
made be-  
tween Phi-  
lip and  
Hannibal.*

\* *Lacinian promontory near Croto in Calabria.*

A. R. 537. “ remain to Hannibal and the Carthaginians.  
 Ant. C. 215. “ That they should afterwards go in conjunction  
 “ into Greece, and make war upon such nations  
 “ as Philip should direct, and that all the coun-  
 “ tries, as well on the continent, as the islands  
 “ that border upon Macedonia, should be annexed  
 “ to the dominions of that Prince.”

Livy repeats only the little I have cited of this treaty. Polybius has preserved the whole, of which I think it incumbent on me not to deprive the reader. These fragments, which shew antient customs, especially in a point of such importance as that of treaties, must seem valuable, and excite our curiosity.

Polyb. vii. *Treaty of alliance, made by oath between Hanni-  
 502—505 bal the General, Mago, Myrcal, Barmocar, and all  
 the Senators of Carthage, then with him (Hannibal)  
 and all the Carthaginians, that serve under him on  
 the one side ; and on the other between Xenophanes  
 the Athenian, the son of Cleomachus, sent to us as  
 Ambassador for King Philip, the son of Demetrius,  
 as well in his name, as in the name of the Macedo-  
 nians, and of the allies of his crown.*

*In the presence of Jupiter, and Juno, and Apollo ;  
 in the presence of the tutelar divinity of the Cartha-  
 ginians, and of Hercules, and of Iolaus ; in the  
 presence of Mars, of Triton and Neptune ; in the  
 presence of the gods, that accompany our expedition,  
 and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the earth ;  
 in the presence of the rivers, of the fields, and of the  
 waters ; in the presence of all the gods, that Car-  
 thage acknowledges for its masters ; in the presence of  
 all the gods that are the masters of Macedonia, and  
 of all the rest of Greece ; in the presence of all the  
 gods, that preside at this Treaty : Hannibal the  
 General, and all the Senators of Carthage that are  
 with him, and all the soldiers of his army, have  
 said :*

*With your good pleasure and ours, there shall be a treaty of amity and alliance between you and us as friends, allies, and brothers, on condition, that King Philip and the Macedonians, and all the allies they have amongst the other Greeks, shall preserve and defend the Carthaginian Lords, and Hannibal their General, and the soldiers under his command, and the governors of the provinces dependant upon Carthage, and the inhabitants of Utica, and all the cities and nations in subjection to the Carthaginians, and all the soldiers and allies, and both the cities and nations, which have joined us in Italy, Gaul, Liguria, and whosoever, in that region, shall enter into amity and alliance with us. In like manner the Carthaginian armies, and the inhabitants of Utica, and all the cities and nations in subjection to Carthage, and the soldiers and allies, and all the cities and nations, with which we have amity and alliance in Italy, in Gaul, in Liguria, and with which we may contract amity and alliance in this region, shall preserve and defend King Philip, and the Macedonians, and all their allies amongst the other Greeks. We do not seek to surprize each other : we lay no snares for each other. We, the Macedonians, declare ourselves from our hearts with affection, without fraud, without design of deceiving, enemies to all those who shall be such to the Carthaginians, except the cities, ports, and Kings, with whom we are engaged by treaties of peace and alliance. And we, the Carthaginians, also declare ourselves enemies to all those, who shall be such to King Philip, except the Kings, cities, and nations, with whom we are engaged by treaties of peace and alliance. You, the Macedonians, shall enter into the war which we have with the Romans, till it shall please the gods to give good success to our arms and yours. You shall assist us with all that shall be necessary, according as shall be agreed in that respect. If the gods do not give us the victory in the war against*

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.



A. R. 537  
 ANT. C. 215

*gainſt the Romans and their allies, and we ſhould treat of peace with them, we ſhall treat of it in ſuch a manner, that you may be included in the treaty, and on conditions that they ſhall not be allowed to declare war againſt you; that they ſhall not be maſters of the Corcyreans, nor of the Apollionates, nor of the Epidamnians, nor of Pharos, nor of Dimallum, nor of the Paribini, nor of Atintania; and that they ſhall reſtore to Demetrius of Pharos his relations whom they detain in their dominions. If the Romans declare war againſt you, or againſt us, we then will aſſiſt each other according to the neceſſity of the occaſion. We will act in the ſame manner, in caſe any other ſhall make war againſt us, except in reſpect to the Kings, cities, and nations, to whom we ſhall be friends and allies. If we ſhall judge it proper to add any thing to, or retrench any thing from, this treaty, we will not do it without the conſent of both parties.*

This treaty is an authentick proof of the common opinion that prevailed amongſt all nations, that the good and bad ſucceſſes of war, and in general all the events of life, depend abſolutely upon the *Divinity*, and that there is a Providence, that regulates and diſpoſes all things.

The words *in the preſence*, repeated ſo often in ſo few lines, ſhews how much the Pagans themſelves were convinced that God is actually preſent in the ceremony of making treaties, that he hears all the articles of them, and that he reſerves to himſelf the Punishment of thoſe who dare to violate any of them, and inſult his ſacred name, that has been invoked to them.

In what aſtoniſhment ſhould we be, if our Ambaſſadors ſhould think fit to uſe in treaties the invocation of ſaints as often as the Pagans did that of their gods, of whatever rank they were, for they had different kinds of them?

Such

Such were very near the conditions of the treaty <sup>A. R. 537.</sup> made between Hannibal and the Ambassadors of <sup>Ant. C. 215.</sup> Philip. Hannibal sent Gisgo, Bostar, and Ma- <sup>Xenopha-</sup> go, with them to confirm the alliance with the <sup>nes with</sup> King in person. They all repaired together to the <sup>the other</sup> same temple of Juno Lacinia, where the ship of <sup>Ambassa-</sup> the Macedonians was concealed in the road. They <sup>ders, is</sup> embarked there: and were out at sea, when they <sup>taken by</sup> were perceived by the Roman ships that guarded <sup>the Ro-</sup> the coasts of Calabria. P. Valerius detached some <sup>mans, and</sup> light vessels, with orders to pursue the ship, that <sup>sent to</sup> had been seen, and to bring it in. The Ambassadors at first did their utmost to escape. But seeing that their pursuers were upon the point of coming up with them, they surrendered themselves of their own accord to the Romans. When they were brought to Valerius, he asked them who they were, from whence they came, and whither they were going. Xenophanes, whose first lie had succeeded so well, replied at first, “ that King  
 “ Philip had sent him as Ambassador to the Ro-  
 “ mans: but that it had been impossible for him  
 “ to cross Campania, which he had found full of  
 “ the enemy’s troops.” The Carthaginian habits having made the Roman General suspect Hannibal’s Ambassadors, he interrogated them, and their answer fully discovered them. Having intimidated them by the terror of punishment, he obliged them to deliver the letters to him which Hannibal had wrote to Philip, and the treaty which had been concluded between that Prince and the Carthaginians. When Valerius was informed, of all that he desired to know, he judged, that the best he could do was, as soon as possible, to send the prisoners he had taken, and all the persons in their train, to the Senate at Rome, or to the Consuls wheresoever they should be. For this purpose he chose five of the lightest gallies, which he made  
 set

A. R. 537.  
AET. C. 215.

set out under the command of L. Valerius Antias, to whom he gave orders to separate the deputies, by putting them in different ships, so that they might have no communication with any body, nor even with one another.

When we unite all the misfortunes, that happened to the Romans in the course of one and the same year, in one point of view: fifty thousand men killed at Cannæ with the flower of their Generals and Senators; soon after another army entirely destroyed with the Consul in Gaul; the almost general defection of the allies; the orders sent to Asdrubal to march with his whole army to Italy, and to Mago, another of Hannibal's brothers, to carry thither twelve thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, and twenty elephants: add to this the new treaty of Philip upon the point of sending a fleet of two hundred sail against them, and to attack them with all his forces by sea and land: I repeat it, when we unite all these circumstances, which might, and even, morally speaking, must have concurred together, so wisely were the measures concerted, does not the ruin of Rome seem absolutely inevitable, and can we believe but that her end is just at hand? But, if this be so, what becomes of the clear and evident prediction of her future greatness laid down in the Scriptures? Is it difficult for the Almighty to dispel all these dangers, and to make them entirely vanish? And this is what happens. The moment Asdrubal is upon the point of setting out, a battle judiciously fought and gained by the Scipios, stops him short. The news of this blow carried to Carthage, prevents Mago's voyage. The taking of Philip's Ambassadors disconcerts all the designs of that new enemy. We shall see, that Rome, in the midst of all these storms, retains a tranquillity and constancy,



cy, that have something prodigious in them. A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.  
But let us go on with the history.

On the report made by Mammula, that was State of  
Sardinia.  
Liv. xxiii.  
34. returned from his government of Sardinia, of the state of that province, of the sickness of Q. Mucius his successor; of the disposition of the inhabitants to a general revolt; and of the rumour of an approaching irruption of the Carthaginians, the Senators ordered Q. Fulvius Flaccus to levy five thousand foot, and four hundred horse, and to make that legion set out immediately for Sardinia, under such a General as he should think fit to chuse, to command it and the other troops already in the province, till Q. Mucius's health should be re-established. This commission was given to T. Manlius Torquatus, who had been twice Consul and Censor; and had subjected the Sardinians in his first Consulship. Almost at the same time, the fleet which the Carthaginians sent under the command of Asdrubal the Bald, having met with a dreadful storm, was driven on shore at the islands Baleares. All the crews had suffered exceedingly; and the bodies of the ships had been so violently shattered, that they were obliged to draw them on shore, and to employ a very considerable length of time in refitting them.

To return to Italy; as the battle of Cannæ had Enterprize  
of the  
Campani-  
ans against  
Cumæ  
frustrated  
by Sem-  
pronius.  
Liv. xxiii.  
35—37. much reduced the strength of the Romans, and the voluptuousness of Capua had softened the courage of the Carthaginians, the war was carried on no longer with the same vigour. The Campanians undertook to subject the people of Cumæ to their yoke. They at first employed solicitations, to induce them to quit the party of the Romans. But not being able to succeed by that method, they had recourse to stratagem, in order to surprize them. They invited the Senate of Cumæ to a sacrifice, which was to be made in the little city

A. R. 537.  
A. D. C. 215.

of Hama, where the Senate was to be preſent. The people of Cumæ ſuſpected ſome treachery, however they did not fail to accept the offer, with the view of making the Campanians fall into their own ſnare. They immediately gave advice of what paſſed to Sempronius, who at that time incamped near Liternum, and cauſed him to be told, that not only the Senate, but the people and army of Capua, would be at the ſacrifice. The Conſul ordered them to remove all their effects out of the country into the city, and to keep themſelves ſhut up within the walls. As to him, the evening before the ſacrifice, he began his march to approach Cumæ, which was but three miles from Hama. The Campanians were already aſſembled there in great numbers. The ceremony was to laſt three days. It began in the evening, and ended before midnight. Sempronius believed this the time for attacking the Campanians. Accordingly he ſet out about two hours before the ſetting of the ſun, and arriving at Hama, in great ſilence about midnight, he entered at once through all the gates of the camp of the Campanians, which he found much neglected, as happens with people, who, after having eat and drank plentifully, are very ſleepy. Moſt of them were killed, ſome in their beds, where they were in a manner buried in ſleep; and the reſt as they returned unarmed from the ſacrifice. The Campanians loſt above two thouſand men in this nocturnal ſlaughter, with their chief Marius Alfius. Thirty-four colours were taken. Sempronius did not loſe an hundred ſoldiers, and remained maſter of the camp.

After having plundered it, he retired haſtily to Cumæ, apprehending that Hannibal, who was incamped upon the mountain Tifata above Capua, might come to attack him. Accordingly, on the firſt rumour of this ſurprize, he ſet out, and  
marched

marched with abundance of expedition towards Hama, persuading himself, that he should find the Romans still there, and that an army composed chiefly of raw soldiers, and even slaves, blinded by their success, would amuse themselves with taking the spoils of the enemy, and with gathering the plunder. But, whatever diligence he had used, he found no enemies at Hama, where he saw only the traces of the defeat of his allies, and the earth strewed with their dead bodies.

The next day he besieged Sempronius in Cumæ; nor did this enterprize succeed better. The besieged defended themselves with intrepid valour. Seeing one of Hannibal's towers placed against the walls, they set it on fire, by the means of abundance of torches, which they threw into it all at once. This fire put the enemy into confusion. The Romans immediately sallied through two of the gates of the city at once, and repulsed the Carthaginians as far as their camp with such vigour, that Hannibal, and not the Consul, seemed that day to be besieged. About thirteen hundred Carthaginians were killed in this action; and fifty-nine were taken alive. Sempronius did not stay, till the enemy had recovered themselves from their consternation, to sound the retreat, and draw off his troops into the city. The next day, Hannibal flattering himself, that the Consul, flushed with the advantage he had gained, would offer him battle in form, drew up his army between the camp and the city. But when he saw, that the enemy contented themselves with defending their walls as usual, without hazarding any thing rashly, he returned into his camp of Tifata, with the mortification and confusion of having missed his aim.



A.R. 537.  
 Ant.C. 215.  
*Vigilance  
 and pru-  
 dence of  
 that Con-  
 sul.*

The Conful Sempronius was a General of experience, vigilant, and attentive to every thing, and fhewed no lefs prudence than activity and valour. When the deputies of Cumæ applied to him, they found him, as I have faid, at Liternum. As he had no enemy actually upon his hands, he there made his troops frequently perform exercifes, in order that the new foldiers, moft of whom were flaves, that had lifted voluntarily, might learn to follow their colours, and know their ranks in battle. His principal care was to keep up a good underftanding amongst them. For this reafon, to prevent quarrels, “ he ordered his  
 “ Lieutenant and the Tribunes exprefsly to for-  
 “ bid the foldiers to reproach any one with his  
 “ former condition ; and that all of them, old  
 “ foldiers and new, freemen and flaves, fhould  
 “ confent to be treated in the fame manner. He  
 “ reprefented to them, that they ought to think,  
 “ (a) all thofe, to whom the Commonwealth  
 “ had confided her arms and enfigns, were fuffi-  
 “ ciently honourable. That the fame reafon,  
 “ which had obliged them to act in this manner,  
 “ required, that they fhould fupport what they had  
 “ done.” The foldiers were no lefs careful to conform to thefe wife admonitions, than the officers to give them ; and fo great a concord was foon feen to take place in this army, that the condition from which each was taken to be made a foldier, was in a manner entirely forgot.

At the fame time, that Sempronius Gracchus made Hannibal raife the fieve of Cumæ, another Sempronius, furnamed Longus, gained a battle in Lucania againft Hanno, in which he killed

(a) Omnes fatis honeftos arma fua fignaque Populus generofque ducerent, quibus Romanus commiffiflet. *Liv.*

him two thousand men, with the loss of only three hundred, and took one and forty ensigns. M. Valerius the Prætor retook three cities of the Hirpini, that had revolted from the Romans. A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

Whilst these things passed, the five galleys that carried to Rome the Ambassadors of Philip, and those of Hannibal, that had been taken prisoners, after having coasted almost all Italy from the Adriatic gulf to the Tuscan sea, passed almost opposite to Cumæ. Sempronius, who did not know whether those ships belonged to the Commonwealth or to the enemy, detached some of his fleet after them, to know who they were. From the questions and answers, that passed on both sides, Valerius, who commanded the five galleys, learnt that one of the Consuls was at Cumæ. He immediately entered the port of that city, and delivered the prisoners in his custody to Sempronius, with Hannibal's letters to Philip. When the Consul had read them, he sealed them up again carefully, and sent them by land to the Senate, ordering Valerius to continue his voyage by sea with his prisoners. The letters and prisoners arrived at Rome almost at the same time. When the affair had been enquired into, and the Ambassadors, that were prisoners, interrogated, their answers agreeing with what was contained in the letters, the Senators were in extreme anxiety to find, that at a time when they were scarce able to make head against Hannibal, they were upon the point of having so formidable an enemy as Philip upon their hands. But, far from suffering themselves to be discouraged by fear, they immediately deliberated upon the means for carrying the war first into Macedonia, in order to prevent that prince from attacking them in Italy. Where do we find the like resolution and greatness of soul?

*The Ambassadors of Philip and Hannibal brought to Rome. Liv. xxiii. 38.*

A. R. 537.  
A. U. C. 215.

After having imprisoned the Ambassadors, and sold those of their train by auction, they decreed, that five and twenty new gallies should be fitted out, to join the twenty-five commanded by P. Valerius Flaccus. When they were in a condition to put to sea, they took with them the five that had brought the prisoners, and all together, to the number of thirty, set sail from Ostia for Tarentum. P. Valerius had orders to embark the troops, which had formerly served under Varro, and which were then under the command of the Lieutenant General Apustius in Tarentum; and with this fleet, composed of fifty ships, not only to defend the coasts of Italy, but also to enquire into the motions, that might be made on the side of Macedonia. He had orders also, in case Philip should seem to act in conformity to what the treaty and letters, found upon his Ambassadors, declared, and to the answers they had given, to give advice of it to M. Valerius, in order that the latter, leaving the command of his army to L. Apustius, might take the fleet at Tarentum to carry it immediately to Macedonia, and keep Philip in his own dominions. The money which had been sent to Appius Claudius in Sicily to pay what had been borrowed of King Hiero, was appropriated to the subsistence of the fleet, and of the troops employed in the war of Macedonia. L. Apustius caused it to be carried to Tarentum. Hiero also furnished two hundred thousand bushels of wheat, and an hundred thousand of barley.

*Philip*

*sends new  
Ambassadors to  
Hannibal.*

Whilst the Romans were employed in these preparations, the Macedonian ships, which had been taken and sent to Rome with the five of the Romans, found means to escape, and returned into Macedonia. Philip was thereby informed, that the Ambassadors had been seized with the letters they were to bring to him. But not having

†

any.



any knowledge of the treaty, which his Ambassadors had made with Hannibal, nor of the answer those of Hannibal were to deliver him, he dispatched a second Embassy with the same orders and the same powers. These second Ambassadors were more fortunate than the first. But the campaign ended before the King of Macedonia could undertake any thing; so important for Rome was the taking of one ship, and the Ambassadors it carried, in deferring a war for an whole year, that might, in the present conjuncture, have become fatal to her.

Fabius, after having expiated the prodigies, that disturbed the publick tranquillity, passed the Vulturnus, and having joined his Collegue, they acted in concert in the neighbourhood of Capua. Fabius retook some cities by force, which had declared for Hannibal.

As to Nola, things there were in the same situation as the year before. The Senate adhered firmly to the Romans, and the people were for Hannibal. The latter carried on the plot for delivering up the city after having massacred the principal citizens. But, to prevent the success of it, Fabius marched and occupied the post of Marcellus beyond Sueffula between Capua and Hannibal's Army, which was near Tifata: and he sent Marcellus to Nola with the troops he commanded, for the preservation of that city.

In Sardinia, T. Manlius revived the vigor of the Roman arms, which had drooped exceedingly since the illness of Q. Mucius. Manlius placed his fleet in safety in the port of Carales (now Cagliari;) and having made the Crews take arms, he joined these with the troops he had received from the Prætor; and formed of the whole an army of twenty thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse. He was very successful against the

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

*The discord between the Senate and People of Nola continues.*

*Sardinia revolts, and is entirely sub-jected by Manlius after a famous victory.*

Liv. xxiii.

40, 41.

A. R. 557.  
Ant. C. 215.

natives of the country, which would have terminated the war of Sardinia, if Asdrubal the Bald, with the Carthaginian Fleet, which the storm had driven upon the islands Baleares, had not arrived very opportunely to encourage the People, who were upon the point of submitting again to the Romans. Manlius had no sooner received advice of the arrival of the Carthaginian fleet, than he returned to Carales: which made it easy for Hampsicoras the General of the Sardinians to join Asdrubal. The latter, having landed his troops, and sent back his ships to Carthage, set out with Hampsicoras, who knew the country, to plunder the lands of the Roman allies. He would have advanced to Carales, if Manlius had not marched to meet him with his army, and had not put a stop to the ravages, which he was making in the country. The two armies incamped at no great distance from each other; which at first occasioned frequent skirmishes, wherein both sides had the advantage alternately. They at length came to a general battle, which continued four hours. The Sardinians fought with little vigour as usual; and the Carthaginians kept the victory in suspense during that time. They at last gave way, when they saw the army of the Sardinians routed, and the earth covered with the bodies of the slain. Manlius, having made the wing, that had defeated the Sardinians, advance, surrounded them at the time they turned their backs. It was then a slaughter, rather than a battle. Twelve thousand remained upon the field, as well Carthaginians as Sardinians. About three thousand six hundred were taken, with twenty ensigns.

What made this battle the more glorious and memorable was, that Asdrubal himself, who commanded the enemy, was taken prisoner with Mago and Hanno, two persons of the first quality of Carthage.

Carthage. Mago was of the Barcinian family, <sup>A. R. 537.</sup> and a near relation of Hannibal. <sup>Ant. C. 215.</sup> Hanno was the author of the revolt of the Sardinians, and consequently of the war which had ensued. The Sardinian Generals also made this victory of the Romans the more glorious by their disgrace. For Hioftus, the son of Hampficoras, was killed in the battle; and Hampficoras, who had escaped by flight with a small number of horse, had no sooner heard of his son's death, which compleated his misfortunes, than he killed himself.

Cornus, the capital city of the district where the battle was fought, served for a retreat to the rest. But Manlius having invested it with his victorious army, made himself master of it in some days. By the example of Cornus, the other cities, which had joined Hampficoras, and the Carthaginians, sent him hostages, and surrendered to him. After having exacted money and provisions from each of them, according to their power, he retired to Carales with his army. He there made his soldiers embark on board the ships, which he had left in the port, and returned to Rome. Having informed the Senate of the reduction of Sardinia, he delivered the money he had brought away to the Questors or Treasurers, the provisions that remained to the Ædiles, and the prisoners to the Prætor Fulvius.

At the same time T. Otacilius, having sailed from Lilybæum into Africa with his fleet, ravaged the country of the Carthaginians: and from thence, steering his course towards Sardinia, whither it was said Asdrubal was lately gone from the islands Baleares; he met his fleet returning to Africa; and after a slight battle, took seven ships, with the soldiers and mariners on board. Fear dispersed the rest, like a storm.



A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

Bomilcar was more successful. He landed at Locris with a recruit of four thousand soldiers, and forty elephants, and with all sorts of provisions, which he brought from Carthage for the army of Hannibal.

*Marcellus*  
*ravages*  
*the coun-*  
*tries of*  
*Hanni-*  
*bal's al-*  
*lies, who*  
*implore his*  
*aid.*  
Liv. xxiii.  
42, 43.

Marcellus, who had been sent to Nola by the Consul Fabius, did not remain idle there. He made incursions into the countries of the Hirpini and Samnites of Caudium; and put all to fire and sword in such a manner, that he made those people call to mind the ravages they had suffered in their wars with the Romans. In this extremity they sent deputies to Hannibal to implore his aid.

The chief of the Embassy, “after having  
“mentioned the wars, which they had in former  
“times sustained during almost an hundred years  
“with the Romans, and boasted the ardor and  
“fidelity of their attachment to Hannibal, added :”  
*We believed that we had nothing to fear from the an-*  
*ger of the Romans, as long as we should have so*  
*powerful and successful a General as you for our pro-*  
*tector and friend. And notwithstanding, whilst you*  
*are not only victorious and triumphant, but being pre-*  
*sent in person, can hear the cries and groans of our*  
*wives and children, and see the fires that consume our*  
*houses, we have undergone all this summer, and still*  
*actually suffer such dreadful ravages, that it seems*  
*to be Marcellus, and not Hannibal, that gained the*  
*battle of Cannæ. We in former times withstood Con-*  
*suls and Dictators with numerous armies : but now*  
*we are the prey of an handful of soldiers, scarce suf-*  
*ficient to defend the city of Nola where they are in*  
*garrison. If our youth, that now serve in your army,*  
*were in their country, they could defend it well against*  
*these robbers, that run to and fro in small bodies with*  
*as much negligence and security, as if they were walk-*  
*ing in the fields about Rome. Send a small number of*  
*Numidians*

*Numidians against them, which will suffice to overpower them. You undoubtedly will not refuse your protection and support to those, whom you have not thought unworthy of your amity and alliance.* Hannibal replied obligingly, “That he would soon put it out of the power of the Romans to hurt them. Then reminding them in emphatical terms of his past exploits, he assured them, that as the battle of Thrasymenus had been more glorious than that of Trebia, and the victory of Cannæ had afterwards eclipsed that of Thrasymenus; so, e’er long, he would make that of Cannæ be forgot by one still more bloody and more famous.” After having spoke in this manner to them, he dismissed them with great presents. Accordingly, having left a small number of soldiers to guard the camp at Tifata, he marched with the rest of his army towards Nola, assuring himself of an easy victory, from what his allies had told him, concerning the weakness and negligence of Marcellus.

Hanno at the same time quitted the country of the Bruttii, and repaired towards Nola with the soldiers and elephants, which Bomilcar had brought. Hannibal, who was incamped not far from that city, having examined every thing with abundance of care, perceived that his allies had only made false reports, and told him things quite otherwise than they really were. For Marcellus acted with great prudence, not coming out to plunder the country without a strong body of troops, and till he had sent scouts to view the neighbouring places, and provided for a retreat in case of being attacked: and lastly, with the same precautions, as if he had been to engage with Hannibal himself. And on the present occasion, he kept his soldiers close within the city.

Hannibal

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.*Hannibal's army is defeated before Nola by Marcellus.*  
Liv. xxiii.  
43—46.

A. R. 537.  
A. U. C. 215.

Hannibal having attempted in vain to corrupt the fidelity of the Senators of Nola, drew up his troops round the place, with design to attack it on all sides at once. Marcellus seeing him near the walls, made a vigorous salley. The Carthaginians were at first put into disorder, and some of them were killed. But they rallied, and the forces being become equal on both sides, they began to fight with great ardor and animosity. The action had been one of the most memorable, if a violent storm, that came on suddenly attended with heavy rains, had not obliged the combatants to separate. About thirty Carthaginians were killed in this attack: Marcellus did not lose one man. The rain continued all night, and great part of the next morning.

The third day Hannibal sent out part of his troops to forage. Marcellus immediately marched out with his army in order of battle, and Hannibal did not decline fighting. It was about a thousand paces between his camp and the city. In this space, which was part of a great plain, that surrounded the city on all sides, they fought. Both armies raised great cries at first, which made those of the Carthaginian foragers that were not far off, rejoin their army soon after the battle began. The inhabitants of Nola offered also to join the Romans: but Marcellus, having praised their zeal, ordered them to form a body of reserve, to assist him in case of need, and in the mean time, to content themselves, with carrying off the wounded from the press, without fighting, unless he gave them the signal.

It was doubtful for which side victory would declare. Both sides, animated by the speeches and example of their Generals, fought with the utmost ardor. Marcellus represented to his troops, “ That  
“ if they acted with any vigour, they would soon  
“ defeat



“ defeat troops they had already overcome three A. R. 537.  
 “ days before ; that had very lately been driven Ant. C. 215.  
 “ from before Cumæ (by the Consul Sempronius)  
 “ and that himself, though with other soldiers,  
 “ had beaten and put to flight the preceding year  
 “ before Nola. That all the forces of the Car-  
 “ thaginians were not together, a great part of  
 “ them being dispersed about the country to plun-  
 “ der. That those who fought were soldiers of  
 “ no force and vigour, enervated by the pleasures  
 “ of Capua, where they had passed the whole  
 “ winter in all kinds of excess and debauch. That  
 “ they had utterly lost that courage and force,  
 “ with which they had overcome all the difficul-  
 “ ties of passing the Alps and Pyrenees. That  
 “ they were only the remains of those first Car-  
 “ thaginians : that they had scarce retained suffi-  
 “ cient vigor to sustain the weight of their bodies  
 “ and arms. That (a) Capua had been to the  
 “ Carthaginians what Cannæ was to the Romans.  
 “ That it was there, that Hannibal had lost the  
 “ valour of his soldiers, the vigour of military  
 “ discipline, the glory he had acquired by his past  
 “ actions, and all the hopes he had conceived for  
 “ the time to come.”

Whilst Marcellus, to raise the courage of his  
 people, depreciated the Carthaginians, Hannibal  
 himself reproached them in a much rougher man-  
 ner. *I see here, said he, the same colours, and the  
 same arms, as at Trebia, Trasymenus, and Cannæ :  
 but I do not see the same soldiers. How ! can you  
 scarce sustain the charge of a single legion, and a  
 small body of Latines, commanded by a Roman Lieu-  
 tenant, you, whom two Consuls, and two consular*

(a) Capuam Annibali Can- nam, ibi præteriti temporis fa-  
 nas fuisse. Ibi virtutem belli- mam, ibi spem futuram ex-  
 cam, ibi militarem discipli- tinctam. *Liv.*

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

*armies, could not withstand? This is the second time that Marcellus, with new raised men and the burghers of Nola, has come to attack us with impunity. What is become of that Carthaginian, who cut off the Consul Flaminius's head, after having unborjed him? What is become of him, that killed L. Paulus after the battle of Cannæ? Are your swords blunted, are your arms benumbed? What! you used without difficulty to conquer armies much more numerous than your own; now, when you have the advantage of number, are you not able to withstand an handful of soldiers? Brave only with your tongues, you brag, that you would take Rome, if you were only led to its walls. The enterprize in question is much less difficult. The proof, to which I this day put your courage and force, is to take Nola. This city is situated in the midst of a plain, and has neither river, nor sea, to defend it. Carry it by storm; and when you are enriched with the plunder of so opulent a place, I'll lead you, or I'll follow you, wheresoever you please.*

Neither reproaches, nor praises, could inspire them with courage. They gave way on all sides, and as the natural bravery of the Romans increased every moment, as well from the exhortations and praises of their General, as the applauses given them by the people of Nola from the walls, the Carthaginians openly fled, and retired full of terror into their camp. The victorious Romans immediately prepared to attack them in it. But Marcellus made them draw off into the city, where they were received with exceeding joy and great acclamations, even by the People, who till then had inclined to the side of the Carthaginians.

The Romans killed this day more than five thousand of the enemy, took six hundred prisoners, nineteen colours, and two elephants, of which  
four

four were killed in the field of battle. Marcellus did not lose a thousand men. The next day there was a tacit truce, during which they buried their dead. Marcellus burnt the spoils of the enemy in honour of Vulcan, to whom he had promised to sacrifice them.

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

The third day after the battle, twelve hundred and seventy-two of the Spanish and Numidian horse, either through discontent for some bad treatment they had received, or in hopes of serving more to their advantage under the Romans, went over from Hannibal's camp to Marcellus. Nothing of this kind had yet happened to Hannibal. For, though his army was composed of many barbarous nations, and all as different in their manners as languages, he had however kept up a good understanding and strict union between them. These horse served the Romans afterwards with abundance of zeal and fidelity. When the war was over, each of them had settlements and lands given them in their own countries, as a reward for their services. Hannibal, having sent back Hanno into the country of the Bruttii with the troops he brought from thence, went to winter in Apulia, and incamped in the neighbourhood of Arpi.

Q. Fabius was no sooner informed, that Hannibal was set out for Apulia, than he caused corn to be brought from Nola and Naples into his camp at Sueffula; and having fortified it, he left a sufficient number of troops in it to guard it during the winter. As to himself, he went towards Capua, and put the whole country to fire and sword. The inhabitants, who did not much rely upon their forces, quitted their walls however, but did not remove far from them, and posted themselves near the city in a well fortified camp. They had a body of six thousand bad infantry. Their cavalry



A. R. 537. valry was better, for which reason they made use  
 Ant. C. 215. of it to harrafs the enemy.

Single  
 combat be-  
 tween  
 Jubellius  
 and Clau-  
 dius.

Liv. xxiii.  
 46, 47.

Jubellius Taurea held the first rank amongst the most distinguished by their birth and bravery in the Capuan cavalry ; so that, when he served in the Roman armies, only the Roman, Claudius Afellus, was capable of being compared with him. He spurred his horse towards the Roman squadrons ; and having long fought Afellus with his eyes, as he saw they were disposed to hear him, he asked aloud where Claudius Afellus was ? why after so many disputes in words about their bravery, did he not come in arms to decide the quarrel ? *Why does not he shew himself*, said the proud Campanian, *either to give me the glory of overcoming him, or to acquire a glorious victory himself* ? Claudius having been informed of this defiance, delayed answering, only till he had got the General's permission to accept it. He then armed immediately, and advancing out of the gates of the camp, called Taurea by his name, and told him he was ready to fight him where he pleased.

The Romans had already quitted their camp in a throng to see this combat ; and on the side of the Campanians, not only their intrenchments, but the walls of the city were covered with spectators : the two champions then after having exchanged some words of defiance, fell upon each other lance in hand. But, as they were in the plain, and could manage their horses as they would, they avoided each other's strokes, and the combat continued a great while without any wounds on either side. The Campanian then said, *This will be a combat of horses, and not of men, unless we go down into this hollow narrow way ; there, as we shall not have room to separate, we may come to close fight.* He

He had scarce said this but Claudius spurred his horse into that way. But Jubellius, braver in words than actions, \* See, said he, *the Ass in the ditch*, a proverb then used; and immediately retired and disappeared. Claudius returned into the plain, and after having rode round several turns without finding his enemy, he reproached Jubellius with cowardice as victor, and went back into the camp in the midst of the applauses of the whole Roman army.

A. R. 157.  
Ant. C. 235.

Both sides remained quiet; and the Consul even removed his camp farther off in order to give the Campanians time to sow, and committed no waste upon their lands, till the corn was sufficiently grown for forage. He then caused it to be cut, and carried into his camp at Sueffula, which he put into a condition to serve the troops for winter-quarters.

He ordered the Pro-consul Marcellus to keep only as many soldiers at Nola, as were necessary to guard the place, and to send the rest to Rome, in order that they might not be a burthen either to the allies or the Commonwealth.

Sempronius having led his legions from Cumæ to Luceria in Apulia, sent the Prætor M. Valerius from thence with the army he had at Luceria, and gave him orders to defend the coast of Sallentum, to provide all things, and to take all the measures necessary for being well upon his guard against Philip King of Macedonia.

Towards the end of the campaign, letters arrived from the two Scipios, in which they gave an

State of  
Spain.  
Liv. xxiii

\* This is not entirely the sense of the Latin. The usual sense of this proverb is not easy to be applied here. Taurea, by

the word Cantherium, which comes from καθήλιος, als, alludes to the Roman's fir-name. Asellus.

A. R. 537.  
A. C. 215.

account of the good success of their arms in Spain ; but they added, that the armies, both by sea and land, were in want of money, cloaths, and provisions. That if there was no money in the publick treasury, they would find some means to raise it among the Spaniards : but that it was absolutely necessary to send them the rest from Rome, without which they must not rely, that it was possible to preserve either the army, or the province. After these letters had been read, every body agreed both in respect to the reality of the wants, and the necessity of providing for them : but at the same time they reflected on the number of troops both by sea and land they were to keep up, and the new fleet it would soon be necessary to fit out, if they were obliged to make war with Philip. “ That Sicily and Sardinia, which paid tribute before the war, scarce supplied enough to support the armies that defended them. That indeed the taxes laid on the Roman citizens and the allies of Italy, had hitherto supplied extraordinary expences : but that the number of those upon whom this money was raised, was exceedingly diminished by the loss of the great armies, that had been defeated at Thrasymenus and Cannæ ; and that if the small number, that had survived those defeats, should be overburthened, it would be entirely crushing and destroying them in a different manner. That therefore, unless the Commonwealth could find resources in the generosity of those who should voluntarily lend it, it was not in a condition to subsist by the sums actually in its coffers. That the Prætor Fulvius should assemble the People, (a) make known to them the wants  
“ of

(a) Indicandas populo publicas necessitates, cohortandosque,  
qui



“ of the State, and exhort such of them as had  
 “ acquired riches in the enterprizes they had sha-  
 “ red in, to assist the Commonwealth with what  
 “ they had gained, not by sacrificing to it what  
 “ they should so advance, but by giving it time  
 “ to repay the sums, and to take upon them to  
 “ supply the army in Spain with the things it had  
 “ occasion for, upon condition of being reimbur-  
 “ sed first of all, as soon as money should come  
 “ into the publick treasury.”

A. R. 537.  
 Ant. C. 215.

The Prætor made these remonstrances in the *Private*  
 full assembly, and set the day, when he would *persons*  
 make the agreement with such as would undertake *supply the*  
 to supply the armies and fleet in Spain with *Common-*  
 cloaths, provisions, and the other things they *wealth*  
 wanted. When the day arrived, nineteen citizens *with mo-*  
 came in three companies, who, in order to their *ney.*  
 undertaking this, demanded two conditions: the *Liv. xxiii.*  
 first was, to be exempt from serving in the troops *49.*  
 as long as this contract should subsist; the second,  
 that the Commonwealth should charge itself with  
 all the losses which their ships should sustain either  
 from storms or the enemy. Both being granted,  
 they accepted the conditions. Thus the money of  
 private persons supplied all the occasions of the  
 publick. Such were the manners of these happy  
 times. (a) The same spirit of generosity and love  
 for their country, equally animated all orders of  
 the State, and inspired the whole people with a  
 lively and ardent zeal for the safety and glory of  
 the Commonwealth.

qui redempturis auxissent pa-  
 trimonia, ut reipublicæ, ex  
 qua crevissent, tempus com-  
 modarent. *Liv.*

(a) Hi mores, eaque caritas  
 patriæ per omnes ordines ve-  
 lut tenore uno pertinebat. *Liv.*

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

*The Car-  
thaginians  
twice toge-  
ther beaten  
in Spain by  
the Scipios.  
Ibid.*

The contractors, at least in the beginning, shewed no less exactness and fidelity in supplying all that was necessary, than they had courage and confidence in taking it upon them; and the troops were cloathed and subsisted, as well as they could have been in times when the coffers of the Commonwealth were full. When these convoys arrived, Asdrubal, Mago, and Amilcar the son of Bomilcar, were besieging the city Illiturgis, which had declared for the Romans. The Scipios passed through the midst of these three camps with great efforts, and a great slaughter of those who endeavoured to oppose them: and after having thrown into the city of their allies such provisions as they wanted, and exhorted them to defend their walls with the same courage they had seen the Romans fight for their service, they marched to force Asdrubal's camp, which was the most considerable of the three. The two other Carthaginian Generals, seeing all at stake here, marched immediately to his aid with their two armies. Accordingly all having quitted their camps, there were sixty thousand combatants against the Romans, who were only sixteen thousand men. However the victory was so little doubtful, that the Romans killed more of the enemy, than they had soldiers in their army, took three thousand prisoners, with fifty-nine ensigns. Besides this, five elephants were killed, and the conquerors made themselves masters of the three camps.

The Carthaginians being obliged to abandon Illiturgis, went to reduce Intibili, after having recruited their armies with the subjects of the province, who were always ready to list, provided there was any thing to be got in war; besides which the country at that time abounded with young men. On this occasion there was another battle

battle with the same success as the former. The Carthaginians lost thirteen thousand men in the action; and above two thousand were taken, with forty-two ensigns, and nine elephants. At this time almost all the States of Spain went over to the Romans; and this year much greater actions passed in that province, than in Italy.

As soon as Hanno returned from Campania into the country of the Bruttii, with the advice and assistance of the natives, he endeavoured to bring over the Grecian cities that continued to adhere to the Romans. The Bruttii, who had flattered themselves with the hopes of plundering Locri and Rhegium, not satisfied with being disappointed, went with their own forces to besiege Croton, intending to carry that city, and to make themselves masters of it in their own name. Croton had formerly been a powerful city: but since the wars of Pyrrhus, it was much fallen from its antient opulence. Six miles from the place was the celebrated temple of Juno Lacinia, more famous than the city itself, and for which all the people had an extreme veneration. Amongst abundance of other riches, there was in it a pillar of massy gold. These riches, as well as those of the city, were a great allurement to the Bruttii; and the discord between the inhabitants gave them hopes that their enterprize would be successful. At Croton, as in almost all the other cities of Italy, the Senate continued faithful to the Romans, and the multitude was inclined to make an alliance with the Carthaginians. The People having delivered up the town to the Bruttii, the principal persons of Croton retired into the citadel, which was very strong. The Bruttii, concluding that they could not take it by force, had recourse to Hanno, who prevailed upon the besieged to consent to be transported to Locri.

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

Hanno's  
ineffectual  
attempt  
upon Rhe-  
gium.

Liv. xxiv.

1.

Croton sur-  
renders at  
length.

Liv. xxiv.

2, 3.

Famous

temple of

Juno La-

cinia.

Ibid.



A. R. 537.

Ant. C. 215.

*Skirmishes**between**Sempro-**nins and**Hannibal**during the**winter.*

The Romans and Carthaginians, who were then in Apulia, did not continue quiet, even during the winter. The Consul Sempronius was incamped at Luceria, and Hannibal not far from Arpi. According as either side found occasion, skirmishes passed frequently enough, in effect of which the Romans became more warlike every day, and at the same time more prudent, in avoiding all ambuscades that might be laid for them.

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## BOOK THE SIXTEENTH.

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# THE ROMAN HISTORY.

**T**HIS book contains only the space of four years, from the 537th to the 540th year of Rome. It includes principally, the history of Sicily from the death of Hiero, the siege and taking of Syracuse by Marcellus; and some exploits in Spain and Italy.

### S E C T. I.

*Hiero, a faithful ally of the Romans. Praise of that Prince. Hieronymus succeeds Hiero. Hiero's design to re-establish liberty in Syracuse. Wise precautions, which he takes at his death. Andranodorus removes all the other guardians. Character of Hieronymus. Conspiracy against that young Prince. He declares for the Carthaginians. He treats the Roman Ambassadors with indecency. Fabius prevents Otacilius his niece's husband from being elected Consul. Fabius and Marcellus are chosen Consuls, and enter upon office. Distribution of the troops. Creation of Censors. Mariners furnished by private persons. Hannibal returns into Campania. The Roman Generals repair to their provinces. Battle between Hanno and Grac-*

*ebus near Beneventum. The Romans gain the victory. Gracchus grants the slaves that served him their liberty, in reward of their valour. Gentle punishment of the cowardly. Joy of the victors in their return to Beneventum. New advantage of Marcellus over Hannibal. Severity of the Censors at Rome. Admirable proofs of the love of the publick good in many private persons. Casilinum retaken by Fabius. Various small expeditions.*

A. R. 537.  
A.D.C. 215.  
*Hiero the  
faithful  
ally of the  
Romans.*


Liv. xxiii.  
30.

**N**Ever did ally shew himself more faithful, zealous, and constant than Hiero II. was to the Romans during the space of almost fifty years, from the beginning of that alliance till his death. His fidelity was put to a rude trial after the bloody battle of Cannæ, which was followed by the almost general defection of the allies of Rome. But even the ravaging of his dominions by the Carthaginian troops, whom their fleet landed there, was not capable of changing him. He had only the grief to see, that the contagion of bad example had extended even to his own family. He had one son, name Gelo, who had married Nereis the daughter of Pyrrhus, by whom he had Hieronymus, of which we shall soon speak. Nothing had been more his desire than to inculcate into him the sentiments, he had himself for the Romans; and he often repeated to him, that (a) as long as he should continue faithful to them, he would find in their amity troops, treasure, and the protection solely capable of supporting his reign. Gelo, despising the age of his father, and setting no value upon the alliance of the Romans, since their last disgrace at Cannæ, had declared openly

(a) Si ea fecissem, in vestra munimenta regni me habitum: citia exercitum, divitias, rum. *Sallust. in Bell. Jug.*



True Longitude as concluded from astronomic Observations.



**SICILY**  
FOR M. ROLLIN'S  
ROMAN HISTORY  
BY M. D'ANVILLE  
Geographer to the K. of France  
Dec. 1740.

Roman Miles of 7,55 Toises and  $\frac{1}{2}$ .  
Common Greek Stadia, computed according to  $\frac{1}{2}$  Foot of Hercules.  
Stadia computed according to  $\frac{1}{2}$  Measure of  $\frac{1}{2}$  natural Foot.  
French Leagues of 3000 Geom. Paces or 2500 Toises.



for the Carthaginians. (b) He had already armed the multitude, and solicited the allies of Syracuse to join him, and perhaps he would have caused commotions in Sicily, if a sudden unexpected death had not broken his measures. It happened so opportunely, that it left some suspicion, says Livy, that the father had antedated it. This suspicion seems to me not to tally with the mild and virtuous disposition of Hiero. He did not long survive his son, and died at the age of fourscore and ten, infinitely lamented by his people. He had reigned fifty four years.

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

Death of  
Hiero.  
Liv. xxiv,  
4.

Hiero was not a powerful King: his dominions were scarce half Sicily. But he was a great Prince, if we are capable of forming to ourselves a just idea of true greatness. When he had attained the sovereignty, he made it his sole purpose entirely to convince his subjects, that he thought himself placed on the throne only to make them happy. He sought, not to make them fear, but to make them love him. He considered himself less as their master, than as their protector and father. One of his principal cares was to support, and increase, the natural fertility of the country, and to place agriculture in honour; which he considered as a certain means for diffusing plenty throughout his kingdom. And indeed this care, and it cannot be too often repeated, is one of the essential parts of good policy; but one that unhappily is too much neglected.

Hiero applied himself entirely to it. He did not judge it unworthy of a King to study and inform himself in the arts of agriculture. He even was at the trouble to compose Books upon that subject, of which we ought to regret the loss. But

(b) Movissetque in Sicilia aspergerat, armantem eam multitudinem sollicitantemque solum patrem quoque suspicione cios absumpsisset. Liv.

he

A. R. 537. he considered this object in a manner worthy  
 Ant. C. 215. of a King. Corn was the principal riches of the country, and the most certain fund of the Prince's revenue. To establish good order in this commerce, to secure and render happy the condition of the husbandmen, who formed the greatest part of the State; to fix the duties paid the Prince in which his principal revenue consisted; to obviate the disorders, which might creep into them; and to prevent the unjust vexations which it might possibly be attempted to introduce in process of time, Hiero made regulations so wise, so reasonable, so full of equity, and so conformable at the same time, to the interests of the People and those of the Prince, that they became in a manner the *Codex* of the country, and were always inviolably observed as sacred laws, not only in his reign, but in all succeeding times. When the Romans had subjected the city and dominions of Syracuse, they imposed no new tribute upon it, and (a) decreed, that all things should be regulated according to *the Laws of Hiero*, in order that the Syracusans, in changing their master, should have the consolation of not changing their polity, and of seeing themselves in some measure governed by a Prince, whose name alone was ever dear to them, and made those laws infinitely venerable and in a manner sacred to them.

It is in effect of this wise government, that we have not been afraid to call Hiero a great King. He might have undertaken wars, gained battles, made conquests, extended the bounds of his dominions: for he did not want valour, of which

(a) Decumas lege Hieronica solum instituta, commutato imperio, verum etiam nomen remaneret. *Cic. orat. in Ver. de frum. n. 15.*  
 semper vendendas censuerunt, ut iis jucundior esset muneris illius functio, si ejus Regis, qui Siculis charissimus fuit, non



he had given good proofs, before he ascended the throne. If he had abandoned himself to frantic ambition as Agathocles did, who an hundred years before had usurped the sovereignty at Syracuse, he could, as well as him, have carried the war into Africa with the hopes of better success, especially as Carthage was then at war with Rome. If such a war had succeeded, Hiero would have passed for an hero in the sense of most men. But with how many taxes must he have burthened his People? How many husbandmen must he have torn from their lands? How much blood must these victories have cost? And of what advantage would they have been to the State? Hiero who knew wherein solid glory consists, placed his in governing his people wisely, and in making them happy. Instead of conquering new countries by the force of arms, his care was to multiply his own in some measure, by the cultivation of the lands, in rendering them more fertile than they were; and actually to multiply his people, who constitute the true strength and riches of a State; which cannot fail to happen, when the people that manure the lands are allowed a reasonable proportion of the fruits of their labours.

When we see Syracuse enjoy an happy tranquillity through the wise conduct of Hiero, and his subjects quietly employed in cultivating their lands as in times of perfect peace, whilst all around them, nothing is heard but the dreadful tumult of arms, and Africa, Italy, and even a part of Sicily, are agitated by a violent and cruel war: may we not cry out with admiration, Happy the people that a wise King governs so, and still more happy the King, that constitutes the happiness of his people, and finds his own in his Duty! Let us suppose on the contrary this same Hiero, entering victorious after many campaigns into his  
Capital

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

A. R. 537.  
A.D.C. 215.

Capital in the midst of the public acclamations, but finding at his return the people miserable; exhausted by taxes, reduced to an hideous poverty, and most of the lands neglected, and many even abandoned during the absence of the husbandmen; sad consequences of long wars, but almost always inevitable. If he retains any sense of humanity, can he support a glory, that costs his people so dear; and not detest the laurels dyed in the Blood of his subjects?

Hiero's love of peace did not prevent his taking precautions against the enemies, that might attempt to disturb him. He had no thoughts of attacking; but he put himself into such a condition to make a good defence. He had a numerous and well equipped fleet. We shall soon see the amazing preparations he had made to enable Syracuse to sustain a long siege: and that (a) like a Prince of wisdom and foresight he had provided during peace, all that might be necessary in war.

We hear nothing in the life of Hiero of magnificence, either in buildings, furniture, equipages, or the table. It was not because the Prince wanted riches to gratify a taste very common at Syracuse, if it had been his own; but he knew how to make a better use of them, and more worthy of a King. The sum of an hundred talents (an hundred thousand Crowns) which he sent to the Rhodians, and the presents he made them after the great earthquake, that had ruined their Island, and thrown down the famous Colossus, are illustrious marks of his liberality and magnificence. A wise œconomy enabled him to assist his allies powerfully. We have seen him in the times of necessity, with joy and ardor supply the Roman army with provisions and cloaths, from no other motive than to testify the esteem and gratitude, with

(a) In pace, ut sapiens aptavit idonea bello. *Horat.*

which his heart was affected in respect to them. A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.  
The Roman generosity indeed did not suffer that liberality to continue unrepaid : but he had no such view, and therefore had all the merit of it.

What, in my opinion, crowns all the praises due to this Prince, is his constant and unalterable attachment to the side of the Romans, even in their misfortunes, and particularly after they had lost the battle of Cannæ, when they seemed irretrievably ruined. In these decisive moments, common virtue hesitates, deliberates, consults, hearkens and weighs the specious reasons, which human prudence suggests against being over hasty in resolving how to act. A great soul considers such a doubt alone and such a delay almost as determinate infidelity. Hiero well knew, that he hazarded every thing in declaring publickly for the Romans at such a conjuncture: but he shuts his eyes to the danger, and consults only his duty and his honour. Can the most glorious conquests and victories be compared with so noble a disposition? we do not know men, when we know them only by their exploits and great actions. They are still concealed and unknown in respect to us, whilst their hearts are a mystery to us. It is from the goodness of the heart, its integrity, and fidelity, that we first know what they are. For we are all that we are in the heart. Now Hiero's seems to shew itself here, and to declare itself in a manner, which ought to do him great honour.

The death of that Prince occasioned great re- Hieronymus succeeds Hiero. Liv. xxiv. 4.  
volutions in Sicily. The Kingdom was fallen into the hands of Hieronymus his grandson. That (a) Prince was yet an infant, who, far from being able to resist the seduction of sovereign pow-

(a) Puerum, vixdum libertatem, nedum dominationem laturum.



A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

er, and to sustain the weight of government, was not capable of bearing as he ought that of his own liberty and of governing himself. His guardians, and those, who had the care of his education, instead of opposing the vices, to which he was naturally inclined, plunged him still deeper into them, in order to engross all authority in his name. It was then (a) seen how important it is to the good of a State, that a Prince who begins to reign whilst young, should be surrounded only by persons capable of inspiring him with sentiments and principles worthy of a King; and what a misfortune it is, when flattery from thenceforth engrosses their ears and heart.

*Hiero's design to reinstate the liberty of Syracuse.*

Hiero, towards the end of his life, had intended to reinstate the liberty of Syracuse, in order to prevent a kingdom he acquired, and strengthened by his valour and prudence, from being entirely ruined by becoming the sport of the caprice and passions of a young King. But the Princesses, his two daughters, spared no pains in opposing so wise a design; in hopes that the young Prince would only have the name of King, whilst themselves with their husbands, Andranodorus and Zoippus, who held the first rank amongst his guardians, should have all the authority. It (b) was not easy for an old man of ninety to withstand the caresses and arts of those two women, who besieged him night and day; to retain all his freedom of mind in the midst of their pressing and assiduous insinuations; and to

(a) Pertinere ad utilitatem reipublicæ, occurrere illi, quos Senatus innocentissimos habeat, qui honestis sermonibus aures [Principis] imbuant. *Tacit. Hist. IV. 7.*

Properant, occupare Princi-

pem adhuc vacuum. *Ibid. V. 1.*

(b) Non facile erat nonagesimum jam agenti annum, circumfessio dies noctesque muliebribus blanditiis, liberare animum, et convertere ad publicam privata curam. *Liv. V.*

sacrifice with courage the interest of his family, to that of the public. A. R. 537. Ant. C. 215.

All that he did to prevent, as much as possible, the evils he foresaw, was to appoint Hieronymus fifteen guardians, who were to form his council. He conjured them at his death never to depart from the alliance with the Romans, to which he had inviolably adhered during fifty years, and to teach the young Prince, their pupil, to tread in his steps, and to follow the principles, in which he had hitherto been bred. Wise precautions of Hiero at his death.

As soon as the king had breathed his last, the guardians he had appointed for his grandson, summoned an assembly of the people, presented the young Prince to them, and read the will. A small number of persons placed there expressly to applaud it, clapped their hands, and raised cries of joy. All the rest, in a consternation equal to that of a family, whom death had just deprived of a good father, kept a mournful silence, which sufficiently argued both their grief for the loss they had just sustained, and their fear for the future. Hiero's (a) funeral was afterwards solemnized, and more honoured by the grief and tears of his subjects, than by the care and respect paid to his memory by his relations.

The first care of Andranodorus was to remove all the rest of the guardians, by declaring to them, that the Prince was of age to govern for himself. He was then almost fifteen years old. Thus, divesting himself the first of the guardianship, which he held in common with many colleagues, he united the power of them all in his own person. The wisest dispositions of dying Princes are Andranodorus removes all the other guardians.

(a) Funus fit regium, magis quam curâ suorum celebre. amore civium & charitate, *Liv.*

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

little regarded and seldom executed after their deaths.

*Character  
of Hiero-  
nymus.*

The (*a*) best Prince in the world and the most prudent, succeeding a King so much beloved by his subjects as Hiero had been, would have found it difficult to console them for the loss of his predecessor. But, as if Hieronymus had sought by his vices, to make him still more regretted, he no sooner ascended the throne, than he shewed how much all things were changed. Neither King Hiero, nor Gelo his son, during so many years, had ever distinguished themselves from the rest of the citizens by their dress, or any other ornament, that favoured of pomp. But now Hieronymus was on a sudden seen to appear dressed in purple, with a diadem on his head, and surrounded with a troop of armed guards. Sometimes he even affected to imitate Dionysius the tyrant, by going abroad like him in a chariot drawn by four white horses. (*b*) All the rest answered this equipage: an express contempt for every body; haughty and disdainful in hearing; an affectation of saying nothing but disobliging things; difficulty of access; so as to be almost inaccessible not only to strangers, but to his guardians themselves; a refinement in discovering new kinds of debauches; and a cruelty, that rose so high as to extinguish all sense of humanity in him. This odious disposition of the young King terrified

(*a*) Vix quidem ulli bono moderatoque regi facilis erat favor apud Syracusanos, succedenti tantæ caritati Hieronis. Verum enimvero Hieronymus, velut suis vitiis desiderabilem efficere vellet avum, primo statim conspectu, omnia quam disparia essent, ostendit.

(*b*) Hunc tam superbum apparatus habitusque convenientes sequebantur, contemptus omnium, superbæ aures, contumeliosa adicta, rari aditus, non alienis modo, sed tutoribus etiam, libidines novæ, inhumana crudelitas.

people



people so much, that some of his guardians either A. R. 537.  
 killed themselves, or withdrew into voluntary ba- Ant. C. 215.  
 nishment.

Only three men Andranadorus and Zoippus, both Hiero's sons in law, and one Thrafo, had free admittance to the young King. He hearkened little to them in all other things: but, as the two first had openly declared for the Carthaginians, and the third for the Romans, that difference of opinions, and the warm disputes, to which it frequently gave birth, drew upon them the young tyrant's attention.

Much about this time, a conspiracy against Conspiracy  
 the life of Hieronymus was discovered. One against Hi-  
 of the principal citizens called Theodotus, was eronymus.  
 accused. When he was tortured, he confessed Liv. xxiv.  
 the crime for himself; but no torments were 4.  
 capable of making him betray his accomplices. At length, as if he had given way to the excess of the tortures, he accused the King's best friends, though innocent, amongst whom he named Thrafo as the chief, of the whole enterprize; adding, that they should have been far from engaging in it, if they had not had a man of great credit at their head. The warmth Thrafo had always expressed for the party of the Romans, made the deposition of Theodotus seem probable; so that he was immediately executed with those declared to be his accomplices, who were as innocent as himself. Whilst Theodotus was made to suffer the most cruel torments, not one of his accomplices hid themselves or fled, so much did they rely upon his fidelity and constancy, and such force of mind had he to keep their secret. In consequence, by a very uncommon and singular event, a conspiracy discovered was not frustrated in effect, and did not fail to succeed as we shall soon see.

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 21.  
*Hieronymus declares for the Carthaginians.*  
Liv. xxiv. 6.

Thraſo's death, who was the ſole tie of the alliance with the Romans, left the field open to the partisans of the Carthaginians. Ambaſſadors were ſent to Hannibal, to treat with him ; and on his ſide he ſent a young Carthaginian of quality to Hieronymus, named Hannibal as well as himſelf, with whom he joined Hippocrates and Epi- cydes, born at Carthage, of a Carthaginian mother, but of Syracuſe by origin, from whence their grandfather had been baniſhed. After the Treaty was concluded with Hieronymus, the young officer returned to his General ; and by Hannibal's permiſſion, the other two remained with the King. The King ſent Ambaſſadors to Carthage, to make the treaty more authentic. The conditions were, “ that after they ſhould “ have driven the Romans out of Sicily, upon “ which the young Prince relied as a thing “ of certainty, the river Himera, which al- “ moſt divides the whole iſland, ſhould ſeparate “ the province of the Carthaginians from his “ kingdom.” Hieronymus, puffed up with the praiſes of his flatterers, demanded ſome time after, “ that all Sicily ſhould be ceded to him, leaving “ Italy to the Carthaginians for their ſhare.” The propoſal ſeemed frantick and idle to Hannibal, as it really was : but he diſguiſed his thoughts, having no other view, than to make the young King quit the ſide of the Romans. How happens it, that the experience of all ages and nations does not teach Princes what they ought to think of flatterers ?

*He treats the Roman Ambaſſadors with contempt.*

Upon the firſt rumour of this treaty, Appius Claudius, Prætor of Sicily, ſent Ambaſſadors to Hieronymus, to renew the alliance, that had ſubſiſted between the Romans and his grandfather. That Prince, affecting a ridiculous and ill-placed haughtineſs, received them with a diſdainful air, “ aſking them

“ in a tone of derision what had happened at  
 “ the battle of Cannæ : that Hannibal’s Ambaf-  
 “ fadors related incredible things of it : that he  
 “ fhould be very glad to know the truth of it  
 “ from their own mouths, in order to determine  
 “ in refpect to the choice of his allies.” The  
 Romans replied, that they would come to him  
 again, when he had learnt to receive Ambaffa-  
 dors ferioufly ; and withdrew.

Hieronimus, undoubtedly did not know, that rail-  
 lery does not become a Prince, efpecially when of-  
 fenfive and injurious, and that in the midft of the  
 graveft and moft important affairs. But he heark-  
 ened only to his pride, and probably, amongft his  
 flatterers, praised himfelf for this language, in which  
 he found an haughtinefs worthy of a great King.  
 All the reft of his conduct was of the fame turn.  
 Soon after his cruelty and other views drew up-  
 on him an unfortunate end. Thofe who had for-  
 med the confpiracy, of which we have fpoke,  
 purfued their plan, and having found a favourable  
 occafion, killed him on a journey he went from  
 Syracufe to the country and city of the Leon-  
 tines. And thus ended a very fhort reign, but  
 full of diforders, injuftice, and violence.

Appius, who forefaw the confequences of his  
 death, gave the Senate advice of the whole, and  
 took all the neceffary precautions for preferving  
 the part of Sicily, that belonged to the Romans.  
 I omit all the violences committed by Hippocra-  
 tes and Epicydes at Syracufe, the murder of the  
 Princeffes defcended from Hiero, the flavery into  
 which the unfortunate inhabitants of that city  
 were reduced, being forced in a manner againft  
 their will to become the enemies of Rome. I  
 have treated thofe things elfewhere with fufficient  
 extent. I fhall confine myfelf here to what parti-  
 cularly concerns the Romans.



A. R. 537.

A. C. 215

Fabius

prevents

Otacilius

his niece's

husband

from being

elected

Consul.

Liv. xxiv.

4.

About the end of this year the Consul Q. Fabius set out for Rome to preside at the election of magistrates for the ensuing year, and having given notice of the assembly of the People for the first assembly-day, immediately on his arrival he repaired to the field of Mars without entering the city. There, as the youth of the century Anienſis, to whom it had fallen by lot to give their ſuffrage firſt, nominated T. Otacilius with M. Æmilius Regillus for Conſuls, Fabius cauſed ſilence to be made, and ſpoke as follows, *If we were at peace in Italy, or were at war with a General, who was not capable of taking advantage of our errors, I ſhould conſider any one as an enemy to your liberty, that ſhould take upon him to oppoſe the choice you think fit to make. But as our Generals have committed no fault in this war, and againſt this enemy, that has not been attended with ſome great miſfortune to the Commonwealth, you ought to uſe no leſs precaution, nor be no leſs upon your guard, when you are to elect Conſuls, than when you are to give the enemy battle. Each of you ought at that time to ſay to himſelf: I am to chooſe a Conſul equal in the field to Hannibal. Whatever precautions we take in that choice, Hannibal has always great advantages of us. He is in the continual exerciſe of commanding armies. His authority is not confined within certain bounds, nor limited to a certain time. He is not obliged to receive the law from any one. He decides with abſolute power on all occaſions, according as conjunctures ſeem to require. This is not the caſe with our Conſuls. They are ſuddenly put into office, and hold it only for a year. They have ſcarce began to act in purſuance of their meaſures, than their time is elapſed, and a ſucceſſor ſent them. Theſe principles being admitted, let us now conſider, what men thoſe are whom you have juſt choſen. M. Æmilius Regillus is prieſt of Romulus; ſo that we*  
could

could neither let him remove from Rome, nor keep A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215. him there, without prejudice, to the affairs of religion, or to those of war. As to T. Otacilius, he is married to my sister's daughter, and has children by her. But your favour, Romans, either to my ancestors, or myself, have taught me not to prefer the interests of my family to those of the Commonwealth. When the sea is calm, any body can steer the ship. But when a furious storm arises, and the vessel is become the sport of the winds and waves, a man of skill and courage, an able and experienced Pilot, is necessary. We are now upon a calm sea. More than one storm has already brought us to the very brink of drowning. For which reason we cannot use too much precaution in the choice of a man capable of carrying us into the harbour. We have made trial of you, Otacilius, in less considerable employments, in which you have not so well acquitted yourself, as to induce us to confide more important ones to you. The fleet you commanded this year, had three destinations. It was to have ravaged the coasts of Africa, secured those of Italy, and above all to have prevented aids of money, men, and provisions from coming to Hannibal from Carthage. Raise Otacilius, Romans, to the Consulship, if he has answered only one of these views: If, on the contrary, whilst he has had the command of the fleet, Hannibal has received all that has been sent him from Carthage, with as much security as if the sea had been entirely open: If the coasts of Italy have been more infested this year than those of Africa: with what right can Otacilius pretend that he ought to be chose to command against Hannibal in preference to all others? If you were Consul, I should think, after the example of our ancestors, that it would be necessary to create a Dictator; and you would have no reason to wonder, or be angry that there was a better General than you are in the Commonwealth. No body is more interested than yourself in not having

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

*a burthen laid upon you, that you would sink under. Let us then conclude, Romans, that we cannot take too much care in the choice of our Consuls. It is not without pain, that I now desire you to call to mind Thrasymenus and Cannæ. But to avoid the like misfortunes, it is sometimes necessary to set those fatal examples before your eyes. Herald, call to the century Aniensis to give their suffrages again.*

T. Otacilius made abundance of noise, and reproached his uncle with great haughtiness, that he was for having himself continued in the Consulship. But Fabius ordered his Lictors to approach Otacilius: and as he had not entered the city, having come into the place where the assemblies were held, he bade him observe, that the *fascæ*, the mark of his power as to life and death, were still borne \* before him. This was giving Otacilius to understand, that his life would answer for his continuing his seditious outcries. He was silent; and the privileged century being returned to vote, elected Fabius and Marcellus Consuls. This was the fourth Consulship of Fabius, and the third of Marcellus, including that to which he had been nominated, and had been obliged to abdicate. All the other centuries were unanimously of the same opinion. They afterwards proceeded to the election of Prætors. In order to console Otacilius for having failed of the Consulship, he was created Prætor for the second time. Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who was then in the same office, was continued. The two others were, Q. Fabius, the Consul's son, then Curule Ædile, and P. Cornelius Lentulus. After the nomination of the Prætors, the Senate decreed, that Q. Fulvius, without drawing lots,

*Fabius and  
Marcellus  
are elected  
Consuls.*

\* The *fascæ* were not carried before the Consuls, when they were in the city; which custom had been introduced by Valerius Publicola.



should have the office of Prætor of the city, and, consequently, that he should command in Rome in the absence of the Consuls. A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.

We have just seen an uncommon example, both of a wonderful docility in the youth of a century, who renounce their first choice, without hesitating, upon the advice of a wise Consul, and of a generous steadiness in Fabius, who forgets the consideration of proximity of blood, and is only attentive to the interests of the Commonwealth. But what seems most admirable in this Consul, is his having had the courage to set himself above popular reports, and the disagreeable suspicions, that might be formed against him, from judging, that he had only excluded his nephew, to have himself chosen Consul in his place. A great soul, conscious of its own sentiments, and that they are known, is not afraid of such a reproach; and though there were reason to fear it, it makes That a sacrifice to the love of its country and its duty. And indeed it had been betraying it in some measure, to have been silent in such a conjuncture. (a) Every body in general did Fabius justice. They said, that the necessity of the State requiring that the most able General the Commonwealth then had, should be placed at the head of the armies, that great man, who could not but know himself to be that General so necessary to the State, chose rather to expose himself to the envy, so unusual and irregular a proceeding would draw upon him, than neglect the interests of his country.

(a) Tempus ac necessitas belli, ac discrimen rerum faciebant, ne quis aut in exemplum exquireret, aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii Consulem haberet. Quin laudabant potius magnitudinem animi, quod, cum summo imperatore esse opus reipublicæ sciret, seque cum haud dubiè esse, minoris invidiam suam, si qua ex re oriretur, quam utilitatem reipublicæ, fecisset. *Liv.*

A. R. 537.  
Ant. C. 215.  
Val. Max.  
iv. 1.

Almost fourscore years before, another Fabius had signalized his zeal for the public good on an occasion, which has some resemblance to that we have just related. This was Q. Fabius Maximus Rullus. Seeing the centuries inclined to elect his son Q. Fabius Gurgus Consul, he opposed his nomination as much as he could ; not that he believed his son wanted merit to fill that office with dignity : but he represented to the People, that it was contrary to good order to confer the first dignity of the State so often upon the same family. Now his great-grandfather, grandfather, and father, had held it several times, and himself had been five times Consul. The People paid no regard to his opposition. But Fabius, in laying aside the tenderness and prejudice of a father, had all the honour of a sacrifice, that could not but cost him dear.

Two very considerable inundations happened this year. The Tiber having overflowed, carried away many houses in the country, and destroyed a great number of men and cattle.

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS. IV.

M. CLAVDIVS MARCELLVS. III.

*Fabius  
and Mar-  
cellus en-  
ter upon  
office.*

Liv. xxiv.  
9.

*Distribu-  
tion of the  
troops.*  
Liv. xxiv.  
11.

This year, which was the fifth of the war with Carthage, Fabius and Marcellus, having taken possession of the Consulship, drew upon themselves the eyes and attention of the whole people. It was long since two Consuls of such extraordinary merit had been seen in office. The Senate being assembled, continued all who had actually any command in their employments. They decreed also to keep eighteen legions under arms. That each of the Consuls should have two under them : that the provinces of Gaul, Sicily, and Sardinia, should each have two for their defence : that the Prætor

Prætor Fabius should command two in Apulia: A. R. 538. that Tib. Gracchus should remain in the neigh- <sup>Ant. C. 214.</sup>bourhood of Luceria, with the two that had been formed of the slaves who had voluntarily lifted: that the Pro-consul C. Terentius Varro should retain one in the country of Picenum; as should M. Valerius, to be employed in the neighbourhood of Brundisium, where he was with a fleet: and that the two last should remain at Rome to guard it. The Consuls had orders to fit out a number of ships, which when joined with those that were in the port of Brundisium, and in the neighbouring roads, would form a fleet for this year of an hundred and fifty sail.

Q. Fabius held the assemblies for the creation of *Creation* Censors. M. Attilius Regulus and P. Furius Phi- *of Censors.* lus were raised to that dignity.

As seamen were wanting, the Consuls, in virtue *Seamen* of a decree of the Senate, ordained, that every ci- *furnished* tizen whose self, or father, had been adjudged by *by particu-* the Censors, L. Æmilius and C. Flaminius, to *lar per-* possess an estate from about an hundred and twen- *sons.* ty-five pounds to two hundred and fifty, or who should since have acquired such a fortune, should furnish one seaman paid for six months. That whoever had from about two hundred and fifty to seven hundred and fifty, should furnish three with their pay for an whole year. That whoever had from seven hundred and fifty to two thousand five hundred pounds, should furnish five. That whoever had above two thousand five hundred pounds, should furnish seven. And lastly, that each Senator should furnish eight with a year's pay. The seamen raised in virtue of this decree, having been armed and equipped by their masters, embarked with biscuit for thirty days. This was the first time, that the fleet of the Romans was supplied with seamen at the expence of private persons.

These



A. R. 538.  
 Ant. C. 214.  
*Hannibal*  
*returns*  
*into Cam-*  
*pania.*  
 Liv. xxiv.  
 12.

These preparations, which were much more considerable than had ever been before, made the inhabitants of Capua apprehend, that the campaign this year would open with the siege of their city. They therefore sent Ambassadors to Hannibal, to desire him to make his army approach Capua, representing to him, “ that armies were raised at  
 “ Rome to besiege it, and that of all the cities,  
 “ which had abandoned the side of the Romans,  
 “ there was none against which they were so much  
 “ incensed.” The consternation, with which they brought Hannibal this news, obliged that General to hasten his march, in order to be beforehand with the Romans. Accordingly he set out from Arpi, and came to incamp at his old camp at Tifata beyond Capua. Afterwards having left a body of Numidians and Spaniards to guard his camp, and Capua, he approached Puteoli, to make himself master of it.

*The Ro-*  
*man Gene-*  
*erals re-*  
*pair to*  
*their pro-*  
*vinces.*

Fabius had no sooner been informed, that Hannibal had quitted Arpi to return into Campania, than he set out to put himself at the head of his army, marching night and day with extreme diligence. He ordered Tib. Gracchus at the same time to quit Luceria, and to come with his troops towards Beneventum; and the Prætor Q. Fabius his son, to take Gracchus's post near Luceria. At the same time two Prætors set out for Sicily; as did P. Cornelius, to repair to his army; Otacilius, to take upon him the command of his fleet, and to secure the coasts. In a word, all repaired to their respective provinces: and those who had been continued in their employments, had orders to remain in the posts where they were the Year before.

It was about this time, that the negotiation between Hannibal and the Tarentines began, which at length ended in the taking of Tarentum. Five  
 young

young persons of the most illustrious families of that city came to Hannibal, and gave him hopes that that city would surrender as soon as he made his troops approach it. It was a very commodious place to him for Philip to land at, in case he came to Italy. He promised them to march that way; exhorting them however to put all things in a condition on their side, to assure the success of the enterprize. He continued some time in Campania, and made new attempts upon Puteoli, and Nola, but as ineffectual as the former.

Hanno and Tib. Gracchus were set out, as if in concert, the first from the country of the Bruttii with a considerable body of horse and foot; and the other from his camp at Luceria, in order to approach Beneventum. The Romans at first entered the city. But having been apprized, that Hanno was incamped three miles from thence upon the banks of the Calor, and that he was destroying the neighbouring country, he also quitted Beneventum, and having incamped about a thousand paces from the enemy, he assembled his soldiers to harangue them. Most of them were the slaves, who, during the two years they had been in the service, had chose rather to deserve their liberty by actions, than to demand it in words. He had however observed, on quitting his winter-quarters, some confused murmurs. They complained of so long a slavery, asking one another, whether they should never see themselves free. Gracchus took occasion from thence to write to the Senate, to acquaint it with what they merited, rather than what they demanded. He represented, “that they had hitherto served with equal fidelity and courage, and that they wanted nothing but liberty to make them accomplished soldiers.” The Senate in answer had left him at liberty to act in that respect

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.

*Battle between Hanno and Gracchus near Beneventum.*

*The Romans gain the victory.*

*Gracchus grants the armed*

*slaves their liberty.*

*Liv. xxiv. 14—16.*

A. R. 538. respect as he should judge most for the good of  
 Ant. C. 214. the Commonwealth.

Therefore before he came to blows with the enemy, he declared to his troops: “ That the  
 “ time was come for obtaining that liberty they  
 “ had so long and so ardently desired. That the  
 “ next day he should give the enemy battle in the  
 “ open field: that there, without fear of ambus-  
 “ cades, they would have room to make their  
 “ courage and bravery appear. That whoever  
 “ should bring him the head of an enemy, should  
 “ immediately have his liberty as a reward; but  
 “ that he would punish those as slaves, that should  
 “ give way and quit their posts. That their fate  
 “ was now in their own hands. That as a secu-  
 “ rity for the performance of his promise, they  
 “ had not only his word, but that of the Consul  
 “ Marcellus, and of the whole Senate, whom he  
 “ had consulted upon this head, and who left it  
 “ entirely to him.” He then caused the letters of Marcellus, and the decree of the Senate, to be read. They immediately raised cries of joy, and with one accord, demanded eagerly to be led against the enemy, and that the signal of battle should be immediately given. Gracchus dismissed them, after having promised, that he would give it the next day. Full of joy, especially those whom the action alone of the next day was to deliver from slavery, they passed the rest of the day in preparing their arms, and in putting them in a condition to second their valour well.

The next day, as soon as the signal was given, they were the first to assemble round Gracchus’s tent; and that General drew up his troops in battle at sun-rise. The Carthaginians did not refuse to fight. Their army was composed of seventeen thousand foot, most of them Bruttii and Lucanians; and of twelve hundred horse, all Numi-



Numidians and Moors, except a small number of  
Italians, that were amongst them. That of the Ro-

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.

mans seems to have been of equal force. The battle was long, and fought with abundance of ardor. During four hours, the victory remained doubtful on both sides. Nothing incommoded the Romans more, than the heads of the enemy, which they were eager to secure, because their liberty had been attached to them. For when a soldier had bravely killed his opposite, he at first lost a considerable time in cutting off his head, in the midst of the tumult and disorder; and when he had at length effected it, the necessity of holding and keeping it, employing one of his hands, made him incapable of fighting, so that the battle was left to the worst and most timorous part of the troops. When Gracchus was apprized by the legionary Tribunes, that his soldiers wounded no longer any of the enemy, who were in a condition to defend themselves; that they were all employed in cutting off the heads of the dead, and that they held them afterwards in their hands instead of their swords; he immediately ordered them to be told, “to throw down the heads; that they had sufficiently signalized their valour, and that those who had done their duty, might assure themselves of their liberty.”

The battle than began again, and Gracchus also made his horse advance against the enemy. The Numidians came on to meet them, and the horse fighting with no less ardor than the foot, the victory again became doubtful. The two Generals animated their soldiers both by their words and example. Gracchus represented to his troops, that they had to do only with the Lucanians and Bruttii so often defeated. Hanno said of the Romans, that they were only slaves, whose chains had been taken off to make them bear arms. At

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.

last Gracchus declared to his soldiers, that there was no liberty for them, except the enemy were beaten and put to flight that day.

This menace animated them to such a degree, that raising new cries, and becoming that moment new men, they threw themselves upon the Carthaginians with a fury that nothing was capable of sustaining. At first the first line, then the second, and at last their whole main body was broken. The flight was universal, and they regained their camp with such terror and consternation, that none took care to defend the gates of it against the Romans, who entered it pell-mell with the defeated, and began a new battle in it, more confused in so narrow a space, but for the same reason more bloody. During this tumult, the Roman prisoners, to second their countrymen, formed themselves in a body, and having seized arms, which they found at hand, attacked the Carthaginians in the rear, and left them no way to escape. It was in effect of this, that of so great an army scarce two thousand men got off, and those almost all horse, with their commander. All the rest were killed. Thirty-eight ensigns were taken. Gracchus lost about two thousand men. The whole plunder was abandoned to the soldiers, except the prisoners and cattle, which should be owned and claimed in the space of thirty days.

*Slight  
punishment of  
the timorous.*

Liv. xxiv.  
16.

When the victors returned into their camp, four thousand slaves, who had fought with less courage than their comrades, and who had not entered the enemy's camp with them, retired to an adjacent hill, to avoid the punishment they believed they had deserved. The next day, a Tribune of the army brought them to the camp, at the time when Gracchus, having assembled his army, was beginning to harrangue. First, he gave the old soldiers the praises and rewards they deserved, in proportion

tion

tion to the valour each of them had shewn upon this occasion. Afterwards, addressing himself to those, who were still slaves, he told them, that on so joyful a day he chose rather to praise all in general and without distinction, than to reproach any of them. That therefore he declared them all free, and prayed the gods that it might be for the honour and advantage of the Commonwealth. They raised great cries of joy, and embracing and congratulating each other, lifted up their hands towards heaven, and wished the Roman People and their General all kind of prosperity. (a) It was then most evident, as Livy says elsewhere, that of all good things, there is none so grateful to man, as liberty.

Gracchus then, resuming his discourse: *Before I had made you all equal, said he to them, by the liberty I have just given you, I was unwilling to make an odious distinction between you. But now that I have acquitted myself of my promise, and that which I made you in the name of the Commonwealth, in order not to confound valour with cowardice, I will cause the names of those to be given me, who to avoid the reproaches and punishment their fault deserved, separated from their companions; and making them all appear before me one after another, I will oblige them to promise me upon oath, that as long as they shall carry arms, they will eat their meals standing, unless prevented by sickness. You cannot but suffer this mortification with patience and without complaint, if you only reflect a little, that your cowardice could not be punished more gently.*

After this discourse he ordered them to put up their baggage, and begin their march. The soldiers, with their booty either on their shoulders or

*Joy of the  
victorious  
troops on  
their re-  
turn to  
Beneven-*

(a) Ut facile appareret, nihil omnium bonorum multitudini gratius, quàm libertatem, esse. Liv. xxxiii. 32.

*tum.  
Feast gi-  
ven them.  
driving Ibid. 16.*



*A. R. 538.* driving it before them, returned to Beneventum, *Ant. C. 214.* singing and dancing with such transports of joy, that they seemed rather guests returning from a feast, than soldiers from a battle. The inhabitants came out of the city in a body to meet them, and were lavish in their professions of joy and congratulations. They emulated each other in inviting the troops to eat and lodge at their houses. The tables were ready spread in every court-yard, and they desired Gracchus to suffer them to eat and drink with them. Gracchus consented, on condition that they should all eat in public. The inhabitants accordingly brought out the tables before their doors, with all they had prepared upon them. Those who had lately received their liberty, had white woollen caps upon their heads, which was the badge of it. Some lay upon beds according to the custom of those times; (I shall speak in the sequel of the manner in which the Romans eat their meals;) the rest were standing, and at the same time ate, and served their companions. Gracchus found this sight so singular and so new, that when he returned to Rome, he had it painted, and placed the picture in the temple of Liberty, which his father had caused to be built upon mount Aventine with the money that arose from fines, which he had also dedicated.

*New advantage of Marcellus over Hannibal.*

*Liv. xxiv. 17.*

Whilst these things passed at Beneventum, Hannibal, after having ravaged the whole country about Naples, went and incamped near Nola. When the Consul Marcellus was informed of his approach, he ordered the Proprætor Pomponius to join him with the army, that was incamped at Sueffula, and immediately prepared to set out to meet Hannibal, and to give him battle. In the dead of night he detached Claudius Nero with the flower of his cavalry through the gate, that was most distant from the enemy; with

with orders, after having taken a great compass, to approach by little and little, the place where the Carthaginians were, keeping always out of sight; and lastly when he saw the action begun, to advance suddenly and charge them in the rear. Nero did not execute these orders, whether he lost his way; or had not sufficient time. The battle was fought without him, and the Romans however had the advantage; but not being seconded by their cavalry, their project did not succeed as they expected. Marcellus, not daring to pursue the enemy in their flight, made his troops retire, though victorious. Hannibal however lost this day above two thousand men; and Marcellus not above four hundred. Nero, having to no purpose fatigued his men and horses, during a day and night, returned without so much as having seen the enemy. It is a great affliction to an able General, who has formed an important project, to see it rendered abortive by the imprudence or folly of the person on whom he has relied for the execution of it. The Consul in consequence reproached Nero in the severest terms; telling him it was his fault only, that they had not repaid Hannibal the defeat at Cannæ. The next day Marcellus again drew up his troops in battle: but Hannibal did not quit his camp, tacitly confessing himself overcome. The third day he retired by the favour of the night; and renouncing the conquest of Nola, which he had so often attempted in vain, marched towards Tarentum, where he expected better success.

The Romans had no less attention to their affairs at home, than to those of the war, and shewed no less courage and elevation of mind in them. The Censors not being employed in the public works for want of money, applied solely to re-  
*Severity of the Censors at Rome. Liv. xxiv. 18.*

A. R. 537.  
A. L. C. 215.

the abuses which the war had introduced, like bad humours, which the body contracts in long diseases. They first cited those before them, who were accused of having intended to have abandoned the Commonwealth and quitted Italy, after the battle of Cannæ. L. Cæcilius Metellus, then Questor, was the most considerable amongst them. He and his associates were ordered to make their defence, and not being capable of justifying themselves, they were convicted of having held discourses contrary to the interests of the Commonwealth, and which tended to form a conspiracy for abandoning Italy.

Next those over acute interpreters in finding subterfuges to dispense with oaths, were made to appear: those cunning Deputies, who having sworn to Hannibal, that they would return into his camp, believed themselves discharged from their engagement by going back again for a few minutes under an imaginary pretext. The doctrine of equivocals is not a new one: but its being condemned and severely punished even by the Pagan world, is very remarkable.

All those of whom we have just spoke were punished with the greatest penalties the Censors had power to inflict. They were deprived of all suffrages in the publick assemblies, were expelled from their tribes, and retained only the quality of citiz-ns, in respect to paying taxes. And such amongst them as were Roman Knights were degraded, and had the horses kept for them by the Commonwealth taken from them.

They treated with the same severity all those of the youth, who had not served during four years, without having been sick, or having some good and valid reason to the contrary. The latter amounted to above two thousand.

This



This rigour of the Censors was followed by a decree of the Senate not less severe. It condemned all those who had been *noted*, or stigmatized, by the Censors to serve in the infantry as private men, to go to Sicily, and to join the army of Cannæ, without hopes of obtaining their discharge, till Hannibal should be driven out of Italy.

From what we have just said, it may be judged, how proper the wise severity of the Censorship was to awe the citizens; to keep up good order in every branch of the Commonwealth; to make the customs and institutions be observed; in a word, how potent a barrier it was against disorders, against the infraction of the laws, and the corruption and looseness of manners, which continually augment, except strong Obstacles from time to time be laid in their way, to stop, or at least to weaken their course.

As the Censors found no money in the treasury, they did not make the usual contracts either for the repair of the temples, or the other current expences of that kind. Those who used to make such contracts with them came to the Censors, and desired them to treat with them in the same manner, as if the treasury was in a condition to supply the necessary sums; declaring, that none of them could demand any money, till the war was at an end.

The masters of the soldiers, whom Gracchus had made free near Beneventum assembled next, and declared in like manner, that though the magistrates, appointed by the Commonwealth to pay them, had given them notice to come and receive the price of their slaves, they would not take the money, whilst the war subsisted.

This general unanimity to ease the exhausted treasury induced those also, who had the fortunes

A. R. 538.  
AEL. C. 214.

of minors and widows in their hands, to give the Commonwealth credit for the money; persuaded that there could not be a more sacred and inviolable asylum than the Publick Faith, nor one, where such previous deposits could more safely be placed. *NUSQUAM EAS (PECUNIAS) TUTIUS SANCTIUSQUE DEPONERE CREDENTIBUS, QUI DEFEREBANT, QUAM IN PUBLICA FIDE*: which is highly for the honour of a State.

This generosity and disinterestedness passed from the city to the camp. The horse and the officers would not receive their pay: and those that did receive it, were treated as mercenary wretches, void of honour.

Where is there now a like zeal, and love for the Publick Good? But where is there to be found a Publick Faith like that which subsisted at Rome as the basis of the government? It may with the greatest reason be considered as the most certain resource of States: but in order to its being so, it is absolutely necessary, that it should never suffer any violation upon any occasion whatsoever.

*Casilinum*  
*taken by*  
*Fabius.*  
Liv. xxiv.  
19.

The Consul Q. Fabius was incamped near Casilinum, which was defended by a garrison of two thousand Campanians, and seven hundred Carthaginians. The Magistrate of Capua armed the people and slaves indifferently, in order to fall upon the Roman camp, whilst the Consul was employed in making himself master of Casilinum. Fabius was exactly informed of all that was contriving at Capua. For this reason he sent to his colleague at Nola, to acquaint him that  
 “ it was absolutely necessary to oppose the at-  
 “ tempts of the Campanians with another army,  
 “ whilst he attacked Casilinum with his. That  
 “ he therefore desired him to join him with his  
 “ troops, leaving a small number of them to  
 “ guard Nola; or, if his presence were neces-  
 “ sary

“sary there, and that city had any thing still to fear A. R. 538.  
 “from the enterprizes of Hannibal, in that case he Ant. C. 214.  
 “(Fabius) would send for Gracchus, who was at  
 “Beneventum.” When Marcellus received this  
 courier from his colleague, he left two thousand  
 Men at Nola, and marched with the rest of his ar-  
 my, to Casilinum. His arrival obliged the Cam-  
 panians, who were already in motion, to remain  
 quiet. In consequence Casilinum saw itself attack-  
 ed by two consular armies. As the Roman sol-  
 diers, in approaching too near the walls, received  
 abundance of wounds without any great advantages,  
 Fabius was of opinion, that they should give over  
 attacking a little paltry place, which gave them  
 as much trouble as a considerable city could  
 have done; and especially as they had affairs of  
 much greater importance upon their hands. He  
 was upon the point of retiring, when Marcellus  
 represented to him, (a) “That if, on the one side,  
 “great Generals ought not to undertake all kinds  
 “of things indifferently, on the other, they ought  
 “not easily to abandon the enterprizes they had  
 “once formed, because reputation, in war, has  
 “usually great consequences, and exceedingly con-  
 “duces to its good or bad success.” Fabius gave  
 in to this opinion, and continued the siege. The  
 Romans then made their mantles advance,  
 and erected all the other machines against the  
 walls, that were usually employed in those times.  
 The Campanians, who were in garrison in Casili-  
 num, terrified by these preparations, demanded  
 permission of Fabius to retire to Capua in safety.  
 A small number of them had already quitted the  
 place, when Marcellus seized the gate through

(a) Marcellus, multa mag-  
 nis ducibus sicut non aggre-  
 enda, ita semel aggressis non de-  
 mittenda esse, dicendo, quia

magnæ famæ momenta in u-  
 tramque partem fierent, tenuit,  
 ne irritò incepto abiretur. *Liv.*



A. R. 535.  
A. L. C. 214.

which they escaped. At first he put all indifferently to the sword whom he met at the gate; then having forced his way into the city, he killed all he met. About fifty Campanians, who had quitted the place first, having taken refuge with Fabius, received an escort from him, which conducted them to Capua. The prisoners, as well Campanians as Carthaginians, were sent to Rome, and shut up in the prisons. As to the inhabitants, they were carried away, and distributed into the neighbouring cities.

*Varinus*  
*expedi-*  
*tions.*

Liv. xxiv.  
20.

At the same time Gracchus, who was in Lucania, having dispersed his troops without precaution to ravage it, was attacked by Hanno, who had his revenge for the loss he had sustained near Beneventum.

Marcellus was returned to Nola, and Fabius had entered Samnium. The latter either by capitulation or storm reduced several cities; in the taking of which twenty-five thousand of the enemy were either killed, or made prisoners. The Consul sent three hundred and seventy deserters to Rome, who were all thrown down the Tarpejan rock, after having been whipt with rods in the Forum. Marcellus was kept at Nola by sickness which prevented him from acting.

Hannibal in the mean time was arrived at Tarentum. No motion was made there in his favour, because the garrison had been augmented upon the first rumour of his march. Discovering that vain hopes had been given him, he returned towards Apulia. When he arrived at Salapia, as the place seemed commodious to him for winter quarters, and the end of the campaign approached, he caused as much corn to be carried thither, as he could bring off from the countries adjacent to Metapontum and Heraclea.

## S E C T. II.

*Marcellus one of the Consuls is charged with the war in Sicily. Epicydes and Hippocrates are created Prætors at Syracuse. They animate the People against the Romans. A wise discourse of a Syracusan in the assembly. It concludes for a peace with the Romans. The two leaders of the Cabal disturb all things at Syracuse, and make themselves masters of it. Marcellus takes the city of Leontium; he then approaches Syracuse. He besieges it by sea and land. Terrible effects of the machines of Archimedes. Sambuca of Marcellus. He changes the siege into a blockade. Reflexion upon Archimedes, and his machines. Different expeditions of Marcellus in Sicily during the blockade. Pinarius commander of the garrison of Enna, frustrates the bad designs of the inhabitants by a bloody execution. The soldiers confined to serve in Sicily, send deputies to Marcellus, to desire to be reinstated in the service. Marcellus writes to the Senate in their favour. Severe answer of the Senate. Marcellus deliberates whether he shall quit or continue the siege of Syracuse. He holds intelligence in the city, which is discovered. Part of the city taken. Fears of Marcellus. Various events followed by the taking of all the different quarters of Syracuse. The city is plundered. Death of Archimedes. All Sicily becomes a province of the Romans. Marcellus regulates the affairs of Sicily with abundance of equity and disinterestedness. Last action of Marcellus in Sicily: Victory gained by Hanno.*

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.  
Marcellus  
one of the  
Consuls is  
charged  
with the  
war in  
Sicily.  
Liv. xxiv.  
and 21.

**T**HE death of Hieronymus had less changed the dispositions of the Syracusans in respect to Rome, than it had given them able and enterprising Generals in the persons of Hippocrates

A. R. 538. and Epicydes. This determined the Romans, who  
 Ann. C. 214. apprehended, that a dangerous war might break  
 out in Sicily, to send Marcellus one of the Consuls  
 thither, to take upon him the direction of af-  
 fairs.

Before he arrived there, many sad and horrid  
 things had passed at Syracuse, of which the de-  
 scription may be seen elsewhere. In the last place  
 Hist. Ant. Epicydes and Hippocrates, both firmly attached to  
 Vol. X. the interests of Hannibal, (as has been said before)  
*Epicydes and Hippocrates are* had been elected Prætors there. These new Præ-  
*created* tors did not at first make known their intention,  
*Prætors at* how sorry soever they were, that Ambassadors  
*Syracuse.* had been sent to Appius, to demand of him a truce  
 Liv. xxiv. of ten days; and that after having obtained it,  
 27. others had been made to set out, to renew the  
 treaty of alliance with the Romans, which Hiero-  
 nymus had renounced. Appius then commanded  
 near Murgantia a fleet of an hundred ships; and  
 from thence observed the motions made by the  
 Syracusans, in effect of the liberty to which they  
 had been lately restored, and which had not yet  
 taken a very fixed and solid form. In the mean  
 time, he sent the Syracusan deputies to Marcellus,  
 who was just arrived in Sicily. The Consul was  
 informed by them of the conditions of peace pro-  
 posed, and finding them reasonable, sent Ambas-  
 sadors also to Syracuse, to conclude the peace and  
 renew the ancient alliance with the Prætors them-  
 selves.

*They ani-* The Roman Ambassadors found, on arriving  
*mate the* there, the state of things much altered. Hippo-  
*people a-* crates and Epicydes, believing they had nothing  
*gainst the* farther to fear, after they had received advice,  
*Romans.* Liv. xxiv. that the fleet of the Carthaginians was arrived at  
 28. the promontory of Pachynus, at first by secret  
 practices, and at length by open complaints, had  
 inspired every body with a great aversion for the  
 Romans,



Romans, in giving out, that designs were formed for delivering up Syracuse to them. The conduct of Appius, who had approached the entrance of the port with his ships, to encourage those of the Roman party, added new force to these suspicions and accusations, so that the multitude ran tumultuously to prevent the Romans from landing, in case they should have such a design.

In this disorder and confusion it was judged proper to call an assembly of the People. Opinions differed very much in it, and the disputes were so hot that they gave room to apprehend some sedition. Apollonides, one of the principal Senators, made then a very wise speech, and as salutary an one as could be conceived in the present conjuncture. “ He shewed that never had city been  
 “ nearer either to its destruction or preservation,  
 “ than Syracuse now actually was. That if they  
 “ all should unanimously embrace either the side  
 “ of the Romans, or that of the Carthaginians,  
 “ their condition would be happy. But if they  
 “ were divided in opinion, the war would be  
 “ neither more warm nor more dangerous between  
 “ the Romans and Carthaginians, than between  
 “ the Syracusans themselves divided against each  
 “ other ; as each faction would have within the  
 “ same walls, its troops, arms, and Generals.  
 “ What therefore was most essential to be done,  
 “ was for all to agree and unite together. That  
 “ at present the most important question was not  
 “ to know, which of the two alliances was to be  
 “ preferred. That however he would observe  
 “ in respect to the choice of allies, that the au-  
 “ thority of Hiero ought in his opinion to take  
 “ place of that of Hieronymus, and that the amity  
 “ of the Romans, well known by an happy ex-  
 “ perience of fifty years, seemed preferable to  
 “ that of the Carthaginians, which could not be  
 “ much.

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.

*Wise dis-  
course of a  
Syracusan  
in the as-  
sembly.*

A. R. 538. “ much relied on for the present, and had been  
 Apl. C. 214. “ found very bad by the past. He added one  
 “ farther motive that was by no means an indif-  
 “ ferent one: that in declaring against the Ro-  
 “ mans, they would have the war that moment  
 “ upon their hands; whereas, on the side of Car-  
 “ thage, the danger was more remote.

*They con-  
 clude for  
 peace with  
 the Ro-  
 mans.* The less passionate this discourse seemed, the  
 more effect it had. The opinions of the different  
 bodies of the State were thought necessary, and the  
 principal officers of the troops, as well natives as  
 strangers, were admitted to the conference. The  
 affair was long discussed, and with great warmth.  
 At length, as they saw no present means to sustain  
 the war against the Romans, they determined for  
 peace, and deputies were sent to them to con-  
 clude it.

*The two  
 heads of  
 the cabal  
 embroil e-  
 very thing  
 at Syra-  
 cuse, of  
 which they  
 make  
 themselves  
 masters.* This resolution would have saved Syracuse, if it  
 had been put in execution. But Hippocrates and  
 Epicydes embroiled every thing by their seditious  
 practices, and by false suppositions and calumnious  
 accusations equally animated the multitude and the  
 troops against the Romans. After various in-  
 trigues and events, the particulars of which may  
 be found in the place referred to above, those  
 two heads of a party made themselves masters of  
 Syracuse, caused their colleagues to be killed, and  
 themselves to be declared sole Prætors in a tumultu-  
 ous assembly. In this manner did Syracuse, after  
 a dawn of liberty, fall again into a cruel slavery.


Marcellus, as we have said, arrived a little be-  
 fore in Sicily, and having joined his troops with  
 those of Appius, had taken the city of the \* Leon-  
 tines by storm, on the first attack. When he was  
 informed of all that had passed in Syracuse, he im-

\* *Leontium, a city upon the eastern side of Sicily, not far from  
 Catana.*

mediately



A PLAN  
of the  
CITY of  
SYRACUSE.





mediately advanced towards that city, and encamped with his army near the temple of Jupiter Olympicus, fifteen hundred paces from Syracuse. Before he proceeded farther, and committed any act of hostility, he sent deputies to let the inhabitants know, that he was come to reinstate the liberty of the Syracusans, and not to make war upon them, except he should be obliged to it. They were not permitted to enter the city. Epicydes and Hippocrates went out of the gates to meet them, and having heard their proposals, answered haughtily, “ that if the Romans intended to besiege their city, they should soon perceive, that there was a wide difference between attacking Syracuse and attacking Leontium. Marcellus was therefore determined to attack the city by sea and land.”

Syracuse, of which Marcellus is going to form the siege, was situated upon the eastern coast of Sicily. Its vast extent, advantageous situation, commodiousness of its double port, fortifications erected with great care and art, and the multitude and riches of its inhabitants, rendered it one of the greatest, finest and most powerful cities of the Greeks. Cicero gives us an account of it worth repeating. (*a*) He tells us, that the air of it was so pure and serene, that there was not a day in the year however cloudy and tempestuous, on which the sun did not shine.

It was founded by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Mægara, upon the same coast.

(*a*) Urbem Syracusas elegerat, cujus hic fitas atque hæc natura esse loci cælique dicitur, ut nullus unquam dies tam magna, turbulentaque tempestate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore solem ejus diei homines viderent. *Cic. Verr. vii.* 26.

It

A. R. 538.  
Ann. C. 214

It was composed, at the time of which we are speaking, of five parts, that were in a manner so many cities joining together : The Isle, Achradina, Tycha, Neapolis, or the New-town, and Epipolæ.

Cic. Verr.  
vii. 97.

The ISLE, situated to the South, was called *Nasos*, a Greek word, that signifies an island, but pronounced according to the Dorick dialect, which was in use at Syracuse. It was also called *Ortygia*. It was joined to the main land by a bridge. In this Isle were the palace of the Kings and the Citadel. This part of the city was of great importance, because it made those who possessed it masters of the two ports that surrounded it. For this reason, when the Romans had taken Syracuse, they would not suffer any Syracusan to live in the isle. There was in this isle a fountain called *Arcthusa*, much celebrated in the fables of the poets.

Strab. vi.  
270.

Virg.  
Ec. x.

*Extremum hunc Arcthusa mihi concede laborem*

---

*Sic tibi, cum fluctus subterlabere Sicanos,  
Doris amara suam non intermisceat undam.*

ACHRADINA, situated entirely upon the sea-side, was the finest, most spacious, and best fortified part of the city. It was separated from the rest by a good wall, flanked with towers from distance to distance.

TYCHA, so called from the Temple of Fortune, which was the ornament of this quarter, extended partly along Achradina, ascending from the south to the north. It was also much inhabited. It had a famous gate, called *Hexapyla*, which led into the country. Almost opposite to Hexapyla was a little town called *Leon*.

NEAPOLIS or New-town extended west along Tycha.

EPIPOLÆ

EPIPOLÆ was an eminence without the city, A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214. that commanded it, and was very steep, and consequently of very difficult access. When the Athenians besieged Syracuse, it was not inclosed with walls, and had none till the time of Dionysius the Tyrant, when it formed a fifth part of the city, but was little inhabited. At the bottom of this eminence was a famous prison called the mines, *Latonica*; and close by it the fort *Labdalon*. It was bounded at top by another fort called *Euryalus*.

The river *Anapus* ran a small half league from the city, and emptied itself into the great port. Not far from its mouth was a kind of castle called *Olympium*, from the temple of Jupiter Olympius.

Syracuse had two PORTS, very near each other, being separated only by the isle: The GREAT, and the LITTLE PORT, called otherwise *Laccus*. The great port had on the left a gulf called *Dasco*, and a fort called *Plemmyrium*.

A little above Achradina, near the tower *Galeagra*, there was a third port called Trogilus.

The plan of Syracuse, which I have caused to be engraved from that of the learned Geographer Philip Cluverius, will make every thing obvious which is said of it in the siege of that city. I follow this plan, which I believe preferable to that I have given in the Ancient History. Marcellus  
besieges Sy-  
racuse by  
sea and  
land.

Marcellus left the command of the land-forces to Appius, and retained that of the fleet. It consisted of sixty galleys of five benches of oars, Liv. xxiv.  
34.  
Plut. in  
Marcel.  
305—  
307.  
Polyb. viii.  
415—  
418. which were filled with soldiers armed with bows, slings, and darts, to scour the walls of the besieged. There were abundance of other vessels laden with all kinds of machines for the attack of places. As he had made himself master of Leontium on the first assault through the terror he had spread



A. R. 538. spread amongst the inhabitants, and as he did not  
 Ant. C. 214. despair of entering on some side such a city as Syracuse, composed of many parts separated from each other, he caused the formidable machines which he had prepared for attacking the place, to be brought near the walls, and exposed to the eyes of the inhabitants. He might easily have succeeded, if there had been one man less in Syracuse.

*Terrible  
 effect of  
 the ma-  
 chines of  
 Archime-  
 des.  
 Plut.*

This was the famous Archimedes, the relation and friend of King Hiero. Entirely removed from business, and the cares of government, he placed his whole pleasure in study. He was by natural inclination, solely engrossed by whatever geometry has of most noble, elevated, and sublime in it. It was only at the request of King Hiero and his earnest sollicitation, that he was at last prevailed upon not to keep his art continually soaring after intellectual things, but to make it descend sometimes to things corporeal and sensible; and to render his demonstrations and discoveries more accessible and palpable to the generality of mankind, by uniting them practically with things of use.

In the siege of which we speak, Syracuse found the benefit of our great Geometrician's complaisance for the King. The Romans in making the assault at once by sea and land, expected by the terrible appearance of their attack, to throw the city into the utmost terror and consternation. But the besieged had Archimedes with them, who was in a manner all things to them. He had taken care to provide the walls with every thing necessary for a good defence.

As soon as he had began to make his terrible engines play, they let fly upon the infantry all kind of darts, and stones of an enormous weight, which were discharged with such a noise, force, and rapidity, that nothing could withstand them, and  
 beat

beat down and crushed to pieces all in their way ; A. R. 538.  
so that they occasioned an horrible disorder in the Ant. C. 214.  
ranks of the besiegers.

Marcellus was no better treated on the side next the sea. Archimedes had disposed machines for discharging to any distance whatsoever. Though the enemy were at a great distance from the city, he reached them by the means of balistas and catapultas of a suitable bigness and force. When the discharges went beyond them, he had smaller, more proportioned to the distance, which occasioned so great a confusion amongst the Romans, that they could not undertake any thing.

These were not the greatest dangers. Archimedes had placed lofty and strong machines behind the walls, which letting fall great beams, with immense weights at the end of them, upon the ships, sunk them to the bottom. Besides this, he caused a grapple fastened to a chain to project suddenly, by which he who guided the machine, having caught hold of the prow of a ship, and raised it up in the air by the means of the counterpoise that was managed within the walls, set the vessel upon the poop, and held it some time in that situation : then letting the chain go by the means of a wind-lace or pulley, let it fall down again with its weight either upon the prow or side, and often sunk it entirely. At other times the machines having carried the ships towards the shore with cordage and hooks, after having made it whirl round a great while, dashed and broke it to pieces against the rocks, that projected under the walls, and in that manner destroyed all on board of it. Every minute, galleys seized and suspended in the air, and whirling round with rapidity, exhibited a dreadful sight, and falling into the sea were swallowed up with their whole crews.

Marcellus

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.  
*Sambucæ*  
*of Marcellus.*

Marcellus, on his side, used also balistas and catapultas, but much inferior to those of the learned geometrician. He had at a great expence provided machines, called *Sambucæ*, from their resemblance to the musical instrument of that name. It was composed of eight galleys of five benches, from one side of which the oars had been taken away, from some on the right and from the others on the left; and which were joined together two and two on the sides where there were no oars. The machine consisted of a ladder, four feet broad, with breast-works on both sides, which when set up was as high as the walls. It was laid lengthwise from the poop to the prow in the inside of the galleys made fast to each other, and reached considerably beyond their beaks. On the tops of the masts pulleys were placed with cords in them. When it was to be used, cords were made fast to the extremity of the machine, and the men upon the poop raised it up with the help of pulleys: others on the prow assisted to raise it up with levers. The galleys were afterwards warped up to the foot of the wall, to which these machines were applied. This is, no doubt, a kind of modern draw-bridge. The bridge of the *Sambuca* was let down upon the walls of the besieged, and served the besiegers for passing to them.

This machine had not the effect expected from it. Whilst it was still at a sufficient distance from the walls, Archimedes discharged a great piece of a rock of above \* twelve hundred weight; after that a second, and presently after a third: all which hitting it with a dreadful whizzing and

\* Mr. Rollin says ten quintals an hundred and twenty-five pounds; according to which ten quintals were above twelve several kinds. The least was hundred.



noise, and threw down and broke its props to pieces, and gave such a shock to the galleys that supported it, that they parted from each other.

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.

Marcellus, almost discouraged and reduced to extremities, drew off his galleys with all possible diligence, and sent orders to his land-troops to do the same. At the same time he assembled the council of war, in which it was resolved, that the next morning before day break, they should endeavour to approach the walls. They were in hopes, by this means, to avoid the machines, which for want of a distance proportioned to their force, would not have sufficient play.

But Archimedes had provided against every thing. He had long before prepared, as we have already observed, machines that carried to all distances, with a great abundance of darts proportioned to them, and ends of beams, which being very short, required less time to make them ready; and these could be discharged more often than others. Besides which, he had caused holes to be made in the walls very near each other, (which are now called *loopholes*) where he had placed \* scorpions, that not carrying far, wounded those who approached, and were not perceived.

When the Romans in consequence had got to the foot of the walls, thinking themselves well covered there, they again found themselves either the mark of an infinity of darts, or overwhelmed with the stones, that fell from above on their heads; there being no part of the wall, that did not continually pour a mortal hail upon them, which fell downright. This obliged them to retire. But they were no sooner removed, than new discharges were made upon them in their retreat:

\* *Scorpions were a kind of cross-bows used by the ancients for discharging darts and stones.*

A. R. 538. so that they lost abundance of men, and almost  
 Ant. C. 214. all their galleys were shattered and beat to pieces,  
 without being capable of doing the least hurt to  
 the enemy. For Archimedes had placed most of  
 his machines safe behind the walls; so that the  
 Romans, overwhelmed with an infinity of wounds,  
 without seeing either the place or hand from which  
 they came, seemed properly, says Plutarch, fight-  
 ing with the Gods.

Marcellus, though at his wit's end, and not  
 knowing how to oppose these machines, which  
 Archimedes employed against him, could not for-  
 bear jesting upon them. *Shall we not give over  
 making war*, said he to his workmen and engineers,  
*with this Briareus of a geometrician, who uses my  
 galleys and Sambucæ so roughly. He infinitely exceeds  
 the hundred-banded giants spoken of in fable, in the  
 number of discharges he makes upon us at once.* Mar-  
 cellus had reason to ascribe this to Archimedes  
 alone. For, in reality, the Syracusans were in a  
 manner only the body of the machines and batte-  
 ries of that great geometrician, who was himself  
 the soul, that moved and acted them all. In con-  
 sequence, no other arms were used: the city em-  
 ployed only those of Archimedes, both in defend-  
 ing and attacking.

*Marcellus turns the  
 siege into  
 a blockade.* Marcellus at length, seeing the Romans so ter-  
 rified, that if they only perceived a little cord, or  
 the least bit of wood upon the wall, they imme-  
 Liv. xxiv. diately fled; crying out that Archimedes was go-  
 31. ing to discharge some dreadful machine upon  
 them, he renounced the hopes of being able to  
 take it by making a breach, gave over all attacks,  
 and resolved to put an end to the siege in time by  
 turning it into a blockade. The only resource that  
 the Romans thought they had, was to reduce the  
 great numbers of the people in the city by famine,  
 in cutting off all provisions, that could be brought  
 them

them either by sea or land. During eight months A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214. which the Romans were before the city, there were no kind of stratagems, that were not invented, nor any actions of valour omitted, except assaults, which they did not dare to attempt any more. Of so much weight are a single man and a single science, when properly employed. Remove but one old man from Syracuse, the city must inevitably be taken by all the forces the Romans have there. His presence alone stops and disconcerts all their measures.

Let us judge from this example (and it cannot *Reflection* be too often repeated) what interest Princes have *upon Ar-* in protecting arts, in favouring the learned, and *chimedes,* and encouraging academies of sciences by distinctions *and his* of honour, and solid rewards, which never hurt *machines.* nor impoverish States. I say nothing here of the birth and nobility of Archimedes; nor indeed was he at all indebted to them either for his profound knowledge, or his reputation. I consider him only as a learned man, and a great geometrician. What a loss had it been for Syracuse, if, for the sake of saving some expence, some pension, such a man had been left in inaction and obscurity? Hiero was far from acting in this manner. He knew all the merit of our geometrician; and it is a very great one in Princes to know that of others. He placed it in honour, he made use of it; and did not wait till occasion and necessity reduced him to do so: that would have been too late. By a wise foresight, the true characteristic of a great Prince and a great minister, he prepared, in the arms itself of peace, all that was necessary for sustaining a siege, and for making war with success; though at that time there was not the least appearance, that any thing was to be apprehended from the Romans, with whom Syracuse was in the strictest amity. Accordingly we see, in an instant,



A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.

come forth, as out of the earth, an incredible number of machines of all kinds and magnitudes, of which the sight alone was capable of giving armies terror and dismay.

Amongst these machines are some, of which the effect is scarce conceivable, and the reality of which we might be tempted to call in question, if we might be allowed to doubt the testimony, such for instance, as of Polybius, an almost cotemporary author, who wrote from memoirs quite new, and in the hands of all the world. And indeed how can we refuse to give into the concurrent report of Greek and Roman historians, of friends and enemies, in respect to facts, of which whole armies were witnesses, and felt the effects; and which had so great a share in the events of the war. What passed in this siege of Syracuse, shews also how high the genius of the ancients rose in the art of besieging and defending places. Our artillery, which so perfectly resembles thunder, has not more effect than the machines of Archimedes, if it has so much.

Mention is made of a burning-glass, by the means of which Archimedes burnt part of the Roman fleet. No ancient author speaks of it: it is a modern tradition, for which there is no foundation. Burning-glasses were known by the ancients; but not of this kind, which the most skilful in geometry and mechanicks even believe impracticable.

Polyb. viii. Marcellus, according to Polybius, continued eight months before Syracuse with Appius: which must have been to the end of the Consulship, and perhaps even farther.

Livy places the expeditions of Marcellus in Sicily, and his victory over Hippocrates, in this first year; though they must necessarily have been in the second year of the siege. And in reality  
that

that historian relates no military actions of Marcellus in this second year, because he ascribes to the first, what passed in that we are going to enter upon. For it is contrary to all probability, that nothing should have been done, especially as the Romans had a numerous army in Sicily, and a General who certainly wanted neither vigour nor activity. This reflection, as I have already observed in the Ancient History, is Mr. Crevier's, late professor of Rhetorick in the College of Beauvais, in his new edition of Livy, of which I have more than once given my thoughts, and which is every day a great help to me in my Work. I shall therefore place the events, that Livy ascribes to the first year, in the second, which we are going to begin.

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.

I also ask permission not to break in upon the affairs of Sicily by facts contained in the Roman History during the two years the siege is still to continue. I shall recur to them in the sequel. These facts, so separated, will be much the clearer. And I shall observe the same method on some other the like occasions.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS. III.

TI. SEMPRONIVS GRACCHVS.

A. R. 539.  
Ant. C. 213.

After Marcellus had resolved only to blockade Syracuse, he left Appius before the place with two thirds of the army, and with the rest advanced into the island, where he made some cities return to the side of the Romans.

*Different expeditions in Sicily during the blockade of Syracuse.*

At this time Himilco, General of the Carthaginians, arrived in Sicily with a great army, in hopes of entirely reconquering it, and driving out the Romans. Hippocrates quitted Syracuse with ten thousand foot and five hundred horse to join him; in order to act in concert against Mar-

Liv. xxiv. 35.

A. R. 539.  
AUL. C. 215.

cellus, with their united forces. Epicydes remained in the city, to command there during the blockade. Marcellus, in returning from Agrigentum, where the enemy had been before-hand with him, and had seized the place, met the army of Hippocrates, attacked, and defeated it. This advantage kept many of those, who intended to go over to the Carthaginians in their duty.

Liv. xxiv.  
36.

Almost at the same time two fleets arrived in Sicily. On the one side, fifty-five armed galleys under the command of Bomilcar entered the great port of Syracuse: on the other, a Roman fleet, composed of thirty galleys of five benches, landed a legion at \* Panormus. Both states applied so strenuously to the war in Sicily, that they seemed to think no farther of Italy. The enterprize of the Carthaginians had no effect. Himilco, who was in hopes of taking the Roman Legion in its passage from Panormus to Syracuse, missed his aim, by steering a different course. The Carthaginian fleet did not continue long near Syracuse. Bomilcar despairing of being capable of making head against the Romans, who had twice as many ships as himself, and being convinced that a longer stay would only conduce to starving his allies, set sail and repassed into Africa.

Himilco confined himself to reducing some places. The first he retook was Murgantia, whither the Romans had sent a great quantity of provisions of all kinds. The inhabitants surrendered it to him by treachery. The revolt of this city inspired a great many others with the desire of change; so that on all sides the Roman garrisons were either drawn out of the places they

\* Palermo, upon the Northern coast of the island.



held by force, or delivered up to the perfidy of the inhabitants. A. R. 539. Ant.C. 213.

The city of Enna was upon the point of treating its garrison in the same manner, which was commanded by L. Pinarius, an equally brave and faithful officer, and who was not of a character to suffer himself to be surprized. He knew, that the inhabitants had resolved to deliver him up to the enemy, and that in order to do so they had sent for Himilco and Hippocrates, who were already on their way. Pinarius perceived, that there was no time to be lost. After having apprized his soldiers of the extreme danger, to which they were upon the point of being exposed, and having taken, with great secrecy, all the necessary measures, he gave them the signal agreed upon. The soldiers instantly dispersed themselves into all the quarters of the city. They plundered, ravaged and killed all that came in their way, as they might have done in a place taken by storm, being no less exasperated against people, without arms and defence indeed, but traitors and villains in their hearts, than if they had met with resistance, and the danger had been equal on both sides. Thus the Romans retained Enna, by a bloody execution, which perhaps only necessity can excuse. Marcellus was not displeased with this conduct of Pinarius. He even gave the whole plunder to the soldiers, convinced, that to prevent the Sicilians from sacrificing the Roman garrisons to the Carthaginians, nothing less than so terrible an example of vengeance was necessary.

Enna is situated exactly in the middle of Sicily. Besides which it was particularly famous for the worship of Ceres and Proserpina. There was an ancient tradition deeply implanted in the minds of all the people of Sicily, that the whole island Cic. in Ver. designis, n. 106—108

A. R. 539.  
Ant. C. 213.

was sacred to those two Divinities, who had been born in it. that it was indebted to Ceres for the invention and use of corn: that Proserpina had been carried away by Pluto from a wood belonging to the city of Enna; and that traces of that rape were still to be seen there. The temple of Ceres, the mother of Proserpina, was in such universal veneration with the Sicilians, that, when they went thither, they believed they went rather to the goddess herself, (a) than to adore her in her temple. This religious reverence shewed itself in effect of what had lately happened at Enna. The news of the massacre, that had been committed there, spread in one day over the whole province; so that those of the Sicilians, who found in this action not only cruelty to men, but impiety to the Gods, conceived still more aversion than before for the Romans; only those who till then had been divided between them and the Carthaginians, made no farther scruple to declare for the latter.

Marcellus returned to Syracuse, and after having sent Appius to Rome to demand the Consulship, he appointed T. Quintius Crispinus his Successor in the command of the fleet and of the camp, and settled his winter quarters at six or seven \* *stadia* (or furlongs) from Epipolæ, in a place called Leon, where he intrenched himself.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS.

APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

(a) Tanta erat auctoritas & vetustas illius religionis, ut, cum illic irent non ad ædem Cereris, sed ad ipsam Cererem proficisci, viderentur.

\* *Thucydides gives it this situation Lib. 6. in which he is rather to be followed than Livy, who places this little town five miles from Hexapylon.*

We

We have already observed that Sicily, at the time we are speaking of, was divided into the Roman province, and the kingdom of Hiero, or State of the Syracusans. Marcellus was with his army in this second part: But there was another army in the Roman province, where every thing was quiet, and where no war was actually carried on. In this last army were the soldiers, who had escaped the battle of Cannæ, under the command of P. Lentulus, Prætor or Proprætor. From these soldiers banished into Sicily without hope of returning to Italy as long as the war with the Carthaginians subsisted, Marcellus, whilst he was in winter quarters, received a deputation consisting of the principal officers of the horse and foot. He that was to speak, addressed himself to him in words to this effect:

*Marcellus, we should have had recourse to you in Italy during your Consulship, when the decree of the Senate, which we dare not call unjust, but which is certainly very rigorous, was passed against us, if we had not expected to be sent into a province, where the deaths of two Kings had occasioned great revolutions, to maintain against the united forces of the Sicilians and Carthaginians a rude and laborious war, in which we might have appeased the resentment of the Senate by our blood and wounds. It was thus that in the times of our fathers, those, who had been taken prisoners near Heraclea by Pyrrhus, obliterated the disgrace of their defeat by fighting against that Prince.*

*But, after all, wherein have we deserved such heavy effects of your past and present indignation, illustrious Senators. For, great Marcellus, when I speak to you, I seem to see both the Consuls, and the Senate united in your person. At least I assure myself, that had we fought under your auspices at the battle of Cannæ, the fate of the Commonwealth and our own would have been more happy. Per-*

A. R. 549.  
Ant. C. 212.  
*The soldi-  
ers banish-  
ed into  
Sicily send  
deputies to  
Marcel-  
lus, to de-  
fire, that  
they may  
be reinsta-  
ted in the  
service.*  
Liv. xxv.  
6.



A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

*mit me, before I give you an account of our sad situation, to make our apology.*

*If our defeat is not to be imputed to the wrath of the Gods, or to the immutable decree of the Fates, that disposes of all human things, but to a fault committed by men; upon whom ought this fault to fall? Is it upon the soldiers or upon the Generals? I who am but a subaltern, shall be far from blaming my General; especially as I have been informed, that the Senate caused thanks to be returned him for not despairing of the safety of the Commonwealth; and that ever since his flight at Cannæ he has always been continued in command; and that all the other legionary Tribunes, who escaped from that battle, demand offices, and obtain them without difficulty. But suffer me at least, illustrious Senators, to ask you, whether it be just, that whilst you are full of lenity and indulgence for yourselves and your children, you should make the whole weight of your anger and severity fall upon soldiers as upon vile slaves? Will you admit that the Consul and the principal persons of the city might fly, without dishonouring themselves, when there was no other resource; but that you sent the soldiers to the battle only to perish in it? At the battle of Allia, almost the whole army fled. At the Furcæ Caudinæ the soldiers delivered up their arms without so much as having attempted to use them: not to mention other battles, of which the events have been equally unhappy and shameful. However nobody thought of noting those armies with any kind of infamy, and there was so far from being reason to repent such indulgence in respect to them, that the city of Rome owed her preservation to the very legions, that had fled to Veii with so much terror and precipitation; and the troops, who returned to Rome without arms after having shamefully passed under the yoke of the Samnites, having been sent back with new arms against the same enemy,*  
made

made them in their turn experience the vile disgrace A. R. 540.  
by which they had taken so much pleasure to mortify us. Ant.C. 212.

But as for the soldiers who fought at Cannæ, can they with reason be accused of cowardice, when it is remembered, that above fifty thousand were killed upon the spot; that the Consul made off with only seventy horse; and that those, who did not lose their lives, preserved them only, because the victor was tired with killing? When the prisoners were refused to be ransomed, every body praised us for having preserved ourselves to serve our country, for having retired to the Consul at Venusia, and for having formed him a body of troops, that wore the face of an army.

At present our Condition is more unhappy and harder than that of prisoners ever was in the times of our forefathers. For the severity used in respect to them, was always confined to making them change their arms, to reducing them from a more honourable into a less distinguished corps, and to assigning them a place in the camp inferior to what they had held before: but they did not fail, on the first occasion wherein they signalized themselves, to recover all that had been taken from them. None of them were ever banished; none of them deprived of the hopes of completing the time of their service, and they were always led on against the enemy to fight, and either to put an end to their lives, or their ignominy. As for us, who can be reproached with nothing, but that we were desirous, that some Romans should survive the battle of Cannæ, we are removed not only from our country, and from Italy, but even from the sight of the enemy, we are left in a shameful banishment, without hopes of effacing our disgrace, of appeasing the wrath of our country and of dying with honour. We do not ask, either that an end should be put to our misery, or that we should be suffered

red

A. R. 540.  
Aul. C. 212.

*red to lie idle; but only that our valour should be put to the trial; to be exposed to fatigues and dangers, and that we should be replaced in a condition to discharge all the duties of men of courage, soldiers, and Romans.*

*The war has now been carried on two years in Sicily with great ardour. The Carthaginians and Romans, in their turns, take cities from each other: battles both of horse and foot are fought: Syracuse is besieged by sea and land: we hear the sound of arms and the cries of battle; whilst we are languishing in an unworthy repose, as if we had neither swords, nor arms to use them.*

*Tib. Sempronius has already fought several times with the legions of slaves, and has made them obtain in reward of their valour the liberty and rank of citizens. Employ us at least as slaves purchased for this war. Let us be suffered to come to blows with the enemy, and to deserve our liberty by fighting. Make trial of our valour, by sea, by land, in pitched battles, or in sieges. Expose us to whatever is most difficult or terrible in fatigues and dangers: we are ready to undertake all things, that we may once for all do what, it seems, we ought to have done at Cannæ; as the whole time we have survived that unfortunate battle, has been punished with ignominy.*

Marcellus  
writes to  
the Senate  
in favour  
of the  
soldiers.  
Liv. xxv.  
7.

Severe an-  
swer of the  
Senate.

After this discourse they threw themselves at the feet of Marcellus. That General answered them, “ that the favour they asked was not in his power; that he would write to the Senate, and “ would execute the orders that should be sent “ him.” Accordingly he wrote, and his letters were delivered to the new Consuls. After they had been read in the Senate, the Senators, who were consulted upon this affair, replied, “ That they did not think it proper to trust the “ safety and glory of their country to soldiers, “ who had abandoned their companions in the “ plains



“ plains of Cannæ. That if Marcellus was of a A. R. 540.  
 “ different opinion, they left him at liberty to act Ant. C. 212.  
 “ in respect to them as he should judge best for  
 “ the good of the Commonwealth; on condition  
 “ however, that they should enjoy no exemption,  
 “ that they should receive no military rewards,  
 “ and should not see Italy, as long as the Cartha-  
 “ ginians should continue the war in it.”

This severity afflicted Marcellus, and when he Plut. in  
 returned to Rome, he complained highly to the Marc.  
 Senate, that after all the services he had done the P. 503.  
 Commonwealth, they should not vouchsafe to  
 grant him entire pardon for the soldiers, in whose  
 favour he had wrote to them. But that wise body  
 had its rules and principles, to which they believed  
 themselves obliged inviolably to adhere, notwith-  
 standing the apparent reasons for the contrary,  
 that is, notwithstanding the extremity to which  
 the Commonwealth was then reduced, and the  
 pressing occasion it had for troops after the total  
 defeat of its armies at the battle of Cannæ. It  
 was from this very extremity that the Senate took  
 the reasons for their conduct. And indeed what  
 impression must not the example of such a seve-  
 rity, and in such conjunctures, have made upon  
 the troops in all succeeding times: In this man-  
 ner was discipline preserved in the Roman armies;  
 and it was that discipline, which rendered them  
 victorious over all nations.

In the beginning of the third year of the siege Marcellus  
 of Syracuse, whilst the Romans on another side deliberates  
 were beginning that of Capua, Marcellus had whether he  
 made little progress. He saw no means for taking shall con-  
 Syracuse, either by force, because Archimedes tinue or  
 continually opposed him with invincible obstacles; quit the  
 or by famine, because the Carthaginian fleet, siege of Sy-  
 which was returned more numerous than before, racuse.  
 caused convoys to enter the place at will. He Liv. xxv.  
 therefore 23.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

*He holds  
intelli-  
gence in  
the city  
which is  
discovered.*  
Liv. xxv.  
23.

therefore deliberated, whether he should remain before the city to push the siege, or march towards Agrigentum against Hippocrates and Himilco. But, before he took the latter resolution, he was desirous to try whether he could not make himself master of Syracuse by some secret intelligence. He had in his camp many of the principal Syracusans, who had come thither to take refuge in the beginning of the troubles. Marcellus addressed himself to them, promising them, that if the city surrendered to the Romans, it should retain its laws, privileges, and liberty. They did not want good will; but it was not easy for them to come to the speech of their relations and friends, who remained in the city; because the authors of the revolt suspected many of the inhabitants, and redoubled their vigilance and attention, to prevent any attempt of that nature in favour of the Romans without their knowledge. It was a slave of one of these Syracusan fugitives, who having got into the city as a deserter, carried on secretly an intrigue, into which fourscore of the principal persons of Syracuse entered. They divided themselves in order to come sometimes one party and sometimes another into the camp of Marcellus, hid in barks under fishing nets. All the measures were taken for putting the city into the hands of the Romans, when one Attalus, out of resentment for not having been let into the secret, discovered the conspiracy to Epicydes, who put all the conspirators to death.

*Part of  
the city  
taken.*  
Liv. xxv.  
24.  
Plut. in  
Marc.  
308.

This enterprize having miscarried in this manner, an accident supplied him with a new resource, and revived his hopes. Some Roman ships had taken one Damippus, whom Epicydes had sent to negotiate with Philip King of Macedonia. Epicydes expressed a great desire to ransom him, and Marcellus was not averse to it. A place near  
the

the port Trogilii was agreed upon for holding the conferences concerning the ransom of the prisoner.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

As they met there several times, a Roman soldier taking it into his head to consider the wall attentively at a nearer view, had counted the stones of it, and measured the height of each of them with his eye; then having cast up the whole, he discovered, that the wall was not so high by a great deal, as himself and others had believed it, and he concluded, that with ladders of no extraordinary length, it would be easy to get upon it.

The soldier, without loss of time, gave Marcellus an account of the whole. All knowledge and wisdom is not always confined to the General's head: a private soldier may give him good hints. Marcellus did not neglect this information, and assured himself concerning it with his own eyes. Having caused ladders to be got ready, he took the opportunity of a festival celebrated for three days at Syracuse in honour of Diana, during which the inhabitants abandoned themselves to feasting and merriment. At the time of night when he supposed that the Syracusans, after having passed the day in eating and drinking, were in their first sleep, he made a thousand chosen soldiers advance softly to the wall with the ladders. When the first were got up without noise or tumult, others followed them; the boldness of the first encouraging the second. These thousand men, taking the advantage of the enemy's tranquillity, who were either drunk, or asleep, had soon scaled the wall. Having soon forced the gate Hexapylon, they seized the part of the city called Epipolæ.

The question was now no longer to deceive, but to terrify, the enemy. The Syracusans, roused by the noise, began to take the alarm, and to put themselves in motion. Marcellus ordered all



A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

the trumpets to sound at once; which spread such a consternation amongst the inhabitants, that they all fled; believing, that there was no quarter of the city not in the hands of the enemy. Accordingly, it will soon appear, that the taking of Epipolæ occasioned that of Neapolis and of the quarter called Tycha. There still remained however not only the isle, but the strongest and finest part of Syracuse, called Achradina, which was well capable of defending itself, having its walls separated from the rest of the city.

Marcellus, at day-break, had entered Epipolæ with all his troops. Epicydes having instantly drawn together some soldiers, which he had in the Isle, that adjoined to Achradina, marched against Marcellus: but finding him stronger and better accompanied than he had imagined, after a slight skirmish he retired hastily into Achradina, less affected with the force and number of the enemy, than with the fear, that some conspiracy might be formed in the city in their favour, and that he should find the gates of Achradina and the Isle shut against him.

All the captains and officers that were with Marcellus, congratulated him upon the success of his arms, and upon so unforeseen a good fortune. As to himself, when he had considered from an eminence the beauty and extent of this city, which was then the vastest and most opulent in the world, he could not help shedding tears, either of joy, for having executed so difficult and glorious an enterprize, or of sorrow, to see the wonderful work of so many ages upon the point of being reduced to ashes. He called to mind two powerful fleets of the Athenians sunk in former times before this city, two numerous armies, with two illustrious Generals that commanded them, cut to pieces: so many wars sustained with so much courage against  
the

the Carthaginians; so many famous Tyrants and powerful Kings; especially Hiero, whose memory was still quite recent, who had signalized himself by so many royal virtues, and still more by the important services, which he had done the Roman people, whose interests had always been as dear to him as his own. Moved by this remembrance, he believed, before he attacked Achradina, that it was incumbent on him to send to the besieged, to exhort them to surrender voluntarily, and prevent the ruin of their city.

The gates and walls of Achradina were guarded by deserters, as men, who having no hopes of pardon in the conditions of a treaty, which should be made with Marcellus, would defend them against him with the utmost obstinacy. Accordingly, they would not suffer any one to approach the walls, or hold any conversation with the inhabitants.

Marcellus, not having succeeded on that side, turned his views upon a fort called Euryalus, situated at the extremity of the city farthest from the sea, which commanded the whole country on the land side, and which, for that reason, was highly proper for receiving convoys. Philodemus, who commanded in it, fought for some days only to amuse Marcellus; till Hippocrates and Himilco should come to his aid with their troops. Marcellus seeing, that he could not make himself master of this post, incamped between the New-town and Tycha.

But at last Philodemus, not seeing himself succoured, surrendered the fort, upon condition, that he should march out with the garrison to Epicydes in Achradina.

The deputies of the New-town and Tycha, came to Marcellus carrying olive-branches, and implored him to forbid his soldiers to put them to

A. R. 540. the sword and to burn the city. He granted them  
 Aet. C. 212. their request: but those two quarters were abandoned to be plundered by the troops.

Bomilcar in the mean time, who was in the port with ninety ships, taking the occasion of a dark and tempestuous night, that made it impossible for the Roman fleet to lie at anchor, set sail with five and thirty ships for Carthage, informed the Carthaginians of the condition to which Syracuse was reduced, and returned with an hundred sail.

Marcellus, who had put troops into Euryalus, and no longer apprehended being attacked in his rear, prepared to besiege Achradina. The two parties lay still for some days.

About this time arrived Hippocrates and Himilco. The first, with the Sicilians, having encamped and intrenched himself near the great port, and made the signal for those who occupied Achradina, attacked the old camp of the Romans, in which Crispinus commanded; and Epicydes sallied at the same time upon the posts of Marcellus. Neither of these enterprizes succeeded. Hippocrates was vigorously repulsed by Crispinus, who followed him quite into his intrenchments; and Marcellus obliged Epicydes to shut himself up in Achradina.

*Havock  
 made by  
 the plague  
 in the two  
 armies.*

*Liv. xxv.  
 26.*

As it was then autumn, a plague came on which made great havock in the city, and still more in the camps of the Romans and Carthaginians. At first the distemper was moderate, and occasioned only by the bad air and season. Afterwards communication with the sick, and even the care taken of them, spread the contagion: from whence it happened that some, neglected and abandoned, died through the malignity of the disease; others received help that became fatal to all that approached them: so that the eyes were continually struck with the sad sight of death, and of  
 the



the funerals that followed it, and the ears heard nothing night and day, but the groans of the dying, or of those who lamented them. But at length the habit of seeing the same objects made people's hearts so hard and insensible, that they not only ceased to lament those whom death swept off, but did not so much as give them interment, and the earth was covered with corpses, that lay as they fell in the sight of their comrades, who expected the same fate every moment.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

The Sicilians, who served in the Carthaginian army, no sooner perceived, that the distemper was communicated by the corruption of the air they breathed near Syracuse, than they retired to their several cities, from which they were not very distant. But all the Carthaginians, who had not the same resource, perished with their Generals Hippocrates and Himilco. As for Marcellus, seeing with what excess the distemper raged, he quartered his soldiers in the houses of the city, where the shade and cover relieved them exceedingly: but that did not prevent his losing abundance of men.

Such a scourge, one would think, should have put a stop to the war on both sides: but it seemed to re-kindle every day more and more. Bomilcar, Admiral of the Carthaginian fleet, who had made a second voyage to Carthage, to bring new succours from thence, returned with an hundred and thirty ships of war, and seven hundred transports. The contrary winds prevented him from doubling the cape of Pachynus. Epicydes, who apprehended, that, if the same winds continued, this fleet would take disgust and return into Africa, left the care of defending Achradina to the Generals of the mercenary troops, went to Bomilcar, and persuaded him to venture a battle, as soon as the weather would permit. Marcellus on his side,

*Various events, followed with the taking of Syracuse. Liv. xxv. 27—30.*

A. R. 520.  
 Ann. C. 212.

seeing that the troops of the Sicilians augmented every day, and that if he waited much longer, and suffered himself to be shut up in Syracuse, he should be very much straitened both by sea and land, resolved, notwithstanding the superiority, which the enemy had from the number of their ships, to prevent Bomilcar from landing at Syracuse. As soon as the winds abated, Bomilcar stood out to sea in order to double the cape the better, and with design to give battle. But when he saw the Roman ships advance to him in good order, on a sudden, no body knew why, he made off, sent orders to the transports to regain Africa, and retired to Tarentum. Epicydes, fallen from such high hopes, and not daring to return into a city already half taken, sailed for Agrigentum, rather with design to wait the event of the siege there, than to make any motion from thence.

When it was known in the camp of the Sicilians, that Epicydes had quitted Syracuse, and that the Carthaginians abandoned Sicily, they sent deputies to Marcellus, after having sounded the disposition of the besieged, to treat of the conditions upon which Syracuse should be surrendered to him. It was agreed unanimously enough on both sides, that what had belonged to the Kings should belong to the Romans: and that the Sicilians should retain all the rest with their laws and liberty. After these preliminaries, they demanded a conference with those, whom Epicydes had appointed to command during his absence. The deputies in conferring with them, gave them to understand, that they had been sent by the army of the Sicilians to Marcellus and them, to make a treaty, in which the interests of those besieged, as well as of those who were not, would be taken care of; it not being consistent with justice, that the one should provide for their particular safety, in neglect of the other.

other. They were afterwards introduced into the place, and having informed their friends of the conditions they had already settled with Marcellus, they engaged them to join with them in putting to death Polyclitus, Philistion, and Epicydes surnamed Sindon, all Lieutenants of Epicydes, who having little regard for the good of Syracuse, did not fail to oppose the negotiations of peace.

After having rid themselves of these petty Tyrants, they called an assembly of the People ; and represented to them, “ That whatever ills they  
“ suffered, they ought not to complain of their  
“ fortune, as it now depended upon themselves to  
“ put an end to them. That if the Romans had  
“ undertaken the siege of Syracuse, it was out of  
“ affection for the Syracusans, not enmity. That  
“ it was not till after having been informed of  
“ the oppressions they suffered from Hippocrates  
“ and Epicydes, those ambitious retainers of Han-  
“ nibal, and afterwards of Hieronymus, that they  
“ had taken arms, and besieged the city, not  
“ to ruin it, but to destroy its tyrants. But  
“ since Hippocrates was dead, Epicydes absent,  
“ his Lieutenants killed, and the Carthaginians  
“ had abandoned all they possessed in Sicily,  
“ what reason could the Romans now have, not  
“ to preserve Syracuse ; as they would do, in case  
“ Hiero, the most faithful of their friends and  
“ allies, was still alive ? That neither the city,  
“ nor the inhabitants, had any thing to fear but  
“ from themselves, if they let slip this occasion of  
“ being reconciled with the Romans. That they  
“ never would have so favourable an one as the  
“ present, when they were just delivered from the  
“ violent sway of their Tyrants ; and that the  
“ first use of their liberty ought to be, to return  
“ to their duty.”



A. R. 540.  
 Ant. C. 212.

This discourse was perfectly well received by the whole Assembly. It was however judged proper to create new Magistrates, before they sent deputies to the Romans, and those deputies were chosen out of the number of such as had been elected Prætors. The person who spoke in their name, and who was instructed to use all possible endeavours to obtain, that Syracuse should not be destroyed, being arrived at the camp of Marcellus with his Colleagues, spoke to him as follows : *Illustrious General, it was not the people of Syracuse who broke the alliance with the Romans, but Hieronymus, less criminal to Rome than to his country ; and afterwards, when the peace was re-established by his death, it was still no Syracusan, that interrupted it, but the instruments of the Tyrant, Hippocrates and Epicydes. It was they that made war upon you, after having reduced us into captivity, whether by force or artifice and perfidy : and no body can say, we had any interval of liberty, that was not a time of peace with you. Now, as soon as we are become our own masters by the deaths of those, who enslaved Syracuse, we come to deliver up our arms, persons, walls and city, determined not to refuse any conditions you shall think fit to impose upon us. For the rest, continued he addressing himself still to Marcellus, the present question concerns your interests as much as ours. The Gods have granted you the glory of having taken the finest and most illustrious of all the Grecian cities. All that we have ever done of memorable, whether by sea or land, augments your triumph, and exalts its lustre. Fame does not suffice to make known hereafter the greatness and strength of the city you have taken ; posterity cannot judge of them but with their own eyes. It is necessary, that we should shew to all those who shall land here, from whatever part of the universe they come, sometimes the trophies we have gained from the Athenians and Carthaginians, and*

*sometimes those which you have gained from us ; and that Syracuse, placed for ever under the protection of Marcellus, may be a perpetual and subsisting monument of the valour and clemency of him, who took and preserved it. It would not be just, that the remembrance of Hieronymus should make more impression upon the Romans, than that of Hiero. The latter was much longer your friend, than the other your enemy. Suffer me to say it, you have experienced the effects of Hiero's amity : but the frantick undertakings of Hieronymus have fallen only upon his own head.*

The difficulty was not to obtain from Marcellus what they asked of him for the besieged, but to preserve tranquillity and union amongst themselves in the city. The deserters, convinced that they should be delivered up to the Romans, inspired the foreign soldiers with the same fear. Both in consequence suddenly taking arms, began by massacring the magistrates newly elected ; and running on all sides, plundered and put all to the sword that came in their way. They nominated six officers, three to command in Achradina, and three in the Isle. The tumult being at length appeased, the foreign soldiers discovered, from every thing they heard concerning what was concluded with the Romans, that their cause was quite separate from that of the fugitives. At that moment arrived the deputies, who had been sent to Marcellus, who fully undeceived them.

Amongst those who commanded in Syracuse, there was a Spaniard, named Mericus : means were found to bring him over. He delivered up the gate near the fountain Arethusa, and received the soldiers that Marcellus sent thither. The next day at sun-rise, Marcellus made a false attack upon Achradina, in order to draw all the forces in it to that side, and also of the Isle that adjoined to it ; to make it easy for some vessels to throw more troops into the Isle, which would be un-

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

guarded. Every thing succeeded as he had designed. The soldiers, whom those vessels threw into the Isle, finding almost all the posts abandoned, and the gates, through which many were just gone to defend Achradina against Marcellus, still open, they took possession of it with little opposition. Marcellus, being apprized, that he was master of the Isle, and of part of Achradina, and that Mericus, with the body he commanded, had joined his troops, caused a retreat to be sounded, to prevent the troops from plundering the Treasury of the Kings of Syracuse, which was not found to be so considerable as it had been believed.

The deserters having taken advantage of this interval of tranquillity to escape, the Syracusans, delivered from all fear, opened the gates of Achradina to Marcellus, and sent deputies to him, who had orders to ask nothing further of him, than that he would be pleased to preserve the lives of themselves and their children. Marcellus having consulted his Council, to which he had admitted the Syracusans who had taken refuge in his camp, replied to these deputies: “ That Hiero, during  
 “ fifty years, had not done the Romans more  
 “ good, than those who had been masters of Sy-  
 “ racuse for some years had intended them harm:  
 “ but that their ill-will had hurt only themselves,  
 “ and that they had punished themselves for the  
 “ violation of treaties in a more cruel manner,  
 “ than the Romans could have desired. That he  
 “ had besieged Syracuse during three years not  
 “ to reduce it into slavery, but to deliver it from  
 “ the tyranny exercised over it by the Com-  
 “ manders of the deserters. That after all the  
 “ Syracusans would be in the wrong to ascribe a  
 “ revolt continued for so many years to the want of  
 “ liberty; as it was in their own power either to  
 “ have followed the example of their fellow citi-  
 “ zens,



“ zens, who had sought refuge in the Roman  
 “ camp; or that of the Spaniard Mericus, who  
 “ had delivered up himself and his garrison;  
 “ and that they might at least have taken the ge-  
 “ nerous resolution sooner of surrendering them-  
 “ selves, as they at last determined. That as for  
 “ himself, he did not think the honour of having  
 “ taken Syracuse a recompence equivalent to the  
 “ pains and dangers he had undergone in so long  
 “ and so rude a siege.”

After this discourse, he sent his Quæstor with  
 some troops into the Isle, to take and guard the  
 treasury of the Kings: then having placed safe-  
 guards at the doors of those who had conti-  
 nued faithful to the Romans, he abandoned the  
 city to be plundered by the troops. He would  
 most willingly have spared it this sad disaster:  
 but he could not refuse that permission to the sol-  
 diers; who, if he had, would have taken it of  
 themselves. Many even demanded that Syracuse  
 should be burnt and demolished: but he could  
 not be prevailed upon to consent to that; and it  
 was not without great difficulty, that he abandoned  
 to them all the riches of that superb city, and all  
 the slaves that they found in it; expressly forbid-  
 ding them however to touch any free person, to  
 kill or hurt any one whatsoever, and to make  
 slaves of any of the citizens. It is said that the  
 riches, plundered at this time in Syracuse, were  
 equal to what might have actually been found in  
 Carthage, had it been taken.

An unforeseen accident gave Marcellus great  
 grief. At the time whilst all was in confusion  
 in Syracuse, Archimedes, shut up in his closet  
 like a man of another world, that does not con-  
 cern himself with what passes in this, was em-  
 ployed in considering geometrical figures, which  
 he had drawn upon the sand. This contemplation  
 had

A. R. 540.  
Ant.C. 212.

*The city  
plundered.*  
Liv. xxv.  
31.

*Death of  
Archimedes.*  
Liv. ibid.  
Plut. in  
Marc.  
380.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

had engrossed not only his eyes, but his whole soul, in such a manner, that he had neither heard the tumult made by the Romans in running about on all sides, nor the noise with which the whole city resounded. On a sudden a soldier came in to him, and bad him follow him to Marcellus. Archimedes desired him to stay a moment, till he had solved his problem, and compleated the demonstration of it. The soldier, who regarded neither his problem nor his demonstration, and who did not so much as understand those words, enraged at his delay, drew his sword, and killed him.

Tusc. I.  
64.

Marcellus was infinitely afflicted, when he was informed of his death. Not being able to restore his life, as he would very gladly have done, he did all in his power to do honour to his memory. He made a strict enquiry after all his relations, treated them with great distinction, and granted them extraordinary privileges. As to Archimedes, he caused his funeral to be solemnized with great magnificence, and erected him a monument amongst those of the most illustrious men Syracuse had ever produced. His tomb had remained a long time unknown and buried in oblivion till Cicero's time, who coming to Syracuse in quality of Quæstor, discovered it with some application.

Anc. Hist.  
Vol X.  
Sicily be-  
comes a  
province  
of the  
Romans.  
Cic. in  
ver. de  
frum. n.  
15.

I have related in what manner elsewhere.

By the taking of Syracuse, all Sicily became a province of the Roman people: but it was not treated, as the Spaniards and Carthaginians were afterwards, on whom a certain tribute was imposed, as the reward of the victors, and the punishment of the vanquished: *quasi victoria præmium & pœna belli*. Sicily in submitting to the Roman people preserved their ancient rights and customs, and obeyed them on the same conditions as it had done its Kings.

Some

Some days before the reduction of Syracuse, A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212. T. Otacilius, with fourscore galleys of five benches of oars, sailed from Lilybæum to Utica; and having entered the port of that city before day, took all the transports in it laden with corn. He afterwards landed his troops, and plundered the whole country round about, and returned on board his ships with a great booty. He arrived at Lilybæum three days after he had set out from thence, and brought with him an hundred and thirty vessels laden with all kinds of provisions, and particularly a great quantity of corn, which he immediately sent to Syracuse. This supply delivered both the victors and the conquered people from a famine, which began to threaten them, and from the fatal effects it would have had upon both, had it arrived later.

Marcellus, after the taking of Syracuse, applied himself in regulating all the affairs of Sicily, which he did with a justice, disinterestedness and integrity, that acquired himself in particular great glory, and did infinite honour to the Commonwealth in general. Hitherto, says Plutarch, the Romans had manifested to other nations that they were highly capable of conducting wars, and very formidable in battles; but they had given no great instances of their lenity, humanity, and clemency; in a word, of the virtues necessary to good government. Marcellus seems to have been the first, who, on this occasion, shewed the Greeks, that the Romans excelled them no less in justice, than in valour and ability in war.

Before Marcellus quitted Sicily, all the cities of that province sent deputies to him, to negotiate their interests. He treated them all differently, according to the different degrees of attachment or opposition their inhabitants had shewn in regard to the Romans. Those who had constantly adhered



A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

hered to their party, or at least had reunited with them before the taking of Syracuse, were received and treated honourably, as good and faithful allies. Those whom fear had reduced to surrender after that conquest, received, as conquered, such terms as the victor thought fit to impose upon them.

*Last action  
of Mar-  
cellus in  
Sicily.  
Victory  
gained by  
Hanno.  
Liv. xxv.  
40, 41.*

The Romans had still however in the neighbourhood of Agrigentum a remainder of the enemy, who were not to be neglected, commanded by Hanno and Epicydes, the only Generals of the Carthaginians, that continued in Sicily: a third sent by Hannibal was come to join them in the room of Hippocrates, whose name was Mutines. He was an active and enterprizing man, who under such a master as Hannibal had learned all the arts and stratagems, that could be used in war. With a body of Numidians, which his Collegues gave him, he over-ran and ravaged the lands of the enemy, taking care, on the other side, to encourage the allies, and to give them timely aid, in order to retain them in his party; so that in a short time all Sicily resounded with his name, and he became the most assured refuge of those, who favoured the Carthaginians. Marcellus having taken the field to put a stop to his incursions, Mutines, without giving him time to breathe, attacked the Romans in their very post, spread alarm and terror on all sides, and the next day, having given them a kind of battle, he obliged them to retire behind their intrenchments, and to keep themselves close within them.

But, whilst these things passed, a sedition having arose amongst the Numidians, three hundred of whom abandoned their camp, and went into a neighbouring city. Mutines set out immediately to bring back the seditious, after having strongly recommended to the two other Generals not to  
come

come to blows with the enemy in his absence. The others, resenting that advice, which seemed to carry with it the air of a command, and being besides jealous of the glory of Mutines, to shew their independance, made haste to offer the enemy battle. Marcellus, who had repulsed the victorious Hannibal before Nola, could not bear to see himself insulted by those he had defeated both by sea and land, ordered his troops to arm immediately, and advanced in good order against the enemy. They could not sustain the charge of the Romans; especially when they saw themselves abandoned by the Numidian cavalry, upon whom they relied most for the victory; and who, partly through a remainder of the discontent that had occasioned the sedition, and partly through an attachment to Mutines, whom the two other Generals affected to despise, had engaged with Marcellus not to fight. The Carthaginians in consequence were soon put to the rout, with the loss of a great number of soldiers killed and taken, and eight elephants. This was the last action of Marcellus in Sicily, who returned victorious to Syracuse.

The year was almost elapsed. At Rome Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and P. Sulpicius Galba, who had never exercised any Curule office, were nominated Consuls.

I return now to the facts, which I postponed, to avoid interrupting the history of the events of the war in Sicily.

### S E C T. III.

*First campaign of Cato the Censor. Philip declares against the Romans. He is beaten near Apollonia by the Prætor M. Valerius. Success of the Scipios in Spain. Distribution of the provinces. Departure of the Consuls. Dasius Altinius of Arpi, traitor*

*traitor to the Carthaginians, as he had been to the Romans. Horrible cruelty of Hannibal. Fabius retakes the city of Arpi. An hundred and twelve Campanians surrender themselves to the Romans. Taking of Aternum. Great fire at Rome. The two Scipios make an alliance with Syphax, King of Numidia. A Roman officer forms an infantry for Syphax. Treaty of the Carthaginians with Gala, another King of Numidia. Syphax is twice defeated by Massinissa, son of Gala. The Celtiberians begin to serve amongst the Romans. Pomponius, as incapable a General, as unfaithful farmer of the revenues, is defeated by Hanno. Novelties in religion reformed by the authority of the magistrates. P. Scipio chosen Ædile before qualified by age. Fraud of the Publicans or Tax-farmers, and amongst others, of Postumius, severely punished. Creation of a Pontifex Maximus. Levies made in a new method. The hostages of Tarentum, who had made their escape from Rome, brought back, and punished with death. Tarentum is delivered up to Hannibal by treachery. He attacks the citadel ineffectually, and leaves it blocked up. Origin of the games called Ludi Apollinares.*

A. R. 538.  
Art. C. 214.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS, IV.

M. CLAVDIVS MARCELLVS, III.

*First campaign of Cato.*

**I**T was under these Consuls, that Cato, who became so famous in the sequel, made his first campaign. He was at that time almost twenty years old.

*Philip declares against the Romans.*

LIV. XXIV.

40

We have seen that Philip King of Macedonia had the year before made a treaty with Hannibal, the execution of which had been deferred only by the taking of his Ambassadors. He at last declared himself openly this year against the Romans.



mans. The Prætor Valerius who commanded a fleet near Brundisium, and along the coast of Calabria, received deputies from the people of Oricum, a city of Epirus, who informed him, that that Prince had first come to found Apollonia, after having gone up the river Aous with sixscore galleys of two benches of oars: but that afterwards abandoning that enterprize, which appeared too long and too difficult, he had secretly approached Oricum during the night with his army, and that on the first attack he had made himself master of that city, situated in the midst of a plain, without either walls sufficiently strong, or troops numerous enough, to defend it. They desired the Prætor to send them aid, to repel the enemy, who must assuredly have formed designs against the Romans, and had attacked Oricum, only because that city seemed commodious in respect to his views against Italy.

Valerius, having confided the care of guarding the coast to T. Valerius his Lieutenant, set out with his fleet, which he kept in readiness, and in condition to act, after having embarked on board transports such of the troops, as the ships of war could not carry: and having arrived at Oricum the second day, he easily retook that city, in which Philip on retiring, had left but a weak garrison.

The deputies of Apollonia came to Valerius in this place, and informed him that their city was besieged by Philip, only because they refused to join with him. That they were no longer in a condition to resist him, unless the Romans sent them aid. The wars of Illyricum had given the Romans occasion to make alliances along all that coast. Valerius promised them, that he would do what they desired; and without delay sent ships of war with two thousand soldiers, under the command of Nævius Crista, a brave and very experienced

A. R. 538.  
Ant. C. 214.

*He is beaten near Apollonia by the Prætor Valerius.*

A. R. 538.  
A.D.C. 214.

experienced officer, with orders to repair to the mouth of the river Aous, near which Apollonia was situated. Nævius landed his troops at this place, and having ordered the gallies, that brought them, to return to Oricum, and rejoin the rest of the fleet, he marched his soldiers, removing from the river, by a way not guarded by the Macedonians, and entered the city in the night, without being perceived by the enemy. They lay still all the next day. Nævius employed it in examining what forces there were in Apollonia, and what arms and regular troops it could further supply. The condition in which he found all things, had already given him entire confidence, when he was informed, that the enemy passed their time with incredible security and indolence. For this reason he quitted the city without noise at midnight, and entered the enemy's camp, who were so little upon their guard, that above a thousand men had entered their works, before they were perceived by any body; and if they had refrained from slaughter, they might have reached the King's tent without any opposition. But the cries of those, who were put to the sword at the gates, at length roused the Macedonians, who were seized with such a terror, that not only none of them took arms, or attempted to repulse the enemy, but the King himself fled, almost naked, as he was when he waked, to the river's side and his ships, in a condition which ought to have made a private soldier ashamed. How infamous was this for a King and a General! The whole army ran the same way in a crowd.

Near three thousand men were killed or taken in the camp: but the number of prisoners was much greater than that of the dead. After the camp of the Macedonians was plundered, the Apollionates caused the Catapultæ, Balistæ, and other

other machines to be carried off that had been intended for battering their walls, with design to use them for their defence, in case they should ever be exposed to the same danger. All the rest of the plunder was abandoned to the Romans.

When this news was brought to Oricum, Valerius immediately sailed with his fleet towards the mouth of the river, to prevent Philip from getting off with the help of his ships. That Prince in consequence, not believing himself in a condition to fight the Romans either by sea or land, after having drawn part of his ships ashore, and burnt the rest, retired by land into Macedonia, with the remainder of his soldiers, most of whom had lost their arms and baggage. M. Valerius passed the winter at Oricum with his fleet.

In Spain, the Carthaginians, during this year, had at first some advantages; but they received several blows, and lost several battles, in which on their side they had, all together, forty-five thousand men killed or taken, with the loss of fifty elephants, and above an hundred and fifty ensigns. Cn. Scipio, one of the two Roman Generals, who commanded in Spain with his brother Publius, had his thigh ran through with a javelin in one of these actions. The Romans, having had such good success, thought it shameful for them to leave Saguntum above five years in the hands of the Carthaginians, the ruin of which had occasioned the war. They beat the Carthaginian garrison out of it, and having retaken the city, settled as many of the old inhabitants as they could find, in it.

C. FABIVS MAXIMVS.

TI. SEMPRONIVS GRACCHVS III.

A. R. 539.  
Ant. C. 213.



A. R. 539.  
Ann. C. 213.  
*Distribu-*  
*tion of the*  
*provinces.*  
*Ibid.* 44.

The first of these two Consuls was the son of the great Fabius. When the Consuls, who had been chosen in their absence, were arrived at Rome, the distribution of the provinces and troops was regulated ; and it was decreed that two new legions and twenty thousand allies should be levied. The Consuls, after having raised these legions, and recruited the rest, took care, according to custom, to expiate the prodigies, which Livy with reason calls vain (*a*) phantoms, that illude the eyes and ears, and are afterwards believed something real and serious.

After this ceremony the Consuls set out, Sempronius for Lucania, and Fabius for Apulia. The father of the latter joined him near Sueffula, in order to serve under him as his Lieutenant-general. When his son went to meet him, the Lictors who walked before him, out of respect for the age and great reputation of that illustrious person, suffered him to advance on horseback without speaking to him ; and he had passed eleven of them, when his son perceiving it, ordered the last, that walked immediately before him, to do his duty. Upon that officer's calling to the old man to dismount, he immediately complied, and approaching the Consul said to him : *I was willing, son, to try whether you knew that you were Consul.*

*Dafius Al-*  
*tinus a*  
*traitor to*  
*the Car-*  
*taginians*  
*as he had*  
*been to the*  
*Romans.*  
Liv. xxiv.  
45—47.

It was in this camp, that Darius Altinus of the city of Arpi came to the Consul in the night, attended only by three slaves, and promised to deliver up Arpi to him for a reward proportioned to such a service. Fabius having deliberated upon the affair in the council of war, some were of opinion, “ That after having caused him to be whipt, he should have his head cut off, as a deserter and traitor, who, having no other rule but his private interest, was alternately the enemy of both nations.

(*a*) *Ludibria oculorum auriumque credita pro veris.*

“ That

“ That after the battle of Cannæ, convinced that A. R. 539.  
 “ it was always necessary to go over to the side of Ant. C. 213.  
 “ fortune, he had declared for Hannibal, and had  
 “ brought his fellow-citizens into his revolt. That  
 “ at present, seeing, contrary to his expectation  
 “ and wishes, that the affairs of the Romans took  
 “ a better turn, and that the Commonwealth  
 “ seemed to rise upon its losses, he came to offer  
 “ those he had betrayed before a new treachery.  
 “ That his heart had always been on one side,  
 “ whilst his body was on the other, as contempti-  
 “ ble an enemy as faithless ally. That it was ne-  
 “ cessary to make an exemplary punishment of him,  
 “ and add it to those of the schoolmaster of Fa-  
 “ lerii and Pyrrhus’s physician, as a third lesson  
 “ for the traitors and villains that were for imita-  
 “ ting him.

The father of the Consul was not of this opini-  
 on. He said, “ That at a time when the war  
 “ was carried on on all sides, they talked as if  
 “ they were at peace with every body. That far  
 “ from inviting the States of Italy from continu-  
 “ ing on the side of the Carthaginians by an ill-  
 “ placed severity, it was necessary to endeavour  
 “ to bring them back to their alliance with the  
 “ Romans. That it were imprudent to treat  
 “ those, who inclined to return to their duty,  
 “ with rigour. That if people might abandon  
 “ the Romans, and not have liberty to come  
 “ over to them again, it was not to be doubted,  
 “ but Rome would soon have no allies, and that  
 “ all Italy would join Hannibal. That after all,  
 “ he was not absolutely for reposing any confi-  
 “ dence in Altinius. That there was a medium  
 “ to be taken in the affair. That without confi-  
 “ dering him at present either as an enemy or a  
 “ friend, it was necessary to keep him near the  
 “ camp in some safe and faithful city, where he

A. R. 539. " should continue a prisoner at large during the  
 Ann. C. 213. " war. That when it should be terminated, they  
 " might judge whether it were most proper to pu-  
 " nish him, either for his past revolt, or to par-  
 " don him for his present return." He, and  
 those who attended him, were laden with chains,  
 and sent to Cales with a great sum of gold which  
 he had brought with him, and which was kept very  
 faithfully for him. During the day he was suffered  
 to walk abroad under a guard, that carefully  
 locked him up at night.

*Horrid  
 cruelty of  
 Hannibal.* As soon as the People of Arpi discovered his ab-  
 sence, they sought for him carefully, but to no  
 purpose. As he was the principal citizen of the  
 place, the rumour of his absence spreading on all  
 sides, occasioned abundance of trouble and alarm;  
 and the fear of some revolution induced them to  
 give Hannibal advice of all that had passed. This  
 news gave him no manner of pain. For besides  
 his having long considered Altinius as a man, in  
 whom no confidence could be safely placed, he  
 found a pretext in his flight for seizing his estate,  
 which was very considerable. But, to make the  
 world believe, that anger had a greater share in his  
 revenge than avarice, he used his family, not only  
 with severity, but with the most horrid cruelty  
 and barbarity. He caused his wife and children  
 to be brought to his camp, and having ordered  
 them to be tortured, first to make them discover  
 what was become of Darius, and afterwards what  
 gold and silver he had left in his house; when he  
 was informed by this means of every thing, he  
 commanded them to be burnt alive; which was  
 executed upon the spot.

*Fabius re-  
 takes the  
 city of Arpi.* Fabius having set out from Sueffula, immediately  
 formed the design of besieging Arpi. After  
 having taken a near view of its situation and walls,  
 he resolved to attack it at a place, which being the  
 strongest,



strongest, was also the least guarded. He formed a detachment of his best officers and bravest soldiers, whom he ordered to scale the wall at that place in the night, and afterwards to force a low and narrow gate, which opened into a street not much frequented in a part of the city almost abandoned. A storm arose very luckily for them; and the rain, which began about midnight, having obliged the centinels to shelter themselves by quitting their posts. The wall was scaled, and the gate forced. On the first sound of the trumpets, which was the signal agreed upon, Fabius made his troops advance, and entered the city a little before day through the gate he had caused to be thrown down. The enemy waked then, the rain having ceased before day-break. The garrison, which Hannibal had placed in Arpi, consisted of five thousand men, to whom the inhabitants had added three thousand of their citizens armed at their own expence. The Carthaginians, who were not assured of their fidelity, and who apprehended that they might attack them in the rear, made them march in the front. The fight began in the midst of darkness, and in narrow streets; the Romans having seized not only the avenues, but even the tops of the houses next the gate, to prevent the damage that might be done them by stones from above. Whilst they were thus at blows, upon some reproaches which the Romans made the people of Arpi for having given themselves up to a foreign and barbarous nation, the latter professed that it had been much against their will, and that they had been sold by their principals, without waiting their consent. Soon after, in consequence of these mutual explanations, the Prætor of the city having been brought to the Consul, who gave him his word that the past should be forgot, the Arpinians on a sudden turned their arms against

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the Carthaginians. At that instant, about a thousand Spaniards came over to the Consul's side, requiring nothing more, than that the Carthaginian garrison should be permitted to retire. The gates were immediately opened to the Carthaginians, no hurt was done them, as had been agreed; and they went to Hannibal at Salapia. In this manner did Arpi return to its obedience to the Romans, without the loss of any of its inhabitants, except him who had twice betrayed them. Double pay was given to the Spaniards, who from thenceforth continued faithful to the Romans, and did them great services on many occasions.

*An hundred and twelve Campanians go over to the Romans.*  
Liv. xxiv. 47.

Whilst the Consuls were, the one in Apulia, and the other in Lucania, an hundred and twelve of the most illustrious citizens of Capua, under pretence of desiring to plunder the enemy's country, demanded permission of the magistrates to quit the city, and as soon as they had obtained it, they repaired to the camp of the Romans near Sueffula. After having made themselves known to the advanced guard, they demanded to be conducted to the Prætor, to whom they had something important to communicate. Cn. Fulvius, who commanded at this post, having been informed of their demand, ordered ten of them to be brought to him without arms. When they had made known their desire to him, which extended no farther than that their estates should be restored to them, when Capua should submit again to the Romans, he received them all under his protection.

*Aternum taken.*

The Prætor Sempronius Tuditanus (it was this Tuditanus, who, the night after the battle of Cannæ, escaped through the enemy, whilst the rest through fear did not dare to quit the camp) this Prætor made himself master of Aternum by storm. He took more than seven thousand prisoners.

soners, and found a great quantity of brass and silver money in it. A. R. 539. Ant.C. 213.

At the same time a fire happened at Rome, and burnt with so much violence during two nights and a day, that it consumed a great number of buildings and temples. Great fire at Rome. Ibid.

The same year, the two Scipio's, encouraged by the considerable advantages they had gained in Spain, where they had added new allies to the old ones they had brought back into the party of the Romans, extended their views as far as Africa itself. Having been informed, that Syphax, \* King of a great part of Numidia, after having been a friend to the Carthaginians, had on a sudden declared against them, they sent an embassy to him, consisting of three officers (*Centurions*;) whom they commissioned to make a treaty of amity and alliance with him, and to assure him that if he continued to make war against the Carthaginians, the Roman People, to whom he would thereby render great service, and themselves, would cultivate all occasions to do what should be agreeable to him, and to testify their entire gratitude. That barbarous Prince received the embassy with great joy, and in a conversation, which he had with the three deputies, who were all old officers, upon the manner of making war, he could not forbear admiring the discipline which the Romans caused to be observed in their armies; and the comparison which he made between their method and his, shewed him how ignorant he was in the art of war. " He demanded of them, as the first " proof of the amity and alliance they came to " offer him, that only two of them should re- " turn to give an account of their commission to " their Generals, and leave the third with him to

\* *Numidia* was a great country of Africa, bounded on the north by mount Atlas, which separated it from Africa proper, and Mauritania: on the South it had Libya interior.



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“ instruct his troops in the art of fighting on  
 “ foot, of which he owned that his Numidians,  
 “ though very dexterous in managing horses, knew  
 “ little or nothing. He added, that from the  
 “ earliest origin of their nation, their ancestors  
 “ had never made war in any other manner, and  
 “ that himself and his subjects had been formed  
 “ from their infancy in this. But, as they  
 “ had an enemy who was very strong in infan-  
 “ try, it was highly for his interest to become  
 “ equal to them in that respect. That he had  
 “ men in abundance : that all that was to be  
 “ done, was only to give them proper arms, to  
 “ teach them to handle them well, and to  
 “ keep their ranks in battle, instead of drawing  
 “ up and fighting in throngs, as had been their  
 “ custom.” The Ambassadors answered, that they  
 would do all he desired : but they made him pro-  
 mise, that he would dismiss the officer they left  
 with him, if their Generals did not approve of  
 his staying in his dominions.

A Roman  
 Officer  
 sent on  
 mission  
 to Syphax.

This officer was called Q. Statorius. The two  
 others returned to give an account of their em-  
 bassy ; and Syphax sent some on his side to re-  
 ceive the engagements of the Roman Generals.  
 He gave them orders at the same time to make  
 the Numidians, that served in the Carthaginian  
 army go over to the Romans. Statorius on his  
 side found amongst the youth of Numidia enough  
 to form Syphax bodies of infantry, whom he  
 taught to perform the exercise, and all the mili-  
 tary evolutions ; to follow their colours, and keep  
 their ranks, with as much ease as the Romans  
 themselves. And lastly he inured them so well  
 to fatigues and all the duties of military disci-  
 pline, as they were practised in the armies of the  
 Commonwealth, that the King soon relied as  
 much upon his infantry as upon his cavalry, and  
 even

even defeated the Carthaginians in a battle he fought with them in the open field. A. R. 539.  
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The Ambassadors of Syphax also occasioned a revolution in Spain highly in favour of the Romans. For most of the Numidians, on the first rumour of their arrival, went over to them.

The Carthaginians were no sooner informed of the treaty, lately concluded between Syphax and the Romans, than they sent Ambassadors to Gala, King of that part of Numidia, of which the people were called *Massyli*, to ask his alliance and amity. Gala had a son called Masinissa, only seventeen years old, but in whom, even so early, virtues began to shine out, which seemed to promise, that he would leave his descendants a kingdom more opulent and of greater extent, than that he should receive from his ancestors. The Carthaginian deputies told Gala, “That Syphax had joined the Romans only with design to strengthen himself, against the other Kings and States of Africa. That it was therefore for Gala’s interest to unite as soon as possible with the Carthaginians: that before Syphax should go to Spain, or the Romans come to Africa, it was easy to prevent and crush the former, who had hitherto only the name of ally from the Romans.” *Treaty of the Carthaginians with Gala, another King of Numidia.*  
Liv. xxiv. 49.

It was not very difficult for them to persuade Gala to raise an army, which Masinissa was appointed to march to their aid; and who having joined the troops of Carthage, defeated Syphax in a great battle, in which thirty thousand men were killed upon the spot. Syphax, with a small number of horse, retired to the country of the Maurusii, that lay at the extremity of Africa, along the ocean, near the straits of Gibraltar; there, a great number of Barbarians, upon the rumour of his presence, having repaired to him from all parts, he presently *Syphax is twice defeated by Masinissa, the son of Gala.*

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presently formed a considerable body of an army. But Masinissa, not to give him time to breathe, or to go to Spain, from which he was separated only by a small arm of the sea, soon came up with him with his victorious army. It was there only with his own forces, and without the aid of the Carthaginians, he continued a war with Syphax. In which he acquired great glory.

*The Celtiberians begin to serve among the men.*

Nothing memorable passed in Spain, except that the Roman Generals engaged the youth of the \* Celtiberians to serve under them, by promising them the same advantages as they had from the Carthaginians; and their sending of above three hundred Spaniards of principal distinction into Italy, to debauch, if they could, those of their nation, who carried arms under Hannibal. Till this year, the Romans, according to Livy, had never employed mercenary soldiers in their armies: the \*\* Celtiberians were the first that served as such.

Liv. xxv. 1. Whilst the things I have just been relating passed in Spain, Hannibal continued in the territory of Tarentum, full of hopes of making himself master of that city, by the treachery of the inhabitants. Some very inconsiderable places surrendered to him.

At the same time, of the twelve states of Bruttium, that had joined Hannibal some years before, and those of Consentia, and Thurium, which was the ancient Sybaris, returned to their alliance with the Romans. Their example would have been followed by a greater number, if the

\* Celtiberia was a part of Hispania Tarraconensis. This people inhabited the country upon the right side of the Iberus. Numantia was one of their principal cities.

\*\* Freinshemius relates after Polybius and Zonaras, that in the first Punic war, some Gauls were received into the pay of the Romans.

defeat



defeat that L. Pomponius Veientanus, \* Præfect A. R. 539. Ant. C. 213. of the allies, drew upon himself by his rashness, *Pomponius* had not prevented it. He had been a Tax-farm- as ignorant er, before he applied himself to the profession of a General arms. Some advantages, which he gained over as known the enemy in the country of the Brutii in respect Taxfarmer to foraging, having flushed him, he looked up- Hanno. on himself as a consummate General. Having ibid. in consequence hastily drawn together some troops, he had the boldness to offer Hanno battle, who killed or took a great number of men, as well peasants as slaves, as ignorant of discipline as their Leader. The least loss sustained on this occasion was that of the commander himself, who being taken prisoner, suffered (a) the punishment his senseless enterprize, and an infinite number of injuries he had done the State, and his Associates by frauds, rapine, and all other unjust methods, deserved.

The length of the war, the troubles of which usually induce a neglect of civil government, had introduced so great a change in the minds of the Romans, and so altered the religion of their ancestors by the mixture of many foreign ceremonies, that says Livy, both the Gods and men seemed to have become quite different from what they were before. A multitude of soothsayers and sacrificers without title or authority, accustomed to enrich themselves, by a gain equally easy and illicit, at the expence of a blind and credulous populace, had filled people's minds with idle superstitions. Persons of merit had long expressed in secret their disgust of this abuse. It was carried to such an excess,

\* This was a military office equal to that of a Tribune in the legions.

(a) Tum temerariæ pugnae

auctor & antè publicanus, omnibus malis artibus & reipublicæ & societatibus infidus, damnosusque. Liv.

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that the Senate at length was obliged to order the Prætor M. Atilius to put a stop to such practices. That Magistrate ordered by a decree, published in the assembly of the People, “ that who-  
“ ever had in their keeping any forms of predic-  
“ tions, prayers, or sacrifices in writing, should  
“ deliver them in to him before the first of April;  
“ and all persons, of whatsoever condition they  
“ might be, were prohibited to sacrifice in any  
“ publick or sacred place, with any new or fo-  
“ reign ceremonies.

P. Scipio  
Ædil. be-  
fore of age  
Liv. xlv. 2.

This year, P. Cornelius Scipio, afterwards sur-  
named *Africanus*, was created Curule Ædile.  
When he presented himself as a candidate for that  
office, the Tribunes of the People opposed his no-  
mination, giving for their reason that he was not  
of sufficient age to exercise it. He boldly repli-  
ed: *if all the Romans are willing to elect me Ædile,*  
*I am old enough.* Immediately all the Tribes gave  
him their suffrages with so much zeal and unani-  
mity, that the Tribunes immediately desisted from  
their opposition. Scipio was then but one and  
twenty. I shall very soon observe what the age  
was, that was necessary for holding the great of-  
fices.

The Curule Ædiles celebrated the Roman  
Games during two days with as much magnificence  
as was possible in those times; and caused a *con-*  
*gius* of oyl to be distributed to each street, that is  
about five pounds fourteen ounces.

The plebeian Ædiles accused several Roman  
Ladies of leading bad lives; some of whom were  
found guilty, and banished.

Polyb. x.  
578.

The election of P. Scipio into the office of  
Ædile is differently related by Polybius, and I think  
it proper to repeat here what he says of it,

Lucius

Lucius Scipio, the elder brother, according to that Author, of him we are speaking of, stood for the Curule Ædileship. At first Publius did not care to ask that office in conjunction with his brother, for fear of hurting him, or of appearing to set up in competition with his elder, which was not decent, and contrary to his intention. But when the time of the assemblies approached, reflecting on one side, that the people were not much inclined in favour of Lucius, and on the other, that he was much beloved by them, he thought, that the only means to get the Ædileship for his brother, was to set up with him. In order to bring his mother into this opinion (for he had only to conciliate her, their father being then in Spain) he thought of the following expedient. She interested herself extremely for her eldest son : she went every day from temple to temple to solicit the Gods in his favour, and offered frequent sacrifices to them. It is remarkable that the Pagans, in all their private or public undertakings, addressed themselves to the Gods to obtain success. Publius went to her, and told her that he had twice dreamt the same dream : that in it both himself and his brother seemed to have been created Ædiles, and that they were both returned home from the forum when they met her at the door to receive them, and that she tenderly embraced them. A mother could not be insensible to those words. *Would to the Gods,* cried she, *that I might see so happy a day ! Are you willing, mother, that we should make the attempt,* said Scipio to her ? She gave her consent, not imagining but that all this was serious. This was enough for Scipio. He ordered such a white robe to be made for him, as was usually worn by the candidates for offices ; and one morning before his mother was up, he put on this robe for the first time,



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time, and in that habit appeared in the Forum. The People who before highly regarded him, and wished him well, were agreeably surprized at so extraordinary a proceeding. He went forwards to the place assigned for the candidates, and stood by his brother. All the suffrages were united not only in favour of him, but of his brother by his recommendation. They returned home ; and their mother had been informed of what had just happened. Transported with joy, she came to the door to receive her two sons, and flew into their arms to embrace them. The pretended dream of Scipio, which his mother took great care to publish, did not a little contribute, according to Polybius, in effect of the good and sudden success, with which it was followed, to cause him to be considered afterwards as a man favoured and even inspired by the Gods ; and we shall see that on his side, he took pains to confirm the Romans in that opinion.

Liv. xxvi.  
13.

Polyb.  
vi. 465.

However P. Scipio might be created Ædile, it is certain, that he was then but 21 or 22 years old, as three years after, when he was sent to command in Spain, he was but 24. The Laws that directed the years, at which persons might hold the great offices, were not yet in use : but, afterwards, it was not allowed to exercise them before having served ten campaigns, and consequently before twenty-seven years of age ; for the Romans began to serve at seventeen. In the 573d year of Rome, in the Consulship of Q. Fulvius Flaccus and L. Manlius Acidinus, L. Villius, a Tribune of the People, passed a law, that fixed the age at which the Curule offices might be demanded and obtained : for only those were in question. According to Manucius, the age for the Curule Ædileship was seven and thirty ; for the Prætorship, forty ; and for the Consulship, three and forty.

Q. FULVIUS

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS. III.

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AP. CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

Q. Fulvius had been twice Consul and Cenfor in the interval between the first and second Punic wars, and had been twice Prætor since Hannibal had entered Italy. Claudius was the same, who had commanded in Sicily before, and under Marcellus. The Commonwealth had twenty-three legions on foot this year, that is, two hundred and twenty-seven thousand men.

A great confusion was raised at Rome on the occasion of M. Postumius Pyrgensis a Publican, or Tax-farmer; who had not his fellow for avarice and fraud, except the Pomponius mentioned above. We have spoke before on the contract made by the Commonwealth with persons of business for supplying the armies in Spain with all necessary provisions; and we have seen, that one condition of that contract was, that the Commonwealth should stand to all the losses, that might happen by violent storms. This convention had made way for two kinds of knavery. They had given in false shipwrecks; and the true ones they had declared, had been purposely occasioned by themselves. For, having laden old ruinous vessels with merchandize of little value and small quantity, they had sunk them, after having saved the seamen in skiffs prepared for that purpose. They afterwards had given in false accounts of a great number of considerable effects lost.

The Prætor M. Atilius, being informed of this fraud, had declared it to the Senate the preceding year. But, as in the present conjuncture it was necessary to hold fair with the contractors, it was not judged proper to pass a decree against them. The People acted with more severity in respect

*Fraud of the Publicans, or Tax farmers, and amongst others of Postumius, severely punished. Liv. xxv. 3, 4.*

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Ducen-  
tūm milli-  
um æris  
multam  
dixerunt.

respect to them. Spurius and Lucius Carvilius, two brothers, and Tribunes of the People, enraged at so hateful and infamous a malversation, accused Postumius, and carried their point so as to have him fined two hundred thousand *asses*, that is, about five hundred pounds sterling. The day on which he was to appear to make his defence being come, he came before the People assembled in so great a number, that the place of the Capitol was scarce big enough to contain them. His cause was pleaded. The People were so averse to him, that his only remaining hope was, that C. Servilius Casca, one of the Tribunes of the People, and his near relation, would oppose the conclusions of his colleagues, before the Tribes proceeded to vote. The witnesses having been heard, the Tribunes made the multitude disperse; and were going on to draw lots, to know which of the Tribes should vote first. In the mean time the accused pressed Casca to dismiss the assembly, by declaring in their favour, and opposing the proceedings of his colleagues. Casca was in great perplexity, divided between the fear of seeing his relation sentenced, and the shame of defending so bad a cause. The contractors seeing that they had little to hope from his protection, in order to excite some commotion, that might prevent the decision of this affair, advanced with their followers into the space, which had been left open by the withdrawing of the multitude, disputing highly against the Tribunes and the People themselves. They were upon the point of coming to blows, when the Consul addressing himself to the Tribunes: *Don't you see*, said he, *that they despise your authority; that they treat you with violence; and that, if you don't immediately dismiss the assembly, a sedition will break out.*



As soon as the People were retired by the order of the Tribunes, the Senate was assembled, to whom the Consuls represented the tumult, which the insolence of the Publicans had excited amongst the People, in order to prevent them from voting. They observed, “ that Camillus, whose banishment had occasioned the ruin of the city, had suffered his country to pass an unjust sentence against him. That before him the Decemviri, by whose laws Rome was still actually governed, and afterwards many other Romans, principal persons of the Commonwealth, had in like manner suffered with submission the judgments passed on them by the People. That none but Postumius had presumed to use violence in order to deprive his citizens of the liberty of their suffrages. That he had dissolved the assembly, trampled upon the authority of the Tribunes, and attacked the People at the head of a seditious rout in a manner drawn up in battle. That if they had not proceeded to blows, if blood had not been shed, it was only owing to the moderation and patience of the magistrates, who had given way for the present to the presumption of a few frantic wretches, that were upon the point of putting every thing in a flame.”

The persons of the greatest consideration having expressed themselves much in the same terms, and the Senate having declared by a decree, that the conduct of the Publicans, on this occasion, was a rebellious attempt against the publick order, and of pernicious example, the Tribunes immediately dropped the pecuniary punishment, with which they would at first have been satisfied, and having formed new articles against the accused, that amounted to banishment, they in the mean time ordered the Lictor to seize the person of Postumi-

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us, and carry him to prison, if he did not give security for his appearance at the time and place assigned him. Postumius gave security, but did not appear on the day fixed: which made the People, on the motion of the Tribunes, decree, that if Postumius did not appear before the first of May, and having been cited, should neither appear himself, nor any body for him, he should be deemed from thenceforth as banished, his estate should be sold for the use of the Commonwealth, *and fire and water be prohibited him.* There was no law at Rome for condemning a citizen to banishment in express terms: but *to prohibit him fire and water*, without which life cannot be preserved, was actually to condemn him to banishment, by obliging him to seek that elsewhere, which he could not have in his country.

An exemplary punishment of this kind, repeated from time to time, would put a stop to many frauds and knaveries, which impunity continues and encourages in contempt of laws and publick good.

After Postumius was sentenced, all who had any share in the tumult and sedition, were cited to appear and to give security for doing so; in consequence of which those who wanted bail were carried to prison. Most of them, to avoid this danger, went voluntarily into banishment. And this was the issue of the frauds of the contractors, and of the insolence of those who undertook to defend it.

*Creation of  
a Pontifex  
Maximus.*

Assemblies were afterwards held for the election of a Pontifex Maximus in the room of P. Cornelius Lentulus, who had died a little before. Three competitors stood for this office, and solicited it with great ardor, and vivacity: Q. Fulvius Flaccus, then Consul for the third time, and formerly Censor; T. Manlius Torquatus, who had also been  
twice

twice Consul and Cenfor; and P. Licinius Cras-<sup>A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.</sup>sus, who was upon the point of standing for the Curule Ædileship. The last, young as he was, carried it against his competitors, notwithstanding their advanced age, and the great offices they had borne. The reasons of this preference are not unworthy our curiosity. Perhaps there was no other but the caprice of the People. The person elected however merited the honour of such a choice, as we shall see in the sequel of this history. Crassus was the only one in an hundred and twenty years, who had been created Pontifex Maximus before he had exercised any Curule offices.

The Consuls found great difficulties in com-<sup>Levies  
made in a  
new man-  
ner.</sup>pleating the levies. There was not sufficient number of youth to recruit the old legions, and form the new ones, that were to be set on foot. The Senate, without dispensing with their duty in that respect, created a double Triumvirate, and those commissioners had orders to go to all the towns and cities of Italy, one half of them within fifty miles round Rome, and the other beyond that distance, to enquire what number of youth each district could supply. They had orders to list all that seemed strong enough to bear arms, though not of the age assigned by the laws. The Tribunes were desired, if they thought proper, to propose a law to the People, in virtue of which those, who should list before the age of seventeen, should be allowed their campaigns, in the same manner as if they had entered the service at seventeen or upwards. The Triumviri made the levies according to their commission.

The Romans had long apprehended the revolt of the Tarentines as much as Hannibal had room to hope it, when an event, that passed at Rome itself, hastened the execution of it. Phileas, a ci-<sup>The hosta-  
ges of Ta-  
rentum,  
who had  
made their  
escape from  
Rome, are  
brought  
back and  
punished.</sup>tizen of Tarentum, had long been at Rome under  
S 2 the



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the character of an envoy. He was of a restless disposition, and suffered the repose with impatience in which he had long languished. He found means to get access to the hostages, whom the Tarentines had given to the Commonwealth, and who were kept in the temple of Liberty. No great care was taken to guard them; because it was neither for the interest of themselves or their country, to deceive the Romans. In frequent conversations that he had with them, he persuaded them to make their escape; and having corrupted two of those who kept the keys of the temple, at the close of day he took them out of their place of confinement, and fled with them. As soon as day appeared, the noise of their escape spread in the city. Persons were immediately dispatched after them, who came up with them at Tarracina, fifteen or sixteen leagues from Rome, and brought them back. They were treated with the utmost rigor; and after having been scourged with rods in the Forum, were thrown down from the top of the Tarpeian rock. The Roman people, in so sudden and cruel a punishment, (a) consulted only their rage, and the desire of revenge, which are bad counsellors, and never hear reason. Reason acts slowly: it weighs and examines every thing: it leaves room for reflection and repentance: it never punishes without regret; and, when compelled to it, proportions the punishment to the crime. Anger is precipitate, violent, and unjust: it hearkens to nothing, and follows only the first impulse which passion inspires. The revolt of two power-

(a) Cupidine atque ira, perfimis consultoribus, grassari. *Sallust. in bell. Jugurth.*

Ira sibi indulget, ex libidine judicat, & audire non vult. Ratio utrique parti locum dat

& tempus—ut excutiendæ spatium veritati habeat. Ratio id judicari vult, quod æquum est: ira id æquum videri vult, quod judicavit. *Senec. de ira, l. i. 16.*

ful cities of Italy made the Romans sensible, how wrong they were in proceeding to such a severity.

So cruel a punishment exceedingly enraged the Tarentines. Many of the principal persons of the city formed a conspiracy for delivering it up to Hannibal. They were a great while concerting the measures necessary to the success of their design. The Carthaginians at length were received into the city in the night, whilst the Commander of the Roman garrison, called Livius, was full of wine and fast asleep. Most of the Romans escaped into the citadel. It was almost entirely surrounded with the sea like a peninsula; and the rest was covered with very high rocks, and inclosed with a wall and broad fossé on the side next the city. Hannibal rightly judged, that it would be impossible for him to make himself master of it by force, and by besieging it in form. In consequence, not to fall into the inconvenience, either of abandoning greater enterprizes by continuing there to defend the Tarentines, or of leaving them exposed to the hostilities of the Romans, he resolved to separate the city from the citadel by an intrenchment, which they should not be able to force. Great progress was made in the work in a very short time, especially after the Romans had made a salley upon the workmen, and been repulsed with considerable loss. The Carthaginians afterwards continued their works without opposition. They dug a broad and deep fossé, upon the side of which they raised a strong palisade. The citadel had been for some time attacked with machines and works of all kinds, when succours, that came by sea from Metapontum, gave them the boldness suddenly to attack the enemy's works in the night. Part of them they burnt, and destroyed the rest.

A. R. 540.  
Ant.C. 212.

Hannibal having assembled the principal Tarentines, explained to them the difficulty of the enterprize. The citadel commanding the mouth of the port, left the sea open to those shut up in it; whereas the city could not receive provisions by sea, and the besiegers had more to fear from famine than the besieged themselves. He therefore made the Tarentines sensible, “ That it was  
“ not possible to take a citadel so well fortified  
“ by assault: that it was no less difficult to take  
“ it by a regular siege, as long as the enemy  
“ were masters at sea. That if he had ships,  
“ with which he could prevent convoys from  
“ coming to them, he could soon reduce  
“ them either to abandon the place, or to surrender.” The Tarentines agreed in all he said; but they did not see how they could make their galleys put to sea, whilst the enemy were masters of the entrance of the port, in which they kept them in a manner blocked up.

Hannibal had a great principle; which was, that (*a*) frequently, what was impossible to common men, was only difficult to those who knew how to employ perseverance and industry. He made use of his principle upon this occasion. By his order a great number of carts were got together, which were made fast to each other: machines were prepared for drawing ships out of the sea: the ways were made broader and more level, that the carriages might pass through them with the greater ease and speed: and a sufficient number of men and draught-beasts for such an undertaking, were provided. The high-street crossed the whole city, and ran from the port to the main

(*a*) Multa quæ impedita naturâ sunt, consilio expediuntur.  
*Liv*



sea at the other extremity. He caused the galleys to be drawn through it upon carriages. The work was begun and carried on with so much zeal and ardor, that at the end of some few days a well equipped fleet was seen turning the point of the citadel, and anchoring at the very mouth of the port. Hannibal, after having put the affairs of the Tarentines into this condition, returned into his winter-quarters.

A. R. 549.  
Ant. C. 212.

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# BOOK THE SEVENTEENTH,

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## THE ROMAN HISTORY.

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### S E C T. I.

*Feria Latina.* Time when the Consuls entered upon office. Origin of the games called *Ludi Apollinares*. The Consuls force Hanno's camp near Capua, whither he was carrying provisions. The people of Metapontum and Thurium surrender to Hannibal. The Consuls prepare to besiege Capua. Fulvius, Prætor of the Lucanians, betrays Gracchus his friend and guest. The Consuls receive a blow before Capua. Single combat between Crispinus a Roman and Badius a Campanian. Battle between the Consuls and Hannibal with equal advantage. M. Centenius Penula defeated by Hannibal. Capua besieged in form. The siege is vigorously carried on by the two Pro-consuls. Hannibal comes to the relief of Capua, and retires after a rude battle. He marches against Rome, to make a diversion. The Pro-consul Fulvius receives orders to follow him with his troops for the defence of Rome. Great alarm amongst the People. Hannibal incamps near the Anio. Both sides prepare  
for

for a battle. A great storm prevents it two several times from being fought. Hannibal mortified by those two singular events, retires to the extremity of Brutium. Fulvius returns to Capua. Capua reduced to extremities. The garrison write to Hannibal, and reproach him warmly. Deliberation of the Senate of Capua. Eloquent discourse of Vibius Virius. Many Senators kill themselves. Capua surrenders at last. Terrible punishment of the Senators and inhabitants. Death of Taurea Jubeilius. Wisdom of the Roman People's conduct, in determining not to demolish Capua.

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS.

APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

THE festival called *Feriæ Latinæ* kept the Consuls and Prætors at Rome till the twenty-sixth of April. Having that day finished the usual sacrifices upon the Alban mountain, each set out for his respective province.

I think I have already observed somewhere, that the solemnity of the *Feriæ Latinæ* was instituted by Tarquinius Superbus. He established it to strengthen the union between the Latines and Romans. Forty-seven States shared in this festival. Their deputies assembled annually upon a day fixed by the Consuls upon the Alban mountain in a temple consecrated to Jupiter Latiaris, and offered a common sacrifice; this was a bull, of which a piece was afterwards given to each of the deputies. Every thing was equal amongst them, except that the President was a Roman. The festival at first continued but one day. A second was added after the expulsion of the Kings: a third, when the People who had retired to the sacred mountain, returned to the city: and lastly a fourth, when the disputes that arose in the time of



A. R. 540. Camillus between the Senate and People concern-  
 Ant. C. 212. ing the Consulship, were appeased. The Consul  
 Plut. in did not set out for the field, or his province, till  
 Camil. he had celebrated this festival.  
 p. 151.

*Time when the Consuls entered upon office.* The time, when the Consuls entered upon office varied much. Not to speak of more ancient times, when the variations were frequent enough, we find in the 364th year of Rome, that the military Tribunes, who supplied the place and had the authority of Consuls, enter upon office upon the Calends, that is to say, upon the first, of July. This custom seems to have subsisted down to the Consuls M. Claudius Marcellus, and Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who, according to the proofs alledged by Sigonius and Pighius, could not have entered upon office before the ides, or the 15th of March in the 530th year of Rome, a little before the second Punic war. And this day is mentioned in Livy, as that for entering upon the Consulship. Lib. xxii. n. 1. At length it was fixed for the Calends, that is to say, the first of January, under the Consuls Fulvius Nobilior, and T. Annius Luscus, in the 599th year of Rome.

*Origin of the Ludi Apollinares.* Upon the pretended predictions of a famous soothsayer, called Marcius, the games called *Ludi Apollinares*, were instituted, and celebrated in the great Circus. The citizens wore crowns on their heads at these games: the Roman Ladies went to pray in all the temples: the citizens ate in public, each before his own door; and this day was solemnized with all the usual ceremonies of religion and great rejoicings.

*The Consuls force Hanno's camp near Capua, whither he was carrying provisions.* Whilst Hannibal was in the neighbourhood of Tarentum, the two Consuls were in Samnium, employed in making preparations for the siege of Capua. And though they had not yet invested that city, as they had prevented the inhabitants from sowing their lands, it already felt the effects of famine, which is commonly only the consequence  
 Liv. xxv. 13, 14.

sequence of a long siege. They therefore sent deputies to Hannibal, to desire him to cause corn to be carried from the adjacent places into Capua, before the Consuls took the field with the legions, and had made themselves masters of all the avenues. Hanno, whom Hannibal had ordered to do this, having hastily collected a great quantity of corn, gave the Campanians notice of the day when they should come and carry away those provisions; ordering them to assemble from all parts of the country as many carriages and beasts of burthen as they possibly could. But the Campanians shewed on this occasion their usual sloth and negligence. They sent only about four hundred carts, with a small number of carriage beasts. Hanno reproved them in the strongest terms, and told them, that hunger, which rouses the very brutes, was not capable of making them quit their natural stupefaction and indolence. He fixed another day for them to fetch away the rest of the provisions.

The Consuls, who were at Bovianum, having been informed of this, Fulvius made his troops set out in the night. The Romans arrived a little before day at the enemies camp, in which they were informed trouble and confusion prevailed. They put it into such a terror and consternation, that if it had been situated in the flat country, it would inevitably have been taken on the first attack. The height of the ground, to which the ascent was steep on all sides, strengthened by the entrenchments which had been made, defended it. When it was day, a battle sufficiently obstinate ensued. The determinate valour of the Romans surmounted all obstacles. They got into the fossé and intrenchments in several places, which could not be effected without many soldiers being killed and wounded. The Consul, discouraged by that loss, conceived thoughts

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

of quitting the enterprize. The officers and soldiers would not consent to it, and he was obliged to give into their cries and ardour. The Romans immediately renewed the attack with fresh courage, and threw themselves in emulation of each other into the enemies camp amidst a shower of darts discharged upon them from all sides. It was taken in a moment, as if it had been in a plain and without entrenchments. From that instant it was rather a slaughter than a battle. The Romans killed six thousand Carthaginians, took above seven thousand with the Campanian foragers, and all the carriages and beasts of burthen that they had brought with them. Besides which they took all the plunder Hanno had taken in the countries of the allies of the Roman People.

The two Consuls repaired to Beneventum, and sold or divided the booty. Those who had signalized themselves at the taking of the camp, were rewarded. Hanno, from Cominium, where he was employed in collecting corn, and where he received advice of the defeat of his troops, fled into the country of the Brutii with a small number of foragers, whom he accidentally had along with him.

*Capua de-*  
*mands aid*  
*of Han-*  
*nibal.*  
*ibid. 15.*

The Campanians, on their side, having been informed of the defeat of their countrymen and allies, sent deputies to acquaint Hannibal, “ that  
“ the two Consuls were near Beneventum, but  
“ one day’s march from Capua: that in conse-  
“ quence, the Campanians were upon the point  
“ of seeing the enemy at their gates and before  
“ their walls. That if he did not speedily come  
“ to their aid, the Romans would make them-  
“ selves masters of Capua sooner and with more  
“ ease than they had taken Arpi. That he  
“ ought not to be entirely so engrossed, by the view  
“ of taking the citadel of Tarentum, as to neg-  
“ lect



“ lest Capua, which he used to equal with Car-  
 “ thage, and abandon it without defence to the  
 “ revenge of the Romans.” Hannibal promised  
 them that he would take care, that Capua should  
 be safe. In the mean time, he sent with the de-  
 puties two thousand men, to prevent the ravages  
 that the armies of the enemy committed upon the  
 lands of the Campanians.

The Romans however, without neglecting their  
 other affairs, took care to defend the citadel of  
 Tarentum. They made some vessels laden with  
 provisions enter the port, through the enemy.  
 This supply came very opportunely, and revived  
 the courage of the besieged. The garrison had  
 been fortified some time, by the soldiers, that  
 had been sent from Metapontum, and had entered  
 the Citadel. Hannibal made a fleet sail from Si-  
 cily, to cut off their provisions. It did indeed  
 shut up all the passages on the side next the sea :  
 but by staying too long in the same place, it re-  
 duced its friends, still more than its enemies, to  
 famine. At length the next year, the Carthagi-  
 nian vessels sailed away, and their retreat gave the  
 Tarentines more pleasure, than their arrival had  
 done. But the benefit they received from it was  
 little considerable, because, as soon as the aid by  
 sea was gone, provisions ceased to be brought into  
 the city.

The People of Metapontum being no longer  
 awed by the Roman garrison, which had been re-  
 moved, as we have just said, into the citadel of  
 Tarentum, immediately surrendered their city to  
 Hannibal. Those of Thurium did the same; and  
 what induced both to act in this manner, was the  
 resentment they had conceived against the Ro-  
 mans for their cruel punishment of the hostages of  
 Tarentum.

The

A. R. 540.  
 Ant. C. 212.

*The Cita-  
 del of Ta-  
 rentum  
 supplied  
 with pro-  
 visions.*

*Liv. xxvi.  
 20.*

*Metapon-  
 tum and  
 Thurium  
 go over to  
 Hannibal.*

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

*The Con-  
suls march  
into Cam-  
pania.*

The Consuls marched their troops from Beneventum into the country of Campania, not only to destroy the corn, which was now well grown, but with design to besiege Capua. They were desirous to render their Consulship famous by taking so opulent a city, and to obliterate the shame and reproach which the Romans seemed to deserve for leaving the treachery and revolt of a People so near Rome so long unpunished. But not being willing to leave Beneventum, without defence, and being also desirous to strengthen themselves against Hannibal's cavalry, in case he came to the relief of Capua, they ordered Ti. Gracchus to march with his horse and light-armed troops from Lucania to Beneventum, and to leave one of his Lieutenants at the head of his legions, to keep Lucania in awe.

*Flavius  
Prætor of  
the Luca-  
nians  
betrays  
Gracchus  
his friend  
and guest.  
Liv. xxv.*

Gracchus was preparing to execute the order of the Consuls when he was deprived both of the means and his life by treachery. The traitor's name was Flavius. He was the head of that part of the inhabitants of the country, that adhered to the Romans, whilst the rest had joined with Hannibal; and was then Prætor. This man having suddenly conceived the design of changing sides, believed, that in order to gain Hannibal's favour, it was not enough to offer him only his own person and party, if he did not seal the treaty, he desired to make, with the blood of his General and guest. He agreed upon the whole with Mago, and promised to bring Gracchus into a convenient place. After this conversation, the traitor went to Gracchus, and told him: "That  
" he had projected an enterprize of the last im-  
" portance, but that in order to its success, it  
" was necessary that Gracchus himself should  
" come into it. That he had persuaded the Præ-  
" tors of all the Lucanian States, who, in this  
" general

“ general emotion of almost all Italy, had decla-  
 “ red for Hannibal, to return into the alli-  
 “ ance and amity of the Romans. That  
 “ he had given them to understand, that the  
 “ fortune of the Commonwealth, which had been  
 “ almost entirely ruined at the battle of Cannæ,  
 “ daily resumed its superiority; whereas that of  
 “ Hannibal insensibly declined, and his troops  
 “ were almost reduced to nothing. That they  
 “ might rely upon the clemency of the Romans,  
 “ when they returned to them by a sincere  
 “ repentance: that no nation was so easily in-  
 “ duced, or so much inclined, to pardon inju-  
 “ ries. That these were the reasons he had used  
 “ for persuading them. That they had come in-  
 “ to them: but that, for their better assurance,  
 “ they would be very glad to hear them from  
 “ Gracchus’s own mouth, and to have his pro-  
 “ mise, in order to make report of it to their  
 “ countrymen. He added, that he had appoint-  
 “ ed them a meeting in a by-place not far from  
 “ the Roman camp. That if he would give  
 “ himself the trouble to repair thither, the affair  
 “ would soon be concluded, and by an happy  
 “ treaty all Lucania would return to their obedi-  
 “ ence to the Romans.”

Gracchus found so much probability in the  
 scheme proposed to him, that without suspecting  
 either the conduct of Flavius of infidelity, or his  
 discourse of artifice, he set out from his camp with  
 his Lictors, and a small number of horse, and threw  
 himself into the ambuscade prepared for him by  
 a perfidious friend. He was no sooner arrived there,  
 than the enemy came out of their lurking places,  
 and poured a shower of darts upon him and his  
 attendants. Upon which that General leaped from  
 his horse, and exhorted his people, as they had  
 done so much, that they should at least make a  
 glorious

A. R. 540.  
 Ant. C. 212.



A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

glorious end. He told them, “ That the only  
“ two things they had to chuse were, whe-  
“ ther they had rather suffer to be butchered  
“ like sheep without revenging themselves, or,  
“ by arming themselves with noble rage, and  
“ despising death now inevitable, to expire, co-  
“ vered with the blood of the enemy, upon the  
“ heaps of their arms and bodies sacrificed to  
“ their just vengeance. And that they should en-  
“ deavour above all things to kill the traitor Fla-  
“ vius.” Whilst he spoke to this effect, he co-  
vered his left arm with the end of his robe,  
(for they had not brought so much as shields  
along with them ) and fell impetuously upon  
the enemy. Numbers prevailed over valour,  
and all fell with Gracchus. Mago immediately  
sent his body to Hannibal, and caused it to be set  
up before the tent of that General with the rods  
and axes that care had been taken to bring off.

*The Con-  
suls receive  
a blow  
before Ca-  
puæ.  
Liv. xxv.  
13.*

The Consuls having entered the territory of  
Campania, began to plunder the flat country, and  
to lay waste the lands in the neighbourhood of  
Capuæ. The Campanians having made a salley  
upon them, seconded by Mago and the Carthagi-  
nian cavalry, put them into such a consternation,  
that they called in their troops, and retired in dis-  
order with the loss of fifteen hundred men. This  
advantage filled the Campanians with such an  
haughty confidence, who were naturally proud  
and arrogant, that they continually harrassed the  
Romans: but the bad success of the battle in  
which they had rashly engaged, made the Con-  
suls more vigilant and more upon their guard.

*Single  
combat of  
Crispinus  
a Roman,  
and Ba-  
dius of  
Capuæ.  
Ibid.*

An event, inconsiderable in itself, did not a  
little contribute to abate the boldness of the Cam-  
panians, and to exalt the courage of the Ro-  
mans; so true it is, that in war the least things  
have often great consequences. T. Quintius Cris-  
pinus

pinus a Roman was in union with Badius of Capua; both by the rights of hospitality, and a very strict friendship consequential of them. What had farther contributed to this amity was, that Badius had fallen sick at Quintius's house at Rome before his revolt at Capua, and had received from him all the kind offices, that could be expected from a good and generous friend. This Badius seeing the Roman troops incamped before the walls of Capua, advanced to the first guard, and with a loud voice demanded that Crispinus should be sent to him. The latter being told of it, believed, that Badius wanted to speak with him as an old friend; and went to him in a very pacifick disposition; remembering, notwithstanding the rupture between the two States, the personal and private tie between them. When Badius saw, that he was within hearing: *I challenge you to fight*; said he to Crispinus; *Let us mount our horses, and shew whether you or I have most courage*. Crispinus, who expected nothing so little; replied; *That they both had enemies enough, against whom they might make trial of their valour and strength*. And as for me, added he; *if I should meet you by chance in battle, I should turn aside, that I might not imbrue my hands in the blood of my friend and guest*; and then was going back again to the camp. Badius, upon that, more proud than before, began to treat the moderation and politeness of Crispinus as meanness of spirit and cowardice; adding abundance of reproaches which he deserved himself. *You pretend*, said he, *to be desirous of sparing my life, because you well know, that you cannot defend your own against me*. But, if you believe that the war, which has dissolved the alliance between the two States, has not sufficiently abolished our private engagements; know, that Badius of Capua solemnly renounces all amity with Titus Crispinus the Roman: and I call to

A. R. 540.  
 Act. C. 212.

*witness this declaration the soldiers of both armies, who bear me. I will no longer hold any thing in common with a man, who is come to attack my country, and household gods. If you have any courage, come and fight me.*

Crispinus, little moved by these vain and frivolous unexpected insults, was long unwilling to accept the challenge; and it was only in effect of the warm and repeated instances of his comrades, who remonstrated to him, how shameful it was to suffer the Campanian to insult him with impunity, that he did at last accept it. But first, knowing that all single combats were prohibited by the laws of war, he went to ask his Generals, whether they would permit him to fight an enemy that challenged him out of the line of battle: which they made no difficulty to grant.

Being then at liberty to act, he took his arms, mounted his horse, and calling Badius out by his name, he declared that he was ready to fight him. Badius came out immediately. They had no sooner clapt spurs to their horses, than Crispinus ran Badius above his shield through the left shoulder with his lance. That wound having made the Campanian fall from his horse, the Roman leaped off his, in order to dispatch him on foot. But Badius quitting both his horse and shield, fled and rejoined his own troops. Crispinus returned to the Romans with the horse and arms of his enemy; and having shewn them those honourable spoils and his bloody lance, he was conducted in the midst of cries of joy and the applauses of all the troops to the tent of the Generals, who bestowed upon his valour the praises and rewards due to it.

Is there a single reader, in whom the relation I have just been giving, has not inspired a particular esteem and a kind of affection for the prudence  
 and



and moderation of Crispinus, who respects, in an antient friend and guest, the name and obligations himself has renounced; who patiently suffers himself to be reproached at the head of both armies with meanness of spirit and cowardice, with which military men usually are infinitely affected; and who even in such a case does not believe it allowable for him to make use of his arms without the permission of his Generals? On the other side, can we forbear detesting the savage brutality of Badius, who through a frantick desire of glory, forgets the strictest ties of nature; ties, which form the greatest happiness of life? But what then should we think of our modern duellists, who trampling under foot the laws of their country, and even the law of God, think themselves obliged, through a false point of honour, unknown to all the Pagan world, to imbrue their hands in the blood of their best friend, for an unguarded word, that has perhaps escaped him at table, or in the company of familiar friends, with whom we talk without circumspection and reserve? To expose one's life for the defence of one's country and Prince, is an action of the highest generosity. But to brave death through a ridiculous vanity, and to fall in effect into the hands of an offended and omnipotent God, is a folly, or rather so prodigious a phrenzy, that there is not a greater proof of the blindness of men, than their having been capable of annexing the idea of reputation to so absurd and senseless an action.

Hannibal in the mean time came to the aid of Capua, and having advanced very near that city, the third day after he drew out his troops in battle, well assured, that the Romans, overcome some days before by the Campanians, would find it much more difficult to sustain him and his victorious army. In the beginning of the battle, the

*Battle between the Consuls and Hannibal with equal advantage*  
Liv. xxv. 19.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

Roman army, overwhelmed with the darts discharged upon them by the enemy's cavalry, began to give way, when the Consuls, having ordered theirs to charge the enemy, reduced the whole action to a battle of the horse. Things were in this state, when the army of Sempronius, under the command of the Quæstor Cn. Cornelius, having been perceived far off, made both sides believe, that they were going to have some new enemy upon their hands. In consequence, the two armies, as if by consent, retreated, and returned into their respective camps, without any advantage of either side.

The following night, the Consuls, to oblige Hannibal to remove from Capua, marched each a different way, Fulvius towards Cumæ, and Appius into Lucania. The next day, Hannibal being informed, that the Consuls had abandoned their camp, and were retired different ways, after having been uncertain how to act for some time, he determined at length to follow Appius. That General made him march and countermarch a great many different ways, and then stealing a march upon him, returned to Capua by a different rout.

M. Cente-  
nius Penula  
defeat-  
ed by Han-  
nibal.  
Ibid.

Hannibal made himself amends by the occasion he had in this place of gaining an advantage over a considerable body of Roman troops. M. Centenius, surnamed Penula, an old and highly esteemed Centurion, who had quitted the service, desired an audience of the Senate, and asked the command of five thousand men. He promised, that as he perfectly knew both the enemy and the country, where the war was carrying on, he should not be long without rendering the Commonwealth some important service. He added, that he should use against Hannibal the same arts and stratagems he had hitherto employed to ensnare  
the

the Roman General and armies. This (a) promise was believed as slightly, as it had been rashly made: as if there was no difference between the merit of a private Officer, and the talents of a General. Instead of giving him five thousand men, they granted him eight thousand; and many having voluntarily joined him on his march, he arrived in Lucania, with double the forces he had on setting out from Rome. Here he found Hannibal, who had halted after having ineffectually pursued Appius. As soon as the two armies came in view, they expressed the same ardor for coming to blows. The match was not equal. On the one side, Hannibal commanded; on the other, a Centurion: on the one side veteran troops, who counted their campaigns by their victories; on the other raw soldiers, raised in haste and badly armed. However, notwithstanding so great an inequality, the battle continued above two hours, the Romans making extraordinary efforts of valour, as long as Centenius was at their head. But, as he exposed himself without reserve to the darts of the enemy, not only to sustain the reputation he had acquired by his past actions, but to avoid the disgrace he should incur for the future, if he survived a defeat which could only be imputed to his own rashness; he soon found the death he desired, and the Romans immediately gave way. Hannibal knew so well how to shut them up on all sides with his cavalry, that of so great a multitude scarce a thousand escaped, all the rest perished either in the battle or flight.

(a) Id non promissum magis stolidè, quam stolidè creditum; tamquam eadem militaris, & imperatoriæ artes essent. *Liv.*



A. R. 541.  
 AN. C. 211.

CN. FULVIUS CENTUMALUS.

P. SULPICIUS GALBA.

*Capua be-  
 sieged in  
 fern.*

It was properly speaking this year, that the siege of Capua was carried on by the Romans with an ardor, or rather with a fury, that has few examples. The better to conceive the motives, that animated the Romans in this enterprize, we must remember the manner, in which the Campanians, who had been antient allies of Rome, had acted in respect to them. The first defeats of the Romans by Hannibal had already much shaken their fidelity; when the blow received at Cannæ entirely put an end to it. They believed the power of the Romans entirely and irretrievably ruined by the loss of that battle. Flattered with a foolish hope of succeeding them in the empire of Italy, they went over to Hannibal; and not contented with abandoning their antient allies in their misfortunes, they added cruelty to perfidy, and inhumanly put all the Romans in their city to death. Their example was in a manner the signal of revolt for most of the other States of Italy, who in like manner quitted the Romans, and joined the victor.

It is easy to judge the resentment, which the Romans conceived for a treachery so black in all its circumstances, and of which the consequences had been so fatal to them. Accordingly, as soon as they saw themselves a little reinstated in their affairs, they determined to besiege Capua, and not to quit it, till they had made themselves masters, and taken ample vengeance of it.

*The siege  
 is vigo-  
 rously car-  
 ried on by  
 the two  
 Pro-con-  
 suls.*

Liv. xxiv.

4.

Q. Fulvius Flaccus, and Ap. Claudius Pulcher had began the siege during their Consulship, and the command had been continued to them under the title of Pro-consuls, in order to terminate this important

important war. Besides the public interest, their glory was concerned in it, and they used all possible efforts to bring it to a speedy and happy end. The besieged on their side, who had continually before their eyes their inhuman treatment of the Romans, and what they ought to expect in their turn, defended themselves with courage, supported by a strong Carthaginian garrison, which Hannibal had left in their city under the command of Bostar and Hanno. They made frequent and vigorous sallies, in which, though much inferior in the actions of the foot, they had almost always the advantage with their cavalry, which was the weak side of the Romans. The latter, suffering with pain an inequality they could not disguise, conceived a means for partly remedying it. They chose out of the legions active and light-bodied men, whom they accustomed to mount behind the horse, and to dismount on the first signal. They gave them shorter shields than the horse, and to each seven javelins four feet long, with such fine and thin points, that they bent and lost their edges very easily; so that after being once discharged, they neither could be of use to the enemy, nor be returned against those who had used them first. When they came to blows with the enemy's cavalry, these light-armed troops leaping suddenly from their horses, discharged all their javelins one after another upon the cavalry of Capua; so that a body which seemed to be all horse, gave birth, to use the expression, on a sudden to an infantry, the Campanians did not expect. This unforeseen attack put the enemy into confusion; and the Roman cavalry completed their disorder, and pursued them quite to the gates of the city.

A. R. 541.  
 Ant. C. 211.  
*Hannibal comes to the aid of Capua; and retires after a rude battle.*  
 Liv. xxvi. 5, 6.

Capua began to be reduced to extremities, and famine to be felt very sensibly in it. The common people and the slaves were absolutely in want of bread. Hannibal was actually employed in finding means to reduce the citadel of Tarentum, (for he was in possession of the city) when he received a courier from Capua, which informed him, that the Campanians could hold out no longer against the Romans, if he did not come to their aid. (a) The desire of taking the citadel of Tarentum kept Hannibal some time in suspense: but at length the interest of Capua prevailed. He saw all the States of Italy, as well allies as enemies, were intent upon this, as upon a lesson, by which they were to judge the event, good or bad, with which the revolt of their own citizens would be attended. Having therefore left a great part of his baggage in the country of the Bruttii, and the main body of his heavy armed troops, he took with him only the flower of his infantry and cavalry, which was in a condition to move with great diligence, and advanced by great marches to Capua. He however ordered thirty three elephants to follow him.

When Hannibal arrived near Tifata, he halted on an eminence, that commanded Capua. From thence he gave the besieged notice of his arrival, and directed them to make a general sally at all the gates at the same time, that he should attack the Roman camp. The battle was rude: and even the lines were partly forced at first, and the Proconsul Appius dangerously wounded. But the

(a) Cum in hoc statu ad in quam omnium sociorum Capuam res essent. Annibalem diversum Tarentinæ arcis potiundæ Capuæque retinendæ trahebant curæ. Vicit tamen respectus Capuæ, in quam omnium sociorum hostiumque videbat animos, documento futuræ qualem cumque eventum defectio ob Romanis habuisset. Liv.

Romans



Romans defended themselves with so much vigour, A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 214. that at length both Hannibal and the Campanians were repulsed. This action, according to some authors, cost them very dear.

The Carthaginian General, seeing he could nei- *Hannibal*  
ther reduce the Romans to another battle, nor *marches*  
force their lines in order to enter the city, did *against*  
not persist in an enterprize that he saw impractica- *Rome, to*  
ble. He however did not yet abandon the care of *make a*  
Capua; and in order to deliver it, he formed a *diversion.*  
design worthy of his valour. To make a power- *Liv. xxvi.*  
ful diversion, he marched suddenly towards Rome. *7.*  
He did not despair of taking some part of the  
city at the first surprize; and at all events he flat-  
tered himself, that the danger of the Capital would  
oblige the Roman Generals to raise the siege of  
Capua, in order to fly with their troops to the  
aid of their country. Or lastly he conceived  
that if in order to continue the siege, they should  
divide their troops, their weakness might give ei-  
ther the besieged or himself some occasion of beat-  
ing them.

Only one thing gave him pain; which was,  
least the Campanians, losing all hope when they  
should see him remove, should surrender to the  
Romans. To obviate this inconvenience, he en-  
gaged a Numidian by great presents to charge him-  
self with a letter, and to repair to the Roman camp  
as a deserter, and from thence to enter Capua.  
The letter to the Campanians was to the following  
effect, “ That he had chosen to retire and march  
“ towards Rome, only for their good, and to  
“ reduce the Romans to raise the siege from the  
“ necessity they would be in of aiding their coun-  
“ try. That they should not lose courage; and  
“ that some days patience would place them  
“ in perpetual security and repose.” He took  
with him provisions only for ten days; and hav-  
ing

A. R. 541  
Ant. C. 211.

ing caused a great number of barks to be got ready, he made his army pass the Vulturnus in the night.

*The Prae-  
consul Ful-  
vius re-  
ceives or-  
ders to  
march  
with his  
troops for  
the de-  
fence of  
Rome.  
Liv. xxvi.  
8.*

As soon as it was known at Rome, that Hannibal was upon his march, the Senate assembled immediately. A Senator, named P. Cornelius Asina, was for having all the Generals with their armies recalled from all parts of Italy, for the defence of Rome. Fabius, who was no less intrepid in great dangers, than circumspect to prevent them, opposed this motion strongly. "He represented, that it would be shameful to quit Capua, and to take the alarm on the least motions of Hannibal. That it was utterly improbable, that a General, who had not dared to appear before Rome, after the victory he had gained at Cannæ, should flatter himself with taking it, after having been repulsed before Capua. That his design was not to besiege Rome, but to deliver the place actually besieged. And that as for him, he believed that the troops in Rome sufficed for its defence." A third opinion, which was a medium between the other two, proposed by P. Valerius Flaccus, carried the question. This was to make Fulvius come to Rome with a part of the troops that were before Capua, whilst his Colleague, with the rest of the army, should continue the siege. As soon as the Senate's orders arrived in the camp, Fulvius set out with the chosen troops of the three armies, which amounted to fifteen thousand foot and a thousand horse. He knew that Hannibal had taken his rout through the Latine way, and he took his through the Appian, after having sent orders to all the municipal cities on his march or in the neighbourhood, to have provisions in readiness for him. The soldiers full of chearfulness and courage, exhorted each other

other to double their pace, by putting one another in mind, that they were going to defend their common country. A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

In the mean time Hannibal approached, and the consternation augmented in the city according to the different rumours that were spread often without foundation, and always beyond truth. The Roman ladies filled all the temples, and bathed in tears, prostrating themselves before the altars, and lifting up their hands to heaven implored the aid of the Gods. The Senators all placed themselves around the Magistrates in the Forum, to be in continual readiness to assist them with their counsels on any unforeseen events that might happen every moment. Those, who were capable of serving in person, came and offered themselves to the Consuls. The troops were distributed at the gates, around the walls, in the capitol, in the citadel and even without Rome upon the Alban mountain, and upon the eminence of Æsula, near Tibur (*Tivoli*). Great alarm amongst the People.

In the midst of this general emotion arrived the Proconsul Fulvius. It was the custom for the Proconsuls to lose their authority and right to command the moment they set foot within the city. To dispense with this law in respect to Fulvius, the Senate conferred upon him equal authority with the Consuls. He entered with his army through the gate Capena, crossed the quarters *Capena* and *Esquilina*, and encamped between the gates Esquilina and Collina. His presence a little revived the city's courage. See the plan of Rome, vol. 1. for these places.

At the same time, Hannibal incamped near the Anio, about three miles from the city. From thence he advanced with two thousand horse from the gate Collina to the temple of Hercules, and going on all sides, he examined the walls and situation of the city as near as he could. Flaccus considered his daring Hannibal encamps near the Anio. ibid. 10,



A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

daring to ride about so quietly in the sight of, and so near Rome, as an insult, and sent out a detachment of cavalry to drive him from the walls, and to make him return to his camp. As an action ensued between these two bodies of horse, the Consuls made twelve hundred Numidian deserters, who were upon the Aventine hill, cross the city judging them the best troops for fighting in the midst of hollow ways, gardens and sepulchres. The common People believed then, that these Numidians were a part of the enemy who had seized the Aventine hill. The alarm was so great, that if the camp of the Carthaginians had not been without the city not far off, the People would have abandoned it directly. The fear of Hannibal stopped them. Each of them retired into his own house, and from the roofs began to throw stones at the Numidian deserters, believing them the enemy. The tumult could not be appeased, nor the People undeceived by discovering the error to them, because the streets were full of the inhabitants of the country, who in the sudden terror into which the first rumour of Hannibal's approach had thrown them, had taken refuge there in multitudes with all their cattle. Happily the Romans had the advantage in the engagement between the cavalry, and obliged the enemy to retire. As every moment tumults arose in different parts of the city, the Senate for the more immediately remedying them gave authority and right to command, to all who had been either Dictators, Consuls, or Censors. The rest of the day, and the night following were extremely tumultuous.

*Both sides  
prepare for  
a battle.*

*A violent  
storm  
twice to-  
gether pre-  
vents it.*

*Liv. xxvi.*

The next day Hannibal having passed the Anio, offered the Romans battle. The Consuls and Fulvius did not decline it. Both sides prepared to do their duty well in an action of which Rome was to be the prize; when a violent storm, with

With rain and hail, distressed both armies to such a degree, that the soldiers finding it next to impossible to keep under arms, and thinking of nothing so little as the enemy, retired hastily into their several camps. They had scarce re-entered them, when the weather became fine and serene. The same thing having happened the next day, Hannibal believed that there was something supernatural in the event: and, according to Livy, (a) cried out, that the Gods had *deprived him sometimes of the will, and sometimes of the power of taking Rome.* It was a general opinion amongst the Romans and their enemies, that Providence was in a peculiar manner intent upon the preservation of Rome: nor were they mistaken.

Two things highly mortified Hannibal, The *Hannibal*, first was his being informed, that at the very time *mortified by* he was incamped at one of the gates of Rome, *two singular events,* recruits had been sent out at another for the army *retires to* in Spain. The second, though not so important *Bruttium,* in itself, was still more offensive to him; which was, that the very ground on which he was incamped, had just being sold at Rome, without any abatement of the price. This last stroke affected him much, and he was so enraged, that there should be any one so bold at Rome as to buy land actually occupied by his army, that he also caused the goldsmith's shops round the Forum of Rome to be sold by auction.

After this bravado, Hannibal set out, and marched to the extremity of Bruttium in Italy, renouncing the hope of saving Capua. Fulvius *Fulvius* immediately returned to join his colleague, in order *returns to* to compleat the enterprize, of which the success *Capua.* was now certain.

(a) Audita vox Annibalis *mæ modo mentem non dari, mortetur, Potiundæ sibi urbis Rædò fortunam.*

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.  
*Capua re-  
duced to  
despair.*

Capua was then abandoned to itself, and destitute of all resources. The Campanians then felt all the evils into which they had plunged themselves in renouncing the amity of the Romans. They at that moment saw all the horror of their guilt, and were from thenceforth solely engrossed by that object. The Pro-consul, in consequence of a decree of the Senate, caused a proclamation to be made, by which a general pardon was granted for all such citizens of Capua as should go over to the Romans before a certain day. This was made known in the city: however none took the benefit of so favourable, and so little merited, an amnesty. Solely engrossed, as I have already said, by the blackness of their treachery, and the horrid barbarity with which it was attended, they could not persuade themselves, that the offer made them was sincere and real, nor that so great a crime could ever be pardoned.

*The garrison writes to Hannibal, and makes him warm reproaches.*

The city was now without counsel, as well as resource. The nobility had absolutely abandoned the care of affairs. None of the principal citizens appeared in publick. The Senators, seeing their city not in a condition to resist the Romans, had shut themselves up in their houses, in expectation of certain death, and the ruin of their country. All power was in the hands of Hanno and Bostar, commanders of the Carthaginian garrison. The latter, more anxious for themselves than their allies, wrote to Hannibal, not only with great liberty, but with warm reproaches. “ They complained, that he had not only abandoned Capua  
“ to the enemy, but delivered up themselves and  
“ the whole garrison to the most cruel punishments. That he had retired into Bruttium, as  
“ if to hide himself, and not to see the fate of  
“ Capua. That the Romans set him a quite different example. That the siege of Rome itself  
“ could



“ could not force them to quit that of Capua: so A. R. 547.  
Ant. C. 211.  
 “ much more constancy did the Romans shew in  
 “ respect to their enemies, than Hannibal in fa-  
 “ vour of his allies. That if he returned to Ca-  
 “ pua, and turned his whole forces on that side,  
 “ themselves and the Campanians were ready to  
 “ make a sally, determined either to conquer, or  
 “ to perish. That the Carthaginians had not pas-  
 “ sed the Alps to make war upon the people of  
 “ Rhegium and Tarentum. That wherever the  
 “ Roman legions were, the armies of Carthage  
 “ ought to be. That it was thus the successes at  
 “ Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannæ, had been  
 “ acquired, that is, by seeking, attacking, and  
 “ forcing the enemy to come to blows.”

The Carthaginian commanders had intrusted this letter to some well-inclined Numidians, who for the sake of a reward, went over to the camp of Flaccus as deserters. They were discovered, and upon being tortured, besides confessing the letter in question, they declared that there were many other Numidians in the Roman camp, who like themselves had fled thither under the appearance of deserters, but who in reality were spies. More than seventy were seized; and after having been scourged with rods, with those who had been lately taken, and had their hands cut off, they were all sent back to Capua.

The People were in a consternation at the sight Delibera-  
tion of the  
Senate of  
Capua.  
Liv. xxvi.  
13. of these wretches, and by their cries and menaces forced the Senators to assemble, in order to deliberate upon what it was necessary to do in the present situation. The prevailing opinion was to send deputies to the Roman Generals, to endeavour to move them by their submission.

But Vibius Virius, who had been one of the principal authors of the revolt, when it came to his turn to speak, expressed himself to a quite different

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

*Eloquent  
discourse  
of Vibius  
Virius.*

ferent effect. Those, said he, who propose sending deputies to the Romans to treat of peace and to surrender to them, must hardly have reflected either upon what they would have done themselves; if they had been victorious over the enemy, or upon the treatment they are now to expect. How! do you then hope to be received in the present conjuncture, as you were heretofore, when; to obtain their protection against the Samnites, we put ourselves, our children, our all into their hands. Have you already forgot at what time, and in what circumstances, we renounced the alliance of the Romans? How, instead of dismissing their garrison; we put them to death, by the most ignominious punishments and torments? How many times, and with what fury, we have sallied upon them and attacked their camp? How we called in Hannibal to destroy them? And which has but just passed, how we made him set out from hence to besiege Rome?

Examine now what their hatred for you has made them undertake, that you may judge from thence; what you are to hope from them. Seeing Italy actually a prey to a stranger; obliged to sustain the attacks of an enemy, come from the remotest parts of the universe, in the very heart of their dominions; and such an enemy as Hannibal, the Romans quit every thing, quit even Hannibal himself, to send the two Consuls with two Consular armies to besiege Capua. It is now almost two years; that they have kept us closely shut up on all sides; they are fiercely determined to subdue us by famine; suffering exceedingly themselves; and exposing themselves to the utmost dangers, and the rudest fatigues, often cut to pieces around their intrenchments, and lastly almost entirely stormed in their camp. But I do not stop at all this; it is a common thing to suffer fatigues and dangers, when the city of an enemy is attacked. We have still more sensible marks of their implacable wrath

and

and hatred. Hannibal, with numerous bodies of <sup>A. R. 541.</sup> horse and foot attacked their camp, and took part of <sup>Ant. C. 211.</sup> it : so great a danger made no change in them. He passed the Vulturnus, and burnt the country of Cales : they saw the ruin of the lands of their allies unmoved. He marched his troops against Rome itself : so dreadful a storm, that raged so near their home, did not alter them. At length he passed the Anio, incamped three miles from their capital ; approached their very walls, and was upon the point of depriving them even of Rome itself, if they did not abandon Capua. They still persevered. Was ever fury so obstinate ? The wildest fiercest beast will quit its prey, if its young ones are attacked in its den. But nothing can force the Romans from Capua ; neither Rome besieged ; the cries and groans of their wives and children, which might in a manner be heard hither ; their altars, temples, household-gods, nor tombs of their ancestors profaned, and destroyed ; so determined are they to punish us, and so much do they thirst after our blood ! And we ought not to be surprized at this ; for we had done as much, had fortune put it in our power.

We have here a truth placed in its full light, and I do not know a more perfect model of eloquence in this kind : but the most difficult part of his design remains to be brought about : this was to make his hearers determine to kill themselves : he therefore continued, and concluded his discourse as follows :

For this reason, as the Gods have so determined, not having it in my power to avoid death, at least, whilst I am free and master of my fate, I will, by an honourable and easy death, spare myself the torments and ignominy the enemy flatter themselves with inflicting upon me. No ; (a) I will not see the haughty  
victors

(a) Non videbo Ap. Claudium & Q. Fulvium victoria  
Vol. V. U insolenti



A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

Victors insult my misery. I will not see myself a captive, laden with chains, dragged through the streets of Rome as an ornament of my enemy's triumph, then thrown into an hideous dungeon, or fastened to a stake, and cruelly scourged with rods, to end by a Roman ax. I will not see my country destroyed and in flames; nor the helplessness of sex and age abandoned to the brutality and fury of the soldiers. They have destroyed the city of Alba from whence they sprung, to the very foundations, that there may be no trace, no remembrance of their first origin: judge, after this, whether they will spare Capua, to which they are greater enemies than to Carthage itself. Those therefore amongst you who chuse rather to comply with their hard fate, than to experience such misfortunes, may find at my house an entertainment I have prepared for them. When our senses are bound up and suspended by wine and meats I will order all my guests to be served with the same bowl, myself shall drink of the first. This cup shall preserve our bodies from torments; and our minds and courage from affronts and indignities; it shall spare our eyes

insolenti subnixos, neque victus per urbem Romam triumphis spectaculum trahar, ut deinde in carcere, aut ad palum deligatus, lacerato virgis tergo, cervicem securi Romanæ subjiciam: nec dirui incendi-que patriam videbo, nec rapi ad stuprum matres Campanas, virginesque, & ingenuos pueros. Albam, unde ipsi oriundi erant, à fundamentis prouerunt, ne stirpis, ne memoria originum suarum extaret: nedum eos Capuæ parafuros credam, cui infestiores quàm Carthagini sunt. Itaque quibus vestrum antè fato cedere, quàm hæc tot tam acerba videant, in

animo est, iis apud me hodie epulæ instructæ paratæque sunt. Satiatis vino ciboque poculum idem, quod mihi datum fuerit, circumferetur. Ea potio corpus ab cruciatu, animum à contumeliis; oculos, aures, à videndis audiendisque omnibus acerbis indignisque, quæ manent victos, vindicabit. Parati erunt, qui magno rogo in propatulo ædium accenso corpora exanima injiciant. Hæc una via & honesta & libera ad mortem. Et ipsi virtutem mirabuntur hostes, & Annibal fortes socios sciet ab se desertos ac proditos esse. Liv.

and

*and ears the cruel necessity of seeing and bearing all the injuries that are the portion of the conquered. A great fire shall be kindled in my court-yard, into which our bodies shall be thrown by those I have appointed to do us that last office. This is the only honourable method we now have to quit life. Our enemies themselves will admire our courage, and Hannibal know, he has abandoned and betrayed generous allies, that deserved to have been treated by him with more fidelity.*

Amongst those who heard this discourse, there were more that approved than had courage enough to put it in execution. Most of the Senators, not despairing of obtaining pardon from the clemency of the Romans, were for surrendering, and actually sent deputies to them. About twenty-seven of them however went with Vibius Virius to that fatal banquet. Whilst they were at table, they endeavoured to forget by wine and good cheer their cruel situation. At the end of the feast, they all took the poison; and then having embraced each other for the last time, and deplored their own and their country's fate, they separated. Some stayed behind to be burnt in one common funeral pile: others retired to their own houses. The quantity of wine and victuals, which they had taken, prevented the immediate effect of the poison. However they all died, before the Romans entered the city.

The next day the gate, called Jupiter's gate, which fronted the Roman camp, was opened by the order of C. Fulvius Lieutenant-general. A Roman legion with a body of the allies entered the city under the command of C. Fulvius the Lieutenant. The first thing he did was to order all the arms in Capua to be brought in. He posted guards upon all the gates of the city, to prevent any body from going out. He seized the

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

Many of  
the Sena-  
tors kill  
themselves  
Liv. xxvi.

14.

Capua sur-  
renders at  
last.  
Ibid.

A. R. 541. Carthaginian garrison, and ordered the Senators  
 MRC 111. to repair to the Roman Generals in their camp. When they came there, they were all put in irons, and were commanded to send all the gold and silver they had in their houses to the Quæstors. The gold amounted in weight to seventy pounds, which is about 2600 or 2700 pounds of our money; and the silver to three thousand two hundred pounds in weight, about twelve thousand five hundred pounds sterling. Twenty-five Senators were put under a strict guard at Cales, and twenty-eight at Teanum: these were those who were known to have contributed most to the revolt of Capua from the Romans.

*Dispute* Fulvius and Appius did not agree concerning  
*the punishment* the treatment of the Senators of Capua. The  
*of the Se-* latter inclined to lenity, the other to severity in  
*netus and* excess. Appius was for having the affair left to  
*the* the decision of the Roman Senate; and he added,  
*that it was* that it was proper to enquire whether some muni-  
*cipal cities,* cipal cities, or of the country of the Latines, had  
 not entered into the conspiracy with Capua, and given it aid. As to this last article, Fulvius represented warmly, “that they ought to be far  
 “from thinking of any such thing: that it was  
 “to disturb faithful allies by doubtful accusa-  
 “tions, and to make their fate depend on wit-  
 “nesses unworthy of belief, who had never  
 “known any rule but their passions or caprice,  
 “either in their discourse or actions.” Appius how strongly soever his Colleague spoke, persisted in being of opinion, that in an affair of that importance it was undoubtedly necessary to wait orders from Rome. He was mistaken. In the evening Fulvius commanded the principal officers to have two thousand chosen horse in readiness against midnight. With this detachment he set out in the night, and arrived early in the morn-  
 ing



ing at Teanum. The People there were astonished to see him at that time. He repaired directly to the forum, whither a great multitude of the inhabitants followed immediately. He there commanded the Magistrate to bring out the Campanians he had in his custody; and after having caused them to be scourged with rods, he ordered their heads to be struck off. From thence he proceeded on the spur to Cales, with the same detachment, in order to perform the like execution. He had already ascended his tribunal, and the Campanians were fastened to the stake, when a courier was seen to arrive in haste, who delivered a letter to Fulvius from the Prætor Calpurnius, and a Decree of the Senate. The joy of the place was universal upon the rumour, that the Senate reserved the cognizance of this affair to itself. Fulvius who suspected it, caused the Campanians to be executed, before he opened the letter and decree. He then read the dispatches. The contents could not prevent what was passed, and of which the Proconsul had only hastened the execution to be beforehand with any obstacles.

When Fulvius rose in order to depart from thence, Taurea Jubellius of Capua, breaking through the croud, called to him by his name. That magistrate having resumed his place in great surprize, in order to know what he would have of him: *Command also*, said he to him, *that somebody may cut my throat, that thou mayst boast of having butchered a braver man than thyself.* As Fulvius only answered, *that the man had certainly lost his senses, and that his hands were besides tied up by a decree of the Senate.* Jubellius resumed. *As*, said he, *after having lost my country, relations, friends; after having killed my wife and children with my own hand to preserve them from the vile treatment they were to expect: As I say, I*

A. R. 521.  
A.D.C. 211.

*cannot perish by the same kind of death as my countrymen, whom I see here before my eyes, let my courage be my refuge, and deliver me from a miserable life I can suffer no longer.* Having spoke thus he stabbed himself, with a dagger he had concealed under his cloaths.

Some Authors tell all that has just been related otherwise, and observe particularly, that Fulvius had read the decree before the execution of the Campanians, and that he put them to death only in effect of the tacit permission given him by these terms of the decree: *That he should leave the cognizance of this affair to the Senate, IF HE JUDGED IT PROPER.* And indeed is it probable, that a Magistrate should presume to insult the Senate in such a manner, by not opening its orders, till it was out of his power to put them in execution?

After the Proconsul was returned from Cales to Capua, Atella and Calatia surrendered to the Romans, those of the Senators who had induced their countrymen to embrace the party of Hannibal, were punished there likewise with death. Accordingly, fourscore in all of the principal Senators had their heads cut off: more than three hundred Campanians were confined in the prisons, where they perished miserably: the rest of the citizens were either dispersed or sold. As to the city of Capua itself, however great and just the anger of the Romans was, reasons of interest prevailed over the desire of revenge. Instead of demolishing it, it was thought better to annex it, with its territory, the finest and most fertile of all Italy, to the Roman dominions. But it was deprived of all privileges, and of every thing that constitutes a free city. It was reduced to have neither Senate, nor Magistrates; and a Præfect

was

was sent thither every year to administer justice A. R. 541.  
Ant.C. 211.  
in the name of the Roman People.

Scarce any event more considerable, or more Wise con-  
duct of the  
Roman  
People,  
who deter-  
mine not to  
demolish  
Capua.  
glorious for the Roman People, than the siege  
and taking of Capua passed during the second  
Punick war. It was that city, which, after the  
battle of Cannæ, had, as I have already said,  
flung up the standard of rebellion, and drawn af-  
ter it most of the allies of Rome. For that rea-  
son, it must have been infinitely dear to Hanni-  
bal, and odious to the Romans: Both which it  
was in effect. It is this city they attack, and  
make themselves masters of in the presence and  
before the eyes of that formidable enemy, who  
has the shame and mortification to see it taken  
from him notwithstanding all the efforts he made  
to save it. We have seen with what amazing  
courage, and obstinate perseverance, the Romans  
acted during this siege. After it was over, they  
shewed no less wisdom and prudence in their  
manner of deciding the fate of that important  
conquest. This is an object well worth being  
considered at a nearer view, and with some care:  
Cicero will be principally my guide in this respect.

The manner in which it was proper to treat Cic. de  
leg. Agrar.  
ad pop. n.  
95.  
Capua, was much and long deliberated. Some  
Senators judged that it was absolutely proper en-  
tirely to demolish a powerful neighbouring city,  
at enmity with, and which had shewn an impla-  
cable hatred for Rome. (a) Every thing there  
seemed dangerous: the fertility of the lands, the

(a) Campani semper su-  
perbi bonitate agrorum, &  
fructuum magnitudine, urbis  
salubritate, descriptione, pul-  
chritudine. Ex hac copia  
atque omnium rerum affluen-  
tia, primùm illa nata sunt;  
arrogantia, quæ a majoribus  
nostris alterum Capua Confu-  
lem postulavit: deinde ca-  
luxuries, quæ ipsum Anniba-  
lem, armis etiam tum invic-  
tum, voluptate vicit. Cic.



A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

abundance of all kinds of grain and fruits, the good situation of the city, the fineness and salubrity of the air, the beauty and conveniency of the buildings, the affluence of all kinds of riches, and of all things ministring to pleasure and luxury: fatal advantages, mortal baits, that had corrupted all the inhabitants from the first, and had inspired them with such arrogance, as to demand to share the Consulship with Rome, and had nurtured that luxury, which, with voluptuousness, had overcome Hannibal, till then invincible to the Roman arms. Now could a city, that was the cause of all these evils, to which it might one day give birth again, be suffered to subsist?

Ibid.  
E. 83.

The majority of the Senators were determined by other views, and found a wise medium proper to conciliate every thing. “Our ancestors, says Cicero, judged, that if they deprived the Campanians of their lands, magistrates, senate, assemblies, and left them no image, nor trace, of a State, they should have nothing farther to fear from them. They resolved therefore not to destroy either the houses or the walls of Capua, but to make it in some measure the granary of Rome, by leaving none in it but husbandmen, who should there lay up their plows and other instruments for cultivating the land, and carry thither their harvests as to a place of safety.”

Ibid. 90.

The Romans afterwards did not treat either Corinth or Carthage in this manner; but believed themselves obliged entirely to demolish both to their foundations: because had they only deprived those cities of their lands, senate, and magistrates; ill-designing people might have made settlements, and cantoned themselves in them, before Rome, in effect of the remoteness, could be informed of it, or at least provided against it. Nothing of this kind was to be feared from Capua, situated in the

the neighbourhood of Rome, and in a manner in the sight of the Senate and People. Accordingly, in all future wars, whether in Italy or abroad, Capua never gave Rome the least umbrage, but was always a great support to it.

And how could any sedition arise there? There was no longer any Assembly, either of the People, in which seditious discourses might be held, or of the Senate, in which deliberations contrary to the repose of Italy might pass: there were no magistrates who by the abuse of their authority might excite publick complaints. All ambition, all discord was extinct, because there were no offices to solicit, nor any honours to be disputed with each other. (a) “ Thus our ancestors (it is still Cicero “ that speaks) by their great wisdom, found means “ to reduce the Campanian arrogance, and turbulent pride, to tranquillity and entire inaction. “ Thereby, they avoided the odious reproach of “ cruelty in destroying so fine and powerful a “ city; and they took secure precautions for the “ future, in cutting all its nerves, and leaving it “ in a state of weakness, that made it incapable “ of moving.”

Cicero mentions another advantage also, upon which he lays great stress; this is the profit, which Rome derived from the lands of Capua: a profit, which he prefers to all the other revenues, that the Roman people received from foreign countries. The slightest causes often stopped or suspended those other revenues; whereas that of Capua ran

(a) Itaque illam Campaniam arrogantiam atque intolerantiam ferociam ratione & consilio majores nostri ad inertissimum & desidiosissimum otium perduxerunt. Sic, & crudelitatis infamiam effugerunt, quod urbem ex Italia pulcherrimam non sustulerunt; & multum in posterum providerunt, quod, nervis urbis omnibus exsectis, urbem ipsam solutam ac debilitatam reliquerunt. *Ibid.*

A. R. 541.  
 Art. E. 211.

ran no risque, being defended both by strong cities and by troops in the neighbourhood; it could suffer nothing from wars; it was always equally sustained, and seemed in some measure from the goodness of the climate, secure against the injuries of seasons and storms. He remarks, that in the war of Italy, when the other revenues failed, the armies were supported with the grain of Capua. Accordingly he calls (*a*) Capua the finest estate of the Roman people, the most assured source of their riches, the ornament of peace, the support of war, the most important of its revenues, the granary of the legions, and the common resource in times of famine.

Liv. xxvi.  
 16.

I shall conclude these remarks upon Capua with the reflections made by Livy upon the same event, which are a kind of abridgment of all that I have collected from Cicero. Such, says he, were the dispositions made by the Romans in respect to Capua, with a wisdom and conduct highly laudable in every respect. A sudden and rigorous justice was executed upon the culpable. The multitude was dispersed without hope of return. A brutal revenge was not exercised upon the houses and walls, which were not guilty of the crimes of their inhabitants. And thereby, at the same time that the Romans acquired very considerable advantages to themselves, they gained a reputation for clemency with their allies, by preserving so illustrious and opulent a city; the ruin of which would have been attended with the groans of all the States of Campania, and their neighbours. And (*b*) lastly,

(*a*) Fundum pulcherrimum populi Romani, caput vestrae pecuniae, pacis ornamentum, subsidium belli, fundamentum vestigalium, horreum legionum, solatium annonae. *Ibid.*

(*b*) Confessio expressa hosti, quanta vis in Romanis ad expetendas poenas ab infidelibus sociis, & quàm nihil in Annibale auxilii ad receptos in fidem tuendos. *Liv.*

they



they shewed by a very remarkable example, on the one side how inevitable were the effects of their resentment against unfaithful allies, and on the other how weak a resource Hannibal's protection was for such as adhered to his party and fortune,

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

S E C T. II.

*Affairs of Spain. The two Scipios divide their armies. Cn. Scipio marches against Asdrubal. He is abandoned by the Celtiberians, and defeated. P. Scipio, who had marched against two other Generals, is defeated and killed in battle. The three Carthaginian Generals join, and march to attack Cneus, and defeat him. He dies. Noble disinterestedness of Cneus. Reflections upon the conduct of the two Scipios. L. Marcius, a private Knight, is chosen to command the army. He gains two victories over the Carthaginians. Manner in which Marcius's letter is received by the Senate. Cn. Fulvius is accused before the People, and sentenced. P. Scipio, only twenty-four years old, is chosen to command in Spain, in quality of Pro-consul. He goes to his province. Return of Marcellus to Rome. He triumphs by ovation. He exhibits abundance of statues and paintings in it. Reflection upon this new kind of pomp. Manlius Torquatus refuses the Consulship. Admirable wisdom of the youth of the century called Veturia. Treaty concluded between the Romans and Ætolians. Motions of the Ætolians, and of Philip King of Macedonia. Surprizing resolution of the people of Acarnania. Levinus besieges and takes Anticyra. He receives news of his being elected Consul.*

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS. III.

AP. CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

A. R. 540.  
 Ant. C. 212.  
*Affairs of*  
*Spain.*  
 Liv. xxv.  
 32—33.

**W**E come now to resume the affairs of Spain, which we passed over, not to interrupt the relation of the siege and taking of Capua.

It was now two years, that nothing considerable had passed in Spain, and that both sides had kept upon the defensive, without undertaking any thing against each other. But, this campaign, the Roman Generals having quitted their winter-quarters, united all their forces, and after having held a council, they agreed unanimously, that after having confined themselves so long to prevent Asdrubal from going to Italy as he intended, it was time now to put an end to the war in that province. That they had a sufficient number of troops to effect it, as they had the winter before engaged thirty thousand Celtiberians to take arms for the Romans against the Carthaginians.

*The two*  
*Scipios di-*  
*vide and*  
*separate*  
*their ar-*  
*ms.*

The enemy had three great bodies of troops in the country. Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, and Mago, had united the forces under their command, and were but five days march from the camp of the Romans. Asdrubal, the son of Amilcar, who had long commanded the armies in Spain, was incamped near Anitorgis at a much less distance from the enemy. The designs of the two Scipios was to attack the first, and they conceived they had forces more than sufficient to overpower him. All they apprehended was, that after having defeated him, the two other Generals, terrified by his overthrow, would retire into inaccessible mountains and denes, and thereby protract the war. To avoid this inconvenience, they believed that the best choice they could make, was to divide their troops into two bodies, and apply themselves at once to the whole war of Spain; so that P. Cornelius, with two thirds of the army, composed of the Romans and allies, should march against Mago and Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, whilst his brother Cneus, with the other third,

third, composed of old troops and Celtiberians, should act against the other Asdrubal. A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

The two Generals set out at the same time with their armies, preceded by the Celtiberians, and incamped near \* Anitorgis, in sight of the enemy, from whence they were separated only by the river. Cn. Scipio continued in this place, with the troops that had been assigned him; and P. Scipio went forwards, to carry on the war as had been concerted.

Asdrubal soon perceived, that there were but few Romans in the army of Cn. Scipio, and that the whole hope of that General was founded in the aid of the Celtiberians. As he knew the infidelity of those nations, amongst whom he had made war so many years, and there was no fraud or stratagem he did not know how to employ himself, he treated in secret with the Chiefs of the Celtiberians by the means of Spaniards, that served in his camp; and engaged them, for a great reward, to retire with their troops into their own country. These officers did not think they committed a great crime in making this bargain. For it was not required of them to turn their arms against the Romans; and besides they were paid for remaining neuter, what they could scarce have expected for exposing their lives to the fatigues and dangers of war. Add to this, that the soldiers were pleased with the sweets of rest, and with the pleasure of returning into their country, and seeing their relations. The multitude were thus as easily brought over as their leaders. Besides which, they had nothing to fear from the Romans; whose small number made them incapable of stopping them by force. The Celtiberians packed up their

*Cn. Scipio marches against Asdrubal. He is abandoned by the Celtiberians, and defeated.*

\* It is not known in what part of Spain Anitorgis was, nor consequently what river Li-  
vy speaks of here.

baggage,



A. R. 542.  
 Ant. C. 212.

baggage, and began their march to return back; giving the Romans no other answer, who asked them the reason of this change, and conjured them not to abandon them, but that they were going to the aid of their country. Scipio seeing that his prayers made no impression on his allies; and that he could not keep them by force; and rightly judging also, that he was not in a condition without their aid to resist the enemy, and that it was no longer possible to rejoin his brother, he made the only choice, that seemed salutary in such a conjuncture: this was to march back as soon as possible, carefully avoiding to fight in the plains with an enemy entirely superior to him in number of troops, and who having passed the river, followed him at the heels, and pressed him very hard.

(a) It cannot be too much inculcated, says Livy, to the Roman Generals, to keep well upon their guard against the like perfidy; and the misfortune, that then happened to Scipio, is a lesson, which ought to teach them to confide in auxiliary troops, only when the number of their own citizens shall exceed that of the strangers in their armies.

P. Scipio,  
 who had  
 marched  
 against  
 two other  
 Generals,  
 is conquer-  
 ed and kil-  
 led in  
 battle.

At the same time, P. Scipio was exposed to a danger still greater and more inevitable: He had to do with a new enemy, who harraressed him continually: this was Masinissa, at that time the ally of the Carthaginians, but whom in the sequel, the amity he contracted with the Romans rendered so famous and powerful. That young Prince, from the moment Scipio arrived, advanced against

(a) Id quidem cavendum ternis credant auxiliis, ut non semper Romanis ducibus erit, plus sui roboris suarumque propriè virium in castris habeant. Liv.

him

him with the Numidian cavalry, and incessantly A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212, harrassed him night and day to such a degree,

that he not only fell upon such of the Romans, as straggled ever so little to fetch in wood or forage, but frequently insulted them even in their camp itself. He often threw himself into the midst of their guards, obliged them to quit their posts with abundance of tumult and disorder ; and falling upon them during the night, when they least expected him, carried alarm and terror to their gates, and into their intrenchments. In a word, there was no place, nor any time, in which they were exempt from fear and trouble. He thereby obliged them to keep close within their works, deprived of all the necessaries of life. They were almost in the same situation as people besieged in form. It even seemed, that they should be shut up closer still, as soon as Indibilis, who, it was said, was every moment expected to arrive with seven thousand men, should join the Carthaginians.

In this extremity, Scipio, otherwise a wise and prudent Captain, reduced by necessity, took a rash and desperate resolution. This was to set out during the night to meet Indibilis, and to fight him wherever he should find him. Accordingly he left a small body of troops in his camp, under the command of T. Fonteius his Lieutenant, and having began his march about the middle of the night, he met the enemy he sought, and immediately attacked them. They fought in small parties, the troops not having time to form themselves in battle. The Romans began to have the advantage in this tumultuary battle : but the Numidian horse, from whom Scipio believed he had concealed his march, attacking him suddenly on the flanks, put his troops into great consternation. He had scarce began to come to blows with the Numidians, than he saw himself attacked by a third enemy.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

enemy. The Carthaginian Generals, who had followed the Romans, came up unexpectedly to charge him in the rear. Invested on all sides, they did not know on which to face, nor where to open themselves a passage. To complete the misfortune, Scipio, fighting with abundance of bravery, and throwing himself wherever the danger was greatest, to animate his troops by his example, received a wound through his right side with a lance. As soon as he was seen to fall from his horse, the cries of joy carried the news of his death throughout the whole army. This accident completed the defeat of the Romans, and the enemy's victory. All those who had not fallen in the battle, immediately betook themselves to flight. They did not find it difficult to open themselves a way through the Numidians and light-armed soldiers: but the difficulty was to escape the pursuit of so many horse, and of foot, who equalled the horse in swiftness. In consequence, more of them were killed in flying than in battle; and not a single man of them had escaped, if night had not come on.

The two Carthaginian Generals, to make as much advantage of their victory as possible, hardly gave their troops some hours rest, and directly marched them towards Asdrubal, the son of Amilcar; not doubting but that, when they should have joined him, they should be in a condition to terminate the war by the total defeat of the Romans. As soon as they arrived there, the Generals and soldiers gave themselves up to the joy, with which so signal a victory over so great a General and his army inspired them; congratulating each other beforehand, upon that they were in hopes of gaining as soon as they came to act.



The news of so great a defeat had not yet reached the army of Cneus Scipio : but the mournful silence that prevailed amongst the troops, and the gloomy surmise, with which every one was possessed, were already sad presages of the misfortune they were soon to know. Scipio himself, besides the desertion of his allies, and the augmentation of the enemy's troops, on reasoning and reflecting upon all the circumstances he saw, was much more inclined to fear than to hope. *For finally, said he within himself, how could Asdrubal and Mago have brought their armies hither so soon, if they had not terminated the war on their side ? Whence comes it, that P. Scipio has not opposed their march, or followed them close, in order that, if he could not prevent the Generals of the enemy and their armies from joining, he might at least join his troops with those of his brother.* In this cruel agitation of mind, he thought he could not act better in his present situation, than to retire as soon and as far as possible from the enemy. Accordingly, the following night he marched a considerable way, without the enemy's making any motion to prevent a retreat, of which they had no previous knowledge. But, as soon as day appeared, having perceived, that the Romans were gone, they set out in pursuit of them with great diligence, having sent the Numidians before, who came up with them before night, and continually harassed them, by attacking them sometimes in the rear, and sometimes upon the flanks. They were therefore obliged to face the enemy, Scipio commanding them to fight retreating, and without halting till the Carthaginian infantry should arrive.

But as they were frequently obliged to stop, they made but very little way in much time. For this reason Scipio, seeing that night approached, drew off his troops from the battle, and posted them

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.  
*The three*  
*Cartha-*  
*ginian Ge-*  
*nerals join*  
*and attack*  
*Cneus,*  
*who is de-*  
*feated.*  
*His death.*

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

upon an eminence ; little safe indeed for troops entirely in a consternation, but where they were however less exposed than they would have been any where else. He placed the baggage and cavalry in the middle of the infantry, who at first repulsed the charge of the Numidians with no great difficulty. But when the three Generals and their three armies were arrived, Scipio saw perfectly, that his soldiers could not resist so many forces, unless he opposed them with some intrenchments, and that was impracticable. The eminence to which he had retired was so naked, and the ground so hard and dry, that besides having neither wood nor herbage, it was impossible to cut a trench in it, or to throw up any of the works necessary in the like case. Add to this, that the declivity which led to it, being very easy and almost insensible, there was nothing rugged and steep enough to keep the enemy from ascending. However, to oppose them with the appearance at least of intrenchments, they placed around them the packs and harnesses of their carriage-beasts, tied and made fast together with the packs and baggage themselves, carrying up the whole as far as possible, to the usual height.

When the Carthaginians were arrived, they easily mounted the eminence: but at first this new kind of intrenchments stopped them short. *Why don't you advance*, cried out their Generals: *Why don't you remove those vain, ridiculous obstacles, obstacles, scarce capable of stopping women and children? Don't you see, that the enemy are taken, and that sculking behind that baggage they can escape you no longer?* With whatever air of contempt the Generals made these reproaches, it was not easy for the soldiers either to cut or untie those harnesses and baggage, which were strongly bound and interwove together. After much time and pains they  
at

at length effected it ; when they entered the Roman camp in several places at once. As they were much superior in number, and victorious, they did not find great resistance from an handful of terrified and defeated troops : and in consequence made a great slaughter of them. However, many having fled to the adjacent forests, got to P. Scipio's camp, where T. Fonteius his Lieutenant commanded. As to Cneus, according to some authors, he was killed upon the eminence even on the first attack. According to others, he escaped with some few followers into a tower not far from his camp, to which the enemy, who could not force the gates, set fire, and that General perished in it with all that were with him.

This was the seventh year that Cn. Scipio commanded in Spain, when he was killed about a month after his brother Publius.

Valerius Maximus, and Seneca, tell us a very *Noble* singular circumstance in the life of Cneus, and *interesting* which does him great honour. That illustrious *ness of* man pressed the Senate to send him a successor, *Cneus.* representing that he had a marriageable daughter, *Val Max.* and it was necessary that he should go to Rome, *IV. 4.* to make provision for her fortune, and to find her *Senec. de* an husband. The Senate, not willing to deprive *Conf. ad* the Commonwealth of the services of such a Ge- *Hel XII.* neral as Cn. Scipio, took his place, and acted as *& Nat.* a father to his daughter. In concert with the wife, *Quæst I.* and nearest relations of Cneus, they chose her an husband, and paid \* eleven thousand asses out of the public treasury by way of fortune for her. (a) O happy bridegroom, cries Seneca, to whom the Roman People served as a father-in-law ! Could

\* Eleven thousand asses at that time, were about 25 l. sterling.

(a) O fœlices viros puellarum, quibus populus Rom. loco soceri fuit.



A. R. 540.  
A.D.C. 212.

we expect to find so generous a disinterestedness, that rises so high as the love of poverty, still subsisting at the time of which we are speaking, and in the most illustrious citizens of Rome? Poverty again must have been much in honour there, if we consider, that so small a portion, as that assigned by the Senate, was thought no shame. The (a) daughters of the greatest men had often no other dowry but the glory of their fathers or families. Things were much changed in Seneca's time. (b) Now, says he, the sum which the Senate believed sufficient for the portion of Scipio's daughter, would not be enough to purchase one of our freed-men's a single looking-glass: to such an enormous height has luxury, the growth of abundance and riches, risen; and so much have vices, its inevitable consequence, augmented!

The two Scipios were no less lamented by the Spaniards, than by the Romans themselves: with one difference however highly for the honour of their memories. The loss of the provinces, that of the armies, and the misfortune of the Commonwealth, had some share in the grief of their own country: but the Spaniards lamented and deplored them only and for their own sakes. They however regretted the loss of Cneus most. For, having come into Spain before his brother, he had governed them longer, and, to use the expression, had been beforehand with him in their affection, by giving them the first distinguished proofs of the justice and moderation of the Roman government.

(a) Paternæ hereditati, præter optimam gloriam, nihil erat quod acceptum referrent.  
*Pal. Max.*

(b) Jam libertinorum virgunculis in unum speculum

non sufficit illa dos, quam dedit Senatus pro Scipione. Processit enim immodestius, paulatim opibus ipsis invitata luxuria, & incrementum ingens vitia acceperunt.

The two Scipios were certainly Generals of great merit: on the one side so brave and intrepid as to deserve to be called *two (a) thunderbolts of war*; on the other, wise, prudent, experienced: they however form in concert and with deliberate design the plan of a campaign it is not easy to comprehend. Without any great skill in military affairs, it may easily be perceived, that as they had two different bodies of the enemy to fight, it was infinitely for their advantage to attack them separately one after the other, by falling upon each with their whole united forces. They renounce so great an advantage upon the slightest reason conceivable; for fear, said they, lest the defeat of the first army, should induce the other to retire into forests and inaccessible places, which would prevent the war from being so soon terminated. They committed another fault no less gross; which was, to leave thirty thousand strangers in one of their armies, who probably composed two thirds of it at least, and to confide the preservation of the State to them. We see here what becomes of man's prudence and ability, when God abandons them to themselves.

The defeat of the two armies seemed to make the loss of Spain a necessary consequence, and to contribute much to that of Italy, by admitting the victorious troops to go thither to the aid of Hannibal. We are going to see in what manner Providence, that was watchful for the safety of Rome, delivers it from this danger by a method, which may in some measure be said to be miraculous, and which shews, that it is God who destroys and saves.

(a) Cùm duo fulmina nostri occidissent. *Cic. pro Corn,*  
Imperii subito, in Hispania, *Balb. n. 34.*  
Cn. & P. Scipiones, extincti

A. R. 540.  
 Ant. C. 212.  
*L. Marcius*  
*a Knight is*  
*chosen to*  
*command*  
*the army.*  
*He gains*  
*two Vic-*  
*tories over*  
*the Car-*  
*thaginians*  
 Liv. xxv.

37—59.

When the armies of Spain seemed to be entirely destroyed, and the province lost to the Romans, one man, little known till then, of an ingenuous, though middling condition, reinstates their affairs there contrary to the opinion and hopes of all the World. Amongst those, who escaped the defeat of Cn. Scipio's army was a brave officer, in the flower of his years, named L. Marcius, the Son of Septimus, only a Roman Knight, but whose courage and capacity were much above the condition, in which he was born. He had strengthened and improved an excellent genius by the instructions and example of Cn. Scipio, under whom he had learnt during many years all that relates to the trade of war. And this was a certain means, for excelling in it. After the defeat and dispersion of both armies, he had drawn together all the soldiers that had escaped; and having added to them all he could draw out of the garrisons, he had formed a sufficiently considerable body of an army, with which he marched to join T. Fonteius, P. Scipio's Lieutenant. But the soldiers, then incamped on this side of the Iberus, in a place where they had intrenched themselves, having resolved that a military assembly should be held for the election of the person, that should command the army, they gave the preference of esteem and confidence to the Roman Knight against the Lieutenant General in so distinguished a manner, that they relieved one another upon their posts in order to give their suffrages, without ceasing to guard their works, and unanimously chose L. Marcius.

The little time that remained before the coming of the enemy, was employed in fortifying their camp, and in bringing provisions into it; the soldiers executing all the orders that were given them, not only with abundance of zeal and diligence, but with great courage and intrepidity.

But



But when they were informed, that Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo, had passed the Iberus, and approach-  
A. R. 540.  
Ant.C. 212.

ed with design to extirpate all the Romans that had escaped former defeats, and saw the signal of battle given by the newly elected General, remembering the Generals, who had commanded them before, under whose auspices and orders numerous armies used to march against the enemy, they all wept, some beating their heads, and lifting up their hands towards the Gods, whom they accused of their misfortune; others lying down upon the ground, and calling their antient Generals by their name. It was not possible to dry their tears, or silence their cries. The officers endeavoured to console them in vain; and Marcius himself made ineffectual remonstrances to them, mingled with kindness and severity, by demanding of them, “ why they abandoned themselves  
 “ in that manner to grief in lamenting like wo-  
 “ men, rather than to think of defending them-  
 “ selves, and the Commonwealth with them, and  
 “ of avenging the deaths of the Generals they  
 “ had loved so much.”

They were in this disposition, when on a sudden they heard the sound of the Carthaginian trumpets and the cries of the enemy, who were upon the point of attacking them. Then, passing in an instant from grief to indignation, and in a manner transported with fury and rage, they fell upon the Carthaginians who advanced with great security, and with an air of contempt. This unexpected charge put the Carthaginians into a consternation. They asked each other with surprize, “ where it was possible for the Romans to have  
 “ found so many soldiers after the defeat of their  
 “ armies? who could have inspired troops defeat-  
 “ ed and put to the rout so few days before with  
 “ so much confidence and boldness? What Gene-

A. R. 540.  
A. D. C. 212.

“ral could so soon supply the place of the two  
“Scipios killed in the field of battle? And lastly,  
“who had given them the signal of battle, and  
“commanded in their camp?” Whilst so unexpected a change kept them in great surprize, and quite out of themselves, the Romans without giving them time to recover, charged them with such fury, that at first they began to give ground full of fear and astonishment, and a moment after to betake themselves to open flight. The Romans, who pursued them with abundance of vigour, might have made a great slaughter of them: but, as they were exposed to some terrible dangers, in case the Carthaginians resumed courage, Marcius caused the retreat to be sounded immediately. And as they were animated by their success, and breathed nothing but blood and slaughter, he found no small difficulty to bring them back to their camp; having been obliged himself to stop those who carried the ensigns in front, and even to seize some of the most mutinous of them, who refused to obey. Such a conduct would do honour to a General, long accustomed to command armies. History abounds with battles lost, or victories not compleated by the imprudent activity of Commanders too intent upon pursuing flying enemies, without foreseeing the consequences. We shall soon see, that Marcius was far from wanting courage.

The Carthaginians, who had been pushed a great way, and with abundance of vigour, imagined that fear had prevented the Romans from pursuing them, and returned into their camp without any confusion, like troops that rather despised, than feared, their enemy. They were no less negligent after they had entered it. For though the Romans were almost at their gates, they still considered them as the remains and ruins of two  
armies,

armies, which they had defeated some days before ; and did not think it necessary to observe much discipline, or to keep themselves much upon their guard. Marcius was apprized of this negligence, and formed a design, which, at first sight, seemed rather rash than daring ; this was, to attack the Carthaginians in their lines, at a time when he had great reason to apprehend, they would attack him in his. And indeed, he judged with reason, that it was easier to make himself master of Asdrubal's camp, whilst he was alone, than to defend his own against the three Generals and three armies, when joined a second time. Besides which, he considered, that if his enterprize succeeded, he should reinstate the affairs of the Commonwealth in the province : and if it did not, that such a bold attempt would at least teach the enemy to fear him.

However, to prevent the surprize of his soldiers, and the darkness of the night, from occasioning confusion in the execution of so dangerous an enterprize, he thought it necessary to prepare them for it. Accordingly having assembled them, he spoke to them in terms to the following effect. *Brave soldiers, if you consider ever so little the singular veneration I had for the merit of our Generals, the Scipios, during their lives, and which I still retain for them after their deaths, and our present condition, you will agree, that if the office, to which you have raised me, is highly for my honour, it is also attended with great cares and anxiety. On the one side, my ever reviving grief for their loss, on the other, the perplexity in which I am to find means for preserving to the Commonwealth the unfortunate remains of our two armies, hang heavy upon me, and leave me not a moment's repose. The images of the two Scipios are night and day before my eyes. They often awake me in my sleep. They seem to speak*



A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

*to me, and I to bear them complain, and exhort me to avenge them; to avenge with them the Commonwealth and your comrades continually victorious in this country for so many years; to imitate their example, to conform to their maxims, and the methods of making war, which they always followed. I wish, soldiers, that you would enter into my way of thinking: that you would not pretend to honour the deaths of those two great men by tears, but when their remembrance recurs to your minds, that you would imagine you see them again at your head, that you hear them and march under their command to battle. It was undoubtedly this remembrance and image that animated you yesterday, when you put the Carthaginians to flight with an intrepidity, that made them know the Roman bravery had not expired with the Scipios, and that no misfortune could depress a people, whom the defeat at Cannæ was not capable of overwhelming. When I checked your ardor yesterday, it was not my design always to oppose your boldness; but to reserve it for a more favourable occasion. That occasion is now arrived. I am well informed, that there are neither sentinels nor guards posted round the enemy's camp according to the rules of war; and that every thing there argues exceeding negligence. It is highly for our good fortune, that they are so little afraid of us, and even have us in contempt. They do not imagine, that troops so lately defeated, have any thoughts of attacking them in their intrenchments. I will lead you against them in the dead of the night, and deliver them all into your hands asleep and without arms. (a) I know the undertaking is bold. But when people have most to fear, and least*

(a) Scio audax videri consilium. Sed in rebus asperis & tenui spe, fortissima quæque consilia tutissima sunt: quia, si in occasionis momento, cunctatus paulum fueris, nequicquam mox amissam quæras. Liv.

*to hope, bold counsels are the safest. For then it is necessary to seize the occasion the moment it offers, and not, by letting it escape, to hazard seeking it afterwards in vain. You have now only to deal with the army of our enemies that are near us. The two others are not far off. You have reason to hope, that you will overcome these first troops by attacking them without delay. They are not unknown to you. You have measured your strength with them in an action, wherein the whole advantage was on your side. If we delay ever so little, our success of yesterday will be known, and we shall be considered as enemies capable of making themselves formidable. All the Carthaginian Generals will then rejoin each other with all their forces. Shall we be able to sustain the weight of three armies, which Cn. Scipio could not withstand with all his forces together? In the same manner as our Generals perished in effect of having divided their armies, may our enemy now be overpowered whilst they are separated. What I propose to you is the only choice we have to make in the present conjuncture. Prepare therefore to improve the opportunity this night affords you. Retire now to refresh yourselves with nourishment and rest, in order to march afterwards, under the protection of the Gods, to attack the enemy's camp with the same vigour and courage you have defended your own.*

This new project, proposed by a new General, was heard with joy, and the bolder it was, the more it charmed them. They<sup>o</sup> passed the rest of the day in preparing their arms, and taking nourishment. They rested a great part of the night, and set out three or four hours before day.

About two leagues beyond the camp of the Carthaginians, on the side next Marcius, there were another body of Carthaginian troops, separated from the former by a deep valley, covered with shady trees. Marcius, by a stratagem of the nature

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

A. R. 540.  
A.D.C. 212.

ture of Hannibal's, had a Roman cohort with some cavalry in this valley. Having thus made himself master of the way by which the two Carthaginian armies could have communication, he led on his troops in silence against that which was nearest to him. As he found neither guards at the gates of the enemy's camp, nor sentinels upon the intrenchments, he entered it without any opposition, and with as much ease, as if it had been his own. At the same instant Marcius ordered the charge to be sounded, and the Romans with great cries dispersed themselves on all sides. Some killed the enemy half asleep in their beds : some set fire to their tents with dry stubble ; and others seized the gates, to cut off their flight. The fire, cries, and slaughter, prevented them from hearing any thing, and from taking any salutary measures. Astonishment seized them, and they had neither sense, nor motion : and if they did move, they fell naked and without arms into the hands of well-armed enemies. Some ran to the gates, and finding them occupied by the Romans, leaped over the intrenchments, and threw themselves headlong into the fossés. All who could quit this camp, made all the haste they could to the other : but they were all stopt and killed, from the first to the last, by the cohort and horse that had been placed in ambush in the middle of the way. And though some had even escaped this slaughter, the victors made with such expedition and rapidity from the first to the second camp, that it had been next to impossible to escape their diligence. The Romans found still more negligence here than in the other army, because being more distant from the enemy, they believed they had nothing to fear ; and because towards day-break most of them had quitted their camp to fetch in wood and forage, or to maraud. They only found the arms of the Carthaginians



nians left in their guard-houses, and the soldiers either sitting or lying upon the ground, walking along their works or before the gates of their camp, all without arms. It was in this state of security, that they saw themselves suddenly attacked by the Romans, flushed with the victory they had just gained : so that they could not prevent them from entering their camp. However they ran in crouds to the gates on the first cries and charge of the enemy, and a bloody engagement ensued. The action would have continued longer : but perceiving the shields of the Romans covered with blood, and judging from thence of the defeat of their comrades, they were seized with terror, immediately fled, and escaped where they could ; leaving the greatest part of their people upon the spot, and their camp in the hands of the victors.

Thus in the space of one night and a day L. Marcius took two camps, and defeated two considerable armies of the enemy. Authors differ concerning the number of those who were killed in these two actions. The spoils were great. A silver shield, that weighed an hundred and seven pounds, upon which the portrait of Asdrubal Hannibal's brother was engraved, was particularly remarkable amongst them. This shield was placed in the Capitol at Rome, and was lost when that temple was burnt in the Consulship of Scipio and Norbanus.

After this expedition, Spain continued some time at peace, both parties not daring to venture a decisive battle, after the considerable losses they had mutually sustained.

I do not know, whether in all the Roman history there be one military exploit more compleat in all its circumstances, more singular and remarkable from unexpected events, more important in its consequences, and more advantageous to the Commonwealth,

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

monwealth, than this of Marcius which we have just related. The entire defeat of the two armies which the Romans had in Spain, joined with the deaths of the two illustrious Generals who commanded them, had occasioned so general a consternation amongst the few of their troops, that remained in that province, that it seemed to leave neither hope nor resource. No obstacle could any longer oppose the passage of the Carthaginians into Italy, and if their victorious armies, that carried terror every where, could have joined that of Hannibal, as it had long been prepared to do, what would have become of Rome, and how would she have been able to make head against this new strength of so formidable an enemy?

A single, private man, breaks all these measures, and almost in a moment dispels so terrible a storm. Marcius draws together the wrecks of the Roman armies, and forms one body of the fugitive troops, whom fear had dispersed on all sides. He consoles, and animates them; and fills them with such courage and confidence, that they seem to have entirely forgotten that they had just before been defeated. We see here in the conduct of this officer all the ability and prudence of a General most consummate in the art of war. He confronts danger in all its extent without being dismayed by it. He thinks of nothing but to remedy it. He makes use both of force and stratagem. He judiciously seizes the occasion as soon as it offers, and takes advantage of every moment. He gives his orders with a coolness and tranquillity capable of reviving the courage of the most fearful. He seems bold even to rashness, and yet knows how to contain himself in the very heat of action, and not to give way to the ardor of victory, which often gets the better of the wisest. In a word, if we examine his whole conduct attentively, we shall see, that it is guided by a profound know;

knowledge in the art of war. A particular attention of the Divine Providence over the Roman empire is observable here.

Such accomplished merit, attended with such great and unexpected success, should, one would think, acquire him great applauses, and an highly glorious reward at Rome. We are going to see in what manner this affair passed there. Immediately after the action, he wrote to the Senate, and gave them an account of the whole. He had taken the title of *Proprætor* in his letter. When it was read, the great and glorious service he had rendered the Commonwealth was praised, which is all that is said of it: *Res gestæ magnificæ Senatui visæ*. But the major part of the fathers took offence at his assuming the quality of *Proprætor*, without having been elected so either by the Senate or People. It was judged “ of dangerous consequence for Generals to be chosen by the armies; and that the august authority of elections legally made by the suffrages of the People, and under the direction of the Gods themselves, consulted by the auspices, should be transferred into the provinces and camps, and abandoned to the rashness of the soldiers.” Some were for having the Senate’s opinion taken upon this head: but it was thought proper to defer that deliberation, till after the departure of the couriers, who had brought Marcius’s letter. As to the recruits and provisions which he demanded, he was answered that the Senate would make provision in respect to them. But it was not thought proper to give him the title of *Proprætor* in the answer sent him. It does not appear that this affair was spoke of any more in the Senate. An assembly was afterwards held, in which the election of Marcius was not expressly condemned, but it was rendered void in fact by the nomination of Claudius Nero to command in Spain.

A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

*Manner in which Marcius’s letter is received by the Senate.*  
Liv. xxvi. 2.

Liv. xxvi. 2.



A. R. 540.  
Ant. C. 212.

It does not suit me to censure the opinion of so wise a body of men so circumspect in their resolutions. I plainly perceive, that reasons of State obliged them to condemn the title which Marcius had assumed upon his own authority, and still more the liberty which the soldiers had taken of electing themselves a General: A liberty, which might have had fatal consequences, as it actually had under the Emperors, when the armies usurped a power of electing, without waiting the consent of either the Senate or People. But might not this censure have been attended with some mark of esteem, and some distinction of honour, after so highly considerable a service rendered the Commonwealth? The only word which the Senate says of it, is a very dry praise of an expedition acknowledged by themselves, *magnificæ*; of an action so prudently conducted, and so happily terminated. Marcius continued in the army in a distinguished rank, and we shall in the sequel see Scipio employ him honourably. This is perhaps all that brave Officer could desire.

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

CN. FULVIUS CENTUMALUS.  
P. SULPICIUS GALBA.

Cn Ful-  
vius is ac-  
cused be-  
fore the  
People, and  
sentenced.  
Liv. xx.  
2, 3.

Another affair, that concerned a person upon the spot, engrossed at that time the attention of the publick. The Tribune Cn. Sempronius Blæsus had cited Cn. Fulvius before the People, and accused him of having by his rashness occasioned the loss of the army he commanded the year before, as Prætor in Apulia. Of eighteen thousand men, of which it was composed, scarce two thousand had escaped. The Tribune declared, “that other Generals, through im-  
“prudence, had suffered themselves to fall in-  
“to ambuscades, where they had perished with  
their

“ their armies: but that Fulvius was the first,  
 “ who had lost his legions by vices and licen-  
 “ tiousness, before he exposed them to perishing  
 “ by the enemy’s swords. That accordingly it  
 “ might be said, that they had been defeated be-  
 “ fore they came to a battle, and were over-  
 “ come not by Hannibal, but by their General  
 “ himself. That those who gave their suffrages  
 “ in the assemblies, did not sufficiently examine,  
 “ whether he to whom they confided the com-  
 “ mand of armies, had the qualities necessary for  
 “ so important a trust. What difference there  
 “ was between Cn. Fulvius and Ti. Sempronius!  
 “ That the latter having been placed, at the head  
 “ of an army of slaves, had soon, by his good  
 “ conduct and the exact discipline he had caused  
 “ to be observed, made them, forgetting their  
 “ birth and condition, become the resource and  
 “ support of the allies, and the terror and scourge  
 “ of the enemy. That Fulvius, on the contra-  
 “ ry, had made Romans well born and bred,  
 “ and worthy of the name they bore, when he  
 “ took upon him the command of them, contract  
 “ all the vices of slaves. That in consequence  
 “ it was his fault, that they had become disor-  
 “ derly and turbulent amongst the allies, and ab-  
 “ ject and cowardly in the presence of the ene-  
 “ my; and that far from sustaining the charge of  
 “ the Carthaginians, they had not so much as  
 “ stood their first cries. That after all, it was  
 “ not to be wondered, that the soldiers had a-  
 “ bandoned their post on the first charge, as their  
 “ General had set them the example, by flying  
 “ first himself. How many Generals in the pre-  
 “ sent war, had chose rather to lose their lives  
 “ in the field of battle, than abandon their ar-  
 “ mies in danger. Was it not a shame, that  
 “ the soldiers of Cannæ, should have been bani-

A. R. 521. “ fled into Sicily, and that the same punishment  
 Ann. C. 211. “ had but lately been decreed against Fulvius’s  
 “ Legions, whilst the rashness of Fulvius him-  
 “ self remained unpunished; though the loss  
 “ of his army was solely to be imputed to him?

The accused laid the misfortune, that had happened, to his soldiers, and represented, “ that they  
 “ had fled through inability to sustain either the  
 “ courage of the enemy, or the terror of Han-  
 “ nibal’s name. That himself had been forced  
 “ along with them, against his will by the press  
 “ of his own troops, as Varro was at Cannæ,  
 “ and many others on different occasions. What  
 “ good could he have done the Commonwealth  
 “ by undertaking to resist the victors alone; un-  
 “ less it was supposed, that his death would have  
 “ been a consolation and remedy for the misfor-  
 “ tune of the public? That his army had not  
 “ perished by famine, and in effect of having  
 “ fallen into some ambush, for want of know-  
 “ ing the enemy: that they had been defeated  
 “ only by force of arms, and in a pitched bat-  
 “ tle: that lastly neither the courage of his own  
 “ soldiers, nor of the enemy, was in his power.”

He was accused at two different times, and at each time the sentence rose only to a fine. But when the witnesses were heard on the third accusation, and many testified upon oath, that the terror and flight began by Fulvius himself, the People were highly enraged; and the Tribune, changing the prosecution, demanded, that he should be punished as guilty of treason, and in order to that, that the Prætor should call an Assembly by Centuries. For it was only in that kind of Assemblies, which was the most solemn and the most general amongst the Romans, that treason could be tried.



The accused seeing the turn which his affair took, <sup>A. R. 548. Ant. C. 211,</sup> tried another resource. His brother Q. Fulvius was in great consideration, as well from the glory he had already acquired, as by that he was upon the point of adding to it by making himself master of Capua, which was then reduced to extremities. He prevailed upon him to write very moving letters to the Senate, in which he demanded permission to be present at his brother's trial, and to solicit for him. But the Senate having replied, that his demand could not be granted because his presence at Capua was necessary to the service of the public: Cn. Fulvius seeing that he had nothing farther to hope, did not stay till the day of the Assembly, and retired to Tarquinii into voluntary banishment. He was however sentenced, though absent, to suffer the banishment he had chosen.

After Capua had been taken, as I have observed before, the Senate ordered Claudius Nero, to <sup>Claudius Nero is sent into Spain. Liv. xxvi.</sup> chuse out of the two legions, he had commanded during the siege of that city, six thousand foot and three hundred horse, with the same number <sup>17.</sup> of Latin foot and eight hundred horse: to embark those troops at Puteoli, and to sail for Spain. When his fleet arrived at Tarraco, he landed his troops, and having drawn his ships ashore, he made the crews also take arms to augment his forces. Having afterwards advanced as far as the banks of the Iberus, he received from T. Fonteius and L. Marcius the troops they had commanded before his arrival.

Asdrubal son of Amilcar, was encamped at the <sup>Asdrubal</sup> Lapidés atri in Ausetania between the cities of Il- <sup>inclosed,</sup> liturgis and Mentissa (cities of the country now <sup>escapes out</sup> called Andalusia.) Nero seized the entrance of a <sup>of his</sup> defile in that place. Asdrubal, who apprehend- <sup>bands by</sup> ed being shut up by the enemy's army, sent him <sup>fraud.</sup> <sup>ibid.</sup>

A. R. 541.  
A.D. C. 211.

a trumpet, with orders to promise in his name, that in case he would suffer him to retire, he would, entirely evacuate Spain with all his troops. Nero having received this proposal with great joy, Asdrubal demanded an interview with him the next day, in which the Romans were to settle the conditions upon which the citadels of the cities were to be delivered up, and the day fixed, when the Carthaginians should withdraw their garrisons, and remove all that belonged to them without doing any injury to the inhabitants. Nero had no sooner agreed upon this meeting, than Asdrubal ordered his troops to begin at the close of the day, and to continue all night, to draw off from the defile with the utmost expedition, the heavy baggage of the army. Good care was taken not to let any great number of men depart that night; a smaller being more proper both to deceive the enemy by silence, and to facilitate a retreat through the narrow ways it was necessary to pass. The next day both sides met at the place of the interview: but the Carthaginian, by purposely holding long discourses, and writing down many superfluous things, spent the whole day without terminating any thing, so that it was necessary to put off the affair till the next day. Nothing farther was then decided; some new difficulties always arising, that required delay. In the mean time advantage was taken of all the nights. The greatest part of the infantry were already safe, when happily at the break of day, a thick fog covered the whole defile, and all the plains round about. The Carthaginian demanded and obtained a last delay under pretext of a festival, on which his nation were not permitted to treat of affairs. By the favour of the darkness he then quitted his camp with his cavalry and elephants; and without being incommoded in any manner by the enemy, he







he gained a post, in which he had nothing farther to fear from them. About ten in the morning the fog was dispersed, and discovered at once to the Romans both light and the fraud of the Carthaginians. Nero, ashamed of having suffered himself to be so grossly imposed upon, set out in pursuit of them. But Asdrubal did not think it proper to hazard a battle, and the whole terminated in some slight skirmishes of no effect. The Roman General ought to have known the Carthaginians better, and what was meant by the term *Punic Faith*.

Whether this beginning of Nero in Spain gave no great hopes from his commanding there; or, as is most probable, he was sent thither only till a General was chosen, that might be left a considerable time in that province; it is certain, that it was resolved at Rome to proceed to the election of a new Commander, to be placed at the head of the armies in Spain. This was a matter of great difficulty. All that was clearly conceived, was that too much care and attention could not be had in the choice of a Captain capable of supplying the place of two great Generals, who had been killed and defeated with their armies in the space of thirty days. The Senate deliberated concerning this choice, and not being able to determine about it, referred the affair to the People. The Assembly was appointed by the Consuls for the election of a Proconsul to command in Spain. It was expected, that before it was held, such as believed themselves worthy of so important an employment would offer themselves as Candidates. This was a mistake. Nobody appeared; which revived all the grief for the fatal blow that had deprived the Commonwealth of two Generals, whose places it was so difficult to supply. The citizens in the mean

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

*P. Scipio*  
*at the age*  
*of 24. is e-*  
*lected to*  
*command*  
*in Spain as*  
*Proconsul.*  
Liv. xxvi.  
18, 19.

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

time, notwithstanding their affliction, repaired to the Forum, upon the day of the Assembly; and there, with their eyes fixed upon the Magistrates and principal persons of the city, who looked mournfully upon each other without speaking, they felt the utmost anguish to see the affairs of the Commonwealth in so desperate a condition, that nobody dared to accept the command of the armies in Spain. At this moment, P. Scipio, the son of him of the same name, who had been killed in Spain, about twenty-four years of age, got upon an higher place where he might be seen by every body, and declared that he would take upon him that employment, if they would repose so much confidence in him. As soon as the assembly cast their eyes upon him, great cries of joy were heard on all sides, which seemed to foretell, that his command would be successful and glorious. They immediately proceeded to vote, and not only all the Centuries but every individual of which they were composed, from the first to the last, decreed, that P. Scipio should go to command in Spain.

When the affair was over, and the first heat of their zeal cooled, a mournful silence was seen to succeed such universal applauses, and sad reflections upon a precipitate election, in which favour had more share than prudence and reason. What gave them the most pain was his great youth. Some even took the misfortune that had befallen his house as a bad omen, and could not see him set out, without trembling, from a family, that were still in tears and mourning, to command in a province, where he was to make war and give battle between the tombs of his father and uncle.

Scipio perceiving this coldness, made a speech to the People, so full of a noble confidence, and spoke to them of his age, the command that had

had lately been confided to him, and the war he was going to make with so much elevation and greatness of soul, that he revived in them the ardor that had abated, and filled them with an assured hope, says Livy, superior to what men's promises, and the reasons, with which they support them, usually inspire, and which seemed to have something supernatural in it. And indeed Scipio did not only draw admiration upon himself by the talents and virtues, which he actually possessed, but by the wonderful address he had from his earliest youth of exalting their splendor by an outside and behaviour highly capable of attracting respect. In almost all that he proposed to the multitude, he gave them to understand, that the Gods themselves had instructed him therein either in dreams or secret inspirations; whether this was the effect of weakness and \* superstition in himself, or he had recourse to this artifice to render the citizens disposed to enter into his designs. It was in this view, that as soon as he had put on the robe of manhood, he took care never to do any action public or private, before he had been at the Capitol, and had passed a considerable time there in the temple. This custom, which he regularly observed ever after, occasioned some to believe, that he was descended from the Gods. The absurd story that prevailed concerning the birth of Alexander was revived in respect to him; and it was talked, that he was begot in effect of a commerce between his mother and an enormous serpent. Scipio seemed willing to confirm this opinion by the mysterious air with which he affected, ne-

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

\* Polybius Book X. proves, address and policy in Scipio.  
that it was not superstition, but



A. R. 541.  
A. L. C. 211.

ver to deny the fact, and at the same time never to affirm it.

I do not in this circumstance discern the greatness of soul and elevation of sentiments, that usually appeared in Scipio's conduct. There seems to me, to be narrowness and meanness of spirit in endeavouring to recommend one's self by falsehood and dissimulation. There (*a*) is even impiety in inclining to cover deceit and imposture with the adorable name of the Divinity. I know, that Minos and Lycurgus amongst the Greeks, and Numa amongst the Romans, made use of the same artifice to acquire the esteem and confidence of the People. But an example, vicious in itself, with whatever great name it is authorized, may indeed blind those who follow it, but cannot justify them. *Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile.*

Horn.

However it were, the marvellous things related of Scipio, had given the Romans an esteem and admiration for that young man, that rose almost to veneration: and it was in effect of them, that they charged him at so early an age with so important an employment and so considerable a war.

Scipio goes  
to Spain.  
Liv. xxvi  
19.

As soon as Scipio had been appointed Proconsul, he prepared for his departure. To the old troops, who had remained in Spain of the two defeated armies, and those which had gone from Puteoli with Nero, ten thousand foot and a thousand horse were added. M. Julius Silanus was also sent in quality of Proprætor, to assist Scipio in the functions of the command. When every thing was ready, that General set out of Ostia with a fleet of thirty gallies of five benches of

(*a*) In specie fictæ simulationis, sicut reliquæ virtutes, cum qua simul & sanctitatem & religionem tolli necesse est. ita pietas inesse non potest: *Cic. de nat. I. 3.*

oars. When he arrived at Tarraco, he held a kind of an Assembly of all the Ambassadors of the States of Spain in alliance with the Romans, who had repaired thither on the report of his coming. He gave them audience, and (a) spoke to them all with that confidence and greatness of soul, that solid merit inspires, in such a manner however that not a word escaped him, that could give room to suspect him either of pride or vanity; and that whilst he retained an air of sincerity which gained him their confidence, he gave his discourse all possible dignity.

When he set out from Tarraco, he visited the cities of the allies, and the winter-quarters of the army; and gave great praises to the soldiers, who, after two such cruel defeats upon the neck of each other, had by their valour preserved the province to the Roman People, and without giving the enemy time to take advantage of their victories, had obliged them to repass the Iberus; and lastly, by so faithful and generous a conduct, had defended the allies of the Commonwealth. He had Marcius always with him. The consideration, which he had for that Officer, and the praises he gave his valour, plainly shewed, that he was exempt from mean envy, and that which he least feared, was to find a person, that might either fully or divide his glory. Silanus succeeded Nero, and the new troops were put into winter-quarters. Scipio having provided for every thing, and taken all the necessary precautions with as much diligence as wisdom, returned to Tarraco.

(a) Ita claro ab ingenti virtutum suarum fiducia animo, ut nullum ferox verbum excideret; ingensque omnibus quæ diceret, cum majestas inesset tum fides. *Liv.*

A.R. 541.  
 Ant.C. 211.  
 Polyb. l.  
 ix. Ex-  
 cerpt. de  
 virt. & vit.  
 Liv. xxvi.  
 20.

A division had arose between the three Generals of the Carthaginians, and had made them take quite different winter-quarters; Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, was on the side next Cadiz upon the coast of the ocean; Mago in the middle of the country, especially beyond the \* forest of Castulon: Asdrubal the son of Amilcar, near the Iberus in the neighbourhood of Saguntum.

*Return of  
 Marcellus  
 to Rome.  
 He tri-  
 umphs by  
 Ovation.*  
 Liv. xxvi.  
 21.  
 Plut. in  
 Marc. p.  
 310.

About the end of the same campaign, Marcellus returned from Sicily to Rome. The Prætor C. Calpurnius assembled the Senate in the temple of Bellona, without the city according to custom, to give him audience. Marcellus there gave an account of his actions and victories: and after having modestly complained, as well in his own name, as in that of his soldiers, that after having driven the Carthaginians out of Sicily, and reduced the province again under the Romans, he had not been permitted to bring back his army; he demanded leave to enter the city in triumph. That honour was not granted him, not through any dissatisfaction, but because the war of Sicily did not seem to be terminated yet. He only obtained an Ovation, that is the smaller triumph. The day before he was to enter Rome he had the honours of the Great triumph upon the Alban mountain, a custom which had been established some years before, in the 521st year of Rome.

*Statues  
 and paint-  
 ings carri-  
 ed on his  
 triumph.*

When he entered the city, besides the picture that represented the taking of Syracuse, it was preceded by the Catapultæ, Balistæ, and all the other machines of war, which had fallen into his hands; by the superb ornaments, which the magnificence of the Kings had accumulated during a long peace in that capital city; by a great number of silver and brazen vases of exquisite workmanship,

\* In Andalusia.



rich moveables of all kinds, and famous statues, with which Syracuse was more adorned than any other of the Grecian cities. Eight elephants were also led in the procession, as a proof of his victories over the Carthaginians. Sosius of Syracuse, and Mericus of Spain, walked before Marcellus with crowns of gold on their heads. They had much contributed to the taking of the city. The freedom of the city and five hundred acres of land were given to them both; to Sosius in the territory of Syracuse, with any house in the city he should chuse; and to Mericus and the Spaniards, who had embraced the party of the Romans with him, one of the revolted cities of Sicily for their abode, and lands in the country, that had been confiscated by right of conquest.

Cicero highly praised the moderation of Marcellus in respect to the paintings and statues of the Syracusans. (a) Having taken Syracuse by force of arms, says that Orator, he might have brought away all that he found in it: But he consulted less the rights of victory than the laws of humanity; or rather he knew how to unite them, by observing a wise medium between both. He carried many masterpieces of art to Rome, and left at least as many at Syracuse, to adorn the one,

(a) In ornatu urbis habuit victoriae rationem, habuit humanitatis. Victoriae putabat esse, multa Romam deportare, quæ ornamēto esse possent: humanitatis, non plane spoliare urbem, præsertim quam conservare voluisset. In hac partitione ornatus, non plus victoria Marcelli populo Romano appetivit, quam humanitas Syracusanis reservavit. Romam quæ asportata sunt, ad æ-

dem Honoris atque Virtutis itemque aliis in locis videmus: nihil in ædibus, nihil in hortis posuit, nihil in suburbano. Putavit, si urbis ornamenta domum suam non contulisset, domum suam ornamēto urbi futuram. Syracusis autem per multa atque egregia reliquit; deum vero nullum violavit; nullum attigit. *Cic. Ver. de Sign.* 120, 121.

and

A. R. 541.  
 AN. C. 211.

and console the other. He even made it a duty of religion, not to take away any statues of their Gods from the latter; and as to those he caused to be brought to Rome, he placed them all in the temples of Virtue and Honour, and in other the like places, but none in his own houses or gardens; convinced that his house in having none of those ornaments would itself become the ornament of the city.

*Reflexions  
 upon the  
 statues and  
 paintings  
 exhibited  
 in the  
 triumph of  
 Marcellus.*

Livy and Plutarch do not judge so favourably of the conduct of Marcellus. They observe that it made way, undoubtedly contrary to his intention, for a disorder which occasioned great evils in the Commonwealth. “All (a) these fine works of painting and sculpture, says the first, were indeed spoils taken from the enemy, from whom the rights of war admitted them to be taken. But this was the unhappy beginning of that fatal taste, which the Romans conceived for the arts of Greece, that till then they had neither known nor esteemed; which soon induced them to plunder without scruple in the provinces, not only the houses of private persons, but the temples of the Gods; and at length to practise their sacrilegious thefts even in the temples of Rome, and particularly in those which Marcellus had so magnificently adorned. For, adds that Historian, we do not see at this time in the temples of Virtue and Honour the paintings and statues, that Marcellus had placed there, and which formerly attracted the curiosity of strangers.

(a) Hostium quidem illa spolia, & parta belli jaris: cæterum inde primum initium mirandi Græcarum artium opera. licentiaque hinc sacra profanaque omnia vulgè spoliandi, factum est: quæ postremo in Romanos deos, templum id ipsum primum, quod a Marcello eximie ornatum est, vertit. Liv. xxv. 40.

Plutarch

Plutarch insists still more strongly upon this re-  
flexion. “ Till then, says he, Rome had neither  
“ had, nor even known, these sumptuous and su-  
“ perfluous curiosities ; and those fine ornaments  
“ of sculpture, which are now so much sought af-  
“ ter, were not to be found in her. Full of  
“ arms taken from the Barbarians, and bloody  
“ spoils ; crowned with monuments of trophies  
“ and triumphs, she presented to the eye a sight,  
“ which had a martial air, and perfectly agreed  
“ with a warlike and victorious State. The  
“ People however were highly pleased with Mar-  
“ cellus for having adorned the city with so many  
“ fine works, which in their variety, include all  
“ the beauty, delicacy, and fine taste of the  
“ Greeks. Judicious persons were of a different  
“ opinion, and infinitely preferred the conduct  
“ of Fabius Maximus, who brought nothing of  
“ the like nature from the city of Tarentum,  
“ which he took two years afterwards : for he  
“ contented himself with the gold and all the o-  
“ ther useful riches ; but left the paintings and  
“ statues of the Gods in their places. It was up-  
“ on this occasion he said these memorable words :  
“ *Let us leave the Tarentines their offended Gods.*  
“ Marcellus was reproached first, with having ex-  
“ cited hatred and enmity against Rome, in cau-  
“ sing not only men, but \* Gods, to be led cap-  
“ tives in his triumph : and next with having  
“ made of a people accustomed to make war,  
“ and to cultivate their lands, and who knew not  
“ what luxury and softness were, one that piqued  
“ themselves no longer upon any thing but re-  
“ finement of taste for the arts, and conversed

\* Cicero says the contrary. Deum verò nullum violavit, nul-  
lum attigit.

“ solely



A. R. 541. "solely upon the beauty of these kind of works;  
 Ant. C. 211. "and the excellency of the artists."

Polybius, that most judicious Historian, in a fragment come down to us, examines whether the Romans did wisely in carrying to Rome the ornaments of the cities they had subjected; and concludes in the negative. He supports his opinion with two or three principal reasons.

First, if the Romans had aggrandized and exalted their country by what are called the fine arts, and all that depends on them, it is evident that they would have done well to have brought into it what had augmented its power and glory. But if it was by a very simple or plain kind of life, and an infinite remoteness from luxury and magnificence, that they had subjected the States, in which these ornaments were found in the greatest number and perfection, it must be confessed, that they committed a great fault in taking them away; for to depart from the manners; to which a people owe their victories, to assume those of the conquered, and to draw upon themselves in the consequence, the hatred that always attends violences of the kind we have been speaking of, is a conduct not to be excused.

Polybius has a second reason in this place which is very strong. And indeed, to treat subjected cities in this manner; to add to their afflictions for being conquered That of seeing themselves deprived of the precious monuments, that were the objects of their attachment and religion; to exhibit these foreign riches as a sight; to display them with pomp to the view of all the world, and even of those from whom they have been taken; and to make the calamities of others the ornaments of one's country, is in some measure to insult the misfortune of the conquered; is being desirous to perpetuate their shame and grief, and at the same time to excite a secret indigna-

indignation against the victors, which the view of such spoils must revive every day.

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

If the Romans had amassed only gold and silver in their conquests, their policy could not have been blamed on that account. In order to attain universal empire, it was necessary to deprive the conquered States of such riches and to appropriate them to themselves. But as for these wonders of the arts, it would have been much more glorious to have left them where they were, with the envy they attract, and to have placed the glory of their country, not in the abundance and beauty of paintings and statues, but in dignity of manners, and nobleness of sentiments.

Cato before Polybius, thought in the same manner and complained vehemently of the dangerous taste, that had been introduced at Rome, and even began to gain ground exceedingly. (a) “ I  
“ already hear, but too many persons, who praise  
“ with transports of admiration, these works,  
“ which constitute the ornament of Corinth and  
“ Athens, and laugh at the antiquated simplicity of  
“ the statues of our Gods. Believe me, when we  
“ introduced the statues of Syracuse into Rome,  
“ we brought in enemies, that sooner or later will  
“ occasion the ruin of the city.

Experience shewed how just these reflexions were. Greece, conquered by the Romans, conquered them in her turn by imparting her taste for the delicacy of the works of art to that people, who had hitherto been gross and ignorant in respect to them.

(a) Jam nimis multos audio Corinthi & Athenarum ornamenta laudantes mirantesque & ante fixa fictilia deorum Romanorum ridentes.—Infe-

sta, mihi credite, \* signa ab Syracusis illata sunt huic urbi.

\* The word Signa in this passage signifies statues, paintings, and military ensigns.

A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.  
Horat.  
Ep. i. l. 2.

Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit; & artes  
Intulit agresti Latio:

*Greece conquered won her haughty victors hearts;  
And rustick Latium fell before her arts:*

In the time of Cicero, this passion rose even to excess, or rather to a kind of madness and phrenzy. The governors of provinces left no work of painting or sculpture, that were in any esteem, either in the houses of private persons; or even in the temples of the Gods, and committed robberies in them, which rendered the name of the Roman People odious and execrable to foreign nations, as we see in one of Cicero's orations against Verres, entituled *De Signis*. This was one of the principal causes of the ruin of the empire. Luxury, (of which this passion for paintings and statues constituted a part,) *more powerful and more fatal, than all the armies of the enemy, subdued Rome, and avenged the conquered globe.*

Juvenal.

—————*Sævior armis*  
*Luxurîa incubuit, victumque ulciscitur orbem.*

Liv. xxvi.  
21.

After Marcellus had quitted Sicily, the Carthaginian fleet landed eight thousand foot and three thousand Numidian horse in that province. Those troops made some cities take arms in favour of the Carthaginians, and ravaged the lands of some of the allies of Rome. Besides which the Roman army, enraged at neither having been permitted to return to Rome with their General, nor to winter in the cities of Sicily, served with great repugnance and indolence; and the soldiers only wanted a leader for exciting a sedition in the province. The Prætor M. Cornelius surmounted all these difficulties. He pacified the soldiers by  
sometimes



sometimes treating them with kindness, and sometimes by speaking to them roughly; and he made the cities that had revolted return to their duty.

The two Consuls were in Apulia with their armies. But, as there was no longer so much to fear from Hannibal and the Carthaginians, they had orders to draw lots for Apulia and Macedonia. The latter fell to Sulpicius, whither he went to succeed Lævinus: Fulvius was recalled to Rome to preside at the election of the new magistrates for the following year. When the question was to nominate Consuls, the century of the youth called *Veturia*, to whom it had fallen by lot to vote first, chose T. Manlius Torquatus, and T. Otacilius.

A croud of people, assured that the plurality of voices, as it seldom failed to happen, would confirm this choice, had assembled round Manlius, who was present, to congratulate him upon his promotion. Manlius then approaching the Consul's tribunal, desired the favour of being heard. Every body was eager to know what he was going to ask, when he excused himself for not accepting the command upon account of the weakness of his eyes. He added, "That (*a*) it would be an excusable rashness in a General, as well as in a Pilot, when he could not act but by the eyes of another, to think of letting others confide their lives, and all that was dear to them, to his care. That therefore he desired the Consul to make the century of the youth, who had given their suffrages, vote again, and to exhort them to consider attentively, before they elected Consuls, the nature of the war to be carried on in Italy, and the state in which the Commonwealth

*Manlius Torquatus refuses the Consulship.*

(*a*) Impudentem & gubernatorem & imperatorem esse, qui, cum alienis oculis ei omnia agenda sint, postulet sibi aliorum capita ac fortunas committi. *Liv.*

A. R. 541. " then was. That they had scarce recovered the  
 Ant. C. 211. " alarm and terror, the approach of Hannibal  
 " had occasioned in Rome; when that formida-  
 " ble enemy had made his troops advance some  
 " few months before to the very gates of the  
 " city." The century replied, that they persisted  
 in their opinion, and should not depart from the  
 choice they had just made.

*Admirable* Torquatus then assuming a sterner tone: *If I am*  
*wisdom of Consul*, said he, *I shall neither be able to bear the*  
*the youth of* looseness of your manners, nor you the severity of my  
*the century* command. Go then, and vote again; and remember  
*Veturia.* we have a war in Italy against the Carthaginians,  
 and that Hannibal is at their head. The tone of  
 authority which Manlius had assumed, and the ad-  
 miration of his generosity signified by an universal  
 applause, made the century sensible, that it was  
 necessary to think of another choice. But before  
 they proceeded to it, they demanded permission  
 of the Consul, to consult their elders, that is the  
 old men that formed the other part of the century,  
 called also *Veturia*. Time was allowed the seniors  
 to confer with the youth in the inclosure or \* *fald*,  
 (*in ovili*) into which each century went in its turn  
 to give its suffrage. The seniors told them, " That  
 " there were three persons, of whom they might  
 " consider which to chuse; two of them had al-  
 " ready exercised the first offices of the Common-  
 " wealth with honour; these were Q. Fabius, and  
 " M. Marcellus. And in case they thought fit  
 " to chuse a new General against the Carthagini-  
 " ans, that M. Valerius Lævinus had signalized  
 " himself by sea and land in the war, in which he  
 " had commanded against Philip." The old men  
 withdrew, and the Youth, after having consulted

\* This place was surrounded sheep-folds, from whence it took  
 with rails, or burdles, like its name, ovile.

together,

together, chose M. Marcellus, all glorious from his late conquest of Sicily, and M. Valerius. All the centuries approved this choice. A. R. 541.  
Ant. C. 211.

(a) Livy, after having related this fact, cannot help exclaiming against those of his time, who derided the manners of the ancients, and affected to turn their admirers into ridicule. *For my part, says he, I am convinced, that if there ever was a Commonwealth of wise men, such as the learned have rather imagined than known, (he alludes to Plato's Commonwealth) it could not be composed either of chiefs more moderate, and less desirous of honours, or of a People better disciplined and more docile. But in particular, that the century of the youth should consult that of the seniors, concerning the choice they should make, is what scarce seems probable in these days, when the authority of fathers themselves is so little respected by their children.* This last stroke shews how much Rome had degenerated from the manners of the ancient times, when childrens want of respect for their parents would have appeared something monstrous.

After the election of the Consuls, the Prætors were chosen. At that time, news came that T. Otacilius, for whom the Consulship had been intended, was dead in Sicily.

The games called *Ludi Apollinares* had been celebrated the year before, and the Prætor Calpurnius having proposed, that they should be celebrated again this year, the Senate decreed, that they

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>(a) Eludant nunc antiqua mirantes. Non equidem, si qua sit sapientum civitas, quam docti fingunt magis quàm norunt, aut principes gravioribus temperantioresque à cupidine imperii, aut multitudinem melius moratam censeam fieri pos-</p> | <p>se. Centuriam verò juniorum seniores verè consulere voluisse, quibus imperium suffragio mandaret, vix ut verisimile sit, parentum quoque hoc seculo vilis levisque apud liberos auctoritas fecit.</p> |
|---|--|



A. R. 541. should be celebrated annually for the future, which  
 Ant. C. 211. however was not put in execution till four years  
 Liv. xxvi. after.  
 23.

*Treaty  
 concluded  
 by the  
 Prætor  
 Valerius  
 between  
 the Ro-  
 mans and  
 the Æto-  
 lians.*  
 Liv. xxvi.  
 24.

At the same time M. Valerius Lævinus, who, as we have said above, had been sent with a fleet and some troops into Greece and Macedonia, in order to weaken Philip, endeavoured to debauch some of his allies from him. The \* Ætolians at that time made a considerable figure in Greece. They were a fierce and brutal People, and had rendered themselves formidable to all their neighbours by their violences, and the more, as they were skilled in military affairs, and excelled especially in cavalry. Valerius began by founding the disposition of the principal persons of the nation in private conversations ; and after having brought them over, he repaired with the fleet well equipped to the place, where the general assembly was to be held : it had been called expressly some time before.

“ There, after having related in what flourishing  
 “ condition the affairs of the Romans were, and  
 “ proved it by the taking of Syracuse in Sicily ;  
 “ and of Capua in Italy ; he highly extolled the  
 “ generosity and fidelity of the Romans to their  
 “ allies. He added, that the Ætolians might ex-  
 “ pect to be treated so much the better by them,  
 “ as they would be the first people beyond sea,  
 “ that had made an alliance with them. That  
 “ Philip and the Macedonians were dangerous  
 “ neighbours to them, from whom they had eve-  
 “ ry thing to fear. That Rome had already very  
 “ much humbled their pride, and well knew  
 “ how to reduce them, not only to restore the  
 “ places they had taken from the Ætolians,  
 “ but even to apprehend for their own country.

\* *Ætolia, now called the Turkey in Europe, is situated  
 Despotism, a small country of upon the coast of the Ionian sea.*

“ That as to the Acarnanians, who had separated  
 “ themselves from the body and society of the  
 “ Ætolians, she would make them comply with  
 “ the same conditions, and return to the same  
 “ dependance they had been under in former  
 “ times.”

A. R. 541.  
 Ant. C. 211.

Scopas, who held the first dignity at that time amongst the Ætolians, and Dorimachus, the most popular of their Senators, very much supported the discourse and promises of Valerius, and went much farther than him in respect to the Roman greatness and power, because they were not obliged to be so much reserved as he upon that head; and every body was more disposed to believe them, than a stranger, speaking for the interests of his country. What pleased them most, was the hope of reducing Acarnania again under their power. The treaty in consequence was concluded between the Romans and Ætolians. A clause was added to it, by which the Eleans, Lacedæmonians, Attalus King of Pergamus, Pleurates and Scerdiledæus, the first King of Thrace, and the other of Illyricum, were left at liberty to accede to it. The Ætolians engaged to declare immediately, and to make war upon Philip, and the Romans to supply them with at least twenty galleys *Quinqueremes*. All the cities from Ætolia to the island of Corcyra, with their dependencies, were abandoned to the Ætolians. All the spoils were to belong to the Romans, who obliged themselves to act in such a manner, as to re-instate the Ætolians in possession of \* Acarnania. It was also stipulated, that the Ætolians should not make peace with Philip, but upon condition, that he should not attack the Romans or their allies; and that the Romans on their side should enter into the same engagement. Acts.

\* *Hodie La Carnia. It is part of the Despotship.*

A. R. 541.  
 AN. C. 211.

of hostility were immediately began. Some cities were taken from Philip: after which Lævinus retired to Corcyra, well convinced, that the King had affairs and enemies enough upon his hands to divert him from thinking of Italy and Hannibal.

*Motions of  
 the Ætoli-  
 ans and  
 Philip.  
 Surpri-  
 zing reso-  
 lution of  
 the Acar-  
 nians.*

Liv. xxvi.  
 25.

Philip passed the winter at Pella his capital, when he received advice of the treaty of the Ætoli-ans. In order to be in a condition to march as- soon as possible against them, he applied himself in putting the affairs of Macedonia in order, and to secure it against the insults of its neighbours. Scopas, on his side, prepared to act against the Acarnanians; who finding themselves incapable of making head at once against two such potent states as Ætolia and Rome, armed however, rather through despair and fury than reason, and re- solved to sell their lives dear. Having sent into Epirus, upon which they bordered, their wives, children, and the old men above sixty, all the rest from fifteen to sixty took an oath not to return from the war except victorious, and not to receive into the city, their houses, or at their tables, any person whatsoever, that should abandon the field of battle, after having been defeated. They made the most terrible imprecations against themselves, if they failed in their engagement; and only desi- red of the Epirots to bury those in one grave, who should die in battle, with this inscription: HERE LIE THE ACARNANIANS, WHO DIED FIGHTING FOR THEIR COUNTRY AGAINST THE VIOLENCE AND INJUSTICE OF THE ÆTOLIANS. They set out that instant full of courage to meet the enemy upon their frontiers. Such a resolution terrified the Ætoli-ans. Besides which they were informed, that Philip was already upon his march to aid his allies. This induced them to retire with precipitation, and Philip did the same.

At



At the beginning of the spring, Lævinus be-  
 sieged \* Anticyra by sea and land, which surren-  
 dered soon after. He evacuated it to the Ætoli-  
 ans, who had seconded him in the siege, and kept  
 only the spoils, as had been agreed by the treaty.  
 He there received advice, that he had been elect-  
 ed Consul in his absence, and that P. Sulpicius  
 was set out to succeed him. But having been ta-  
 ken ill of a disorder rather long than dangerous,  
 he did not go to Rome, till much later than he  
 was expected.

A. R. 541.  
 Ant. C. 211.  
 Lævinus  
 besieges  
 and takes  
 Anticyra.  
 He re-  
 ceives ad-  
 vice of his  
 being cho-  
 sen Consul.  
 Liv. xxvi.  
 26.

S E C T. III.

*Marcellus enters upon office. Complaints of the Peo-  
 ple. Great fire at Rome. The Campanians,  
 who set the city on fire, punished with death.  
 Complaints of the Campanians against Fulvius.  
 They follow Lævinus to Rome, in his return from  
 Sicily. Complaints of the Sicilians against Mar-  
 cellus. Consequences of that affair, which at length  
 terminates happily. Severe sentence passed by the  
 Senate against the Campanians. Decree in respect  
 to the fleet, which occasions great murmurs. Sa-  
 lutory counsels of the Consul Lævinus. The whole  
 people, in emulation of each other, carry in their  
 gold and silver into the publick treasury. Hanni-  
 bal's cruel resolution in respect to the cities in his al-  
 liance. Salapia retaken by the Romans. Defeat  
 of a Roman fleet by that of Tarentum. The gar-  
 rison of the citadel of Tarentum gains an advantage  
 over that of the place. Affairs of Sicily. Lævi-  
 nus makes himself master of Agrigentum, and  
 drives the Carthaginians entirely out of Sicily. Af-  
 fairs of Spain. Scipio forms a great design, and*

\* A small city in the gulf of Lepanto, now called Suola. It was famous amongst the an-  
 tients for Hellebore, which its soil produced in abundance.

*pares every thing for the execution of it during the winter season. The army and fleet set out together, and arrive at the same time before Carthagera. Situation of that city. It is besieged by sea and land. Carthagera taken by assault and scaling. Its plunder considerable. Manner of dividing the spoils used by the Romans. Scipio harangues the victorious army, and praises the valour and zeal of the troops. Very warm dispute concerning the mural crown, terminated pacifically by Scipio. Scipio's generosity to the hostages and prisoners. His wise conduct in respect to the Ladies found amongst the hostages. He restores a young princess of exquisite beauty to Alucius. Warm gratitude of that Prince. Praise of Scipio. He sends Lælius to Rome, to carry the news of his victory. He exercises the land and sea forces. Scipio returns to Tarraco. The Carthaginians conceal their grief for the loss of Carthagera.*

A. R. 542.  
A. C. 210.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS IV.

M. VALERIUS LÆVINUS II.

*Marcellus enters upon office.*  
Liv. xxvi. 26.

**M**arcellus having entered upon office on the Ides of March (the fifteenth) assembled the Senate that day only for form-sake, having declared, “ that he would enter upon no affair relating  
“ to the Commonwealth, or the provinces of  
“ the Generals, in the absence of his Colleague.  
“ That he knew there was a great number of Sicilians in the neighbourhood of Rome, in the  
“ houses of those, who envied his glory; and  
“ that far from preventing them openly to lay  
“ the accusations calumny had invented against  
“ him in Rome, he would immediately have given  
“ them audience in the Senate, if those strangers  
“ had not industriously given out, that they da-  
“ red

“red not speak against the Consul in the absence A. R. 542.  
 “of his Collegue. That assoon as Lævinus should Ant. C. 210.  
 “arrive at Rome, he would introduce the Si-  
 “cilians into the Senate, and not suffer any  
 “other affair to be brought on till they had  
 “been heard. That M. Cornelius (Prætor of  
 “Sicily) had in a manner caused a drum to be  
 “beat throughout the province, for accusers a-  
 “gainst him, and had sent as many as he could  
 “of them to Rome. And that, to fully his re-  
 “putation, he actually wrote continually to his  
 “friends in the city, that the war was not ter-  
 “minated in Sicily.”

The Consul having made every body admire  
 his reserve and moderation, dismissed the Senate.  
 It seemed as if nothing was to be done till the  
 arrival of the other Consul. Idleness as is usual,  
 excited the murmurs of the People. “They Com-  
 “complained of the evils occasioned by a long plaints of  
 “war. That all the countries, through which the Peo-  
 “Hannibal had passed, were ruined, and made de- ple.  
 “farts. That Italy was exhausted by levies. That  
 “they lost some great battle every year; and that  
 “two Generals had been elected Consuls of an ac-  
 “tive restless disposition that breathed nothing but  
 “battle, and were so far from being of a temper to  
 “suffer the people to take any repose in war, that  
 “they were capable of disturbing the tranquility of  
 “the Commonwealth in times of entire peace.

A fire, which happened in several parts of the Great fire  
 Forum at once in the night, interrupted these dis- at Rome.  
 courses. It continued burning an whole night  
 and day, and consumed a great number of build-  
 ings. It appeared evidently to be the effect of ma-  
 lice, and not of accident. It was for this reason,  
 that the Consul, by the authority of the Senate,  
 declared in full Assembly, that whoever would  
 discover the criminal, should, if free, have a sum  
 of



A. R. 522.  
Ant. C. 213.  
*Campani-  
ans au-  
thors of  
this fire.*

of money, and his liberty, if a slave. This promise induced a slave named Mannus to accuse the Calavii his masters, with five other persons of the best families in Capua, whose fathers had been beheaded by the order of Q. Fulvius. They were seized with their slaves. At first they denied the fact. But when they saw, that those whom they had employed for setting the city on fire, were put to the torture in the middle of the Forum they confessed the whole. They were all punished with death, and their accomplices; and the informer for his reward, besides his liberty, received a sum \* of money which amounted to very near fifty pounds sterling.

*Complaints  
of the  
Campani-  
ans against  
Flaccus.  
They fol-  
low Læ-  
vinus on  
his return  
from Sicily  
to Rome.*

The Consul Lævinus passing through Capua on his return from Greece, was surrounded by a great throng of the Campanians, who conjured him with tears in their eyes, to suffer them to go to Rome, to throw themselves at the feet of the Senate, to implore its mercy if possible, and to beg, that they would not suffer Flaccus to extirpate them entirely, and to abolish the very name of Campanian, as he seemed to design. Flaccus to this invective replied, “ that he had no personal  
“ enmity for the Campanians: but that he hated  
“ them as the declared enemies of the Common-  
“ wealth, and that he should never cease to treat  
“ them as such, as long as he found them in-  
“ clined as they were in respect to Rome. That  
“ there was not a people in the world, that had  
“ so confirmed an hatred for the Roman name.  
“ That the reason why he kept them within the  
“ walls, was because those of them, that could  
“ get out, dispersed immediately about the coun-  
“ try, like wild beasts, killing and destroying  
“ whatever came in their way. That some of

\* Viginti millia æris.

“ them

“ them had taken refuge with Hannibal, and o- A. R. 542.  
 “ thers gone to Rome, to set it on fire. That Ant. C. 210.  
 “ the Consul on his arrival in that city, would  
 “ find recent traces, of the guilt of those fran-  
 “ tic wretches in the midst of the forum. That  
 “ as for him, he did not think it safe to let the  
 “ Campanians enter Rome.” Lævinus, having  
 obliged the Campanians to swear to Flaccus, that  
 they would return to Capua five days after they  
 should have received the Senate’s answer, com-  
 manded them to follow him to Rome.

He entered Rome with this train, which was  
 augmented by the Sicilians, who came to meet  
 him ; bringing along with him, to accuse two Ge-  
 nerals, who had acquired immortal glory by taking  
 two of the most famous cities in the world, the  
 very people their arms had conquered.

The first thing the Consuls brought on, was  
 the dispositions it was necessary to make for the  
 campaign, upon which they were entering. Læ-  
 vinus gave an account of the situation of affairs  
 in Macedonia and Greece ; those of the Ætoli-  
 ans, Acarnanians and Locrians ; and of what he  
 had done himself both by sea and land. The  
 Senate afterwards regulated every thing in respect  
 to the provinces as well of the Consuls, as of the  
 other Commanders. . And as to what regarded the  
 Consuls in particular, it was decreed that one of  
 them should remain in Italy against Hannibal ;  
 that the other should go to Sicily ; and that the  
 Commonwealth should have this year, only one  
 and twenty Legions on foot.

After the Senate had entirely regulated what  
 regarded the distribution of the Commanders and  
 troops, the Consuls drew lots for their provinces.  
 Sicily fell to Marcellus, with his command of the  
 fleet ; and Lævinus had the command in Italy a-  
 gainst Hannibal. When the Sicilians, who were  
 in

A. R. 542.  
 Ant. C. 210.  
*Complaints*  
*of the Sici-*  
*lians a-*  
*gainst*  
*Marcel-*  
*lus.*  
*Conse-*  
*quence of*  
*that af-*  
*fair,*  
*which at*  
*last termi-*  
*nates hap-*  
*pily.*  
 Liv. xxvi.  
 29—32.  
 Plut. in  
 Marc.  
 311.

in the porch of the Senate-house, heard how the  
 lots had fallen, they were so much afflicted, that a  
 second taking of Syracuse could not have grieved  
 them more. They raised mournful cries, that  
 drew upon them the eyes of the whole assembly,  
 and made way for different reflections. In their  
 consternation they addressed their complaints to all  
 the Senators in general, and to each of them in  
 particular; protesting “that they would aban-  
 “don their country and Sicily, if Marcellus re-  
 “turned thither with the supreme authority. That  
 “before they had given him any cause of dis-  
 “content, he had acted with excessive rigour,  
 “and had shewn implacable wrath in respect to  
 “them: and what might they expect after the  
 “complaints, which he knew they had brought  
 “to Rome against him. That it would be more  
 “advantageous for that unhappy island to be de-  
 “stroyed by the flames of mount Ætna, or swal-  
 “lowed up by the waves of the sea, than to be  
 “abandoned to the revenge of its declared ene-  
 “my.”

These bitter complaints, often repeated in the  
 houses of the Great, who were moved with them,  
 in proportion, either of their compassion for the  
 Sicilians, or envy for Marcellus, came to be talk-  
 ed of in the Senate. The Consuls were desired to  
 agree to consult the fathers in respect to the ex-  
 change of their provinces.

Marcellus replied, “that if the Sicilians had  
 “been admitted to audience in the Senate, he  
 “should perhaps have thought and acted in ano-  
 “ther manner, than he was disposed to do. But  
 “not to give any one room to say, that fear had  
 “prevented them from speaking with entire liber-  
 “ty against a man, to whose power they were  
 “upon the point of being subjected, he was rea-  
 “dy, if his colleague did not think it inconveni-  
 “ent,



“ ent, to change provinces with him. That he  
 “ only begged the Senate not to decide before-  
 “ hand in favour of the Sicilians against him, by  
 “ passing a decree for such exchange. As it would  
 “ not have been reasonable, added he, to give  
 “ Lævinus his choice of the provinces without  
 “ leaving the determination to chance, it would  
 “ be doing me a signal affront, to give him an  
 “ employment fallen to me.

A. R. 542.  
 Ant. C. 210.

The Senate, after having expressed what they  
 desired, but without decreeing it, withdrew. The  
 Consuls then conferred together, and changed  
 provinces: fate, says Livy, breaking through all  
 obstacles, to oppose Marcellus to Hannibal; in  
 order that, as he was the first of the Romans who  
 had the glory of defeating him, he might also be  
 the last that the Carthaginians should boast of hav-  
 ing made fall in his snares; and that at a time  
 when the Roman arms were successful, and refu-  
 med the superiority.

After the exchange of the provinces, the Sicili-  
 ans having been introduced into the Senate, began  
 their harangue with the praise of King Hiero; ta-  
 king honour to the whole people of Syracuse for  
 the services and faithful attachment of that Prince  
 to the Commonwealth of Rome. They added,  
 “ That the citizens of Syracuse had had no part  
 “ in the infraction of the alliance and treaties, nor  
 “ in any of the violences consequential of it.  
 “ That Hieronymus first, and Hippocrates and  
 “ Epicydes after, exercising a cruel tyranny over  
 “ them, had in a manner kept them in chains:  
 “ but that their hearts had always been for the  
 “ Romans. That they had given undoubted  
 “ proofs of this in all times. That seventy of the  
 “ principal youth of the city had formed a con-  
 “ spiracy against Hippocrates and Epicydes,  
 “ which had miscarried only through the fault of  
 “ Marcellus.

A. R. 542. " Marcellus. That the most considerable persons  
Ant. C. 210. " of Syracuse had continually gone to and fro  
" between his camp and the city, to assure him,  
" that they would deliver up the city to him when  
" he pleased. That he had taken little notice of  
" these advances, through the hope of acquiring  
" great fame by taking the city by force. That  
" not being able to succeed in that, he had chose  
" rather to treat for the surrendry of the place  
" with Sasis and Mercius, men of nothing, than  
" with the principal citizens, who had so often  
" made him the proposal, without having ever  
" been hearkened to; in order, no doubt, to  
" have a more plausible pretext to plunder and  
" destroy the most ancient of the allies of the  
" Roman People. That accordingly Marcellus  
" had treated them with the utmost inhumanity :  
" that, except the houses stripped of every thing,  
" there was nothing remaining in Syracuse. That  
" they implored the Senate to take compassion of  
" their misery, and to cause all to be returned,  
" that could be restored to them."

After they had made this heavy complaint, Lævinus ordered them to quit the house, in order to his taking the opinions of the Senators. But Marcellus taking the word: *No, no, said he, let them stay, that I may answer in their presence; since our reward for making war for you, is to have those we have subjected to your power for accusers. Let Capua and Syracuse, taken the same year, have the satisfaction of having cited their victors before your tribunal.*

The deputies accordingly returned into the house, and Marcellus resuming his discourse, said as follows: *I have not so much forgot the majesty of the Roman people, nor the dignity of the office I am now in, to make a Consul descend so low, as to answer the accusations of these Greeks, if it were that*

*that should now appear as criminal. But the question is much less to examine here into the treatment they have had from me, than the punishment their revolt deserved. If they have not been our enemies, there is no difference in my having injured Syracuse at present, or having done so in Hiero's time. But if they have revolted against us; if they have pursued our Ambassadors sword in hand; if they have shut their gates against us; if they have defended the Carthaginian armies; can they complain of having suffered hostilities, they, who have committed such cruel ones in respect to us? The concealing of those only with whom they accuse me of having treated, is a proof, that I have not rejected any persons, who have offered themselves to serve the Commonwealth. Even before I besieged Syracuse, I did my utmost to conclude a peace with the Syracusans, sometimes by sending Ambassadors, sometimes by going myself to hold conferences with them. But seeing they carried their insolence so far as to insult our Ambassadors, and even myself, I found myself obliged against my will to have recourse to arms. It is to Hannibal, and the Carthaginians conquered with them, that they should complain of the severity they have met with; and not in the Senate of the victors. As for me, I aver, that I have done nothing contrary to the laws of war, and the rules of equity. It is for you to authorize the dispositions I have thought proper to make; that is more immediately the concern of the Commonwealth, than mine. I have done my duty. It is for you to take care, that by disapproving and annulling what I have done, you do not render other Generals less warm and zealous for the service of the Commonwealth.*

Marcellus, after having spoke thus, quitted the Senate, and went to the Capitol, in order to make the levies; and the Sicilian deputies also retired. Lævinus then brought the affair into deliberation. Opinions were divided for some considerable time.



A. R. 542.  
A.D. C. 210.

Most of them seconded T. Manlius Torquatus, who had expressed himself to this effect: *That the Generals of the Commonwealth had been appointed to make war against the Tyrants, who were equally enemies of Syracuse and Rome, and not against Syracuse itself. That it had been their duty to deliver it as an ally, and not to take it as an enemy; and after having taken it, to restore its laws and liberty, and not to plunder and ruin it. If Hiero, that most faithful friend and ally, should return to the earth, would any body have the boldness to shew him, on the one side Syracuse half ruined, and deprived of all the ornaments that adorned it in his time; and on the other, Rome enriched with the spoils of his unfortunate country.*

Notwithstanding these vehement declarations, which had for their principle, in some, compassion for the Sicilians, and in others, envy of Marcellus, the decree passed by the Senate was moderate enough, and sufficiently in favour of the Consul. Every thing he had done, and all the regulations he had made during the war, and since his victory, were confirmed, and orders given for their execution. The Senate declared, that it would take care of the interests of the Syracusans, and directed the Consul Lævinus to afford them all the redress and relief, that should not extend to the detriment of the Commonwealth.

Two Senators were immediately sent to the Capitol, to bring back Marcellus, and the Sicilians having also re-entered the Senate, the decree, that had just been passed, was read in the presence of the parties concerned. The deputies of Syracuse were dismissed, after having been treated with all possible marks of amity and good-will. But before they withdrew, they threw themselves at the feet of Marcellus, desiring and conjuring him to  
pardon

pardon them for saying all they could, in order to A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210. excite some sense of compassion for their unfortunate country, and to vouchsafe to receive the city of Syracuse under his protection, and to consider its inhabitants as his clients. The Consul answered them with abundance of goodness and clemency.

The Syracusans, after the return of the deputies, Plut. paid Marcellus all the great honours they could imagine; instituted a festival, to which they gave Marcellus his name, and which still subsisted in Cicero's leat. time; and decreed by an express law, that as often as Marcellus, or any of his family, should come to Syracuse, the Syracusans should wear wreaths of flowers, and offer sacrifices to the Gods by way of thanksgiving. Marcellus, on his side, made it for his honour to protect them; and his descendants, as long as his name and family subsisted, were always the patrons of Syracuse.

Thus terminated, to the content and glory of both parties, an affair that began with so much warmth, but which seemed however less excited by the resentment of the people of Syracuse, than by the envy of some Romans, enemies to Marcellus, as Plutarch expressly tells us.

The Senate afterwards gave the deputies of Capua audience. Their complaints were still more Severe sentence passed by the Senate against the Campanians. lamentable than those of the Sicilians; but their cause was not so favourable. For they could not deny, but they had deserved to be punished rigorously; and they had not, like the others, a specious pretext for laying their revolt to the charge of the Tyrants: but they believed, that so many Senators as had either been poisoned or beheaded, were a sufficient satisfaction. They added, "That

" only a small number of the nobility remained  
 " at Capua, whose consciences had not reproach-  
 " ed them so much, as to induce them to deprive  
 " themselves of life; and whom the victor had

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Ant. C. 210.

“ not deemed criminal enough to be punished  
“ with death. That they demanded liberty for  
“ them and theirs, with part of their fortunes.  
“ That they expected this grace from the Ro-  
“ mans, most of whom were related to them by  
“ alliance or blood, since the many marriages,  
“ contracted between the two States.

After these deputies had quitted the Senate, it was deliberated for some time, whether Q. Fulvius should be made to return from Capua, in order that this affair, which concerned him personally, and in which he must be better informed than any one else, might be treated in his presence. It was at length agreed, that it was not proper to make him quit his post, where his presence was necessary ; and the less as there were several Senators present, who having served in the army during the siege of Capua, had been witnesses of all that had passed there, and could inform the Senate of it.

The affair was therefore brought upon the carpet. M. Atilius, the most distinguished of those who had served under Flaccus against the Campanians, having been desired to give his opinion, spoke to this effect. *I was of the council held by the Proconsuls after the taking of Capua. After we had enquired what Campanians had done our Commonwealth any service, we found only two women, namely Vestia Oppia of the city of Atella, and Fauscula Cluvia formerly a courtezan. The first did not let one day pass without offering sacrifices to the Gods for the safety and success of the Roman People : the other secretly supplied such of our prisoners as wanted them with provisions. All the rest of the Campanians have been actuated by an hatred for us equal to that of the Carthaginians. And Q. Fulvius rather cut off the heads of the most illustrious, than of the most criminal, of that people. For the rest, I do not see, that the Senate can decide in respect to the Campanians,*



*nians, who are Roman citizens, without consulting the People.* A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

Upon the remonstrance of Atilius, the People were consulted by one of their Tribunes, and they referred the affair entirely to the Senate.

In consequence of this decree of the People, the Senate began by restoring their estates and liberty to Oppia and Cluvia, adding, that if they desired to ask any other reward of the Senate, they had only to repair to Rome. How laudable is Oppia's zeal, who every day offered sacrifices for the Romans: but what a reproach is this for such persons as are now-a-days so little concerned for the good of the publick.

Different decrees were made in respect to each family of the Campanians, which it would be too long to repeat. It was ordained, that none of those who were in Capua, whilst the gates had been shut to the Romans, should continue either in the City or territory after a certain day; and a place beyond and at some distance from the Tiber was assigned them to settle in. Others less criminal were placed at less distance from Capua. None of them were allowed to possess lands or houses at less than fifteen miles from the sea. The estates of all the Senators were sold at Capua, and of all those, who had been magistrates, either in that city, Atella or Callatia, places in its neighbourhood. All the free persons, that had been reduced into slavery, were sent to Rome to be sold there. And lastly, it was decreed, in respect to the brass statues taken from the Campanians, that the college of Pontiffs should decide what ought to be considered as sacred, and what might pass for profane. When we recollect the excess of hatred, fury, and cruelty, with which Capua had acted against the Romans, we cannot be surprized at the severity of this punishment. The deputies

A. R. 542. returned in despair, complaining no longer against  
 M. C. 210. Flaccus, but of the injustice of the Gods, and the cruelty of Fortune.

*New ex-  
 pence im-  
 posed upon  
 the citi-  
 zens,  
 which oc-  
 casions  
 great mur-  
 murs.*  
 Liv. xxvi.  
 35, 30.

After the Sicilians and Campanians were dis-  
 missed, the levies for recruiting the armies were  
 made : and the next care was to man the  
 fleet with seamen. But as there were neither suf-  
 ficient numbers in the Commonwealth for this last  
 occasion, nor money enough in the publick trea-  
 sury to hire men and pay them, the Consuls de-  
 creed, that private persons should supply, accord-  
 ing to their ranks and incomes, as had been done  
 before, a certain number of mariners, whom they  
 should pay, and find provisions the moment of  
 their embarkation for thirty days. This decree  
 excited so universal a murmur, and so declared a  
 discontent, that it would infallibly have occasioned  
 a sedition, if there had been a leader capable of  
 heading and supporting it. It was loudly com-  
 plained. “ That the Consuls, after having ruined  
 “ the Sicilians and Campanians, were contriving  
 “ to crush and destroy the Roman people them-  
 “ selves. That exhausted by the excessive taxes,  
 “ they had paid during so many years, they had  
 “ nothing left but the soil of their barren and de-  
 “ sert lands. That the enemy had burnt their  
 “ houses, and the Commonwealth deprived them  
 “ of the slaves whom they employed in husban-  
 “ dry, by forcing them to resign them, in order  
 “ to their serving either as soldiers in the armies,  
 “ or as seamen in the fleet. That the pay of the  
 “ rowers, and the yearly taxes, had robbed them  
 “ of the little money that still remained. That  
 “ there was no authority, nor violence, that could  
 “ make them give what they had not. That the  
 “ Consuls then might sell the estates and effects of  
 “ the citizens ; that they might also make slaves

“ of

“ of their persons ; and that what they still had, A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.  
“ did not suffice to pay their ransom.”

They held these discourses neither in secret, nor in small companies, but openly, and before the faces of the Consuls, who saw themselves in a manner invested by a multitude of exasperated citizens, whom those magistrates could neither appease by severity, nor gentle treatment. The Consuls wisely declared to the People, that they gave them three days to reflect upon what had been proposed ; and themselves employed that interval in finding some expedient to extricate them out of this difficulty. The next day they assembled the Senate, in order to deliberate upon this affair. After many speeches, they were obliged to confess “ That the People had some reason for  
“ murmuring, and refusing the aids demanded of  
“ them : but they however concluded, that it was  
“ absolutely necessary to lay this load upon parti-  
“ culars. For as there was no money in the pub-  
“ lick treasury, where else could they have sea-  
“ men ? And how could they preserve Sicily,  
“ keep Philip out of Italy, and defend its coasts,  
“ without having fleets in a condition to act ?”

In so unhappy a conjuncture, the Senators being highly embarrassed, and not knowing what salutary  
council of  
Lævinus. to chuse nor what advice to give, the Consul Lævinus represented to them, *(a)* *That as the magistrates were above the Senators by their rank, and the Senators above private citizens ; so ought they to set them the example, when the question was to aid*

*(a)* Magistratus Senatui, & Senatui populo, sicut honore præstent, ita ad omnia, quæ dura atque aspera essent subeunda duces debere esse. Si quid injungere inferiori velis, ut prius in te ac tuos, si ipse juris statueris, facilius omnes obediētes habcas. Nec impensa gravis est, cum ex ea plusquam pro virili parte sibi quemque capere principum vident. *Liv.*



R. 542.  
A.C. 210.

*their country, and to take the heaviest and most oppressive loads upon themselves. If you are for finding in inferiors docility and submission in respect to taxes and imposts; do you, and yours, contribute first yourselves. The expence will be less felt by the Small, when they see the Great impose more upon themselves, than they would be obliged to pay. If then we are for having the Roman people supplied with fleets well equipped, and that particulars should furnish rowers with a good will, let us, as many of us as are Senators, begin the first ourselves to furnish them. Let us to-morrow carry in all the gold, silver, and copper money, that we have, to the publick treasury, retaining only our rings, for us, our wives and children, and the Bullæ (ornaments in the shape of an heart) worn by our sons in their infancy. Such of us as have wives and daughters, may keep an ounce of gold to serve as ornaments for each of them. Those who have served Curule offices, may keep the furniture of their horses, and the quantity of silver necessary for making the vessels for salt, and libations, used in religious ceremonies. The other Senators shall keep only a pound of silver, and five thousand asses for the use of each family. Let us put into the hands of the Triumviri, or officers of the treasury, all the rest of our gold, silver, and copper money; and that without any decree of the Senate, in order, that this voluntary contribution, and so laudable a passion for the service of our country, may first pique the Knights in point of honour, and next all the rest of the citizens, and inspire every one with an equal emulation for the publick good. You have now the only expedient my colleague and myself have been able to find, after having examined the affair with all possible attention. Go, fathers, and with the assistance of the Gods, be the first to put our counsel in execution. By saving the Commonwealth, we save our private interests; but*

*but by betraying those of the publick, we vainly should imagine our own secure.* A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

This proposal was so well received, and executed with so much zeal and ardor, that the Consuls had the thanks of the Senate for making it. As soon as the Senators withdrew to their houses, they sent all their gold, silver, and copper money to the treasury, with so much emulation, that they seemed to contend who should be first upon the registers; and neither the *Triumvirs* sufficed to receive it, nor the clerks to write it down. The Knights imitated the ardor of the Senators, and the People that of the Knights. Thus, without any decree, or occasion to use the authority of the magistrates, the Commonwealth had its fleet manned with seamen, and had money to pay them. And now every thing being ready for opening the campaign, the Consuls repaired to their provinces.

Since the war had broke out, the losses and successes had been so equal, that the Romans and Carthaginians seemed to have actually as much to fear and to hope, as when the two States began hostilities. But what gave Hannibal most pain, was, that his indolent and ineffectual endeavours to defend Capua, whilst the Romans attacked it with incredible vigour, had extremely hurt his reputation with most of the States of Italy, and much abated their warmth for his party. He could not put troops into the cities he had taken, capable of keeping them in awe, without dividing his army into many small bodies, which would by no means suit his views; nor draw off his garrisons, without abandoning most of his allies. As he was equally avaritious and cruel, he determined to plunder and ravage the places he could not keep, and to leave them not in a condition of being of any advantage to his enemies. But this

*Cruel resolution of Hannibal in respect to the cities in alliance with him*  
Liv. xxvi, 38.

A. R. 542.  
A. M. C. 210.

resolution was no less fatal to him in the event, than it was horrid in itself. For he thereby incurred the hatred, not only of those he had treated so inhumanly, but also of all the other states of Italy, who believed themselves threatened with the same fate. The Consul, on his side, was vigilant to improve all occasions of making the Italians return to their duty.

*Salapia*  
*taken by*  
*the Ro-*  
*mans.*

Liv. xxvi  
35.

Salapia (now called *Salpe*) was a city of Apulia, subject to Hannibal, in which he had a good garrison. Dasius and Blasius were the two principal citizens of that place. The latter was entirely in the interest of the Romans, and had often endeavoured, but always ineffectually, to bring Dasius over. This did not hinder him from soliciting the other continually ; till in effect of new instances, and remonstrating how advantageous that change would be to both, as well as to their country, he made him consent to deliver up the city to Marcellus, with the Carthaginian garrison, consisting of five hundred Numidians. But those soldiers, who were the flower of Hannibal's cavalry, sold their lives dear. Accordingly, though they had been surprized, and could make no use of their horses in the city ; however having armed themselves in the midst of the tumult, they used their utmost efforts to get out of the place ; which not being able to effect, they fought like men in despair, resolving to quit their arms only with their lives ; so that not above fifty of them fell into the hands of the Romans alive. The loss of those horse was more affecting, and did Hannibal more hurt, than that of the city of Salapia. From thenceforth, he did nothing considerable with his cavalry, which was the part of his forces that had acquired him most advantages over the enemy.

At



At this time the Roman garrison, which de-<sup>A. R. 542.</sup>  
fended the citadel of Tarentum, could scarce sup-<sup>Ant. C. 210.</sup>  
port any longer the famine, that distressed them; <sup>*Defeat of*</sup>  
and M. Livius, the Governor of that place, had <sup>*a Roman*</sup>  
no resource, except in the provisions that came <sup>*fleet by*</sup>  
from Sicily. In order to secure their passage along <sup>*that of Ta-*</sup>  
the coasts of Italy, there was a fleet near Rhegi-<sup>*rentum.*</sup>  
um of twenty ships. D. Quintius, an officer of  
obscure birth, but who had advanced himself by  
his merit, commanded it. Having sailed from  
Rhegium, at about fifteen miles from that city,  
near the sacred Port, he fell in with the fleet of  
Tarentum, consisting as well as his own of twen-  
ty sail, and commanded by Democrates. They  
immediately came to a battle. Never did two  
fleets, however strong and numerous, charge with  
so much ardor and fury. They boarded each  
other immediately, and the soldiers going from  
one ship into another fought in a firm front, as  
they might have done by land. The success was  
long doubtful. But Quintius, Commander of the  
Roman squadron, being killed, his death put the  
other galleys into a consternation; so that betak-  
ing themselves to flight, some were sunk, and  
others having made to the land by the help of  
their oars, were taken by the people of Thurium  
and Metapontum. Happily almost all the trans-  
ports, that followed the fleet laden with provisi-  
ous, escaped the pursuit of the enemy.

An advantage gained by the garrison of the ci-<sup>*The garrison*</sup>  
tadel of Tarentum over the enemy, consoled it a <sup>*of the*</sup>  
little for the misfortune of the fleet. Livius, who <sup>*citadel of*</sup>  
commanded it, being intent upon taking advan-<sup>*Tarentum*</sup>  
tage of all the occasions that offered, had no sooner <sup>*gain an*</sup>  
been informed, that four thousand men had quit-<sup>*advantage*</sup>  
ted the city, in order to forage in the country, <sup>*over that*</sup>  
and were dispersed about without precaution, than <sup>*of the city.*</sup>  
he sent one of his bravest officers, called C. Per-<sup>*Liv. ibid.*</sup>  
sius,

A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210. sius, against them, with two thousand soldiers. The latter having found them straggling on all sides, made a great slaughter of them, and obliged the few that could escape him, to re-enter Tarentum in haste, of which the gates were but half opened; so much did the inhabitants fear, that Persius might throw himself into the place with those that fled.

*Affairs of Sicily.*  
Liv. xxvi.  
40. At this time the Consul Lævinus arrived in Sicily, where he was expected with equal ardor by all the allies of the Commonwealth, as well old as new. The first thing he did, was to put the affairs of Syracuse in some order, which the new peace they enjoyed, had not yet been capable of entirely reinstating in its antient tranquillity.

*Lævinus makes himself master of Agrigentum, and drives the Carthaginians entirely out of Sicily.* He afterwards marched his legions against Agrigentum, the only city of importance of the province that remained in the hands of the enemy, and in which the Carthaginians had a strong garrison. He had the good fortune to succeed entirely in this enterprize. Hanno commanded in chief in it: but the Carthaginians relied most upon Mutines, the General of the Numidians. That officer over-running all Sicily with his troops, ravaged the lands of the allies of the Romans; and it was not possible, either to keep him out of Agrigentum, when he thought fit to re-enter it, or to prevent him from quitting it, as often as he desired to go out, and plunder the country. The glory Mutines had acquired by his great successes, beginning to give Hanno umbrage, excited that General's envy and hatred against him, who, not being able to hear any longer without pain the advantages he continued to gain over the enemy, deprived him of his post, to give it to his own son. Envy, the basest of all vices, blinds those who are so unhappy to give themselves up to it. Hanno assured himself, that Mutines would cease to

to be esteemed by the Numidians, when he had no longer any authority over them. Directly the contrary happened. The injustice done that brave officer only augmented the affection and attachment of his Numidians for him; and Mutines, on his side, could not bear the affront he had received; so that he privately sent a courier to Lævinus, in order to treat with him concerning the surrender of Agrigentum. When they had agreed upon the conditions and manner, in which the place was to be put into the hands of the Romans, the Numidians seized the gate that led to the sea, and having either killed or driven away those that guarded it, they introduced into the city a body of the enemy, who had repaired thither expressly. They had already advanced towards the middle of the city, and as far as the publick place, in order of battle, when Hanno, hearing the noise and tumult which they occasioned, but which he attributed to the mutiny of the Numidians, who had already rose more than once, ran thither to appease the sedition. Perceiving then by the number, which was much greater than that of the Numidians, and hearing the language of the Romans more distinctly, which was not unknown to him, he thought proper to fly, and quitting the city with Epicydes through the opposite gate, they both repaired to the sea-side; where happily for them finding a small vessel, they embarked for Africa, abandoning the possession of Sicily to the Romans, which they had disputed with them during so many years. The rest of the multitude, consisting of Carthaginians and Sicilians, without endeavouring to defend themselves, ran with as much precipitation as blindness and terror, towards the gates of the city in order to escape. But having found them shut, they were all killed near the gates and places leading to them.

Lævinus

A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.



A. R. 542.  
AUL. C. 210.

Lævinus seeing himself absolutely master of Agrigentum, caused the heads of the principal citizens to be cut off, after they had been whipped with rods, and sold all the rest with the plunder. The whole amount he sent to Rome. The rumour of the taking of Agrigentum, and of the revenge executed upon its inhabitants, having spread in Sicily, subjected all the rest to the power of the Romans. In a very short time twenty cities were delivered up to them, in effect of secret intelligence: six were taken by force, and more than forty surrendered voluntarily.

The Consul having either punished or rewarded the principal persons of those cities, accordingly as they deserved, obliged the Sicilians at length to renounce war, and apply themselves solely to agriculture; in order that the island by its fertility, might be in a condition, not only to subsist its own inhabitants, but to supply the city of Rome and Italy with grain; as it had frequently done on many occasions. He carried away with him into Italy four thousand men, who were an herd of robbers driven out of different countries for their debts and crimes, and accustomed to live by rapine and theft, and who could not but disturb the still but weakly established peace Sicily began to enjoy.

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Scipio being informed, before he left Rome, that his father had been defeated only through the treachery of the Celtiberians, and because the Roman army had been divided, did not give way to the universal terror, that the victories of the Carthaginians in Spain had excited amongst the People. Having afterwards been informed, that the allies on this side of the Iberus, had not changed in respect to the Romans, that the Generals of the Carthaginians did not agree amongst themselves, and treated the people in subjection to them with cruelty, he set out full of confidence, and assured himself of great success.

He was scarce arrived in Spain, than revolving already a great design in his mind, and taking advantage of the leisure the winter-quarters afforded, he informed himself with all possible exactness of the condition in which the affairs of the enemy were. Care and foresight of this kind prepare and assure great successes. He was informed, as we have already observed, that prosperity had soon been followed by a misunderstanding between the Carthaginian Generals: that they had separated their forces; that they were at a very great distance from each other; and that neither of them had less than ten days march from New Carthage.

A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

*Scipio forms a great design, and prepares every thing for the execution of it, during the winter quarters. Polyb. 580.*

A. R. 542.  
 Ant. C. 210. sius, against them, with two thousand soldiers. The latter having found them straggling on all sides, made a great slaughter of them, and obliged the few that could escape him, to re-enter Tarentum in haste, of which the gates were but half opened; so much did the inhabitants fear, that Persius might throw himself into the place with those that fled.

*Affairs of Sicily.*  
 Liv. xxvi.  
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 ALI. C. 210.

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*Affairs of Spain*  
*Scipio and*  
*the taking of*  
*Carthage.*  
*na. Confir-*  
*mation of*  
*that con-*  
*duct.*  
 Polyb. x.  
 576—  
 596.

As to the affairs of Spain, P. Scipio is going to make himself known there, and to give us by his conduct an idea of one of the greatest captains, that the world perhaps ever produced. It is principally after Polybius, that we talk in this manner; and he was capable of judging well of the fact, as he relates nothing concerning that great man, but from the mouth of C. Lælius, who, from his earliest youth to Scipio's death, had attended him in all his enterprizes, and had always been the faithful confident of all his secrets.

Scipio

Scipio being informed, before he left Rome, that his father had been defeated only through the treachery of the Celtiberians, and because the Roman army had been divided, did not give way to the universal terror, that the victories of the Carthaginians in Spain had excited amongst the People. Having afterwards been informed, that the allies on this side of the Iberus, had not changed in respect to the Romans, that the Generals of the Carthaginians did not agree amongst themselves, and treated the people in subjection to them with cruelty, he set out full of confidence, and assured himself of great success.

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In consequence, he at first judged that it was not proper to come to a pitched battle. That in doing so, he must either fight all the enemy's armies together, and then it would be to hazard every thing, as well on account of the preceding losses, as because his troops were much inferior in number to the enemy, or attack only one of the three Generals, in which case he was afraid, that if he put him to flight, and the rest should come to his aid, he should be surrounded, and incur the same misfortune, as Cneus Scipio his



A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

uncle and Publius his father had done. He therefore directed his march another way.

Knowing that New Carthage was of infinite advantage to the enemy, and that it might prove a great obstacle to the successes he hoped, he informed himself during the winter quarters from prisoners in all that related to it. They told him, that it was almost the only city of Spain, that had a port fit to receive a fleet and naval army: that it was commodiously situated for the landing of the Carthaginians from Africa, and crossing the arm of the sea between them; that a great quantity of silver was kept there; that all the munitions of the armies, and the hostages of all Spain were there: and which was most important, that the garrison consisted only of a thousand men; because nobody could imagine, as the Carthaginians were masters of almost all Spain, that any one would dare to conceive thoughts of besieging that place: that the city was besides really well peopled, but with artisans, merchants, and other people of that kind, all entirely strangers in respect to war, and who would only serve to advance the taking of the city, if it were unexpectedly attacked.

He made himself as well acquainted with the situation of the city, the munitions it contained, and the disposition of the lake, with which it was surrounded. Some fishermen had informed him, that in general that lake was marshy, fordable in many places, and that the tide was very often down towards the evening. All this made him conclude, that if he effected his design, he should distress the enemy as much, as he should advance his own affairs: that if this failed, it would be easy, keeping the sea, to retire without loss, provided only, that he secured his camp; a thing that was not difficult, considering the remoteness

moteness of the enemy's troops. Accordingly, A. R. 542. Ant. C. 210. quitting all other designs, he applied himself solely during the winter quarters in making preparations for this siege; and, which is remarkable in one of his age at that time, he did not open himself concerning this enterprize, except to Lælius, till he believed it necessary to declare it.

Early in the spring Scipio made his fleet put *The army and fleet* to sea, and ordered all the auxiliary troops of the allies to repair to Tarraco. He afterwards made *set out together, and arrive before Carthage.* his fleet with the transports sail to the mouth of Polyb. x. 583. the Iberus, whither he ordered the Legions also to Liv. xxvi. 32. march from their winter quarters. He set out himself immediately from Tarraco with five thousand allies; in order to put himself at the head of his army. As soon as he arrived, having assembled his troops, “ he began by thanking the old soldiers for the zeal and affection they had expressed for his father and uncle during their lives, and since their deaths, and for the valour with which they had preserved a province for the Roman People, of which the loss seemed inevitable. He added, that these defeats ought not to discourage them. That it was not by the valour of the Carthaginians, that the Romans had been overcome, but by the treachery of the Celtiberians; upon the confidence in whom the Generals had too easily separated from each other. That the enemy were now actually in the same circumstances. That they were divided and in different countries. That the oppressions, which they exercised upon their allies, had exasperated them all against Carthage. That part of them had already treated with him by deputies: that the rest would do the same, as soon as they saw the Romans on the other side of the Iberus. That the Generals of the enemy not being in unity with each other,

“ would

A. R. 542. “ would not join to give him battle, and that  
 A. C. 270. “ fighting separately they could not be able to  
 “ sustain the first charge of the Romans. That  
 “ all these reasons ought to animate them to pass  
 “ that river with confidence, and to expect from  
 “ the Gods an assured protection.”

After this discourse, having left M. Silanus, who commanded under him, three thousand foot, and five hundred horse to guard the country on this side the river, he passed to the other with the rest of the army, without discovering his design to any one, which was, as we have said, to take New Carthage by assault.

We must remember, says Polybius, after the whole account, that we have just given, that Scipio was now but seven and twenty, and that the affairs he was charged with, were such as in effect of former defeats left no hopes of any success. Having engaged to reinstate them he quitted the ways laid down and known to every body, and struck into new ones, that neither the enemy, nor his own army could conjecture. And he took these new measures in consequence only of the most solid reflections.

After having given secret orders to C. Lælius, who was to command the fleet, and to whom alone he had imparted his design, to steer towards New Carthage, now called Carthagena, he put himself at the head of the Land troops, and advanced by long marches. His army consisted of twenty-five thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse. After seven days march he appeared before the city, and incamped on the side aspecting the North. He had ordered Lælius to take a compass with his fleet, and so to direct his course, as to enter the port at the same time, that the army should appear on the land side : which was punctually executed. Scipio caused



caused a fossé and double intrenchment to be carried on behind his camp. On the side of the city he raised no works, the situation of the post alone covering him from all insult.

Polybius, before he enters into the particulars of the siege, describes the situation of the city and country round about it. I shall copy it after him without fear of mistaking; that author having been upon the spot to assure himself the better in respect to it.

New Carthage, says he, is situated towards the middle of the coast of Spain in a gulf that lies toward the wind \* *Africus*. This gulf is about twenty stadia in depth, (something more than a league) and ten broad at its entrance. It forms a kind of port, because there is an island, which on each side leaves only a narrow passage for coming in. The waves of the sea break against this island, which makes the whole gulf entirely calm except when the wind *Africus*, blowing through those two openings, agitates the sea. This port is shut against all other winds by the continent that surrounds it. At the bottom of the gulf rises a mountain in the form of a peninsula, upon which stands the city, that on the East and South is defended by the sea, and on the West by a lake, which extends also to the North; so that the Isthmus, or space between two seas, which joins the city to the continent, is only two stadia, that is to say, something more than four hundred and sixteen yards. The city, towards the middle, is low and hollow. The way from the sea on the South is through a plain. The rest is surrounded by hills; two of them are high and rugged, and three others of much more easy ascent, but full of

\* *It blows South-West.*

A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.  
*Leſſiſtan*  
*a league.*

hollows, and difficult to paſs. The circumference of the city was of old but twenty ſtadia.

By this ſituation of the place, the front of the Roman camp was ſecure, being defended on one ſide by the lake, and on the other by the ſea. Only the middle, oppoſite to what I have above called the Iſthmus, was expoſed and without defence. Scipio did not judge it proper to fortify it, whether he intended thereby to terrify the beſieged by a ſhew of confidence; or deſigning to attack the place, he thought it proper to have nothing to ſtop him in marching out of, or retiring into, his camp.

*Carthage-*  
*na beſieged*  
*by ſea and*  
*land.*

Polyb. x.  
585.  
Liv. xxvi.  
45.

The fleet arriving in time, as we have ſaid, Scipio aſſembled his army. In the ſpeech he made to it, he uſed no other reaſons to encourage it than he had determined himſelf to undertake the ſiege, and which we have related. “ After having ſhewn that the enterprize was practicable, and explained in few words how prejudicial it would be to the enemy, and advantageous to the Romans, if it ſucceeded; he promiſed crowns of gold to thoſe who firſt ſhould mount the wall, and the cuſtomary rewards to ſuch as ſignalized themſelves on that occaſion. And laſtly he added, that Neptune had inſpired him with this deſign; that that God having appeared to him in his ſleep, had promiſed him he would infallibly aid him, and in ſo evident a manner, that the whole army ſhould perceive the effects of his preſence.” The force and ſolidity of the reaſons which he gave, the crowns he promiſed, and above all the aſſured aſſiſtance of Neptune, inſpired the foldiers with incredible ardor.

The next day, having ſupplied the fleet with darts of all kinds, he ordered Lælius, who commanded it, to attack the city on the ſide next the ſea. As the ſiege was of no great duration, it  
does

does not appear that any great use was made of the fleet, except for seizing the ships in the port, after the taking of the city. On the land side, Scipio detached two thousand of his best soldiers, with people to carry ladders, and began the attack about nine in the morning. Mago, who commanded in the city, having divided his garrison, left five hundred men in the citadel, and with the other incamped upon the hill on the East. Two thousand of the inhabitants, amongst whom he distributed the arms that were in the city, were posted at the gate, which led to the place where the sea washed the continent, and which consequently led also to the Roman camp: and the rest of the inhabitants had orders to hold themselves in readiness to assist, wherever the wall should be assaulted.

As soon as Scipio had ordered the trumpets to give the signal for the attack, Mago made the two thousand men who guarded the gate march, convinced that assault would terrify the enemy, and frustrate their design. Those troops fell with impetuosity upon the Romans, who were drawn up in battle at the end of the Isthmus. A warm engagement ensued there. On both sides, that is on that of the besiegers and the city, great cries were raised to animate the combatants. But the aids were not equal; the Carthaginians having but one gate to sally at, and almost two stadia to go; whereas the Romans were at hand, and came on from several sides. What made the battle so unequal was Scipio's having drawn up his troops near his camp, in order to leave the besieged more ground to make in coming on; rightly judging that if that first corps, which was the flower of the inhabitants, were once defeated, every thing would be in confusion in the city, and that afterwards none would have the boldness to venture



A. R. 542.  
 Ann. C. 210.

out of the gate. As only chosen troops fought on both sides, the victory was for some time doubtful. At length the Carthaginians were obliged (to use the expression) to sink under the weight of the legionary soldiers, whose numbers continually increased, and were repulsed. Many lost their lives upon the field of battle, and in retreating; but more of them were crushed to death in entering the gate, which put the inhabitants into so great a consternation, that the walls were abandoned. The Romans wanted but little of entering the city with the flying troops: but this flight however gave them opportunity to apply their ladders without danger.

Scipio was in the press, but as much as possible with safety to his person. Three able-bodied soldiers moved before him, and covered him with their shields against the darts discharged in showers from the walls. Sometimes he leaped upon the sides, and sometimes he got upon rising ground; so that, seeing all that passed, and being seen by every body, he very much contributed to the success of this attack, every one doing his utmost to deserve the praises and avoid the reproofs of such a spectator and judge. This attention of the General occasioned that nothing was omitted in this action, and that all orders were properly given and executed.

Those who got up the ladders first, did not find so much opposition from the courage of the besieged, as from the height of the walls. The enemy perceived the difficulty it gave them, and their resistance became the more vigorous from it. Accordingly, as those ladders were very high, the soldiers went up in great numbers at a time, and broke them in effect of their weight. If some did not give way, the first who got up to the end became giddy from the depth of the precipice; and

and if a little repulsed, they could not keep their standing, but fell from the top to the bottom. If poles were thrust against them through the battlements, or any thing else of the like nature, all together were thrown down and dashed against the ground. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Romans continued the scalado with the same ardor and courage. The first being thrown down, the next took their places, till the soldiers not being able to resist the fatigue any longer, the General caused the retreat to be sounded.

The besieged triumphed in some measure, believing they had averted the danger for ever, and flattering themselves at least with being able to protract the siege, till the Carthaginian Generals had time to come to their aid. They did not know how high the ardor and vivacity of Scipio rose. He waited till the tide was out, and posted five hundred men with ladders on the sides of the lake. At the place where the action had passed he posted fresh troops, exhorted them to do their duty well, and supplied them with more ladders than before, to attack the wall from one end to the other: The signal was given, the ladders applied, and the soldiers got up along the whole length of the wall. A great confusion arose amongst the Carthaginians. They imagined that they had nothing farther to fear, and now a new assault brought them into the same danger again. On the other side their darts failed them, and the number of the dead damped their courage. Their perplexity was very great: however they defended themselves as well as they could.

During the heat of the scalado, the sea began to ebb, and the waters to run out of the side of the lake; so that those who did not know the cause of that running off, could not sufficiently wonder at it. Scipio then, who had taken care

A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

to have skilful and experienced guides in readiness, commanded the troops he had posted on that side to enter into the lake and fear nothing. One of his great talents was to exalt the courage of those he spoke to, and to fill them with confidence. The soldiers obeyed, and threw themselves into the lake in emulation of each other. It was about noon, and as the North wind, which blew the same way, drove out the tide with violence, which already flowed off of itself, the water was so low that it came no higher than the soldiers waists, and in some places not up to their knees. It was then the whole army believed, that some divinity directed the siege, and called to mind what Scipio, in his speech, had promised concerning the aid of Neptune; and this remembrance so enflamed the courage of the soldiers, that they could see danger no longer, believing they had that God at their head.

*Carthage-  
na taken  
by storm.  
Polyb. x.  
588.  
Liv. xxvi.  
45.*

The attack was most vigorous towards the gate opposite to the Roman camp. In the mean time the five hundred men, who had passed the lake, came to the bottom of the wall, and from thence soon got up to the top without any resistance. For the inhabitants believing it impregnable on that side, had taken no care to fortify it, and had not thought necessary to place troops to guard it; the side, on which the Romans seemed to make the greatest efforts, engrossing their whole attention. The detachment of five hundred men, of which we have just been speaking, entered the city in consequence without any obstacle, and instantly ran to the gate where the two parties were at blows. The battle was so hot here, that it employed not only the minds, but the eyes and ears of the Carthaginians; so that nobody discovered what had passed on the other side, till they felt the blows they received from behind, and saw themselves  
between



between two bodies of the enemy. The Cartha-<sup>A. R. 542.</sup>  
ginians then thought only of saving themselves by <sup>Ant. C. 210.</sup>  
flight. The Romans having broke the iron bars  
that shut the gates, those who were without ente-  
red in crouds. The foldiers who had got upon  
the walls to a considerable number, dispersed on  
all sides to put the inhabitants to the sword by Sci-  
pio's order, who at the same time forbade plun-  
dering till the signal was given. Seeing that the  
enemy escaped at two different places; some up-  
on the eminence towards the East, guarded by a  
body of five hundred men; others into the cita-  
del, whither Mago himself had retired, with such  
of the foldiers as had abandoned the walls; he di-  
vided his troops also into two bodies. He sent  
the one to seize the eminence, whilst he marched  
himself at the head of a thousand men towards the  
citadel. The eminence was carried on the first  
attack. Mago at first prepared to defend himself:  
but seeing himself invested on all sides, without  
hope of its being possible to resist, he surrendered  
himself with the place and troops in it to the  
victor.

Hitherto all the inhabitants capable of bearing *Plunder*  
arms, had been put to the sword. But Scipio *consider-*  
put a stop to the slaughter, as soon as he saw him- *able.*  
self master of the citadel. The city was then *Liv. xxvi.*  
abandoned to be plundered. The spoils were *47.*  
very considerable. Ten thousand free men were  
made prisoners to the Romans. They remained  
masters of all the machines of war, which were  
many in number. Abundance of gold and silver  
was brought to the General: two hundred and  
seventy-six cups of gold, almost all of a pound  
weight, eighteen thousand three hundred pounds  
of silver, in money and plate, a little more than  
twenty-eight thousand five hundred and ninety-

A. R. 542.  
A.D. C. 210.

Polyb.

593.

About

ninety

thousand

pounds

sterling.

Manner of

dividing

the spoils

amongst

the Ro-

mans

Polyb. x.

589, 590.

three \* marks. These riches were put into the hands of the Quæstor C. Flaminius, after having been all weighed and counted in his presence. Polybius says, that all the money taken here from the Carthaginians amounted to above six hundred talents: which added to four hundred which he brought from Rome, made a thousand talents for carrying on the war.

The night being come, those who had orders to remain in the camp, continued there. The General with a thousand soldiers posted himself in the citadel. He ordered the rest by the Tribunes of the army, to quit the houses, and to bring by cohorts to the market-place all the plunder they had taken, and to pass the night near it. The light-armed troops were brought from the camp, and posted upon the hill which fronts eastward. In this manner was New Carthage reduced by the Romans.

The next day, all that had been taken as well from the garrison as the citizens and artificers having been brought to the market-place, the Tribunes distributed it to their legions according to the custom established amongst the Romans. Now the manner of acting of that People when they took cities was this: they detached part of the troops, but never more than half, to plunder the place. Those who were to execute this purpose, were chosen out of the whole army, and each brought what he took to his cohort or legion. The booty was sold by auction, and the Tribunes divided the money into equal parts, which were given not only to those upon duty in the necessary posts to secure the execution of plundering, but to those who guarded the tents and baggage,

\* The French weigh silver by marks, which is a weight of eight ounces.

the sick, and to others who had been detached upon any occasion whatsoever. And least any fraud should be committed in this part of the war, the soldiers were made to swear before they took the field, and the first day they assembled, that they would not conceal any part of the spoils they should take, and should bring them all faithfully to the common heap. For the rest, continues Polybius, the Romans, by this wise custom, provided against the bad effects of the avidity of gain. For the hope of sharing in the booty not being frustrated to any, and being as certain to those who were upon duty in the posts, as those that plundered, the discipline was always exactly observed. This is not so amongst the nations, who hold it for a maxim, that what every man takes in the plunder of cities belongs to himself. For then, the part of the troops who are deprived of their share in the spoils, are deprived at the same time of a powerful motive to induce soldiers to do their duty, and despise danger, which is the attraction of gain. Every body knows, that David ordered, *that as his part is which goeth down to the battle, so shall his part be that carrieth by the stuff: they shall part alike. And it was so from that day forward, that he made it a statute, and an ordinance for Israel unto that day.* 1 Sam. xxx. 24, 25.

The provisions laid up by the enemy remained still in the city: forty thousand bushels of wheat, and two hundred and seventy thousand bushels of barley. They took in the port an hundred and thirty ships, most of them laden with corn, arms, provisions, iron, sails, cordage, and other materials necessary for fitting out a fleet. Scipio also took eighteen ships of war, which considerably augmented his fleet: he had thirty-five before. Thus of all the gains the Romans acquired



A. R. 542. acquired by the taking Carthageria, the place it-  
 Ant. C. 210. felt was the least considerable.

*Scipio ba-  
 rargues  
 the victo-  
 rious army,  
 and prais-  
 their va-  
 leur and  
 zeal.  
 Liv. xxvi.  
 48.*

That day, Scipio having confided the guarding of the city to Lælius and the soldiers of the fleet, led back the legions into the camp, and ordered them to refresh themselves with food and repose. The next day, having assembled the soldiers of the land and sea armies, “ he began by thanking the “ immortal Gods, not only for having reduced “ in one day the most opulent city of all the pro- “ vince into his power; but for having first “ brought all the rich things of Africa and Spain “ into it, to deprive the enemy of all their re- “ sources, and to give him and his troops abun- “ dance. He afterwards praised the soldiers, “ whose valour had surmounted so many obsta- “ cles, without being stopped either by the unex- “ pected sally of the Carthaginians, the extraor- “ dinary height of the walls, the difficult passage “ of an unknown lake, or a strong citadel de- “ fended by a good garrison. He confessed, that “ he was obliged to them all for so glorious and “ unexpected a success: but that the honour of “ the mural crown was in particular his due, who “ had first mounted the wall. That he who be- “ lieved he had deserved so glorious a reward, “ had only to appear.”

*Very  
 warm dis-  
 pute for  
 the mural  
 crown,  
 terminated  
 pacifically  
 by Scipio.  
 Liv. xxvi.  
 48.*

Two instead of one presented themselves: Q. Trebellius a Centurion of the fourth legion, and Sext. Digitius, a soldier of the fleet. The dispute grew extremely hot, but still less between the two competitors, than between the land and the sea armies, who warmly espoused his side, who was of their own body. Lælius, Commander of the fleet, spoke strongly for the sea-forces, and M. Sempronius Tuditanus supported the side of the legions. Scipio seeing that this contest was upon the point of terminating in an open sedition, no-

minated

minated three commissioners, whom he ordered maturely to examine into the affair, and determine according to the testimony of credible witnesses, which of the two competitors had mounted the wall first. These commissioners were C. Lælius and M. Sempronius, both interested in the cause; with whom Scipio associated P. Cornelius Caudinus, who was neuter. They prepared to take cognizance of the cause. But this expedient, which seemed proper for appeasing the troops, did but inflame them more. For Lælius, and Sempronius, who each had with difficulty kept their party within bounds, were no sooner withdrawn by changing the quality of leaders into that of judges, than the soldiers observed measures no longer. Lælius then, quitting his colleague, went to Scipio upon his tribunal, and informed him of what passed. He told him that both sides were just upon the point of proceeding to the last extremities, and turning a dispute of honour into a civil war.

Scipio having praised Lælius's wise care, assembled the troops, and to reconcile them, immediately declared, that Q. Trebellius and Sex. Digittus had mounted the wall at the same time, and that to reward their valour, he granted them both the mural crown. He then gave praises and distributed rewards to others, in proportion to the courage each had shewn, and the service he had done during the siege. Lælius, the Admiral of the fleet, was the person upon whose merit he most expatiated. After having given him the greatest praises, and declared, that he was as much indebted to his prudence and valour as to himself for so glorious a success, he made him a present of a crown of gold, and thirty oxen.

The

A. R. 542,  
A.D.C. 210.

The mural crown was usually of gold, and made at top with such battlements as the walls of fortified places have. The ardor we see upon this occasion between the two competitors, shews the wonderful effect, that marks of honour and distinction have upon the minds of soldiers. And as much may be said of other military rewards. And in this manner troops are rendered invincible.

*Generosity  
of Scipio  
to the  
besieged  
and pri-  
soners.  
Polyb. x.  
501.  
Liv. xxvi.  
49.*

Scipio, after having praised and rewarded his troops in this manner, assembled the prisoners, who were, as we have said before, almost ten thousand, and ordered that they should be divided into two classes: the one of the principal persons and burghers of Carthagenæ, with their wives and children; the other of artificers. After having exhorted the first to adhere to the Romans, and to bear in remembrance for ever the grace he was going to grant them, he sent them all back to their own houses. They prostrated themselves before him, and retired with tears in their eyes, but in tears of joy, which an event so little expected drew from them. As to the artificers, he told them they were now the slaves of the Roman people: but if they behaved with affection for the Commonwealth, and rendered him the services they ought, each according to his profession, that they might depend on being set at liberty, as soon as the war with the Carthaginians should be happily terminated. They were two thousand in number, who had orders to give in their names to the Quæstor; and they were divided into bands of thirty, over each of which a Roman was placed to take care of it.

Amongst the rest of the prisoners, Scipio chose such as had the best mien, and most vigour, to augment the number of his rowers. He made them the same promise as the artificers, and assured them, that after he should have overcome the Cartha-



Carthaginians, he would give them their liberty, if they served the Romans with zeal and affection. A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

This conduct in respect to the prisoners gained himself and the Commonwealth the amity and confidence of the citizens of Carthagera; and by the hopes of liberty which he gave the artisans, he inspired them with a great ardor for his service: not to mention the considerable re-inforcement of his sea-forces in effect of this very clemency to the prisoners.

He afterwards assigned Mago, and the Carthaginians taken with him quarters, two of whom were of the council of the elders, and fifteen of the Senate. He gave the guard of them to Lælius, enjoining him to take all possible care of them. Then having caused all the Spanish hostages to be brought to him, which were above three hundred in number, he began by soothing and caressing the children one after another, promising, in order to console them, that they should soon see their parents again. He exhorted the others not to abandon themselves to grief. He represented to them, “ (a) That they were in the hands of a people, “ that chose rather to engage men by favour, “ than to subject them by fear; and to unite with “ foreign nations under the honourable name of “ friends and allies, than to impose upon them “ the shameful yoke of slavery.” After this, having chosen out of the spoils what best suited his purpose, he made presents to each of them according to their sex and age. To the little girls he gave toys and bracelets, and to the young boys knives and little swords.

(a) Venisse eos in populi Romani potestatem, qui beneficio quàm metu obligare homines malit; exterâsque gentes fide ac societate junctas habere, quàm tristi subjectas servitio. *Liv.*

What

A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

What goodness and wise care have we here! Having asked each of the hostages their country, and been informed how many there were of each nation, he sent couriers to their parents, and caused them to be told to come and take back their children. As some cities had already sent deputies to demand their own, he immediately ordered them to be put into their hands, and commanded the Quæstor C. Flaminius to take great care of the rest, and to treat them with abundance of kindness and humanity.

Wise con-  
duct of Sci-  
pio in re-  
spect to  
some ladies  
amongst  
the hosta-  
ges.  
Liv. xxvi.  
49.  
Polyb. x.  
592.

Whilst these cares engrossed him, a very ancient lady, the wife of Mandonius brother of Indibilis King of the Ilergetes came out of the crowd of the hostages, and throwing herself at his feet, she conjured him with tears in her eyes, to recommend to those who had the ladies in their keeping to have regard to their sex and birth. Scipio, who did not understand her thought at first, assured her, that he had given orders, that they should not want for any thing. But the lady replied: *Those conveniences are not what affect us. In the condition to which fortune has reduced us, with what ought we not to be contented? I have many other apprehensions, when I consider on one side the licentiousness of war; and on the other the youth and beauty of the Princesses, which you see here before us. For as to me, my age protects me from all fear in this respect.* She had with her the daughters of Indibilis, and several others of the same rank, all in the flower of their youth, who considered her as their mother. Scipio then comprehending what the subject of her fear was: *My own glory, says he, and that of the Roman people, are concerned in not suffering, that virtue, which ought always to be respected wherever we find it, should be exposed in my camp to a treatment unworthy of it. But you give me a new motive for being more strict.*

*strict in my care of it, in the virtuous sollicitude you shew in thinking only of the preservation of your honour, in the midst of so many other subjects of fear.* After this conversation, he gave the care of them to some officers of experienced prudence, and ordered them to treat the ladies with all the respect they could pay to the mothers and wives of their allies and particular friends.

It was on this occasion, that his soldiers brought him a young lady of such perfect beauty, that she drew upon herself the eyes of every body. He desired to know who she was, and to whom she belonged: and having learnt amongst other things that she was upon the point of being married to Allucius, Prince of the Celtiberians, he sent to him to come thither with the parents of that young prisoner. And being told that Allucius loved her to excess, that Spanish Prince no sooner appeared in his presence, than even before he spoke to the father and mother, he took him aside; and to remove the anxiety which he might be in on account of the young lady, he spoke to him in these terms. *You and I are young, which admits of my speaking to you with more liberty. Those who brought me your future spouse, assured me at the same time, that you loved her with extreme tenderness: and her beauty left me no room to doubt it. Upon which, reflecting, that if, like you, I had thoughts of making an engagement, and were not solely engrossed with the affairs of my country, I should desire, that so honourable and legitimate a passion should find favour; I think my self happy, in the present conjuncture, to do you this service. She you are to marry, has been amongst us, as she would have been in the house of her father and mother. I have kept her for you, in order to make you a present worthy of you and of me. The only gratitude which I require of you for this gift, is that you*  
*would*



A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

*would be a friend to the Roman people; and that, if you judge me a man of worth, as my father and uncle have been deemed by the states of this province, you may know, that there are in Rome many who resemble us, and that there is not a people in the universe, you ought more to fear as enemies, or to desire more to have for friends.*

Allucius, full of gratitude and joy, kissed Scipio's hands, and prayed the Gods to reward him for so great a beneficence, as himself was not capable of doing it in the degree he desired, and his benefactor deserved. Scipio caused the father and mother, and the other relations of the young lady, to come thither. They had brought a great sum of money with them for her ransom. But when they saw that he restored her without ransom, they conjured him with great earnestness to accept that sum as a present, and declared that by complying, that new favour would compleat their joy and gratitude. Scipio not being able to resist such warm and earnest sollicitation, told them, that he accepted the gift, and ordered it to be laid at his feet. Then, addressing himself to Allucius; *I add, says he, to the portion you are to receive from your father-in-law this sum, which I desire you to accept as a marriage-present.*

That young Prince, charmed with the liberality and politeness of Scipio, went into his country to publish the praises of so generous a victor. He cried out, in the transports of his gratitude; “That there was come into Spain a young hero  
“like the Gods, who conquered all things, less  
“by the force of his arms, than the charms of  
“his virtue, and the greatness of his beneficence.” For this reason, having raised troops in his own dominions, he returned some days after to Scipio, with a body of fourteen hundred horse.

Allucius

Allucius, to render the marks of his gratitude more durable, afterwards caused the action we have just related, to be engraven upon a silver buckler, which he presented to Scipio: a present, infinitely more estimable and glorious than all treasures and triumphs. This buckler which Scipio carried with him when he returned to Rome, was lost in passing the Rhone, with part of the baggage. It continued in that river till 1665, when some fishermen found it. It is now in the King of France's cabinet.

I shall have occasion in the sequel to dwell up- *Scipio's*  
on what regards Scipio's character, and I have al- *praise.*  
ready done it elsewhere with sufficient extent: but I cannot help observing here in few words, that in the expedition of which we are speaking, he shewed all the qualities of a great General. We have seen that he formed of himself the boldest design it was possible to imagine, and so far from all probability, that the enemy did not so much as suspect the least thought of it. He passes the winter, not in idleness and inactivity, not in eating, drinking, and gaming, but to inform himself secretly of all that related to the enterprize he meditated, and without noise to prepare all that could contribute to the success of it. He kept a profound silence in respect to the whole, and communicated his designs only to a single person in whom he entirely confided, and who was necessary to him for the execution of them. As soon as the spring appears, the army and fleet set out without knowing for what they are intended. They arrive exactly at the appointed time and place, and Carthagera is besieged at once both by sea and land. Could the most consummate General in the art of war take more proper measures? Scipio was then only seven and twenty years old at most, and this may be called his first trial of skill,

A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

and the first fruits of his command. In the same siege, what valour and intrepidity, tempered however with great discretion, does he not shew? What presence of mind, which foresees all things, supplies all things, and gives the necessary orders on all sides. But Scipio is still greater, and excels himself in what follows the taking of the place, both in the use he makes of the victory, in which he shews a greatness of soul, an elevation of sentiments, a talent in conciliating affection, and what is above all, a virtue, wisdom, and moderation, the more admirable, as an historian observes, as Scipio was then young, unmarried, and victorious: *Et juvenis, Et cælebs, Et victor.*

Scipio

sends

Lælius to

Rome, to

carry the

news of his

victory.

Polyb. x.

594.

Liv. xxvi.

51.

After Scipio had regulated all things in concert with Lælius, he gave him a galley of five benches, and having embarked Mago in it, and the Carthaginian Senators taken with him, he sent him to Rome, to carry thither the news of his victory. He was convinced, as nothing was expected on the side of Spain, the advantages he had gained there would no sooner be known, than they would resume courage, and think more seriously than ever of carrying on that war vigorously. As to himself he continued some time in New Carthage, in order to exercise his naval forces, and to shew the Tribunes in what manner they were to exercise the land army.

Scipio exercises his  
land and  
sea-forces.

Præpilatis.

The first day, the legions filed off in his presence under arms, the space of four thousand paces. The second, he ordered them to clean and furbish their arms before their tents. The third, the troops presented to the eye the image of a real battle, the soldiers fighting with wooden swords, with a button at the ends of them, and darting at each other javelins with buttons also at the end of them. The fourth was allotted to repose and diversion.



version. The fifth, the exercise began again as on the first day. As long as the troops remained at Carthage, they observed this alternative of labour and rest.

He did not forget his cavalry, and made it perform before him the evolutions necessary on all different occasions, and conjunctures that might occur. He especially exercised it in advancing and retreating, in such a manner that when it should be obliged to hasten its march, it might not quit its ranks, and always keep the same distance between the squadrons: nothing being more dangerous than to engage with a cavalry that has lost its ranks.

The soldiers of the fleet, on their side, standing out to sea, when it was smooth, tried the swiftness of their vessels in the representation of a sea-fight.

These exercises, continued without the city by sea and land, enured both the bodies and minds of the troops for real battles. By keeping their forces continually employed in this manner, the Romans rendered them indefatigable, and accustomed them to observe in all times and places the military discipline with the utmost exactness.

Whilst this passed, the city rang with the noise made by the artificers of every kind, in making arms of all sorts, and every thing in general necessary in war, in the publick workshops. The General was present every where, assisting at the exercises both of the fleet and legions, and passing a considerable time every day in examining the works of all kinds, at which an infinite number of artisans worked in emulation of each other in the magazines and arsenals.

A. R. 542.  
Ant. C. 210.

In all that we have hitherto related of the siege and taking of Carthagera, and of the events that succeeded, is there with respect to Scipio, any stroke, any tint wanting, to the portrait of an accomplished General; Polybius, in drawing this picture with a masterly hand, which certainly does not flatter, but is taken from nature, undoubtedly designed to instruct all succeeding times, and to propose to Generals and officers of armies a proper model for forming great men for war. For That is one of the principal ends of history.

Scipio re-  
turns to

Tarraco.

Polyb. x.

594.

Liv. xxvi.

51.

When Scipio believed his troops sufficiently exercised, and the city covered from all insult by the fortifications he had added to it, and the garrison he left in it, he set out for Tarraco. Having met Ambassadors from several of the Spanish States on his way, he dispatched affairs with some of them upon the spot, and deferred giving audience to others till he should arrive at Tarraco, whither he had ordered all the allies, as well old as new, to repair.

The Car-  
thaginians  
dissemble  
their grief  
for the loss  
of Cartha-  
gena.

Liv. ibid.

The taking of Carthagera occasioned a terrible consternation amongst the Carthaginians. At first their Generals suppressed that news. But afterwards, not being able either to conceal or dissemble it, they affected as much as possible to depreciate the merit of that success. They said,  
“ It was a (a) single place surprized by a stolen  
“ march. That however so trivial an advantage  
“ sufficed to flush and puff up a young General,  
“ who, through the insolence of his joy, gave  
“ this slight success the air of an important con-  
“ quest, and of a great victory. But that the

(a) Næ opinato adventu ac væ præmio elatum, insolentem, immodico gaudio speciem magnæ victoriæ impetuisse.

“ moment

“ moment he should be apprized, that the three A. R. 542,  
Ant. C. 210.  
“ Carthaginian Generals approached with their  
“ three armies, the misfortunes of his house would  
“ recur to his memory, and very much abate his  
“ pride and haughtiness.” And this is what they  
gave out to the people and soldiers. But at bot-  
tom they perfectly knew how prejudicial the loss  
of Carthagenæ was to them, and how great the  
advantage it gave their enemies for the future.



# DIGRESSION

UPON THE

MEALS of the ROMANS.

**T**HIS subject, upon which I have promised to speak, would require great extent, if it were my design to expatiate much upon it. I shall content myself, according to my custom, with giving a slight idea of it.

Lib. I.  
Sat. 6.

The Romans, properly speaking, made but one meal: this was supper. About the middle of the day, they took some little nourishment, to refresh themselves, and enable them to stay for their evening's meal. *Pransus non avidè*, says Horace, *quantum interpellat inani ventre diem durare*. But this slight dinner cannot be called a meal, no more than the breakfast and nunchion or collation, which only children ate.

The supper-hour was the ninth and tenth of the day, that is three hours, or else two hours, before sun-set. Till then they applied themselves to serious affairs: but then they dismissed all care, and were at leisure to receive their friends. To anticipate the supper-hour, and to sit down to table before this time, Horace calls, *diem frangere* — *partem solido demere de die*; to abridge the day, to cut off and retrench a part of it. They also said, to express the same thing, *epulari de die*.  
To

To sit down so early at table, carried with it an air of debauch, which sober people avoided.

At Rome, bathing was always used before supper: which, on one side, was necessary for the sake of cleanliness, the Romans wearing no linen; and, on the other, might serve to sharpen the appetite. The rich, and those who could afford such accommodations, had baths in their houses. Pliny the Younger, in the description which he gives us of his country-houses, tells us what care was taken in those days to build baths in them, which were supplied with every thing necessary to taking that refreshment commodiously. For the common people, there were publick baths, some of which were very magnificent edifices, in which some Emperors seemed to have taken pleasure to signalize their magnificence.

On quitting the bath, before they sat down to table, they put on an habit more or less slight according to the season, and the master of the house often piqued himself upon supplying his guests with very magnificent ones.

The place where they ate their meals was called *Triclinium*, because the table was surrounded with three beds. The tables were of different forms, in different times; square, round, and semi-circular. I shall only speak of the first, which were most frequently used. One of the square sides was left vacant and open for serving the dishes.

In the early times, the Romans ate sitting upon plain benches, after the manner of the people of Crete and Sparta. In process of time the custom of lying down to eat was introduced amongst them: it is believed to have been derived from Asia or Greece. The ladies for a long time retained the ancient custom of sitting at table, which was most conformable to the modesty and

Val. Max II. 1. decency of the sex. Valerius Maximus tells us, that at the religious feasts given to the Gods, the Goddesſes ſat and the Gods lay upon beds.

A bed was laid on each of the three ſides of the table. Each bed uſually held three perſons, and ſometimes, but ſeldom, four or five. The beds were covered with carpets, and furniſhed with pillows or bolſters for the gueſts. In the beginning, both the ſubſtance and coverings of the beds were very plain: but luxury in proceſs of time introduced extraordinary magnificence in them. (*a*) This luxury came from Aſia. It was in the triumph of Cn. Manlius, that beds of braſs, carpets and coverings of the richeſt and fineſt ſtuffs, and ſide-boards made with the niceſt art, and at a great expence, were ſeen for the firſt time at Rome. And this was only the firſt beginning, and in a manner the ſeed of that pretended taſte, which ſome time after (*b*) men of inventive geni- uſſes, and wonderful ſagacity for all the refine- ments of luxury, and at the ſame time of un- bounded prodigality, carried to exceſſes, which are ſcarce credible.

We have already ſaid, that the gueſts began by bathing, after which they put on cloaths intended for the table. Before they got upon the beds, they took off their ſhoes for the greater cleanli- neſs. In parties of pleaſure they made uſe of the moſt exquisite eſſences and perfumes, and wore wreaths of flowers upon the heads. In this con- dition they got upon their beds.

(*a*) *Luxuriæ peregrinæ ori- go ab exercitu Asiatico inve- cta in urbem eſt. In primum lectos æteos, vellem ſtragulam præſtari & abacos Romam adveherunt. — Vix tamen il-*

*la, quæ tum conſpiciebantur, ſemina erant futuræ luxuriæ. Liv. xxxix. 6.*

(*b*) *Prodigi & ſagacis ad lux- uriæ instrumenta ingenii. Plin. ix. 11.*

The



The meal always began with libations and prayers made to the Gods, by pouring a little wine on the table in honour of them; a custom derived from the most remote antiquity, as we find in Homer and Virgil. The latter speaks thus of Dido, who addresses her prayers to Jupiter, and afterwards makes libations.

*Jupiter, hospitibus nam te dare jura loquuntur, &c. Æneid. I. Dixit, & in mensa laticum libavit honorem.*

This ceremony was universally established: *Mensam adisti*, is said in one of the declamations ascribed to Quintilian, *ad quam cum venire capi-* Quintil.  
*mus, deos invocamus.* The ancients always con- Declam.  
cluded their meals as they began them, that is, cccci.  
with prayers and libations, as we find in several passages of Plutarch's Morals. I cannot forbear inserting in this place the translation of a Greek passage from Heliodorus, which is very express. *It is time, says he, to dismiss the guests: but first* Heliod.  
*let us not forget God. The cup for the libations was* Æthiop.  
*then carried round to all the guests; and thus the* l. v. sub  
*feast concluded.* This act of religion, by which finem.  
meals began and ended, was a kind of public protestation made by the Pagans, that they received the nourishment they had from the bounty of the Gods. And it is for this reason that the ancient authors always speak of the table as of a sacred thing. Tacitus calls the ceremonies used at Annal. xv.  
meals, *sacra mensæ.* 52.

It is a very sad thing, and argues great forgetfulness of God, to see that the custom of consecrating in some sense the beginning and end of meals by prayer and returning thanks, observed in all times by the Pagans, is now entirely abolished among us at the tables of almost all great lords and rich persons, and is no longer retained except  
amongst

amongst tradesmen and the common people : it even begins to be neglected by them, of so much force is the bad example of the Great, and so contagious does it become.

After the duties of religion were satisfied, a King of the feast was created, who prescribed the laws that were to be observed in it, and the number of cups that each was to drink. Lots usually determined this sovereignty.

Hor. Od.  
vii. l. 2.

*Quem \*Venus arbitrum dicet bibendi ?*

Od. iv.  
l. 1.

*Nec regna vina sortiēre talis.*

Sometimes, for instance, the guests were obliged to drink as many cups as there were letters in the name of the person whose health was drank. Cicero (*a*) observes that Verres, who had trampled upon all the laws of the Roman people, punctually conformed to those of the table. To conclude, this ceremony of joy and gaiety was observed at the table of the wisest persons. Cato (*b*) the Censor said, that this sovereignty of the table and kind of legislature instituted by an ancient custom, gave him great pleasure.

It is time to set the dishes upon the table. At great feasts or entertainments (*c*) slaves neatly drest, with white napkins round their waists, brought in the dishes in formality. They were followed

\* This word signifies here the most lucky cast upon the dice, as three sixes is with us at raffie.

(*a*) Iste prætor severus ac diligens, qui populi Rom. legibus nunquam paruiſſet, iis diligenter legibus parebat, quæ in populis ponebantur.

(*b*) Me verò & magisteria delectant à majoribus instituta, & is sermo qui more majorum à summo adhibetur in poculis. Cic. de Senect. n. 46.

(*c*) Agmen servorum nitentium, & ministrorum ornatissimorum turba linteis succincta. Senec.

by

by a (*a*) carver, who with great art and dexterity cut up the meat, and often to a certain time of music. There were other slaves that waited at the buffet, to serve the cups, pour out the wine, and change the plates. The side-board was the place of the eating-hall, where the master of the house displayed his magnificence with the utmost pomp, by exposing a great number of vessels and cups of gold and silver, of exquisite workmanship, and often set with jewels.

Their tables were covered several times, as with us. A singularity, which ought not to be omitted, was, that new laid eggs were always a part of the first course : *ab ovo usque ad mala*, says Horace, to signify from the beginning to the end of the feast. It appears also that the fruit was served upon another table than that for the preceding part of the entertainment. From thence comes the expression of Virgil, *mensæ grata secundæ dona*, to express the dessert, raw fruits, or sweetmeats, tarts, and other things of the like nature, which are called by a common name, *dulciaria*, or *bel-laria*.

In the happy times of the Commonwealth, the meals, though plain, were dressed well, but without any studied delicacy. The gaiety and liberty that prevailed at them, with the pleasantry and solidity of the conversation, were their principal seasoning. Cato the Censor, entirely austere as he was in other respects, laughed at himself, and renounced his serious character at table. He was not an enemy to mirth. He drank freely and often, but always moderately ; and he says himself, that he loved little cups : *Me delectant pocula,*

(*a*) Alias pretiosas aves scindit, & per pectus & clunes ruditam manum, in frustra excutit. *Senec.*  
certis ductibus circumferens e-



Cic. de se-*sicut in symposio Xenophontis, minuta & rorantia.*  
 nest. n. 46.

Plut. in  
 Cai. 251. When he was at his country-house, he every day invited some of his friends in the neighbourhood, and he passed his time merrily with them, making a very kind and agreeable companion, not only to those of his own age, but to young persons; for he not only had a great experience of the world, but had seen himself, and heard from others, an infinity of curious things, which were very pleasing in conversation. He was convinced that the table was one of the most proper means for giving birth to, and cultivating friendship. At his table the most usual topicks were the praises of the good and brave citizens, but not a word was ever said of the bad, and such as wanted merit. Cato would not suffer the latter to be spoke of at his table either favourably or otherwise, and he was attentive and happy in averting the occasion of it. (a) It was the pleasure of the conversation that made the repasts, which were very long, agreeable to him; and he was obliged, he said to old age, that, by lessening his occasion for eating and drinking, had as a reward increased his

Cic. de se-*taste for, and the pleasure he took in, conversa-*  
 nec. n. 43. *tion.* He makes a very sensible remark upon the difference of the name which the Greeks and Romans give meals. The first call it *συνπόσιον*, *convivatio*, which signifies *an assembly of persons to drink and eat together*; (b) by which they seem to give the preference in repasts to that which constitutes their least merit. With the Romans the re-

(a) Ego propter sermonis delectationem tempestivis quoque conviviiis delector, nec cum æqualibus solum, (qui pauci admodum restant) sed cum vestra etiam ætate atque vobiscum: habeoque senectuti

magnam gratiam, quæ mihi sermonis aviditatem auxit, portionis & cibi sustulit. Cic. de Senect. 46.

(b) Ut quod in eo genere minimum est, id maxime probare videantur.

past is called *convivium*, an assembly of persons who *live together*, that is, who converse with, entertain, and keep up discourses equally sprightly and agreeable with each other: for that is properly *to live*. Accordingly Cato said, (*a*) that what pleased him most at table was not the good cheer, but the company and conversation of his Friends. Are there many tables amongst us, where people live together in this manner? We do not seem to pique ourselves much upon being at any great expence of wit.

The luxury of Asia, when it was subjected, was soon brought to Rome, and infected the tables as well as every thing else. They (*b*) were usually accompanied with buffoons, comedians, players upon musical instruments, and women-dancers. The dishes were dressed with more art and expence. At that time, says Livy, a cook on whom the ancients set little value, and made little use of, became a man of consequence; and what had till then been a mean and contemptible office, was considered as an important art and employment. The evil perpetually increased, and rose to an excess that seemed scarce credible. The suppers of Lucullus are known to all the world. Their (*c*) taste became so perverted as to esteem

(*a*) Neque ipsorum conviviorum delectationem voluptatibus magis, quàm cœtu amicorum & sermonibus metiebar.

(*b*) Tum psaltriæ, sambucistriæque, & convivalia ludionum oblectamenta addita epulis: epulæ quoque ipsæ & curæ & sumptu majore apparari cæptæ. Tum coquus, vilissimum antiquis mancipium & æstimatione & usu, in pretio esse; & quod ministerium fu-

erat, ars haberi cæpta. *Liv.* xxxix. 6.

(*c*) Appositas dapes non sapore, sed sumptu æstimabant. *Pacat. in Panegy. Theod.*

O miserabiles, quorum palatum nisi ad pretiosos cibos non excitatur! pretiosos autem non eximius sapor, aut aliqua faucium dulcedo, sed raritas & difficultas parandi facit. *Senec. de consol. ad Hel. ix.*

the

the dishes served up at a feast only for their rarity and the enormous prices paid for them, not for their goodness and real qualities. One man alone is sometimes sufficient to spoil an whole nation ; as has been said of the famous Apicius, (*a*) who setting up for a master in the science of good eating, was so successful in his way as to corrupt the whole age he lived in.

Seneca, in his description of this Apicius, gives us the image of a sensual and voluptuous man, who greedily receives, and tastes pleasure in large draughts with all his senses. (*b*) Behold, says he, an Apicius, propped on his pillow filled with roses, contemplating the magnificence of his table, gratifying his ear with the most melodious concerts, his eyes with the most charming sights, his smell with the most exquisite perfumes, and his taste with the most delicious food.

At different times, many wise regulations were made, to put a stop to the excessive expence of the table. The first appeared in the 571st year of Rome, in the Consulship of Q. Fabius and M. Claudius, and was called *Lex Orchia*. But luxury stronger than the laws, broke through all the barriers which pains had been taken to lay in its way at different times, and continued almost always victorious and triumphant. Tacitus tells us, that the luxury of the table, which had been carried to excess for above an hundred years, declined very much under Vespasian ; and amongst

(*a*) Apicius, scientiam propinæ professus, disciplina sua seculum infecit. *Senec. ib. x.*

(*b*) Vide hos eisdem (Nomentanum & Apicium) è suggestu rosæ spectantes popinam suam, aures vocum sono, spectaculis oculos, saporibus pala-

tum suum delectantes. Molibus lenibusque fomentis totum laceffitur corpus, & ne nares interim cessent, odoribus variis inficitur locus ipse, in quo luxuriæ parentatur. *De vit. beat. xi.*

many



many other reasons of that change, he gives us one which does that Emperor much honour. As (a) Vespasian, says that author, observed at his table, and in his whole manner of living, the ancient simplicity of the Romans, many, to please the Prince, emulated each other in imitating him. Thus his example, more powerful than all laws and penalties, in a short time succeeded in reforming the publick disorders. The effect will be the same in all States. When he who dispenses all rewards declares for virtue and honour; hope, protection, and the example of the Prince, have an infinite force upon the minds of the subjects, and are capable of abolishing, or at least of making the most confirmed vices disappear.

I return to some circumstances relating to repasts, of which I have deferred speaking till now. The table, in the early times, was uncovered, and as one course was removed, care was taken to wipe it, and keep it very clean. It was afterwards covered with a cloth, which was called *mantile*. But what seems surprizing, it was not the custom, till long after the Augustan age, to supply the guests with napkins, *mappas*: they used to bring them from home. Catullus complains of one Asinius, who had carried away his, and threatens him with exposing him in verse, if he does not immediately send it back again.

*Marrucini Asini, manu sinistra  
Non belle uteris in joco atque in vino.  
Tollis lintea negligentiorum—*

(a) Præcipuus astricti moris & æmulandi ardor, validior auctor Vespasianus fuit, antiquo ipse cultu victuque. Obsequium inde in principem, quam poena ex legibus & metus. *Tacit. Annal. iii. 55.*

*Quare*

*Quare aut Hendecasyllabos trecentos  
Expecta, aut mihi linteum remitte.*

Martial says almost the same thing of one Hermogenes.

*Attulerat mappam nemo, num furta timentur.  
Mantile è mensa sustulit Hermogenes.*

I shall not say much of a custom, common enough amongst the ancients, but very low and nasty, of making themselves vomit in order to create a new appetite, and to enable them to eat at new expences, as if they had not yet began to do so. For this purpose they drank a light nauseous wine, which did not fail to produce the desired effect. What a shame was this! “They  
“ (a) vomit, says Seneca, to eat, and they eat to  
“ vomit; and do not give themselves time to  
“ digest the meats brought at great prices from  
“ the extremities of the world.”

Neither shall I say more of the variety and excellence of the wines used by the Romans at their tables. Horace praises them in more than one place. He was voluptuous enough, and had a sufficiently good taste, to deserve to be believed on his word.

Plin. xiv. 4. The custom of keeping wines for a great length of time is known to all the world. Pliny cites an amazing example of this. Wine had been kept to the age in which he lived, that had been made in the Consulship of L. Opimius, and consequently near two hundred years.

(a) Vomunt ut edant, edant coquere dignantur. *Senec. de  
ut vomant, & epulas, quas to- consol. ad Helv. ix.  
to orbe conquirunt, nec con-*

I shall

I shall conclude this digression with a difficulty, that has always been not easily conceivable, and matter of doubt. Our habit of sitting at table makes it hard for us to comprehend, that the Roman manner of lying on beds to eat could be as commodious. It must however have been so, as the Romans, after having long followed the custom of sitting to eat, quitted it at last to adopt the other, which they observed ever after; so that with them it was a sign of grief and mourning to eat sitting. Plutarch relates, that Cato never ate except sitting, after the breaking out of the war between Cæsar and Pompey. The exact time when this change began is not known: but it is very probable, that it was a consequence of the commerce of the Romans with the people of Asia. Every body knows, when those people were subjected by the Roman arms, that they communicated to the conquerors their taste of luxury and voluptuousness, and their attention in cultivating every thing that conduced to the ease and convenience of life. Let us now see in what manner they ate, drank, and conversed with the guests in this situation, which seems very incommodious.

I have already said, that there was usually three persons upon a bed. This bed was a little lower than the table. The upper part of the body was a little raised up and supported by bolsters, and the lower extended along upon the bed behind the back of him who lay next. Leaning upon the left elbow, they used the right-hand, which was at liberty, for eating and drinking. Thus the head of the second was opposite to the breast of the first, and if he desired to speak with him, especially when the thing was to be secret, he was obliged to lean upon his breast, including under that name from the bottom of the face to the waist. What has been said here, may serve to



explain the situation of St. John in the \* Lord's Supper in respect to JESUS CHRIST, and in what manner the woman could pour her perfumes upon the feet of our Saviour. It is very probable that in conversation, when it was long, which usually happened, he who spoke, in order to be heard by the guests, kept himself sitting almost upright with his back supported by bolsters. I leave it to the reader to judge whether that posture was very commodious.

\* *The painting of the Lord's Supper by Poussin, of which there are many copies, and prints in great abundance, very well represents the disposition of the beds and guests, and the particular situation of St. John.*

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